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Summary  
The focus of my doctoral research is to account for the emergence and continued existence of 
a plural policing landscape in Plateau State, Nigeria. Plateau State, the spatial context of my 
doctoral project is an administrative unit of Nigeria’s federal structure. The research seeks to 
trace and shows an otherwise little known link between the plural policing landscape of 
colonial Nigeria and the evolution of a new plurality of policing, that began to emerge in the 
first decade after independence and has continued to evolve in response to changing political 
and social contexts. To do this, the research seeks to answer three main questions: First, who 
are the groups that have constituted and still constitute the main actors in a plural policing 
landscape? In other words, what are their origins; how have they been structured and 
internally organised? The second question is to understand how these groups encounter the 
Nigerian state. The research is interested in examining the dynamics that characterize 
relationships and interactions within a space of plural policing. The third key question of this 
doctoral research is focused on understanding the effects and impacts of non-state policing, as 
a phenomenon what does it create? How have these groups responded to changing political 
and social context? 
 
To conduct this research I have largely deployed historical methodology, embedded in 
qualitative methods. This is to specifically account for the origins and changing forms of 
plural policing, but also to examine its contemporary manifestations, selected ethnographic 
methods have been deployed to complement the historical methods of data collection. I rely 
on primary and secondary data. The historical and contemporary salience of the phenomenon 
of plural policing led me to adopt a multi-disciplinary approach that draws from history, 
sociology, anthropology and political science. The conceptual framework is constructed based 
on how the concepts of the state, vigilantism, authority and plurality of security institutions 
are understood and situated within the research context. The concepts I engage with are in two 
categories, the first category are concepts that provide the empirical context of the thesis (state 
and vigilantism), and the second category provides us with the basis for understanding the 
relational dynamics (plurality and authority) of the empirical context. My analytical 
framework seeks to accommodate useful ideas from the different disciplines that contribute to 
our understanding of the historical role of state and non-state actors in plural policing. In this 
thesis, I have made four major arguments. 
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The first main argument is that current forms of institutionalised plural policing in Plateau 
State, Nigeria can be traced back along a historical trajectory to the institutionalisation of 
paramouncy in the chieftaincy institutions of the Plateau province from the early 1940s to the 
late 1950s. The dismantling of the former Native Authority Police in the late 1960s, the 
Nigerian government’s policy in the mid-1970s to reform local government, and the attempt 
by traditional rulers to re-assert some semblance of influence and authority. The major link in 
this process of institutionalising plural policing is the institution of traditional rulership. The 
processes of negotiating change revolved around the traditional rulers. Furthermore, I 
demonstrate how the Nigerian state was involved in the formation of vigilante groups in the 
1980s; the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) influenced this. Furthermore, following 
on this argument I have tried to show that even though having evolved on different 
trajectories the macro processes analysed speaks to the need to reform Nigeria’s current 
policing structures.  
 
Secondly, I have argued that the current plural policing landscape in Plateau State Nigeria is a 
product of different influences over the historical trajectory. The earliest and most profound 
influence on policing has been the influence of the military. This process of socialisation has 
been midwifed by Nigeria’s war history (1st and 2nd World War, and the Nigerian Civil War). 
Socialisation was based on army ideals and practice because most recruits in the first instance 
were soldiers. After several decades of military rule, the police themselves had not come out 
unscathed. In sum, the Nigerian military had largely played an instrumental role in the 
socialisation of institutions, groups, and individuals who make claim to providing policing 
services and the maintenance of law and order. Also important in these institutional 
trajectories of policing are influences drawn from the immediate socio-political landscape, 
cultural templates of law and justice, and the interventionist state sponsored socialisation, as 
manifest by the influences of the colonial and post-colonial state police. What emerges from 
this argument and analysis of socialisation is that what we are currently witnessing may be an 
advanced stage of institutionalised plural policing but it is not yet definitively formed. The 
process is yet still unfolding before our very eyes for example the recent active involvement 
of vigilante groups and hunter associations in the fight against insurgency in northeast 
Nigeria, has created new dynamics of socialisation, institutionalisation and legitimation of 
plural policing.  
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Following from the two previous arguments where I have showed how the institution of 
policing in Nigeria has gone through different periods and experienced different processes. 
From the composition, structures and ultimately practice have not remained static. My third 
argument is to suggest that while understanding these processes at the macro level is 
important, the picture is however only complete when we extend the analysis to the micro 
narrative. Therefore, I have examined the transformation of plural policing by focusing on 
micro narratives. I have tracked and analysed everyday policing practice from the lens of the 
NAPF and vigilante groups. On one hand, this means understanding the practice of the NAPF 
and vigilante groups as it relates to plural policing during British colonial rule, when the 
NAPF were active and the period from the late 1970s to the 1990s, which tracks the 
emergence and acceptance of vigilante groups as part of the policing landscape. On the other 
hand, this micro narrative focus has equally offered insight into the relationship between the 
NAPF / vigilante groups and the Nigerian Police Force, again this has been historicised from 
the lens of the NAPF and the vigilante groups. Using profiles of NAPF men and vigilante 
group members we are able to weave together an intimate history of plural policing. This is in 
contrast to some existing literature, thus, it is in such ventures that this thesis makes effort of 
departure from existing literature. If there is a core thrust of this perspective, it is the 
argument that macro analysis of policing while important in presenting and understanding 
grand trends ultimately provides a partial and insufficient analysis of what transpired. As part 
of this micro focus, I also engage with the use of violence as policing practice. This refers to 
the everyday use of violence by the NAPF, and by the vigilante groups that succeeded the 
NAPF. I argue that there is domestication, legitimisation, and an institutionalisation of 
violence; there is a societal acceptance tacit and complacent of the use of violence as part of 
policing practice. It is in such context that I have analysed and understood state and non-state 
policing violence.  
 
The last major argument of this thesis is drawn from an analysis of the latest stage of plural 
policing. I argue that the latest and current feature of this plurality is characterised by the 
activities of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN), a semi-official citizens policing 
organisation registered in 1999 with Nigeria’s Corporate Affairs Commission. The objectives 
of the VGN as is clearly spelt out in the organisation’s constitution is to support state agencies 
(particularly the Nigerian police) in combating crime and general maintenance of law and 
order in society. Therefore, plurality in this context refers to a policing landscape that actually 
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bridges the state and non-state divide. Furthermore, I argue that an example such as the VGN 
questions the formulation of vigilant practice as something, which solely confronts and 
contest the writ of the state. My thesis seeks to show that in studying current policing practice 
we have to take into account the role of non-state actors, not always as a spontaneous 
communitarian response to a weak or absent state but rather as an extension of the state. 
Plural policing as historically evolved and currently practiced in this part of Nigeria is about 
statecraft from below. What has emerged from this study reveals that the vigilante groups that 
emerged from the historical process of institutionalisation of plural policing actually support 
the state and its agencies. Therefore, while the Bakassi Boys, the OPC and the Hisbah were 
emerging on to the scene the VGN was being registered, consequently the structures, 
organisation, and practices of vigilantism were being further transformed with the active 
approval and involvement of the state. In sum, the study contributes in a very innovative way 
to the debates on state building in Africa, debates on vigilante practice, and policing. 
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
1.1.	How	I	Came	To	Study	Plural	Policing	
The decade from 2001 to 2010 was violent for the people of Jos, and Plateau State Nigeria.1 
In January 2010, I was six months in to my return from 18 months MA Fellowship at King’s 
College London and was considering topics and themes for Doctoral studies. It was at this 
point that another wave of violence broke out in Jos, and quickly spread out to rural areas of 
Jos North and Jos South local governments.2 At the time, I was resident in the University of 
Jos, Senior Staff Quarters, Bauchi Road. Some interesting dynamics are relevant to recount. 
In close proximity to the staff quarters on Bauchi road is a predominantly Hausa, Muslim 
quarter of this part of the city. The residents of the staff quarters on the other hand are 
predominantly Christian. This religious dynamic created tension between the residents of the 
quarters and their Jasawa3 neighbours. It is within this setting that tension was heightened 
within the neighbourhood by another wave of violence in early 2010. The residents of the 
staff quarters, mostly university academics realised that they had to introduce security 
initiatives and take immediate measures to secure the quarters. It had become too precarious 
not to organise. A security committee was promptly set up, and sub-committees were 
established on every block within the quarters. This was how I got involved. I was part of a 
patrol sub-committee in my immediate neighbourhood. Every night at approximately 21.00-
22.00 until 05.00 or 06.00 we took turns in groups of four to patrol the neighbourhood. We 
particularly had two core concerns. Firstly, to secure the quarters and raise an alarm if there 
was an attack from our Jasawa neighbours. Secondly, and perhaps more critical for us, was 
restraining our own younger residents from initiating an attack on the Jasawa community. We 
did this on an ad hoc basis for two weeks. We were relieved by a detachment of the Nigerian 
air force, deployed to secure the university quarters. The air force detachment remained with 
us for several months until relative peace had returned to Jos and its environs.  
                                                            
1  There  have  been  detailed  studies  of  the  Jos  crisis  for  example  see  U.H.D  Danfulani  and  S.U.  Fwatshak, 
“Briefing: The September 2001 Events  in Jos, Nigeria” African Affairs (London RAS) (2002): 101. Adam Higazi, 
“The Politics of Urban Violence  in  Jos, Nigeria,  from Colonial  rule  to  the 2007 elections”, Politique Africaine, 
No.106,  (2007):  69‐91.  Adam Higazi,  The  Jos  Crisis:  A  Recurrent Nigerian  Tragedy,  Friedrich  Ebert  Stiftung, 
Discussion Paper No.2,  January 2011. Phil Ostien,  Jonah Jang and the  Jasawa: Ethno‐Religious Conflict  in  Jos, 
Nigeria,  Muslim  Christian  Relations  in  Africa,  2009,  www.sharia‐in‐
Africa.net/pages/publications.php.August2009.and Mustapha, Abdul‐Raufu; Higazi, Adam; Lar, Jimam; Chromy, 
Karel, “Jos: A Decade of Fear and Violence in Central Nigeria” and “Jos: Top‐Down and Bottom‐Up Approaches 
to Conflict Resolution” in, Mustapha, A.R. and Ehrhardt, D. (Eds) Creed and Grievance: Muslims, Christians and 
Society in Northern Nigeria (James Currey, Boydell and Brewer Ltd, forthcoming May, 2016) 
2 Higazi, The Jos Crisis: 20‐30. 
3 The Hausa Muslims of Jos refer to themselves as Jasawa ‐ Hausawan Jos (Hausas of Jos). 
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Furthermore, one could take a cynical reading of the state and its agencies by questioning the 
intentions of the deployment of the Nigerian air force to secure the university quarters. This 
would be to draw a sceptical point on whether the deployment was for protecting the citizens 
residing in the quarters or rather meant to secure state property, or perhaps even both. If the 
intention were to protect citizens then it would be logical to inquire why the state fails to 
extend such to all citizens. In other words by virtue of residing in the quarters of the 
university, we assumed a status of privilege above other citizens of Jos. While there may be 
security agents stationed in different quarters of Jos in times of such mayhem, government 
residencies like the university of Jos quarters are prioritised. 
 
My experience during this time got me curious and therefore I decided to check around other 
neighbourhoods in Jos. I tried to find out how those who did not have the privilege we had of 
the air force or other security agencies being deployed to secure their neighbourhoods coped 
with the situation. How did other residents of Jos organise their security? I quickly found out 
that citizens across the city had various arrangements in place not just for security during 
episodes of collective violence but even for everyday regular policing. In the Hausa quarter of 
Gangare, I was told of the existence of community vigilantes over a long time span who were 
organising as community defence groups following the recurring episodes of violence in the 
city. The ward head of Chwelyap (Congo Russia), in the Nassarawa quarters of the city, 
talked of the commitment of the youth in the area in defending the people and property during 
periods of violence, but also patrolling the area after the violence. In Kabong and Tudun 
Wada, I found similar accounts of community vigilantism. These were community initiatives 
driven by local leaders and youth associations in response to collective violence, but built on 
already existing forms of citizen policing. What I realised was that there were citizen policing 
group operating side by side with the state police with the objective of maintaining law and 
order in the city. 
 
The notion of contemporary plurality is however twofold: On one hand is the form of plurality 
just described in the preceding sentences. For lack of a better formulation, I refer here to state 
and non-state policing actors constituting the policing landscape across the state. The other 
plurality is the plurality within the Nigerian state, though the focus of this thesis is on the 
former, an example of what is meant by plurality within the state is instructive. Presently in 
Nigeria, other state agencies are carrying out daily policing duties side by side with the 
Nigeria police. On occasion, it is not clear to citizens which security agency is in charge of 
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which function. This creates confusion amongst citizens in regards to the mandate of such 
agencies in relation to the Nigerian Police Force (NPF). An example of this is the 
establishment of state security agencies like the Nigerian Security and Civil Defence Corps 
(NSCDC). Initially established as a voluntary organisation during the Nigerian civil war, the 
NSCDC gradually increased in its membership and following its spread across the federation, 
underwent organisational restructuring in the early 1980s transforming the corps into a 
national voluntary security outfit. In 2003, the Nigerian government passed a law that gave 
the NSCDC statutory status as a federal government para-military institution. It was an 
attempt to come to grips with these varied levels and forms of plurality that provided the 
motivation for this thesis. 
 
Now back to my opening story. At the time, I considered the question as to how one should 
interpret the initiative of university staff, whose job is teaching and research and yet 
compelled by circumstances to organise to secure their residence. The fact that we did this for 
two weeks could suggest that this represents the failure of the state through its security 
agencies to protect citizens and secure government property in times of such collective 
violence. The scenario we found ourselves in was by no means unique to us, as I found out 
other citizens were engaged in such practice for much longer periods. Citizen policing had 
become part of policing practice. The scenario could be framed in another perspective. 
Interestingly, one could also argue that it was not the deployment of the air force that brought 
the state back into the picture; rather, even when the residents of the staff quarters were 
organising their security committees the state was already actively involved, but in a different 
mode. Here I refer to the security department of the University of Jos. The Chief Security 
officer of the University of Jos was actively supervising our efforts and providing advice. It 
would therefore be incomplete to render our efforts as purely citizens organising on their own 
to secure their residence. The state through its agency, in this case, the university authority 
was still part of our initiative. Likewise, the communities around the city of Jos that I gave as 
examples of citizen policing arrangements equally had the involvement of the police in some 
capacity. Often, such arrangements are framed as community policing initiatives. There are 
examples of these groups that seek permission and the mandate to practise from the police. 
They also actively cooperate with the police and support everyday policing practice. 
 
Concisely what this whole account reveals is that there are varied policing actors apart from 
the Nigerian Police Force - and in times of collective violence, the Nigerian military - across 
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the landscape of Plateau State. While state institutions still remain the primary statutory 
bodies responsible for policing and the maintenance of law and order, over the years a 
plethora of groups have emerged and have made claims to providing policing services, and 
maintaining law and order. These groups as I have argued throughout this thesis are 
constitutive of Nigeria’s policing landscape. This then is the starting point of my inquiry. 
Within this frame, this thesis is intended as a contribution to the study of how institutions, 
agency and processes of plural policing have been constituted and reconfigured. 
 
The study is intended as a contribution to three existing bodies of literature. First, it 
contributes to the literature on the study of the Nigerian state through an understanding of 
state practice, and how this has contributed to the transformation of plural policing in Nigeria. 
In this sense, it is an institutional history of plural policing. Secondly, the study sheds light on 
the practice of policing in Nigeria, from a historical perspective. This perspective is emic, and 
from below. The focus of the thesis is therefore not solely on institutions and structures; it is 
also about understanding the role of actors, and their lived experiences (forms of mobilisation, 
motivations, rationale and function) within a plural policing landscape. Thirdly, the study is 
also a study of processes. The usage of the category of process in this thesis is twofold: a 
historical approach, to help us understand processual encounters and ruptures and how this 
reconstitutes and reconfigures the historical trajectory. How events at a given time configure 
possibilities and constraints on what will occur subsequently. I have also used process to 
understand the socio-political trajectory of institutionalisation, and socialisation of plural 
policing. In sum, this refers to the process of state building. Process therefore carries a dual 
category. It denotes historical change, while also drawing on the change of institutional 
structures. 
 
1.2.	Research	Questions	
The research seeks to trace and show an otherwise little known link between the plural 
policing landscape of colonial Nigeria and the evolution of a new plurality of policing in 
contemporary Nigeria. This began in the first decade after independence in 1960, and has 
continued to evolve in response to changing political and social contexts. My thesis seeks to 
show that in studying current policing practice we have to take into account the role of non-
state actors, not always as a spontaneous communitarian response to a weak or absent state 
but rather as an extension of the state. Plural policing as historically evolved and currently 
practiced in this part of Nigeria is about statecraft from below. The thesis historicises varied 
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themes; I am interested in how non-state policing actors have been and are currently 
socialised and the formulation of a certain form of ‘vigilante identity’, vis-à-vis other 
important forms of social group belonging, for instance ethnic, religious, and generational 
identity. Vigilante groups operate based on different legal codes, some statutory, others 
influenced by the historical experience of practice carried on from one generation to another. 
Taking the forgone background, the overarching objective of this thesis is to account for the 
origins and transformation of plural policing from the perspectives of the policing actors on 
the ground.  
 
Therefore, the main research question is to account for how the contemporary plural policing 
landscape of Plateau State, Nigeria was historically constituted. To do this, the research seeks 
to answer four main questions:  
 
First, who are the groups that have constituted and still constitute the main actors in a plural 
policing landscape? To what extent is it possible to provide a profile of plural policing actors? 
How have they been structured and internally organised?  
 
Secondly, what is the role of plural policing actors? How have they functioned in the different 
historical epochs studied in the thesis? How have they responded to changing political and 
social contexts?  
 
The third question is to understand how these groups encounter the Nigerian state. The state 
as conceptualised in the thesis4 refers to the Nigerian government at national, state and local 
government levels. The research examines the dynamics that characterize relationships and 
interactions within a space of plural policing.  
 
The fourth key question of this doctoral research is to understand the effects and implications 
of plural policing. As a phenomenon, what does it create?  
1.3.	Scope	and	Periodization	
To conduct this study I selected some specific local government areas. The study is not 
attempting a systematic coverage of the whole Plateau State; I have rather selected particular 
local government areas for understanding change with regard to socialisation, plurality, 
authority, and institutionalisation in policing. The local government areas studied are 
                                                            
4 For more on this please see conceptual framework. 
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Langtang North, Shendam, Pankshin and Jos North. What should be of note here is the fact 
that during the late 1970s through to the 1980s when vigilante practice had begun with the 
active involvement of traditional rulers, the same area of Plateau State had fewer local 
governments with wider coverages; therefore, the particular local government areas studied 
here had a wider administrative area of coverage then. Jos North was created in 1991 out of 
the former Jos Local Government Area (LGA), which prior to that comprised the current Jos 
North, Jos South and Jos East LGAs. Pankshin formerly comprised the present Pankshin and 
Kanke LGAs, and the former Langtang LGA comprised of present day Langtang North and 
Langtang South LGAs. The former Shendam LGA constituted the current Shendam, Qua’an 
Pan, and Mikang LGAs. Therefore, for instance in my discussion of traditional rulers, leading 
the mobilisation for vigilantism in the 1980s – when reference is made to traditional rulers 
like the Ngolong Ngas, Ponzhi Tarok, and Long Goamai mobilising their communities 
following directives from the federal and state governments, the area of jurisdiction they 
presided over included a wider area of coverage.  
 
In regards to the scope of my study, another important factor to mention is that my research 
design is equally about the varied manifestations of vigilante policing across urban and rural 
settings. Thus, there is a comparative consideration of insights from the urban city of Jos, the 
semi-urban locations like Pankshin, Langtang and Shendam, and rural areas like Dadur, Pil-
Gani, and Shimankar. I have selected vigilante groups from the city of Jos and other 
communities in Plateau State to compare. These selected cases collectively constitute a case 
study and provide insight on the impact of socialisation, institutionalisation, and violence on 
plural policing. The reference here to violence refers to the several outbreaks of sectarian 
violence in Jos, the state capital, and other parts of the state in the decade since September 
2001.  
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Figure 1: Map Nigeria’s Plateau State (1976-1996) Local Government Areas. 
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Writing on the periodisation of African history, Ivan Hrbek notes “that historical periodisation 
is one of the means by which the historian can see historical development not only as a 
chronologically arranged succession of events and facts, but as a phenomenon with its own 
inner laws, with different stages, that can be interpreted in causal terms and that offers itself to 
a synthesis.”5 These principles, as Hrbek further explains, depend on the historian’s approach 
to his subject matter. In this thesis, my approach to plural policing is informed by turning 
points, but also by continuities. With regard to the concentration in the thesis on the period 
from post-World War II, colonial Nigeria to the present is informed by the fact that the mid 
1940s were critical as the period when the returning war veteran “natives” of what was then 
Plateau Province were recruited in large numbers into the NAPF. The policy was to constitute 
a trend in the 1950s.  
The study is periodised into three historical epochs. The institutionalisation of paramountcy6 
as a new feature of the chieftaincy in the former Plateau Province from the early 1940s to the 
late 1950s and the manner in which the Native Authority Police became the fulcrum of local 
administration constitutes the first period of plural policing. The dismantling of the former 
Native Authority Police in the late 1960s; the Nigerian government’s policy in the mid-1970s 
to reform local government, and the attempt by traditional rulers to re-assert some semblance 
of influence and authority. This was followed by the Nigerian government’s introduction of 
vigilante policing, packaged as community policing initiatives in the wake of austerity 
occasioned by the Structural Adjustment Programme in the mid-1980s. This constitutes the 
second span of plural policing. The third and final era of plural policing considered in this 
work is that which we are currently witnessing and commenced in 1999. This hinged on 
Nigeria’s transition to civilian rule in May 1999 and the official registration of the Vigilante 
Group Nigeria (VGN). The post-1999 period focuses on a case study of the VGN.  
What is interesting to note here is that, at the beginning of my study, I had set out to define 
the era(s) to be studied according to Nigeria’s political history. It is of course an enduring 
practice of Nigerian historiography to structure study and research periods into pre-colonial, 
colonial, and post-colonial. Alternatively, studies are done according to centuries. The 17th, 
18th, 19th, and 20th century histories for instance are some of the styles of periodization one 
would find in history textbooks, but equally in researched monographs. In my case the 
                                                            
5   Ivan Hrbek, “Towards a Periodisation of African History,” in T.O. Ranger (Ed), Emerging Themes of African 
History, (East African Publishing House, 1974), 37‐38. 
6 This refers to the socio‐political transformation of chieftaincy institutions from clan stool to chieftaincy 
institutions presiding over ethnic groups. It represented the political institutionalisation of the ethnic category. 
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moment I delved deep into the field work particularly the data I recovered from oral histories, 
it became very clear that a political periodization of Nigerian history that would attempt to 
define the 20th century by two sub-periods:7 the colonial and the post-colonial epochs, would 
not capture the historical evidence gained from my research. If we are to designate the three 
aforementioned eras in terms of the history of plural policing, I would designate the first 
epoch as the time of establishing plural policing, the second would represent a period where a 
new era is emerging but with strong vestiges of the outgone one. When examined this would 
constitute its own epoch. The final epoch, is that of renewal and crystallisation, where plural 
policing is seen to have been newly institutionalised. What emerges from all these 
periodization attempts has consequences for specific outcomes. What is important for the 
historian is not just examining temporal divides, what they mean and their implications. Of 
importance are also the trajectories across the periods and their complex outcomes. As stated 
earlier, a defining characteristic of these historical processes, relationships and outcomes is 
their ambivalence. Important processes of change can be seen because of attempts to 
overcome certain ambivalences, which, however, only led to a reproduction of these 
ambivalences – often in a different form but with the constitutive characteristics remaining in 
place. What seems to emerge here is a cyclical process of historical change.  
 
                                                            
7 This is a common structure to be found in dissertations and published monographs on Nigerian history. 
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Figure 2: The Federal Republic of Nigeria showing its thirty-six states and some major towns 
in core area of my current research in Plateau State.8 
1.4.	Plateau	State,	Historicising	Resistance	and	the	Minority	Politics	
Plateau Province, initially made up of Jos and Pankshin Divisions, was carved out of Bauchi 
and Muri Provinces in 1926. My study focuses on two main areas of the former Province. 
While the urban city of Jos, situated on the Jos Plateau, is critical for my study of urban plural 
policing, the main data for the study was drawn from the former Shendam Division of the 
Plateau Province. The Shendam Division during the colonial period was the land area situated 
on the right bank of the Benue River, south of the central Nigerian Plateau. It is the low-lying 
continuation of the lower Benue plains,9 formerly part of Wase District in Muri Province, it 
was formerly Lowland Division. As an administrative unit of Nigeria’s federal state structure, 
Benue-Plateau was created in 1967; Plateau State in 1976, Nasarawa state was carved out of 
Plateau in 1996. Jos was the administrative headquarters of Plateau Province and has been a 
state capital since the Nigeria regions were divided into states in 1967.  
                                                            
8 Map taken from: Adam Higazi and Jimam Lar, “Articulations of Belonging: The Politics of Ethnic and Religious 
Pluralism in Bauchi and Gombe States, North‐East Nigeria“. Africa 85, 1, (2015):103‐130. 
9 B.F. Bawa “Origin, Migrations and Early History of the Lowland Communities of Plateau State”, Aliyu A. Idrees 
and Yakubu A. Ochefu (eds), (Studies in the History of Central Nigeria Area, Lagos: CSS, 2002), 71‐72. 
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Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the intensity and virulence of the conflict within the 
Nigerian landscape has regularly punctuated attempts to engender democracy and the rule of 
law. Plateau State and particularly the capital Jos represent one of the most volatile of these 
violent theatres of conflict. Since September 2001, Jos and its environs have witnessed 
incessant episodes of sectarian violence. Jos is a city of about 1.6 million people in central 
Nigeria, and as earlier stated the capital of Plateau State. It is part of the middle belt, an 
ethnically diverse zone made mostly of minority ethnic groups, running across central 
Nigeria. In November 2008, there was renewed violence in Jos during local government 
elections in which at least 800 people were killed. The conflict was not resolved and more 
violence broke out in January 2010, the worst affected areas this time being in the rural areas 
on the edge of Jos.  
While my study is more focused on a history of policing institutions and the agency of 
policing actors, in order to understand the relational analysis that follows in subsequent 
chapters of this thesis it is important to grasp the historical relationship between the minority 
groups of Plateau State and the Hausa-Fulani emirates of northern Nigeria. I have referred to 
this throughout the thesis. The contemporary circle of violence in Jos, and Plateau State for 
example shows how mobilisation is along the fault lines religion and ethnicity and 
characterised by historical tension and mutual suspicion. While there is a history of trade and 
cordial relations, the predominant dynamic of the relationship between the Hausa-Fulani 
Emirates of Northern Nigeria and the non-Muslim communities of central Nigeria before the 
arrival of the British is characterised by denigration of the non-Muslim groups by the Hausa-
Fulani, this is reciprocated with distrust and suspicion. To understand this, there is need to 
briefly recapitulate the history of the relationship, and highlight some of the main factors that 
defined the representation of Hausa-Fulani in the consciousness of the peoples of the Plateau 
Province. Two key points will suffice; the wars and experiences occasioned by the extension 
of the Sokoto Jihad to the non-Muslim communities; and long standing derogatory references 
to these areas as a backwater used for the purposes of slave raiding. In the wake of the Sokoto 
Jihad, armies from Bauchi and the Zazzau (Zaria) emirates made concerted efforts to conquer 
the Plateau polities, while they did make substantial inroads and penetrated the area, they did 
not succeed in conquering the people.10 The impact of the Jihad on the Plateau in comparison 
to other parts of central Nigeria is considerably negligible. Mangvwat, relying on accounts by 
                                                            
10  Monday Mangvwat “Warfare on the Jos Plateau in the Nineteenth Century” in Warfare and Diplomacy in 
Precolonial Nigeria: Essays in Honor of Robert Smith, eds. Toyin Falola and Robin Law (African Studies Program: 
University of Wisconsin‐Madison, 1992), 112. 
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courtiers, and those written by colonial officers like C.G. Ames, asserts that: “…it is clear that 
during the reigns of both Yakubu and his successor Ibrahim, Bauchi fought wars with various 
groups on the Jos Plateau such as the Ngas of Dawaki, Amper, and Garram; the Yergam 
(Tarok); Montol (Tehl); Goemai; the Berom; and the Mwaghavul of Panyam.”11 Each of these 
groups fought the Jihad invaders separately, there were no particular alliances to deal with 
invaders and this made the conquest of the region difficult.12 Mangvwat has argued that the 
multiplicity of independent chiefdoms, each guarding its independence, was the crucial factor 
in the failure of the jihad on the Jos Plateau and the immediate environs rather than the 
allegedly difficult terrain, advanced largely in colonial records.13  
Throughout the 19th century, incessant slave raids continued from the emirates into the central 
Nigerian area, or Kasashen Bauchi14 as the Hausa referred to the area. In fact, in his 
introduction to the chapter, Adamu refers to the whole of the territory of the present Middle 
Belt of Nigeria “up to the valleys of the Niger and Benue…with the exception of Adamawa”, 
as being part of Bauchi. It must be pointed out that at no time in its history did Bauchi have 
suzerainty over the whole of the area in question, the exceptions being that parts of the region 
had come under its control after British conquest, and prior to British conquest areas like 
Wase emirate were off shoots of Bauchi, and the Sayawa area was administered from Bauchi. 
In his well sourced article15 on violence and the acquisition of slaves in the Bauchi Emirate in 
the 19th century, Yakubu recounts that the core communities which Bauchi raided for slaves 
included the Sayawa (Zar); Angas (Ngas); Ankwe (Goemai); Doma; Montol (Tehl); and 
Yergam (Tarok).16 However, Yakubu goes on to suggest that the absence of centralised 
political systems amongst these groups rendered them politically weak and thus “enabled their 
relatively easy subjugation by the more cohesive and disciplined emirate forces.”17  
 It must be clarified that Yakubu while relying on source material collected from libraries and 
archives of the Bauchi ruling aristocracy, did not get the accounts of those whose ancestors 
                                                            
11 Ibid., 112. 
12 Ibid., 114. 
13 Ibid., 114. 
14 See Mahdi Adamu, The Hausa Factor in West African History, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press, 1978) of 
particular significance for us is chapter two where Adamu discusses Hausa land and Kasashen Bauchi. In fact, in 
his introduction to the chapter Adamu refers to the whole of the territory of the present Middle Belt of Nigeria 
“up to the valleys of the Niger and Benue…with the exception of Adamawa”, as being part of Bauchi.  
15 See Yakubu, M.A., “Violence and the Acquisition of Slaves in the Bauchi Emirate, 1805‐1900”, in Warfare and 
Diplomacy  in Precolonial Nigeria: Essays  in Honor of Robert Smith, eds. Toyin Falola and Robin  Law  (African 
Studies Program: University of Wisconsin‐Madison, 1992), 145‐156.   
16 Ibid., 27. 
17 Ibid. 
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had been enslaved, for example while Yakubu argues that the political weakness of the non-
Muslim groups enabled their easy subjugation, accounts of these times from the Plateau 
groups refer more to slaving ambushes and Chiefs selling of criminal elements into slavery, 
rather than successful slaving raids defeating armies and carting away with slaves as Yakubu 
has suggested.18 In interviews conducted during my field research, I heard accounts that 
provide a differing analysis, as these are the same groups who successfully resisted the 
emirate forces during the Jihad. The success of the slave raiders is explained by the methods 
and practice of slave raiding, as earlier mentioned slaves were mostly not captured as part of 
war booty, rather individuals were seized and kidnapped, on occasion in their farms or on 
raids and attacks on small villages.19 When the commercial utility of slaving was established, 
captives from inter-ethnic battles amongst the Plateau people were sold as slaves to the 
emirates.20  
The British invading the Plateau communities by the early 20th century experienced the same 
resistance that Jihadist had encountered earlier, though with a different consequence, owing 
largely to superior weaponry. Interestingly, as I show in my thesis the British conquest further 
extend Hausa political, social and cultural influence into the Middle Belt area. Prior to British 
colonization, institutionalised Hausa influence in the Middle belt had been limited to a few 
emirates21, established following the Sokoto Jihad in the early 19th century, within the Middle 
Belt area. What Ochuno has termed “scattered systems” of emirate control that nominally 
oversaw some non-Muslim peoples while pragmatically ignoring others. Memories of these 
experiences are still alive across the present Plateau State. British colonisation introduced an 
administrative policy that placed non-Muslims under the control of emirates. This misreading 
of precolonial relations between the emirates (like Bauchi and Zaria) and the non-Muslim 
groups on the Plateau highlands, and the Jema’a area was continually resisted throughout the 
period of British colonisation. The culmination of this resistance was the rise in Middle Belt 
consciousness.22 This explains why even contemporary sectarian violence in Plateau State 
occasioned by identity politics, is easily associated within the consciousness of the hitherto 
non-Muslim groups with Hausa-Fulani hegemonic tendencies.  
                                                            
18 Ali Dakshang, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Dadur‐Langtang North, 04th.09.2012, Benjamin Voncir, interviewed 
by Jimam Lar, Langtang, 10.01.2015. 
19 Ali Dakshang, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Dadur – Langtang North, 04th.09.2012.  
20 Mangvwat, “Warfare on the Jos Plateau,” 114. 
21 Examples of such emirates in the Plateau Province were Wase and Kanam. 
22 For a detailed and sustained analysis of this resistance see Moses E. Ochuno, Colonialism By Proxy: Hausa 
Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University 
Press, 2014), 77‐85. 
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1.5.	The	Structure	
I have elaborated in the preceding sections on the research questions of this thesis, the scope 
and periodization of the study, and a brief background on the historical political context 
relevant as a basis to understanding my arguments and analysis on the history of plural 
policing in Plateau State Nigeria. The overall structure of the thesis is thematic. All the 
chapters are a discussion of the history of plural policing approached from different themes, 
there is a chapter on the government at the macro level and a chapter of the government at the 
micro level. A chapter that discusses socialisation and another chapter that focuses on the 
institutionalisation of plural policing, across the chapters I have discussed the relational 
dynamics of authority, violence and plurality. Following this introductory chapter, the thesis is 
divided into the following chapters:  
 
In the methodological chapter, I illustrate how the research was carried out, focusing on 
processes of data collection and analysis. With selected local government areas that 
collectively constituted my case study; I set out to collect accounts of the lived experience of 
all stakeholders of plural policing practice. I discuss my experience in the field narrating the 
main highlights and experiences from my interviews in Plateau and Kaduna states, Nigeria to 
my trip to the United Kingdom to meet and interview former colonial administrators and 
police officers. My trip to the United Kingdom also included a research visit to the British 
archives, and the Rhodes library archives at Oxford University. Additionally, I have also 
considered the benefits and challenges of interdisciplinarity. The methodological process as I 
was reminded while in the field is not always fun. I recount the challenging experience of 
conducting fieldwork within a conflict context, and reflect on how this affects the research 
process even in circumstances where the research focus is not on the conflict.  
 
In chapter three, I present the conceptual framework. The framework is based on two 
categories of concepts. First category are institutional concepts, I refer to the Nigerian state, 
the police and vigilante groups. The second category of concepts – plurality and authority 
provide the basis for understanding the relational dynamics. Relying on insights generated 
from my data, I situate my study within debates of state society relations, particularly in 
regards to policing practice showing points of convergence and divergence. The 
complementary dialectic between the existing literature reviewed and data generated from 
fieldwork creates the basis for my framework, and subsequently a historical and contemporary 
understanding of plural policing, as the basis of understanding state society relations emerges.  
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In chapter four, i argue that current forms of institutionalised plural policing in Plateau State, 
Nigeria have evolved from a direct historical trajectory to the institutionalisation of 
paramouncy in the chieftaincy institutions of the Plateau Province of Nigeria from the early 
1940s to the late 1950s. In this chapter, I argue that the major transformative agent responsible 
for the processual change and the institutionalising of plural policing is the institution of 
traditional rulership. The processes of negotiating change revolved around the traditional 
rulers. Furthermore, I show how the interface between the Nigerian state at the national and 
local level further midwifed this process. In the contingent epochs that I have studied state 
practice through the implementation of chiefly paramouncy, local government reforms and the 
implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) are connected to the 
configuration and reconfiguration of the policing landscape at the local level. In sum, I show 
how the contemporary plural policing landscape is a product of a socio-political historical 
process.  
 
Using the notion of socialisation, chapter five examines the influences that have driven the 
practice of plural policing in Plateau State Nigeria. I discuss the socialisation processes of 
specific policing institutions and groups examined in my research. The main objective of the 
chapter is to show the historical socialisation processes that have influenced plural policing 
practice as manifested in the practices of the NAPF, Yanbanga, and the Vigilante Group of 
Nigeria (VGN). I show how the trajectory of plural policing from the Native Authority Police 
Force (NAPF) to the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN), the alternative policing structures 
that have engaged in policing alongside the Nigerian Police Force (NPF) have been heavily 
influenced by the absorption of war veterans. Also important in these institutional trajectories 
of policing are influences drawn from the immediate socio-political landscape, cultural 
templates of law and justice, and the interventionist state sponsored socialisation, as manifest 
by the influences of the colonial and post-colonial state police. The main argument in this 
chapter is that the process of policing socialisation shows how vigilante practice mirrors 
society in all its facets and history. It is not just institutions that shape practice; we should also 
consider how agency is formed, by groups and individual actors.  
 
In chapter six, I examine the transformation of plural policing by focusing on local narratives. 
I show how vigilante groups are able to substantiate their legitimacy by gradually expanding 
their activities and imbibing new modes of policing practice. This micro narrative focus has 
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equally offered insight into the relationship between the NAPF / vigilante groups and the 
Nigerian Police Force. As part of this micro focus, the later parts of the chapter present a 
discussion of violence as policing practice. This refers to the everyday use of violence by the 
NAPF, and by the vigilante groups that succeeded the NAPF. There is domestication, 
legitimisation, and an institutionalisation of violence; there is a societal acceptance tacit and 
complacent of the use of violence as part of policing practice. It is in such context that I have 
analysed and understood state and non-state policing violence.  
 
Chapter seven continues the historical trajectory with a case study of contemporary 
vigilantism, in other words the contemporary case study is drawn from the historical process. 
I argue that this should be seen as the latest stage of a process of institutionalising plural 
policing. What emerges from this chapter reveals how the Vigilante Group of Nigeria presents 
us with a different logic of mobilisation in comparison with other vigilante groups we find in 
the literature on vigilantism in Nigeria. My main objective in this chapter is to show what this 
means for contemporary plural policing. I examine how the police and the VGN have 
interacted, through cooperation and negotiation. The VGN is an example of a vigilante group 
that has emerged from the historical process of institutionalising plural policing, and actively 
supports the state and its agencies.  
 
In the concluding chapter, I seek to pull together common threads from the preceding chapters 
outlined above. To do this, I engage in dialogues, and for the process of institutionalisation, I 
consider the interface between the government at the macro and micro level. In concluding on 
socialisation I return to the discussion of the analytical category of ambivalence in our 
understanding of plural policing practice, highlighting the importance of violence but also 
demonstrating how policing actors engaged in rendering a ‘proper policing service’ to their 
communities. What therefore emerges, shown across the thesis is a duality that is constitutive 
of policing practice. I refer to the relational notions of authority and plurality, recapturing the 
relationships between the Nigerian state, and plural policing actors. Finally, I consider the 
wider implications and conclusions that can be drawn from the study. This is categorised in 
the immediate context of policing in Nigeria, and policing on a broader wider perspective. 
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Chapter	Two:	Methodology	
2.1.	Introduction	
The main question of this thesis, as explained in the first chapter, is to account for the origins 
and the development of a plural policing landscape in Nigeria. It should be clearly stated that 
no single methodological approach was deployed in this research endeavour: rather, a toolkit 
of methods was used. A possible means “…of exploring the processuality of research in both 
the historical and the social sense would be to scrutinize the various research practices in their 
textbook sequence, from development of questions and hypothesis, through the various types 
and situations of data collection, to the evaluation and write up phase.”23 However, I have 
primarily deployed a historical approach embedded in qualitative methods. This is to 
specifically account for the origins and changing forms of plural policing. To examine the 
contemporary manifestations of plural policing, selected ethnographic methods are used to 
complement the historical methods of data collection. Equally, I have relied on primary data 
(interviews and archival documents) and secondary data. Following this introduction, I 
discuss the tools of data collection, and then reflect on my experience of field research and 
particularly on how the socio-political context has influenced my research. I will also consider 
and discuss the analytical tools I have deployed to interpret and understand the data. My 
analysis follows a historical perspective to understand trajectories of change and continuity. I 
have also used the extended case method, to understand the interface between macro and 
micro historical processes. Drawing from my field research experience I have also reflected 
on the dynamics of conducting research within a conflict context, even if as it was, in my case 
my research was not focused on the conflict. 
2.2.	Historical	Research	and	Multidisciplinarity		
Historical research over the decades has undergone some critical paradigm shifts. For my 
methodological approach, I am interested in three of these shifts, namely: History and the 
challenge of postmodernism; Historical research and its relationship to the social sciences; 
and the shift from a history of the rulers’ perspective to a history of the people (history from 
below).  
 
In his well-received book about history and the postmodernist approach, Richard Evans notes 
that postmodernism has compelled historians to re-consider questions of “how we study 
                                                            
23 Achim von Oppen , Bounding Villages: The enclosure of locality in Central Africa, 1890s to 1990s, (Habilitation 
Treatise, Humboldt University, Berlin, 2003), 57. 
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history, how we research and write about it and how we read it.”24 Furthermore, Evans argues 
that the core questions postmodernist scholars put forward, such as the claims for objective 
knowledge and the elusive and relative nature of historical “truth” have wider implications 
that go beyond the academic milieu. That also relates, according to Evans, to whether “society 
can ever attain the kind of objective certainty about the great issues of our time that can serve 
as a reliable basis for taking vital decisions for the future.”25 Therefore, it is important to 
attempt a brief commentary and offer a position, particularly how these debates relate to this 
research project. To start with, one has to be very clear that the postmodernist idea that 
historians are in the vocation of creating – and not finding, uncovering, and interpreting 
historical understanding – undermines the purpose of historical research and should be 
vehemently refuted. After all, one of the core requirements of historical research is the 
adoption of a critical and well-grounded approach towards source criticism; in this sense, the 
process of historical research already embraces some level of reflexivity. Historians are 
socialised to be cautious over how they use their evidence, and interpret it to give analytical 
value to it. In other words, the first and primary obligation is to establish for instance that an 
event did occur, then proceeding to analyse what it meant and the consequence. Nevertheless, 
the aim of this procedure remains the reconstruction of historical realities. Historical 
knowledge about facts is therefore both desirable and attainable. However, when we reflect on 
our data and in the process of analysing and understanding what it is telling us, critical 
insights may emerge. 
 
While I do not embrace the call of postmodernist to reconsider all historical facts as 
discourses, relative to different interpretations I have realised and thus argued in my thesis 
that we should accept contradictory realities as the outcomes of the historical trajectories 
studied. If there is a constant, theoretical thread that runs through this thesis it is the 
expression of ambivalence of events and processes. I would suggest that the quest for 
historical and contemporary reality in my study is not an either or scenario, the insight is to 
recognise and analyse realities that can be viewed in a contradictory way. 
 
Secondly, as I have realised from my own PhD experience, historical narratives are not free of 
interest and perspective; they often set out to provide a historical justification for political and 
                                                            
24 Evans, Richard. J Evans, In Defence of History, (London: Granta Books, 2000), 1. 
25 Ibid., 9.  
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social movements in the present.26 The writing of history or historiography27 illuminates two 
periods: the one it is written about, and the one it is written in.28 In other words, I have 
approached the study of the history of plural policing from a vantage point of the present. It is 
no surprise that in presenting my narrative, right from the opening page of the introduction I 
invite the reader to consider the current state of plural policing in Plateau State, Nigeria, 
before presenting the history. Fred Cooper asserts that trying to illuminate present issues is a 
fine motivation for exploring the past; however, as one looks backwards, there is a risk of 
anachronism: confusing the analytical categories of the present with the ‘native’ categories of 
the past.29 Of course, there is a risk of anachronism, particularly when we approach the past 
with the logics of the present, to render reliable and trustworthy history it is critical that we 
understand the historical past in its own context. This applies to social, political, and cultural 
context of the specific periods that are studied. 
 
Writing history with the motivation that such a study will provide understanding on the 
present period, which the researcher lives in also raises questions of positionality. Eminent 
Nigerian historian Yusufu Bala Usman shows the importance of this point. According to 
Usman, “…since the purpose of historical study is to grasp the historical process for the 
purpose of influencing it then the only correct conceptual framework, for any epoch is that 
which provides a basis for the practical determination of the direction of (agency) in that 
epoch…every view you have of the past has specific implications regarding what you should 
do now.”30 In other words, personal reflexivity is imperative for the process of history writing. 
Hence, Usman extrapolates the point further: “Once you are aware of your own historicity, 
then you will realize the historicity of the concepts that you use, and you do not sit down and 
accept them as if these have come down to you from heaven.”31 In other words, recognising 
one’s own biases, positions and subjectivities informed by one’s historical experience is a 
critical starting point. Furthermore, it is important to recognise our positionality in the process 
of fieldwork, interpreting data, and writing. One has to readily recognise assumptions that are 
                                                            
26 Evans, In Defence, 149. 
27 This also refers to the study of the writing of history. 
28 Melvin Bragg, In Our Time, BBC Radio 4, 30.03.2000. 
 
29 Fredrick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, and History, (Berkeley and Los Angeles: 
University of California Press, 2005), 18. 
30 Usman, Yusufu Bala “History, Tradition, and Reaction: The Perception of Nigerian History in the 19th and 20th 
Centuries”, in Beyond Fairy Tales: Selected Historical Writing of Yusufu Bala Usman (Zaria: Abdullahi Smith 
Centre for Historical Research,2006), 21‐22, also see  Mamdani, Mahmood,  Define and Rule: Native as Political 
Identity, (Cambridge, Massachusetts and London, England: Harvard University Press, 2012), 91‐92. 
31 Ibid., 92. 
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drawn due to the influence of socialisation and has to attempt to rigorously resist the 
temptation to let these assumptions direct our inquiry. Consequently, I am attempting here to 
study the history of policing beyond the received knowledge in scholarly work and in 
Nigerian society that only describe the police in negative and disparaging ways, or as tools of 
political domination. The processes of institutionalisation and socialisation described and 
analysed in my thesis documents a policing history that is diverse and varied. The historical 
insights in turn guide my approach to examining the contemporary policing landscape. Earlier 
assumptions, and perceptions informed by my socialisation are therefore overtaken by the 
information that emerges from the study. 
 
My second point in this section is a consideration of the scholarly shift in history from the 
perspective of elites to those of what has been called “the subalterns”, from “history from 
above” to “history from below”. In undertaking this study, I have been inspired by the 
historical scholarship that has focused its enquiry on the history of ordinary people. In 
recapitulating the intellectual history of modern historical writing Richard Evans notes that, 
“History…when it emerged during the professionalization process of the nineteenth century, 
was emphatically the political history of the nation-state and its relations with other nation-
states. The history of high politics and international diplomacy was king. History was made 
by great men.”32 Evans proceeds to rightly point out that, “…History has become too diverse 
for such arguments to stand any chance of damming the new currents in history… Such as 
social history, cultural history, microhistory,”33 one could add sports history, history of 
marriage, and of course history of policing. The specific twist in this thesis is, however, that 
policing has often been seen only in the context of “history from above” – as an emanation of 
state history – not from below, from the perspective of police officers themselves and of the 
ordinary population. Historians have displayed great ingenuity in maximally exploiting 
unwritten sources to successfully document the history of groups and societies that were 
considered in academic terms to be ‘preliterate’.34 Scholarship has thus been the beneficiary 
of this trend of studying history from different perspectives. It is in these traditions that I 
situate my work, so my thesis is a departure from history that only focused on those that 
‘mattered politically’. It was revealing to realise I was amongst a few researchers who had 
talked to former NAPF police officers.35 Some of them were very keen to recount their 
                                                            
32 Evans, In Defence of History, 161. 
33 Ibid., 163. 
34 Ibid., 164. 
35 Another exception is Prof. Kemi Rotimi one of Nigeria’s foremost historians of the police and policing. 
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experiences for the first time to a researcher. Thus my study is first and foremost an account 
of the history of policing from below, but also engages in understanding how politics at the 
top echelons impacts on everyday policing and vice versa. In looking back upon the history of 
ordinary people, Hobsbawm suggests, “we are not merely trying to give it a retrospective 
political significance which it did not always have, we are trying more generally to explore an 
unknown dimension of the past.”36 The objective is beyond understanding micro and macro 
trajectories as such, rather it is to analyse the interaction between the two.  
 
The third discussion in this section refers to the relationship between history and the social 
sciences. E.H. Carr writing in What is History notes that “…social scientists and historians are 
all engaged in different branches of the same study:-the study of man and his environment 
(social, political etc.) and of the effects of man on his environment and of his environment on 
man.”37 In other words the history of historiography is the history of encounters, encounters 
that have led to productive exchange between history and other disciplines.” Howell and 
Prevenier have asserted, “…the most important effect of these encounters has been, not on 
what is studied, but on how historians study it-in short, on what they think they can know and 
how they think they can know it.”38 In other words, historians in pursuance of their vocation 
study a wide range of topics and phenomenon, and employ a much wider variety of methods. 
There are cases where the subject matter of study benefits from engaging with other 
disciplines, while still relying on historical approach as the core methodology. 
 
The historical and contemporary salience of the phenomenon of plural policing has led me to 
adopt a multi-disciplinary approach that draws from history, sociology, anthropology and 
political economy. This is to account for the origins and changing forms of plural policing, but 
also to examine the contemporary manifestations of plural policing. Selected ethnographic 
methods complement the historical methods of data collection. My analytical framework 
seeks to accommodate useful ideas from the different disciplines that contribute to our 
understanding of the historical role of policing groups in Plateau State. Using 
historiographical method, complemented by sociological and ethnographic approaches I 
attempt a tracking of institutional plurality, specifically as it relates to policing. I have 
identified three key periods of change in the policing landscape of Nigeria. Post-World War II 
                                                            
36  Eric Hobsbawm, On History, (London: Abacus, 1997), 270. 
37 E.H. Carr, What is History? (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1961), 5. 
38 Martha Howell and Walter Prevenier, From Reliable Sources: An Introduction to Historical Methods, (Ithaca 
and London: Cornell University Press, 2001), 89. 
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colonial rule and the early post-colonial period; the epoch of local government reforms up to 
the structural adjustment programme (early 1970s to mid-1980s); the failure of state police 
and the rise of criminality in the 1980s, and the transition to civilian rule in the late 1990s up 
to the present. 
 
An ethnographic study of group relations seeks to answer questions relating to the 
contemporary period. For clarity, my concept of group relations distinguishes between 
horizontal and vertical ones. Horizontal relations refer to interactions between vigilante 
groups, and to their functions within the communities, they operate in. Vertical interaction 
refers to top-down and bottom-up interactions, between vigilante groups and state institutions. 
A purpose of the extended case method adopted here is understanding the political economy 
of conflicts in Plateau State since 2001, which has also been relevant in explaining why 
violence has persisted, and the extent to which plural policing practice, particularly 
vigilantism, has had an impact on the violence. 39 
2.3.	Fieldwork:	Methods	of	Data	Collection	
My fieldwork period took place in Nigeria and the United Kingdom. This was divided into 
three main phases: July 2012 – December 2012, August –September 2013, and December 
2014 –January 2015. From July –December 2012 I conducted the major field trip in Nigeria. 
This focus is on Plateau and Kaduna states. Conducting a study about plural policing it 
became apparent for me quite early that I would require several tools of data collection. In 
Plateau State, I conducted the bulk of the interviews, and observed vigilante practice. My 
research visit to Kaduna state entailed a visit to the headquarters of the VGN, located at the 
Tudun Wada quarter of Kaduna city to interview the national commander general and some of 
the national executive members of the group. I also conducted research at the National 
Archives, Kaduna. The National Archives Kaduna holds documents that emanate from the 
former Northern Region of Nigeria; my research had particular focus on documents related to 
the former Plateau Province. The second period, August to September 2013 entailed a 
research trip to the United Kingdom. The objective of this trip was twofold. First, was to meet 
and interview serving colonial administrative and police officers who had served in Northern 
Nigeria. Secondly, I conducted research at the British National Archives at Kew, London. The 
last main research period in the field, was a trip to Plateau State Nigeria from December 2014 
– January 2015. The main objective of this trip was to fill in gaps that had emerged following 
                                                            
39See David Keen, The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, Adelphi Paper no.320 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press for the International Institute Strategic Studies, 1998), 11. 
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evaluation of the data. Therefore, the corpus of data, which I have analysed in this study, is 
from oral interviews, archival research, and notes developed from my observation in the field. 
The archival data is for historical purposes, and the notes generated from observation have 
provided specific insight for my understanding of present day plural policing. The data 
generated from the oral interviews serve as a bridge between the historical and present day 
analysis of plural policing. 
 
As a rule and from my experiences fieldwork is dynamic and flexible. While one prepares and 
structures the period, in the field there are so many unexpected occurrences, which can alter 
and change one’s plans. In practice, Von Oppen has observed, “the production of knowledge 
proceeds through numerous loops as a result of pitfalls and feed-backs. Moreover, it is 
important to keep in mind that these procedures are part of the researcher’s agenda, while the 
other actors involved in the research pursue different agendas.”40 Therefore, while I had a 
work plan, and tried to fix appointments with my research informants, on occasion I found 
myself staying longer in some areas and in other cases spending a shorter period. It was my 
experience that some individuals pencilled down as important informants turned out not to 
contribute as much as was expected. Perhaps the best story that illustrates the unexpected and 
fluid nature of fieldwork is the story of my interview with Mr Danladi Tanglar Wuyep, who 
was one of the last people I interviewed in January 2015. My interview with Tanglar and the 
subsequent contacts I got from him changed my core understanding of the role of the NAPF 
from one of a tool of colonial domination and oppression to a more ambivalent phenomenon. 
 
2.3.1.	Oral	Interviews	
When I commenced planning my pilot trip to the field in October 2011 the focus of my study 
was to trace the history of vigilantism in Plateau State. After some preliminary interviews in 
December 2011, it became apparent that the phenomenon I was dealing with was broader than 
vigilantism. Vigilantism, I came to realise, was a more recent component of a historical 
phenomenon of plural policing. It emerged that in order to understand the history of this 
phenomenon I would need to talk to retired and serving police officers. When I returned for 
the substantive field research, it also became clear that the mediating agent of the 
transformation from NAPF to the vigilantes of the 1980s and the present VGN were 
traditional rulers. This meant I had to understand the roles of traditional rulers during the 
                                                            
40Oppen, Bounding Villages, 58. 
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colonial era in administering the native authority. Fortunately, there were former NAPF and 
NPF officers still alive. Concisely oral testimony has enhanced the richness of the historical 
narrative and provided interesting perspectives to go along with the archival sources. 
 
Another very important viewpoint I brought into my thesis was the recollection of former 
colonial administrators and police officers, not just from the archives but from being warmly 
received into the comfort of their homes and interviewing them in different parts of Britain. 
On occasion, I confronted them with information I had collected from the archives and from 
interviews in Nigeria, some directly involving them, others from other remote parts of the 
colony. It was a very interesting experience for me. At the beginning of an interview with a 
retired NPF officer in Kent, south-east England, he observed how it was “exciting”, but yet 
also “disquieting” to be interviewed by a young Nigerian academic, to discuss his experiences 
as a colonial police officer over forty years after he had left Nigeria.41 This conditioned my 
thinking to the extent that I was careful not to come across as aggressive, reproachful and 
disapproving of his colonial service. I had already imbibed a sense of empathy and a measure 
of understanding towards former colonial officers. This was because of my engagements with 
former administrative officers in prior interviews. I had come to realise the difficult 
experiences former colonial officers had on returning to Britain after the independence of the 
colony where they served. The challenge narrated to me, showed how these men and their 
families were returning to a completely different country in contrast to when they left to take 
up colonial service. The mood of the country as they described it was a country ashamed of its 
imperial past. As the considered fulcrums of this imperial past, they took the brunt of this 
collective “shame”. This has since changed. However, as one of these men described it in the 
late 1960s when he returned his children were teased in school as children of a former 
colonial officer.42 Juxtaposing this newfound empathy with my learning on Nigerian colonial 
history was a difficult process. I questioned whether it was this experience that has tailored 
me towards writing an ambivalent history of plural policing. at the end I was convinced that 
the data for the argument of ambivalence emerged more from my interviews, both in Nigeria 
and Britain, than a moment of common humanity I experienced while talking to former 
colonial officers. Some of these former colonial officers still depicted the colonial adventure 
in the light of being a ‘civilising mission.’ I did restrain myself from engaging in debates that 
                                                            
41 Robin Mitchell, interviewed by Jimam Lar, 20.08.2013, Kent, UK. 
42 John Smith, interviewed by Jimam Lar, 17.08.2013, Cheltenham, UK.  
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could have potentially damaged the relationship with the informant, while not changing his 
opinion and understanding of the colonial era. 
 
In conducting the interviews, I used a semi-structured biographical interview method. This 
meant I had long periods of discussions and exchanges with my research informants, on topics 
and issues that had little to do with my research questions. The advantage was I have to know 
more about the people I was interviewing and their experiences. Furthermore, as I found out 
the biographic interviews allows the researcher to get an in depth focus into the informant’s 
experiences, as the informant is almost compelled to focus on him/her life. Biographic 
interviews are not necessarily linear; this is because the narration is centred on what the 
informant consider as highlights of his/her life. After many days of working with an 
informant, to the point where he/she has an appreciable understanding of the research focus, 
the informant becomes a research assistant and guide by default. An instance of this dynamic 
during my fieldwork was the deputy commander of the VGN Shendam LGA, who at first was 
an informant but later he became a guide. There were instances at the end of an interview 
where I would ask him if he had any questions, or lines of inquiry that I did not consider. 
  
In summary, among those interviewed were serving and retired police officers, retired NAPF 
officers, local government officials, community leaders, women leaders, vigilante group 
leaders and members of the VGN (serving and retired), traditional rulers, youth leaders, 
former British colonial officers. I also conducted group interviews with different groups in the 
communities I studied. This was to identify any inconsistencies and points of similarity, trying 
to understand what people agree and disagree on. In total, I conducted sixty-four interviews. 
These interviews varied in length, importance and eventual relevance to the study. I listened 
back to all of them and transcribed forty-two. I had three categories of transcription. The 
general interviews, on which I took rough notes and recorded relevant points and opinions. I 
had twelve interviews in this category. The second category, I termed main interviews, for 
which I did full transcriptions. There were thirty interviews in this category. Among the thirty 
after evaluation, twenty-one emerged in a third category of very important interviews. There 
were some sensitive issues in the interviews and some individuals who asked for anonymity. 
For such individuals I have used pseudonyms.  
 
Access to respondents was facilitated through various means. In the first instance, after I 
established my research questions I identified the specific categories or groups and 
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individuals I wanted to interview. During my exploratory field trip for this study in Plateau 
State, Nigeria, from December 2011 to January 2012, I made an effort to contact as many 
informants as possible, make acquaintances and in some cases have preliminary discussions. 
Phone numbers were exchanged to prepare for my substantive research period July –
December 2012. My research assistants were very helpful in obtaining access and introducing 
me to informants.43 This was especially very useful in the Muslim communities of Jos, being 
categorised as a Christian researcher created a sense of suspicion and mistrust. My intention 
questioned, and was viewed from the lens of the sectarian divide of Jos. I discussed this 
problem in more detail in a later section of this chapter. As is the case with most researchers 
who embark on qualitative research, the so-called snowball approach is useful. The moment 
contact is established with an individual, group, organisation, or institution this often led to 
another informant, and the process continued until I reached a saturation point. This was 
particularly relevant for my research interviews with the members of the VGN; my first 
contact was the local government commander of Langtang North. He linked me up with other 
local government commanders and the Plateau State officials of the group. It was through 
these contacts that I secured an appointment with the Commander General of the group 
leading to a very useful meeting and discussion at the headquarters of the VGN in Kaduna. 
The decision of which contact to follow up on was determined by the research questions.  
2.3.2.	Observation	and	Occasional	Participation		
Conducting research on the present day manifestations of plural policing required the 
observation of how plural policing practice is conducted. In chapter eight, I have related 
accounts of what actually transpired during some selected episodes while I was in the field 
with members of the VGN on patrol. Observation as a research tool allowed me to witness 
what the VGN members were doing when they were on patrol. In some cases the VGN patrol 
with the police, and sometimes on their own. This is sometimes in contrast to interviews. 
Ethnography is not readily a historian’s tool for data collection, however when the objective is 
to capture the essence of the present-day it is a useful method. Ethnography is the method of 
choice for Anthropologists, but is required to complement historical research methods. 
 
                                                            
43 Research Assistants are a critical part of fieldwork and gaining access to informants in Nigeria. I worked with 
the  following Research Assistants.  Yunus  Ibraheem: Hausa  community  in  Jos,  for  research work  in  Jos,  and 
access to the Standard Newspapers archives Bulus Gambo was my assistant. For my fieldwork with the VGN in 
Langtang  North,  I  benefited  from  the  assistance  of  Julfa  Nimmyel  and  Napkur  Kumdong.  For  the  VGN  of 
Shendam  Tsenyen  Deputy  served  as  my  assistant.  At  the  Kaduna  archives,  Abdullahi  Baba  served  as  my 
research assistant. Finally  for my work amongst  the VGN  in Pankshin  LGA Monday  Joshua was my  research 
assistant. 
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There is then the other component of this method, the idea of participating as a tool of 
understanding the phenomenon or as is done in classical ethnography to cultivate an in-depth 
understanding of a social group. While one was hesitant to refer to the field experience as 
participant observation, it should be acknowledge that such instances did occur. The practice 
of going out on patrol with the VGN members does constitute participant observation, though 
for the sole purpose of observing, when I go out with the VGN and the police I am already 
participating in the patrol. I participated and observed VGN patrols in Langtang North 7th-13th 
September, and 4th -7th October 2012. In Shendam, I participated and observed night patrols 
from the 9th -16, November. In Pankshin and Kanke LGAs, I observed and participated in 
patrols from 10th -15th, December 2012 and 9th-10th, January 2015. 
 
There are however scenarios that represent another level of participation. I have two relevant 
experiences to recount. The first instance was while on patrol with two members of the VGN 
on a market day in Pankshin town (central Plateau State) in November 2012. The Pankshin 
Monday market, as the name implies, holds on Mondays and attracts small-scale 
entrepreneurs from all over Plateau State. The VGN on such a market day patrol in pairs and 
generally look out for any suspicious behaviour. On this day while they were patrolling, their 
attention was drawn to two young men suspected of stealing a goat from amongst a herd. The 
herd belonged to a dealer who buys from markets like Pankshin and sells on to major dealers 
for onward transportation to southeast Nigeria. The VGN members arrested the two young 
men, and without the detaining and restraining device of a handcuff, the vigilantes held the 
suspects by their trousers. As there were only two of them at that point before support arrived 
they requested me to hold the goat by the rope and we made our way to the office. It occurred 
to me that in my possession was the stolen property and evidence for the offence. This made 
me anxious. As we approached the VGN local office to my relief, I handed over the goat and 
resumed my passive observation role.  
 
The second experience was in Dadur, Langtang North, also in November 2012. In this case, I 
was observing a VGN recruitment meeting. In attendance were traditional rulers, former 
vigilante members of the SAP period in the 1980s, a police inspector there to give a lecture on 
the more finer details of policing work and of course the new recruits. A member of the local 
youth association, who was taking notes, had to leave the meeting. The manner in which he 
abruptly left led me to conclude that it was a possible emergency. The point however was that 
one of the traditional rulers asked if I could continue with taking the minutes of the meeting, 
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if I do not mind, he requested. While I did have reservations I made effort not to show it, and I 
continued writing the minutes. As it was in my illegible, field note style handwriting, I had to 
rewrite before dully submitting. As I have described in my accounts of vigilante patrol and 
practice in chapters, seven and eight observation presented me with varied experiences. Apart 
from the joint VGN/Police patrols earlier mentioned, I also observed the practice of mounting 
road checkpoints by VGN members on the highway connecting the Jos Plateau and the 
Plateau lowlands in Kanke LGA. I listened to VGN interrogation of suspects in Pankshin, 
Langtang North, and Shendam LGAs. I observed the performative spectacle of the dance of 
shame, discussed in more detail in chapter seven. Finally, I observed the weekly VGN parade 
with a lecture and inspection by the officer in charge of patrol and guard at the divisional 
police headquarters Langtang north, LGA. All of these experiences, and others not mentioned 
had a profound consequence on my understanding of contemporary plural policing.  
2.3.3.	The	Archives		
To research colonial Nigeria I had to conduct archival research. I conducted this research in 
two main archives, the National Archives, Kaduna Nigeria and the British Archives, Kew-
London. The Department of History, at the Jos University has scanned and digitalised files 
from the Kaduna and Jos Archives. Therefore, it was instructive to first study the files at Jos 
before going to Kaduna. I also conducted research at the Rhodes House Library, at Oxford 
University. The Kaduna Archives is where all documents related to colonial northern Nigeria 
are preserved. In the Kaduna Archives, the main documents I was interested in were largely 
colonial correspondences, official letters and memos from district officers, and reports that 
refer to law and order in the Plateau Province of Northern Nigeria 1940 -1960. At the British 
Archives I was interested in general files on native administration. This encompassed a broad 
variety of topics, for instance policy, the ordinance, and jurisdiction.  
 
I was also interested in files on the Nigerian Police Force, and the Native Authority Police 
Force. Also of interest were Nigerian intelligence reports, particularly reports on internal 
security of the period from 1945 – 1960. At the Rhodes House Archives in Oxford, I came 
across a compendium of British Colonial Police Officers Service Memoirs (1940-1960). This 
contained a wide range of information. There were diaries of police officers, typescripts of 
interviews with the police officers, and experiences of wives with the colonial service in 
Nigeria.  
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Figure 3: Researcher in the Nigerian Standard Newspapers Archive, Jos. 11.12.2014. 
 
In approaching and studying archival documents, as all historians are aware archival 
documents, do not necessarily present a balanced account of the past. Richard Evans aptly 
notes that:  
 
Archives are the product of the chance survival of some documents 
and the corresponding chance loss or deliberate destruction of others. 
They are also the products of the professional activities of the 
archivist. Archivists have often weeded out records they consider 
unimportant, while retaining those they consider of lasting value. This 
might mean for example destroying vast and therefore bulky 
personnel files on low-ranking state employees such as ordinary 
soldiers…while keeping room on the crowded shelves for personnel 
file on high state officials.44  
 
An instance of this reality of the historians’ tools is experienced on arrival at the British 
Archives. On arriving at Kew, as part of your orientation you learn two important points 
regarding how the colonial archives are organised. First, the documents are registered in 
                                                            
44  Evans, In Defence of History, 87. 
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indexes with a list of everything that was sent back to London, organised chronologically. The 
second point, in relation to the immediate quotation by Evans is the fact that only a selection 
of five percent (5%) of the original documents are preserved and kept. These are catalogued in 
files according to subjects. Therefore, one can only imagine how much history has been lost 
based on the decisions, or simply the lack of space. My archival research was after I had 
spoken to key informants. Therefore, I already had some themes, concepts, and perspectives I 
was considering. In the archives, I came across opinions, and views that supported some of 
my perspectives, but altered others. With archival documents, is not just the text that one 
considers; also important is an understanding of who wrote it? In what given context – this 
could be social, political, or legal. In this sense the researcher finds himself in conversation 
with the archival source, accordingly one cannot claim to “recover a single, unalterably ‘true’ 
meaning of a dispatch simply by reading it; on the other hand, we cannot impose any meaning 
we wish to on such a text either.”45 A document also has meaning in relation to other 
documents; in this case, the researcher is also interested in what preceded and what follows. 
Documents are therefore, studied as pieces of a puzzle and there are occasions where the 
puzzle is not completed and the researcher has to reconsider the line of argument. As I noted 
previously, when a historian goes to the archives one is not in search of a toolkit of evidence 
to answer all questions; rather it is a tedious process of reading heaps of documents and trying 
to make sense of it all. At the end of the process, the archival material complements the 
process of reconstructing the historical narrative.  
  
2.4.	Method	of	Data	Analysis:	The	Extended	Case	Method	
Having collected the data I found that the task of how to evaluate the amorphous information 
collected into a sequence of structured and comprehensible narratives, all weaved into a 
coherent whole was perhaps the most difficult and challenging part of the PhD process. I have 
deployed two methods in interpreting and analysing the data. First, my approach to change 
and continuity is situated within a historical approach; I have extrapolated on this in the 
previous sections of this chapter. To complement the historical approach I have also relied on 
the extended case method. In sum as Burawoy captures it, “the extended case method applies 
reflexive science to ethnography in order to extract the general from the unique, to move from 
the “micro” to the “macro,” and to connect the present to the past in anticipation of the 
future.”46 I have argued the method equally seeks to reveal the macro underpinnings of a 
                                                            
45 Evans, In Defence of History, 106. 
46 Michael Burawoy, “The Extended Case Method” Sociological Theory 16, no. 1, (1998), 5. 
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micro phenomenon. The extended case method therefore helps the researcher to look at micro 
events and seek to explore the macro phenomenon underlying these processes. The extended 
case method in this thesis is not a replacement for historical methods of analysis, rather to 
complement. Burawoy refers to the extended case method as a “methodological duality, the 
coexistence and interdependence of two models of science – positivist and reflexive.” 47 As he 
argues in his paper this is conceptualised according to inductive and deductive modes of 
analysis. Now to be clear, it is important to lay out the extent to which I agree with Burawoy 
in regards to the coexistence of these methodological traditions. It is my belief that literature 
review is constitutive of the methodological process, my research process has been deductive 
to the extent where I considered existing notions of the concepts I identified as central to my 
study. Understandings of the state and the concept of vigilantism as drawn from existing 
literature constituted a starting point for my inquiry. I did not go to the field with a clean slate 
looking to fill it up with meaning and understanding. From my readings I generated 
perspectives, according to how other scholars had understood these concepts within a 
Nigerian, African, and broader general understanding. The data generated from my fieldwork 
is however, the basis of my interpretation and analysis. In this case, I have arrived at 
conclusions that are in conformity with some scholars I had reviewed, but also my analysis 
equally disputes several other scholars. The notions and conceptions I generated are a product 
of my research beginning from my review of literature to the writing of the thesis. 
 
The extended case method as proposed by Burawoy extends the researcher’s scope of inquiry 
beyond specific context. In Burawoy’s conception, there are four possibilities to draw this 
extension, namely: extending the observers gaze into the lives of the groups and individuals 
studied; extending the researchers observation over time and space; extending micro 
processes to macro forces48; and the extension of theory. The extension of theories refers to 
the extension of understanding and interpreting data aimed at formulating theoretical 
frameworks. I am particularly interested in the second and the third methods of extension. In 
my study, I have used the extended case method to understand interrelation between historical 
processes across the period studied. In this case, the extended case method shares a similarity 
with the historical approach. The extended case method enables “the exploration of broad 
historical patterns and macrostructures without relinquishing the contextual narratives and 
                                                            
47 Ibid., 14. 
48 I have showed in my thesis how we can also extend from macro process to micro processes, and vice versa. 
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processes.”49 At this level, the analysis compiles temporal historical knowledge into an 
account of social processes from varied historical periods. In relating this to my study it can 
be argued that the knowledge of the transformation of the chieftaincy institution in post- 
world war II colonial Nigeria and the consequent establishing of the NAPF set the course of 
the social processes the thesis has studied – the process of plural policing. By studying the 
past through oral histories as recounted by individual biographies and archival documents we 
are able to account for the establishment of plural policing, and understand how policing 
actors have responded to changing political and social context. We can also track processes of 
state building through the institutionalisation of plural policing. Secondly, regarding micro to 
macro extension, and vice versa we are able to understand how reforms and policy changes at 
the macro state level can release a chain of events and actions at the micro state level, in other 
words we can study the micro level to draw insight on the macro, and vice versa. Eric 
Hobsbawm captures this, in an apt analogy: 
 
 “…there is nothing new in choosing to see the world via a 
microscope rather than a telescope. So long as we accept that we are 
studying the same cosmos, the choice between microcosm and 
macrocosm is a matter of selecting the appropriate technique. It is 
significant that more historians find the microscope useful at present, 
but this does not necessarily mean that they reject telescopes as out of 
date.”50  
 
A study of these interactions lends to insights on the interface between state and society 
through the lens of plural policing, and the practices of actors at different levels, and across 
different groups and institutions. Therefore, we are able to extend our understanding across 
vertical and horizontal connectedness.  
	
	
	
 
 
                                                            
49 Burawoy, “The Extended Case Method”, 6. 
50 Hobsbawm, On History, 253. 
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2.5.	Research	in	a	Conflict	Context	
Arjun Appadurai51 has shown how historical narratives of the past can be mobilised for 
political and cultural projects in the present. The past, he argues, becomes a ‘scarce resource’ 
within contexts of contestation, because cultural understandings of history may differ, records 
may be thin on the ground, and one particular interpretation of the past or of oral history – e.g. 
by one clan or ethnic group – may be challenged by another. The right to have traditional-
cultural and political suzerainty over Jos, the Plateau State capital, for instance is weaved into 
competing discourses of autochthony, belonging and ownership. Autochthony as ‘belonging’ 
according to Geschiere can have a varied meaning among different groups, even when these 
groups reside within the same given territory. Fourchard and Segatti suggest a departure from 
a unifying meaning of all xenophobic tendencies. The conceptualisation offered considers 
synonymous notions “as autochthony, nativism, and indigeneity as local concepts used by 
actors in situations of xenophobia.”52 Autochthony is therefore situated within a specific 
social context of discourse and practice. For some groups the claim to autochthony is based 
on early settlement, for others they are autochthonous because of conquest, and yet other 
groups make claim to being autochthonous on the basis of having lived in an area for a given 
period of time over several generations.53 As my analysis of vigilantism in the time of 
sectarian violence in Jos clearly demonstrates, historical narratives about the origins and 
formation of vigilantism in an area overtaken by sectarian violence can become highly 
contested. 
Secondly, my research experience has also shown that archival research can also be impacted 
by violent conflict. One may imagine that this may relate to the archives or libraries’ being 
destroyed, as was the case in Timbuktu, Mali in 2013. That being an important risk, in my 
case, however, I refer to a different kind of vandalisation. Owing to the fact that some cases of 
violent sectarian conflicts are weaved around territorial claims to land and autochthony, 
colonial documents kept at the archives emerge as important sources of evidence to present 
before judicial commissions of inquiry. Generally, one of government’s responses to recurring 
episodes of violence have invariably been to institute commissions of inquiry, often headed 
by legal luminaries, with the mandate of establishing the causes of specific episodes of 
                                                            
51 Arjun Appadurai, “The Past as a Scarce Resource”, Man, (1981),  201‐219. 
52  Laurent Fourchard and Aurelia Segatti, “Introduction of Xenophobia and Citizenship: The Everyday Politics of 
Exclusion and Inclusion.”  In Africa, 85, 1, (2015), 2‐12, doi: 10.1017/S0001972014000746.   
53 Peter Geschiere, Pearls of Belonging: Autochthony, Citizenship, and Exclusion in Africa and Europe. (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2009). 
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violence, identifying the key actors, and proposing remedial measures to prevent future 
violence. Groups go to the archives in search of evidence to strengthen their claims, but 
unfortunately, to also vandalise potential evidence that perceived opponents may find useful. 
At the Kaduna, archives I found the evidence of the visits by ethnic organisations in the 
Archives register around the period the organisations were preparing their memorandums to 
submit to the Justice Bola Ajibola Commission of Inquiry that followed the 2010 electoral 
violence in Jos. For instance at the Kaduna Archives, missing documents include memos on 
chiefs and their loyalty or the lack of it, minutes of meetings, political activities in Jos in the 
1950s, proposals for reorganising divisional, and native authority boundaries. Adoyi, referring 
to such practice as the malaise of pilfering through stealing of critical and sensitive archival 
documents identifies some other objectives like attempting to influence chieftaincy disputes, 
land cases and/or certain damaging intelligence reports compiled about areas as reasons why 
archival documents are taken.54 While we may not be able to conclude on whom actually took 
away these documents, one may suggest it would seem an interesting coincidence that 
documents missing are related to such areas engulfed in sectarian conflict. 
  
Another challenge that emerged while I was conducting fieldwork was questions of my 
identity(s) and perceptions of my positionality, and how this is situated within insider-outsider 
dynamics. Beyond the conflict context, insider-outsider dynamics of a research context have 
been one of the more discussed aspects of field research. It raises questions like, who is an 
insider, and who is an outsider? While in one context being an insider could be an advantage, 
it could equally be a disadvantage in another context, and the same applies to an outsider. 
This becomes even more acute in a conflict context, as I realised getting access was not just 
challenging where I was regarded as an outsider but also where I was seen as an insider. 
Following the several episodes of violence Jos became segregated along religious lines, 
therefore as a Christian resident of Jos I had to consider if it was safe going into the Muslim 
quarters of the city for research purposes. The fact that I desired to meet and talk to Muslim 
vigilante members and groups meant I had to try, but it required caution and good preparation. 
The challenge was not only that of physical safety, it was also about access – so that people 
could be in a position, where they trust you and feel free to talk to you. It is difficult to 
convince that you come without an opposing religious or political predisposition.  
 
                                                            
54 Adoyi F. Onoja, “An Endangered Specie? The State of the Archives in the Reconstruction of Nigerian History,” 
Mike O. Odey, John J. Nengel, and Okpeh O. Okpeh eds. Historical Research and Methodology in Africa: Essays 
in Honour of Professor Charles Creswell Jacobs, (Makurdi: Aboki Publishers, 2010), 109. 
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The final point is the challenge of observing and witnessing violence as policing practice. 
How should a researcher approach this problem, as an ethical risk, vital access or as both? 
When one is researching contemporary vigilante practice a key source of data is observation. 
While interviews can provide insight into the structures, functions and individual motivations 
for joining up, observing everyday practice for a sustained period complements and as I 
learned sometimes contradicts the oral information provided by the vigilante members. 
Getting access to go around with vigilante groups as they go about their normal daily routines 
can constitute a challenge on two levels. Vigilante groups work during the day - for instance 
patrolling local markets – but the main function of guarding is actually at night. In taking the 
decision to request permission to go out on night patrol, one has to weigh the risks involved; 
questions of (the researcher’s) safety to be considered. In other words when making such a 
decision – you take the same risk which the vigilantes take. Vigilantes are never certain of the 
situation that awaits them every night they go out, how armed or dangerous is a potential 
offender/suspect. When going out on patrol with VGN member as a researcher, all these 
considerations are also important for the researcher.  
 The second level entails to what extent will the researcher’s presence impact or influence 
practice. One of the key objectives of observation is to be as inconspicuous as possible, in 
other words to what extent is one’s research partners carrying out their normal daily routine, 
or is it a case of performance? In my case, the question that emerged was how should I deal 
with instances of ‘violent interrogation’ – this to an extent is an ethical dilemma. Should I 
decline to conduct observational research of vigilante or policing practice, and simply rely on 
what I am told, should I speak out when I observe that the line is perhaps being crossed, or 
should I merely observe and basically describe and analyse the practice as experienced. In this 
case, I refer to Lars Buur, confronted with a similar dilemma Buur decided to witness and 
analyse it as part of vigilante practice. He notes that “…just because one actually experiences 
something, (violence) this does not mean one necessarily endorses what one sees and 
experiences. Sometimes the best way of speaking up against something is by describing it so 
that others can make their own judgements.”55 Baz Lecocq laments how “positive, and 
especially negative emotions, within the field at large, and its effects on analysis and writing 
are scarcely dealt with.”56 Furthermore, commenting on what he described as the open 
                                                            
55 Lars Buur, “Domesticating Sovereigns: The Changing Nature of Vigilante Groups in South Africa”, in 
Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa, Thomas Kirsch and Tilo Gratz, eds., (James Currey, Suffolk and Rochester, 
2010), 47 
56 Baz Lecocq, “Fieldwork ain’t always fun: public and hidden discourses on fieldwork”, in History in Africa, 
vol.29, (2002), 274. 
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reluctance and outright denial of the “pain of fieldwork” in favour of the “fieldwork holiday 
myth” Lecocq, contends “not accounting for all of one’s attitudes in and towards the field in 
one’s professional life and writing is to some extent cheating both the audience and oneself. It 
is simply denying one’s own humanity…”57 It is worth noting that I was working largely in 
areas I have already lived in or where I am from, thus familiar with the general context. The 
more serious challenge in regards to access during fieldwork was gaining access to the 
Muslim side and overcoming any suspicion they may have felt towards me.  
One of the major points I came away with was how thin the line is between negotiating these 
challenges and being stuck in the field bereft of any idea of what to do. In other words despite 
all these challenges, I would argue that largely I did achieve the objectives of my field 
research, while still noting that it could have easily gone wrong. Another point to make in 
conclusion is to perhaps ask the question if our training for field research in conflict zones or 
conflict context is adequate or still lacking in the manner we are prepared for the realities of 
such contexts. In any case, we do fieldwork to find out new things, and maybe no matter how 
we prepare it is still likely that nothing prepares us enough for what we may encounter. 
Patrick Peritore argues the process of embedding oneself into the context of research requires 
one to become ‘street wise’, context knowledge and understanding must supersede ideological 
and cultural assumptions.58 
 
 
 
 
 
	
 
                                                            
57 Ibid., 275. 
58 N.P. Peritore, “Reflections on dangerous fieldwork”, in American Sociologist 21, 4, (1990), 370. 
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Chapter	Three:	Conceptual	Framework		
3.1	Introduction	
This chapter provides the conceptual framework on which the main arguments of the thesis 
are anchored. The conceptual framework is formulated based on two categories: The first 
category is the institutional context, which refers to the Nigerian state (local government and 
police) and policing institutions, like the NAPF and the VGN. The second category of 
concepts relates to the relational context. Plurality and authority are deployed in this thesis to 
provide the basis for understanding the relational dynamics of the empirical context. Starting 
with the first category on a broader general level my study is within the scope of state-society 
relations in Africa. The state here refers to the Nigerian state understood through its 
constituent parts, such as the police and local government administration. Society in this case 
refers to vigilante groups and the communities where they operate. It is also important to 
make clear that in this chapter I do two things. Firstly, I review relevant literature and situate 
my thesis within existing debates. Secondly, I outline the concepts I have used and situate 
them within my empirical context. 
 
In my understanding of the state and vigilantism, I have three levels of analysis. The first 
level is around debates on the state in Africa. My review and entry into these debates is 
historical. I engage with the concept of the state and extrapolate on what my thesis gains from 
such discourses. The second level is on the Nigerian state. In this section, I engage critically 
with the existing literature on the Nigerian state. I then proceed to show the approaches which 
have been used to understand the Nigerian state, and how my understanding of the Nigerian 
state, from my study of plural policing in Plateau State, adds to the existing literature. I then 
engage with the concept of vigilantism, starting with a brief narration of the origins of the 
concept and its usage, illustrated with some cases of how vigilantism has been studied and 
analysed by Africanist scholars. I analyse the literature on Nigerian vigilantism, showing how 
the main existing gaps are found in the scope – periodization and parts of Nigeria that have 
not received scholarly attention, and I show how I conceptualise and understand vigilantism 
within my research context.  
 
The chapter then proceeds to the second category of concepts, plurality and authority. These 
concepts help us understand the relational dynamic between state and society. This is 
particularly relevant for our understanding of the relationship between the police and vigilante 
groups. 
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 Plurality and authority help us to see beyond the dichotomy of state and society, beyond the 
idea that the police and vigilante are constantly in opposition; rather I have used these 
concepts to show how they are cross cutting and overlapping. I argue that my 
conceptualisation of plurality is a form of institutionalised pluralism. I then proceed to show 
how plurality is relevant and domesticated within the analysis of my case study. In the last 
section of the chapter, I show how I have built the framework around the concept of authority- 
this is preceded by a discussion of the genealogy of the concept and a brief history of usage.  
 
In sum, the literature on the state, policing, and vigilantism was important for the formulation 
of the research problem, secondly I conducted a literature review as a prelude to identifying 
contextual gaps and to develop my conceptual categories. These literatures were also relevant 
during the process of evaluating and interpreting data. The last point here is to acknowledge 
how such scholarly contributions also constituted perspectives, which I reanalysed and 
reinterpreted. It is the vocation of the historian as it were to first establish that certain events 
or processes did occur then proceed to analyse what it might mean. In this sense, I have 
considered the published work of other historians and I have used existing literature and 
referred to particular events as described and narrated by other historians. The point of 
departure therefore is in a reinterpretation of such material. With a careful, critical re-reading, 
we can shed new light and understandings of phenomenon. When we ask different questions, 
we emerge with different arguments. Relying on insights generated from my data I then 
attempt to situate my study within these debates showing points of convergence and 
divergence. The complementary dialectic between the existing literature reviewed and data 
generated from fieldwork creates the basis for my framework, and subsequently a historical 
and contemporary understanding of vigilantism, and on a broader frame plural policing, as the 
basis of understanding state society relations. This is the basis of my case study. I will 
proceed to argue that what is lacking in the literature is a historical sociology of vigilantism.  
3.2	The	State	in	Africa	
The conceptual understanding of the state within this thesis is derived from the existing 
literature on the post-colonial African state; the legacies of its colonial past and the 
contradictions of its post-colonial history,59 particularly as it relates to the provision of 
                                                            
59 Claude Ake, “The Future of the State in Africa,” International Political Review, 6, 1, (1985),  and Claude Ake, 
Democracy and Development in Africa (Washington DC: Brookings Institution, 1996), 3‐6.  Also, see Mahmood 
Mamdani, Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism, (Princeton Studies in 
Culture, Power, and History, (Kampala: Fountain Publishers, 1996), 37‐62. 
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security. In other words, I am interested in how scholars have understood the state in Africa 
from historical lens but also contemporary insights are equally of relevance. Specifically the 
problemitazation of the colonial state, and the legacies bequeathed to the successor state. 
 
Though discredited and no longer in vogue as a basis of understanding the state in Africa, it is 
instructive to recapture the historical contentions made by the modernisation theory and the 
dependency school in understanding the place of colonialism in the development of the state 
in Africa. The modernisation theory was situated within the poles of transition from ‘tradition’ 
to ‘modern’. One of its major proponents W.W Rostow writing within a cold war context was 
keen to sell the Euro-American capitalist system as the system that can emancipate 
‘traditional’ societies.60 Other Modernisation theorist picked on Rostow’s arguments, 
colonialism was understood as a stage in Africa’s developmental process, and the African 
elites were rendered as critical agents that will drive an Africanist modernist transformational 
agenda.61 In this cold war context, African states were encouraged, cajoled and sometimes 
forced to adopt western institutional models as the only means that will drive the transitional 
process.  
 
The dependency school which emerged largely in response to the modernisation school built 
their arguments on showing how Africa has been on the losing side of a long historical 
relationship with Europe and North America. For the dependency school the stages of 
development and underdevelopment were two sides of the same coin,62 Europe is developed 
because Africa is underdeveloped and Africa is underdeveloped because Europe is developed. 
They argued that colonialism constituted one stage in the process of hindering Africa’s 
developmental process. Dependency scholar’s main argument was that the condition of the 
African ‘neocolony’ was because of how African states had been exploited, externally by the 
different stages of imperialism and internally by African ‘petty’ or ‘comprador’ bourgeoisie.63 
The conceptualisations framed along ‘global systems’ failed to adequately capture the 
transformations unfolding across the African political and social landscape.  
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In more contemporary scholarship there has been a shift from using western models as the 
basis of understanding the state in Africa. Rajeev Bhargava for instance interrogates the 
analytical value that political concepts like the state may have in the post colony, Bhargava 
asks: 
 
How valuable is the concept of the state outside the context where it 
originated? In particular, what is its usefulness in India [or Nigeria]? 
Does it illuminate our social and political reality? Does it obstruct us 
from a proper understanding of how we should view ourselves?64 
 
In their influential work The Anthropology of the State: A Reader, Aradhana Sharma and 
Akhil Gupta make a critical point about the need to shift in the way the state can be studied, 
they argue that scholars should consider approaching the study of the state by looking at its 
constituted and (un)constituted practices and the way these practices are encountered.65 The 
unfolding scholarship still however made attempt to draw continental patterns of analysis. 
This has produced some interesting insight, accompanied by notions that set out to capture the 
African condition: social, political and economic. Some prominent examples of these 
conclusions include the state as a site of ‘prebendal practice’,66 extrapolated as ‘the politics of 
the belly’.67 The African state has also been described as a harbinger of mismanagement and 
squandered opportunities, suffering the ailment of ‘resource curse’.68 The state has also been 
described as the perpetrator of ‘criminality’.69 These conclusions do constitute part of the 
African reality. However, we should recognise that they represent a part of the reality. My 
approach to understanding the state is inspired by a methodological consideration that 
embraces the category of ambivalence. I seek to extrapolate on this category in the following 
section in specific reference to the Nigerian state.  
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3.3	The	Nigerian	State	
For ease of analysis, I examine the literature on the Nigerian state in its pre-colonial, colonial 
and post-colonial formations. I am interested in understanding how scholars have deployed 
usage of the concept of the state to provide insight into the historical and contemporary socio-
political landscape of the Nigerian context. Joel Migdal notes that “…while the state may 
occupy a privileged place in our collective thinking, its empirical reality in large parts of the 
world is much more complex.”70 On one extreme is to measure the state in Africa on the 
yardstick of a Weberian ideal type, the state that has presence, authority and reach. On the 
other extreme is the weak state, unable to govern its territory and people in a meaningful way. 
My interest and approach in understanding the Nigerian state is captured by the category of 
ambivalence. This category is given meaning by converging three different framings of the 
state in Africa: the state at work; the state as a producer of abjection; and the state as idea. 
 
The notion of the state as a producer of abjection is drawn from the analysis how Nigerians 
encounter the state. Taking a lead from Sharma and Gupta71, Wale Adebanwi and Ebenezer 
Obadare72, attempt to answer specific questions on how different agents and actors encounter 
the Nigerian state, and what are their understandings of it? What do people think of the state? 
Is the state seen as hindrance or as a facilitator, or neither of the two? What are the different 
spaces of encounter, formal and non-formal, anticipatory and participatory? How do people’s 
experiences determine their understanding of the character of the state? In other words it is 
important to also define the state by looking at it through the lens of its citizens, the potential 
and actual assumptions of what the state is, is hopefully made clear. Their conclusion frames 
the Nigerian state as one that creates abjection. 
 
My departure from the formulation of Adebanwi and Obadare is to consider an emic 
encounter of the state. In other words, encountering can also be from the inside, not just the 
outside. Bierschenk and Olivier De Sardan use the metaphor of states and public services as a 
working site, an ongoing construction site. They “proceed from the premise that processes of 
state formation in Africa were not completed once and for all with the establishment of the 
colonial states, with the achievement of the independence of these countries, or with the 
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recent emergence of democratic (and civil) regimes.”73 They however do not limit this 
argument to African states, they contend that “ If one considers, from a Weberian perspective, 
the institutionalisation of violence, the local anchoring of central power and the self-limitation 
of the rulers qua codification of the law as the core of the development of the modern 
Western-type state, state building processes are never ending.”74 Their main point – 
characteristics like incompletion, fragility, and reversibility are universal features of state- 
building processes. Our task therefore is to identify how these dynamics manifest in specific 
state context and in particular institutional settings. 
 
The third aspect of the category of ambivalence is the concept of the state as an idea, what Till 
Foster75 refers to as the imagination of the state. He draws insight from his study of a specific 
historical situation of northern Cote d’Ivoire; where the state as an institution with the 
capacity of coercion has generally evaporated but the imagination of its practices persist. A 
similar scenario is replicated in my study context; this is particularly in rural settings where 
the imagination of the state as a guarantor of law and order existed before certain particular 
vigilante groups began to be active.  
3.3.1	The	Colonial	State	
The indirect system contributed in entrenching institutional hierarchies, the institution of the 
Native Authority being at the bottom of this hierarchy. Among the societies of southern 
Plateau State, the colonial transformation of the chieftaincy institution became a critical 
turning point. The Nigerian colonial state was amongst other things built and sustained on the 
objectives of maximising economic benefit for the colonial metropolis. To achieve the 
exploitation of resources there was a particular fixation with maintaining law and order. The 
socio-political policies of the colonial government had economic objectives. The colonial 
system of indirect rule allowed the colonial state to cut the cost of administration by using 
local chiefs as proxies for the colonial state. In the Middle Belt however, there were two 
levels of mediation. The people were not just dealing with local chiefs; they were also dealing 
with Hausa imperial agents. The institutionalisation of “Native Alien” Subcolonialism by the 
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British amongst the Middle Belt groups of Nigeria is excellently analysed in Ochuno’s76 
‘Colonialism by Proxy: Hausa Imperial Agents and Middle Belt Consciousness in Nigeria.’ 
Ochuno conceptually and empirically shows us how it is possible to go beyond the European 
colonizer/African colonized binary. The book shows how the instituting of Hausa political 
structures amongst the peoples of the Middle Belt violated the core rationale of the indirect 
rule system in Northern Nigeria. Ochuno extensively shows how “Hausa subcolonial rule was 
intellectually packaged, rationalized, and justified against the suffocating backdrop of British 
obsessions with the tenets of indirect rule, especially the cardinal idea of indigenous 
mediation.”77 In analysing the phenomenon of ‘Hausanisation of Policing Practice’ in the 
former Plateau Province, I have found the notion of ‘Colonialism by Proxy’ very useful 
 
Mahmood Mamdani has argued that the post-colonial struggle to entrench democratic rule in 
Africa, particularly the rural landscape - has a causal link to how African colonies were 
administered. He argues that the colony was administered through a bifurcated system; the 
post-colonial ruling elite maintained a decentralised despotism rather than being dismantled. 
What Mamdani has referred to as ‘decentralized despotism’,78 a regime of institutional 
differentiation characterized by a bifurcated system with two forms of power used to govern 
‘colonial subjects’. Urban power was predicated on the language of civil society and civil 
rights – the rights of the colonizers. Community and culture, ethnic groups reconstituted as 
Native Authorities administered by customary law, on the other hand characterized rural 
power. A thread that runs through the foregoing conceptions of the conditions of the African 
state is how these notions attribute some transformational value to the colonial state. For the 
modernisation theorist it was a stage in Africa’s developmental process, for the dependency 
school it was a stage in the process of Africa’s exploitation, for ‘decentralised despotism’ 
colonialism through its governing system created rural despots whose main objective was the 
furtherance of the objectives of the colonial project. Mamdani’s core argument therefore is 
that, we are in a better position to understand the present predicament and challenges of 
instituting democratic rule when we consider how the colony and the predecessor post-
colonial state have been administered.  
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While rights governed citizens, subjects were governed indirectly through a range of different 
arrangements. Under the system, most of the colonial population were subjects because the 
status they had was generally derived from a putative customary law which colonialism used 
in order to compel Africans into the commodity chain of imperial capitalism. Citizenship was 
reserved for colonial officers and the few who were at their service. Africans (in this specific 
case Nigerians) were subjects of the colonial state but also subject to its discipline via so-
called custom and tradition. It is my intention to argue that in societies like those in my case 
study area the impact of this bifurcated system was much more acute: it was not just the 
institution of the paramount chief that was foreign but the people were equally subjected to 
ruler-ship under a native authority system with its own policing arm, which at its inception 
was constituted primarily to protect the state and its agents. In an attempt to understand the 
processes and dynamics that characterised the socio-political transformation of these societies 
in the colonial and post-colonial context, I contend that, though important and useful, we 
would need to go beyond the frame of decentralised despotism. While Mamdani’s79 notion of 
‘decentralised despotism’ captures the core essence of the systems of colonial governance, the 
making of traditional authority in Africa could not only be captured by its capacity of 
coercion. It is much more ambivalent than that.  
 
Building on this notion of ambivalence, von Oppen observes that colonial state making was 
beset by a series of very specific contradictions. These contradictions are equally important 
for my understanding of the colonial state. Referring to contradictions and tensions partly 
created by ‘decentralised despotism’80 von Oppen observes, “It was not uncommon for this 
tension to permeate comparable instruments of territorial rule, such as census-taking, identity 
documents or boundary demarcation.”81 These tensions one may note still permeate the 
contemporary governing practices of the Nigerian state, issuance of identity documents has 
for instance become bureaucratized, but citizens as Fourchard has argued have found creative 
patron-client practices to side step the process.82 A second contradiction, according to von 
Oppen is that of locality and mobility. The colonial drawing of boundaries was presented as 
civilizing mission, a struggle against mobility. “On the other hand, colonialism itself was a 
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highly unsettling endeavour that demanded and frequently forced subject populations to move 
in large numbers over considerable distances.”83 Again, we find enduring legacies of such 
practices in contemporary Plateau State.84  
 
It is my contention that we need to deploy our inquiry beyond the colonial state, its intentions 
and its policy. Of more importance is the implementation and what becomes of it. As Thomas 
Spear85 has aptly argued, the more we are drawn to suggestions that British colonisers and 
African ethno-political entrepreneurs were responsible for reconceptualising tradition, custom 
or ethnicity, the more we are drawn to disembodied ideas of invention. Thus, agency must be 
seen as a function of discourse as people debate issues of the present in terms of ideas and 
beliefs drawn from the past, reformulating them and revising them in the context of the 
present. Where transitions occur, ideas, beliefs and practices that resonate with current 
concerns are therefore adapted, and those that do not are rendered immaterial, or simply 
expire.  
A second point is captured in Fredrick Cooper’s critique of Mamdani’s notion of 
decentralised despotism. Cooper is interested in how processes unfold, rapture, and recreate 
new histories. According to Cooper, there are convincing points in Mamdani’s analysis of 
colonial administration in the 1920s and 1930s – of administering the colony through 
traditional rulers and the causal link to the contemporary challenges of deepening democratic 
practice in Africa with particular reference to the 1980s and the 1990s. It does however 
become challenging, when such an attempt is made without rigorously detailing the historical 
trajectory. This ‘ahistorical’ vocation Cooper refers to as ‘leap frogging.’ “Claiming that 
something in time A caused something in time C without considering time B, which lies in 
between.”86 Cooper writes that while:  
“Mamdani has a point at either end of his leapfrog, but he 
misses what lies in between. His book says almost nothing about 
the 1950s and the 1960s, and thus does not consider another 
dimension of Africa’s malaise: that there was indeed effective 
mobilization in those years that cut across ethnic and urban/rural 
distinctions. Through such mobilizations Africans made strong 
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claims to citizenship…The explosion of citizenship in the final 
years of colonial rule appears nowhere in Mamdani’s book.”87 
 
Cooper points out how in failing to analytically relate to what transpired in the 1950s and 
1960s Mamdani misses a critical period in the historical trajectory of the decolonisation era. 
Furthermore, Mamdani fails to capture the tragic dilemma of how the African populace’s 
exciting response to the futuristic projects of the political class was eventually dashed by an 
unfolding landscape of dashed promises and squandered opportunities. The analysis it seems, 
adequately provides this missing bridge between Mamdani’s period of ‘decentralised 
despotism’ and the failed politics of the 1990s. I have used ‘decentralised despotism’ to 
understand the role, which traditional rulers played in the practice of plural policing and the 
institutionalisation of vigilantism. I have however, problematised the role of traditional rulers 
beyond mere agents of colonialism and its oppressive tendencies. The fact that these 
institutions of chieftaincy have not only survived but have taken a new lease in Nigeria’s 
contemporary socio-political formation,88 requires us to understand not just the contemporary 
state but more important the processes across historical trajectories. To address the 
relationship of past and present we have to also interrogate and understand how processes 
have unfolded over time. 
3.3.2	The	Post‐Colonial	State	
Achille Mbembe’s89 conceptualisation of the post-colonial African state ‘the postcolony’ is a 
fusion of the discourses and actual political economic practices that characterised the state in 
Africa. With a particular focus on Cameroon, his points resonate with other African countries. 
I find his analysis useful on two specific accounts. Mbembe though not the first, but perhaps 
with additional clarity and analytical insight, argues that the hegemony of the colonial state 
was constructed, entrenched and sustained by violence. This violence came in different forms; 
there was the physical violence of subjugation and suppression as referred earlier. 
Additionally, the conquered had to be rendered as a ‘native’ who was desirous of ‘civilising’ 
from a ‘barbaric’ to a ‘moral’ state of ‘existence’, he/she was robbed of dignity so as to 
prepare the way for exploiting his/her (bodily) labour. In the postcolony in context (Nigeria) 
again as referred to earlier the institutions of violence were maintained and used as tools the 
state deploys to achieve the political and economic objectives of colonial governing.90 The 
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socio-political impact of structural adjustment as prescribed by the Bretton Woods 
Institutions, resulting in the withdrawal of state services and its resulting challenges are also 
covered in Mbembe’s analysis of the postcolony.  
 
I argue that the re-emergence of vigilantism in Plateau State and indeed other parts of Nigeria 
during the late 1980s can be attributed to the implementation of structural adjustment and the 
subsequent withdrawal of state funding from the police force.91 Mbembe92 argues that even 
the political turbulence that accompanied the democratic transitions that swept the African 
continent in the 1990s could not bring positive change, subsequently leading to uncontrolled 
violence with public and private actors involved. Here his contribution to the debate on the 
privatization of violence is instructive. He then focuses on what he refers to as the “private 
indirect government” and demonstrates how the role of the state as an institution for public 
good has been undermined.  
 
In this context, as I have argued in reference to vigilante socialisation, vigilantes are 
socialised to understand laws and customs of state practice for policing. The socialisation into 
the workings of the state also comes along with the skills of avoiding its inhibition. In a 
society where as Ekeh93 would argue corruption is celebrated as access to a ‘proverbial’ 
national cake, vigilantism does not exist in a different context. The tools of legitimation and 
authority are thus maximised towards achieving political economic functions. 
 
My empirical understanding of constituted state practices is particularly influenced by Peter 
Ekeh’s94 seminal notion of ‘two publics’ in Nigeria. On one hand is the ‘primordial’ public 
defined on the lines of group identity and belonging, the ‘primordial’ public puts obligations 
on its citizens and expects of them to give and contribute to its progress, even if this means 
taking away from the civic public. On the other hand then is the civic public, which gives to 
all citizens but gets very little in return. As Ekeh puts it ‘while the individual seeks to gain 
from the civil public, there is no moral urge on him to give back to the civic public in return 
for his benefits. Duties, that is, are de-emphasized while rights are squeezed out of the civic 
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public with the amorality of an artful dodger’95. Ekeh, sees this process as somehow within a 
logic of dialectics – between the civic and the primordial. The law of this dialectic thereof is 
the understanding that it is legitimate to rob the civic public in order to strengthen the 
primordial public. I have used Ekeh’s insightful conception to interrogate the dynamics of the 
relationships between the Nigerian state (police) and the citizens the police are expected to 
serve. A historical understanding of how the two publics evolved helps us understand why the 
Nigerian state has found it daunting to ensure the security of citizens and the protection of 
property.  
3.4	Police	and	policing:	conceptual	clarifications	
For a long period, scholarly thinking about policing has been examined with a state-centred 
lens. This thinking largely rested on the assumption generated from the sociology of Max 
Weber. The argument being that one of the defining features of the modern sovereign state is 
its monopoly of legitimate force within given spatial boundaries, a monopoly that is 
principally vested – with regard to internal threats to security in the dedicated, uniformed 
institution we have come to know as the police.96 While this thinking emerged, in studies that 
focused on police practice in Western Europe and North America it has equally been 
influential in studies of policing in other context around the world. In the context of my 
inquiry, (the Nigerian context) there have been several scholarly contributions on police 
forces in Nigeria from the origins of colonialism in the mid-19th century to the present that 
have approached the study of policing within this lens; these have emerged from the 
disciplinary stables of historians, sociologists, and anthropologists. Of significant note are the 
contributions of Tamuno,97 Ahire98 already mentioned, and Rotimi99 all three are particularly 
important on the discourse of the early origins and development of the Nigeria Police force. 
Alemika100 has equally contributed a significant body of work on the challenges of policing in 
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contemporary Nigeria. Finally also of importance is Olly Owen’s101 excellent emic 
ethnography of police practice in contemporary Nigeria. My entry point and departure from 
these existing studies of policing is embedded in my approach of understanding vigilantism as 
a constituted part of a plural policing landscape. This study attempts a broader understanding 
of what Hills102 calls the ‘police system’ where she describes it as “an organisation made up of 
groups and individuals, existing for a specific purpose, employing systems of relatively 
structured activity with an identifiable boundary, and driven by actors pursuing their own 
goals according to their own incentives and calculations”.103 As I understand it, Hills’ focus 
here is the national force, the state police in its varied manifestations. However, with the 
present institutionalisation of civil organisations into policing practice our reference to a 
‘police system’ has to be broader. As Alemika and Chukwuma rightly note, there is a need to 
delineate two interrelated concepts. By police, we refer to state agencies charged primarily 
with the enforcement of criminal law and maintenance of order. In an analytical sense, 
policing refers to measures and actions taken by a variety of institutions and groups (formal 
and informal) in society to regulate social relations and practices in order to secure the safety 
of members of the community.104 Johnston has suggested that the history, structure, and 
organisation of criminal justice can be conceptualised along the categories of public vs 
private, formal and informal, and central versus local.105 It is generally accepted that diverse 
networks of commercial bodies, voluntary and community groups, individual citizens, 
national and local governmental regulatory agencies, as well as the public police deliver 
policing in many country contexts around the globe.106 Therefore, while non-state policing 
forms may not have the statutory backing of legal state frameworks, through their practices 
we can observe how they become part of the ‘police system’. 
 
Around the world, plural policing manifests in different forms and guises. As Loader has 
argued, it could be through private policing forms secured through government; it can also be 
transitional police arrangements taking place above government; to markets in policing and 
                                                            
101 Oliver Owen, The Nigerian Police Force: an institutional ethnography, (D.Phil., Thesis, Anthropology, 2013), 
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102  Alice  Hills,  Policing  Africa:  Internal  Security  and  the  Limits  of  Liberalization,  (Boulder  &  London,  Lynne 
Rienner Publications, 2000), 10. 
103 Ibid., 10‐11. Hills takes this definition from Daft’s definition of Organisation. R. Daft, Organization: Theory 
and Design (St Paul, MN: West, 1992), 9. 
104 E.E.A Alemika and I.C. Chukwuma, Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria, CLEEN Foundation, Justice 
Sector Reform, 3. 
105 Les Johnston, The Rebirth of Private Policing, (New York: Routledge, 1992), 6. 
106 Trevor Jones and Tim Newburn, eds. Plural Policing: A Comparative Perspective. (London and New York, 
Routledge, 2006), 1. 
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security services unfolding beyond government; and also policing activities engaged in by 
institutions organised by citizens alongside government.107 Through its practices, 
vigilantism108 has changed the way we think of policing at least in a Nigerian context, but 
police practice has also changed vigilante practice, the interaction has created a certain kind of 
symbiotic interpenetration. This I argue has to be embraced not just as current practice but 
also as the future of policing. Therefore, the history of vigilante practice is better understood 
when we equally track the history of the Nigerian police. In studying policing solely within 
the boundaries of the Nigerian Police Force (NPF), I argue that a substantive category of 
policing is left out. The approach in this thesis understands vigilantism as a relational 
phenomenon, i.e. vigilantism studied in relation to the state; and the core state institution that 
is often in interaction with vigilante groups is the police.  
To understand the relationship between the police and vigilante groups we turn to scholarly 
works that focus on the relationships and interactions between state and non-state actors in 
relation to administrative, law and order, and security functions. They refer to ‘twilight 
institutions’109, ‘polycephaly’110, and ‘heterarchy’111 multi-choice policing112, for instance, 
enriching our understanding of a phenomenon which is characterised by cooperation, co-
option, and in some cases conflict. Understood collectively, the notions of ‘polycephaly’, 
‘twilight institutions’, ‘multi-choice policing’ and ‘heterarchy’ demonstrate that in the fields 
of governing security and local order, state actors and state codes (law) are merely a category 
of actors amongst others. Therefore, it is critical to understand, how security is locally 
conceptualised – in a broad sense within the spatial area I have, studied security is about 
protection against local crime and personal security, protection of property, like livestock and 
access to justice and resolution of public disputes.113 Such matters concern people on a day-
to-day basis. We only gain a deeper understanding when we identify the multiplicity of actors 
                                                            
 
108 Over the years, the concept of vigilantism has had quite a negative connotation; here I use it as a category of 
non‐state policing. 
109 Christian Lund, Twilight Institutions: Public Authority and Local Politics in Africa, (Blackwell Publishing, 2007) 
110 See Thomas Bierschenk and Jean‐Pierre Olivier de Sardin, “Local Powers and a distant state in rural Central 
African Republic”,  in  Journal of Modern African Studies, 30, no.97,  (1997), 441‐468, and Thomas Bierschenk, 
“Powers in the Village: Rural Benin between democratisation and decentralisation” in, Africa, 73, (2003) 145 ‐
173. 
111 Georg Klute, and Birgit Mbalo, The Problem of Violence: Local Conflict Settlement  in Contemporary Africa, 
Topics in interdisciplinary African Studies, vol. 21, (Rudiger Koppe Verlag, 2011) 
112 Baker, Bruce Multi‐Choice Policing in Africa, (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2008), 6. 
113 Funmi Olonisakin; Eka Ikpe; and Paschal Badong, The Future of Security and Justice for the Poor: A ‘Blue Sky’ 
Think‐Piece, (CSDG Policy Studies, no. 21, 2009), 13. 
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and the varied processes of negotiation that are constantly in motion.114 Additionally, in order 
to understand insecurity in Africa, one needs to contextualize the state as all encompassing, 
by looking at the form and function of the state and the politics, which it creates.115 My 
empirical inquiry is interested in overlaps, multiplicities, divergent and convergent patterns of 
practice and relationships between various actors. 
On the one hand, when non-state security and justice actors are excluded, a major part of the 
security sector is left unaccounted for. On the other hand, the challenge for international 
organisations and Nigerian governments has been a cautionary and withdrawn engagement 
with non-state actors for fear of obvious risks that this entails. 
3.4.1	The	Nigeria	police:	An	Introduction	
The origins and establishment of the Nigerian police force as an institution of colonial 
governance is best understood within the context of the indirect rule policy. Given the 
character of colonial rule, police forces were the instrument used to sustain alien domination. 
As it relates to the security roles, the structure of what was then the colonial police force 
critically shaped the relationship between the state and society in colonial and then post-
colonial Nigeria. The goal was to overcome the legitimacy crisis and to achieve the extractive, 
accumulation and taxation objectives of the colonial state. The colonial state, its legitimacy 
crisis and its preoccupation with ‘law and order’ threw up a specific state structure, state 
personnel and institutions to achieve these objectives.116 
 
According to Ahire, the function of colonial policing through the enactment of ordinances and 
laws extended state authority not through persuasion, but by coercively compelling 
obedience.117 He argues that colonial policing adopted two major forms, militaristic and civil 
policing. Ahire writes that militaristic policing:  
 
                                                            
114 Dieter Neubert, “Competing Orders and  the Limits of Local Forms of Socio‐Political Organisation”,  in The 
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(Rudiger Koppe Verlag, 2011),  49‐68 
115 This approach has been developed in, Mustapha, et al., (forthcoming November 2015) ‘Jos: A Decade of Fear 
and  Violence  in  central Nigeria’  and  Jos:  Top‐Down  and  Bottom‐Up  Approaches  to  Conflict  Resolution’,  in 
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…denotes the use of physical force, or the threat of it, by the police 
against internal and external challenges to the survival and acceptance 
of the colonial state and its authority…in colonial Nigeria, the 
militaristic style of policing dominated the period between 1860 and 
1914, when the police, in conjunction with other colonial armed forces 
and coercive apparatuses, joined hands to conquer the indigenous 
societies and to pacify indigenous resistance to colonial rule.118  
 
Accordingly, the militaristic form of policing following conquest was restricted to events of 
economic crisis and social upheavals like anti-tax protest, and pockets of resistance across the 
country. On the other hand, civil policing in Ahire’s conception: 
 
 …is the extension of police coercion beyond the narrow confines of 
the workplace or public order into all aspects of the superstructure. In 
other words, civil policing refers to policed regulation of auxiliary 
economic functions, (and) public order…In this regard, the police 
were involved with activities like the regulation of environmental and 
moral hygiene, licensing duties, guard duties, regulating public 
assemblies, suppressing secret societies, oracles, and other cultural 
activities…In colonial Nigeria, civil policing featured mainly after the 
completion of the main wave of conquests and pacifications, after 
1914…it was a means of extending state control and making it more 
efficient. It was demilitarized coercion.119  
 
Ahire’s approach here provides valued analysis when conceptualised as ‘forms’ of policing or 
varied modus operandi of policing. The problem, however, is that Ahire presents the two in a 
linear process, with the civil form sequentially succeeding the militaristic form. However, as 
he does allude in his analysis and as I have shown in this section and previous chapters, these 
forms of policing did not straddle particular periods in any distinct fashion. Rather, they 
existed and were practised concurrently. 
 
Ibeanu and Momoh rightly argue that while there is variance in the understanding of 
insecurity from the colonial to the post-colonial context and the forces that constituted such 
threats to security equally vary, in both cases ‘security has had an unchanging and fixated 
meaning. Security is about the state; it is both the prerogative and obligation of the state and 
its controllers to protect them, and it is in this context that the Nigerian police emerged and 
continued to develop in the post colony.’120 In sum, the post-colonial Nigerian Police Force 
(NPF) is not attuned to be in the service of ordinary citizens, neither is it obligated to operate 
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under democratic norms and principles; peoples of the colony were subjects who were not 
practically entitled to be protected by the state. Conceptualisations of security are not 
necessarily state centric; personal security, security nexus around the family and community 
as observed by Baker121 are valid and should not be discounted. In post-colonial Nigeria, the 
people developed a culture of not expecting the state to protect them.  
 
As I have analysed previously, some important monographs have documented the history of 
the Nigeria Police Force (NPF). What is lacking in the literature is not just the absence of a 
study that focuses on a history of non-state policing, but more generally, the literature on 
policing in Nigeria lacks a historical ethnography of policing. While Kemi Rotimi122 does 
document the politics and dynamics of decentralized policing of colonial Nigeria, providing 
insight on a macro level and Olly Owen’s123 contribution does an excellent job of providing 
us with a contemporary ethnography of policing. There remains a gap in our historical 
knowledge of policing at the micro (local) level. One of the objectives of my thesis is to 
address this gap. I argue that when studying policing solely within the boundaries of the 
Nigerian Police Force (NPF) an important aspect of policing is left out. From when it was 
established, the institution of policing in Nigeria was plural. Attempts to centralise it looked to 
have succeeded, but I argue only on the surface. Plurality has re-emerged on the ground and 
has continued to evolve and recreate itself. Institutional state policing in Nigeria from the 
onset was instituted on a plural basis. I argue that plurality within the context of Nigerian 
policing has to be approached and understood on two levels. For lack of better categories, 
there is a macro and a micro level. It is my contention that to understand the current and 
emerging issues around policing practice and attempts at policing reform there is a need to 
properly grasp macro and micro historical trajectories of plural policing in Nigeria. The macro 
level refers to the dynamic between the Nigerian state at the centre and its constituent parts. 
At this level, the focus is on the debates and discourses in academia and within Nigerian 
politics for and against the decentralization of the police, referring not just too current debates 
but also drawing on such debates from the last decade of British colonialism. My thesis is 
particularly focused on the micro level; this refers to the plurality of actors engaged in, and 
debates about, everyday policing. I show that this plurality is not merely a function of current 
practice but it is also traceable to a specific historical moment, from the last decade of British 
colonialism. Based on the narrative the study shows that even though they evolved on 
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different trajectories, the macro and micro processes both constitute key drivers of attempts to 
reform policing in Nigeria. For clarity, my use of macro and micro levels government indeed 
refers to scale, federal (centre) and local levels of the Nigerian state. Furthermore, I also use 
this to refer to particular types of policing. 
	3.5	Vigilantism	
The term vigilante is used in contemporary Spanish adjectively to mean ‘watchful’ and as a 
noun ‘watchman’ or ‘guard’ and appears to have entered North American English from the 
south during the nineteenth century.124 The concept was used to describe a plethora of non-
state security actors that were active in the United States. Cowboys in western epics, to self-
help security groups on the streets of San Francisco and New York have all been described as 
vigilantes. Amongst Africanist scholars, Ray Abrahams125 is recognised as perhaps the first to 
give the contemporary phenomenon of vigilantism scholarly attention. Abrahams has 
compared and analysed a wide range of vigilante practices, from nineteenth century Vigilance 
committees in 19th century America to 20th century death squads in the Philippines126, and 
vigilante groups organised to combat cattle rustling amongst the Nyamwezi of Tanzania.127 
Although the word ‘vigilantism’ is widely invoked to refer to actions taken to control 
behaviour deemed to be ‘deviant’, outside the purview of the official justice system, there is 
as yet no scholarly consensus on what vigilantism is – especially as regards the nature of its 
relationship with the state. Johnston128 argues that a key feature of vigilantism consists in its 
being ‘a voluntary activity engaged in by “active citizens” (private voluntary agents) without 
the state’s authority or support’. Johnston in an earlier conceptualisation was keen to show the 
characterisation of vigilantism as ‘autonomous’ this is contrasted to ‘responsible’ 
citizenship.129 As I will show in my analysis this definition is too narrow and does not 
accommodate varied vigilante typologies. Rosenbaum and Sederberg130 and David 
Kowalewski131 on the other hand conclude that vigilantism is establishment violence, 
perpetrated in furtherance of conservative ends and designed to create, maintain, or recreate 
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an established socio-political order.’ Vigilantes can be state officials or private citizens. In 
other words, the lines are blurred.  
 
Michael L Fleisher132 examines the state sponsored incarnation of the Sungusungu vigilante 
group amongst the Kuria of Tanzania. Suzette Heald133 shows how ceding power to local 
communities reverses the centralism of the state and opens up a divide between the different 
branches of government – political administration supporting the vigilante groups, while 
police and judiciary opposing This sentence seems to be incomplete. What we observe is a 
phenomenon that suggests that even at the local level the state is not a homogenous entity. 
Through our study of vigilantism, we see how different branches of the state find themselves 
in opposition to one another regarding their relations and engagement with vigilante groups. 
David Anderson134 studied the activities of urban vigilantes in Nairobi Kenya (Mungiki and 
Taliban) exploiting urban insecurity for material gain. This heightens urban violence and it is 
seen to be both criminal and political in character.  
 
Two important volumes on vigilantism are by David Pratten and Atreyee Sen135 and Thomas 
G. Kirsch and Tilo Gratz136. Among other things, the authors make three important points that 
I find relevant for my conceptualisation of vigilantism. Firstly, the case studies demonstrate 
that vigilantism is a relational phenomenon – relational to the state. The primary focus of the 
authors here is the need to question the conception that sees the state as a unitary entity. In 
considering questions of legality and illegality, legitimacy and illegitimacy, state and non-
state, we are able to subject existing notions of power and authority not just at the context 
case level, but also at a broader conceptual level.  
 
Secondly, the volume makes the important argument that vigilante groups can change their 
rationale from filling a gap and responding to a quest for order by society to acting as agents 
of state power and legitimating the authority of the state. As I show in my thesis, this 
paradoxical relationship between vigilante groups and the state is not always necessarily a 
function of historical change across time; vigilante practice, which I have observed, acts in the 
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interest of strengthening the state and simultaneously undermines it. Vigilantism as Abrahams 
notes has a power to generate ambivalence. Constitutive of vigilante group practice is the 
agency of citizens to support or stand in for the state, but communities are not homogeneous, 
as elements within such communities may try to exploit community initiatives for their own 
ends.137 
 
In understanding vigilante practice, particularly when it borders on criminality, we should 
seek to situate the function of political economy, as violence has a capacity to create new 
forms of patronage, power and control. Since the 1999, return to civil rule in Nigeria Vigilante 
groups have found reason to organise themselves and strived to further legitimate their 
existence. Bruce Baker138 examines the idea of multi-choice policing in Uganda and Sierra 
Leone, argues that there is a range of options available for the average citizen, and different 
groups do different things. A shortcoming of Baker’s otherwise useful contribution is the fact 
that the arguments made and even the cases presented are largely descriptive and Baker’s over 
enthusiasm with the non-state category of policing means he fails to adequately recognise the 
role the state is already playing in sanctioning and legitimating non-state actors. I have 
observed from my research that the so-called paradox of failures of state policing constituting 
the objective of non-state policing and yet the state is still required to support the non-state 
does not necessarily hold. What is rather unfolding is the state does recognise its failures or 
weakness and is actively using the non-state- as an extension of the state; the lines of state and 
non-state are quite blurred. This is not to read as a commendation of the state, rather it 
describes processes of statecraft beyond a state-centric notion, showing how intertwined and 
interdependent the state-society nexus often is. 
3.5.1	The	Nigerian	Context	
There is a growing body of literature that has examined the various types and diverse 
functions of vigilante groups and non-state policing structures in Nigeria. These existing 
studies are a reflection of Nigeria's pluralistic landscape, focusing on the activities of vigilante 
groups, local militias and local private guarding outfits. The research has particularly focused 
on the southern zones of Nigeria,139 though there has also been some research work on the 
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religious functions of non-state actors in northern Nigeria140, and recent research on the role 
of non-state security actors, particularly ethnic militia groups, in mobilization and group 
violence in some of central Nigeria’s conflict theatres.141 Therefore, it is difficult to address 
this phenomenon as a Nigerian collective, as like most Nigerian social phenomena it is a 
product of a highly diverse society, with varied regional and community histories.  
 
Vigilantes have organised at different levels and through varied means: from lineages to 
clans, ethnic groups to religious organisations. They are present in many locations and operate 
in different settings, from villages to wards, districts and city streets. They function for 
different reasons, from fighting crime - particularly armed robbery and theft - to criminality 
and political lobbying. They have championed the quest for different modes of citizenship, 
other than the nation: religious and ethnic forms of belonging, such as Hisbah – and the 
discourses of belonging to and mobilizing a larger Muslim ummah. The Yoruba Oodua 
People’s Congress (OPC) - championing neo-ethnic nationalism. While most of the literature 
has focused on vigilantism amongst the larger Nigerian ethnic groups - the Bakassi Boys 
among the Igbo, the Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) among the Yoruba, and the Yanhisba 
and Yanbanga142 among the Hausa of Kano. Other studies show how the phenomenon is 
unfolding amongst minority ethnic groups of the Niger Delta143 and the Middle Belt area. I 
would argue that what is lacking is a further deepening of our understanding of vigilantism 
within the Middle Belt zone of Nigeria, hence the focus of my study on Plateau State. 
 
In a thematic debate and understanding of vigilantism in Nigeria can be categorised in to two 
broad categories. On the one hand are those who make the case for a ‘cultural’ understanding 
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and on the other hand are the proponents of a ‘rational’. We start with the cultural reading. In 
an attempt to put, forward an explanation for the rise of vigilantism in southern Nigeria 
Pratten and Gore, amongst the key proponents of the cultural reading lay emphasis on the 
primacy of cultural roots and practices that have a historical basis and relevance within the 
community. They argue that, vigilantism or vigilante action in Nigeria is: 
 
…based directly on secret society revivals or drawing indirectly on the 
idiom of the secret society, has been a common response to crime since the 
[Nigerian] civil war [1967-1970]. Contemporary vigilantism therefore 
represents the articulation of claims to a set of rights based on the historical 
and spiritual legitimacy of young powerful men...defending the village 
under the protection of locally reputed charms, medicines and oaths.144 
 
They further argue that these cultural practices are employed by these youth organisations and 
vigilante groups not just as tools to re-establish order, but more importantly to legitimise their 
participation in Nigeria's 'politics of plunder,' which though traced back to the historical oil 
boom, was given a vent and intensified after the transition of the late 1990s. 
 
 The second reading or the ‘rational’ strand argues that the vigilantism of the late 1990s are a 
product of popular institutional struggles, which are however unfortunately vulnerable and 
subject to manipulation by the state. While vigilantism is a response to the failures of the 
police force and escalating criminality, it is also a response to a predatory state that had a long 
legacy of military rule and high handedness in the maintenance of security.145 The experience 
of the state’s arrogation of consolidated violence manifest in the production of legitimate 
violence. In the post-1999 era, these groups have been hijacked by the political class and 
deployed in the pursuance of political goals, involving tactics such as thuggery and electoral 
violence. As Meagher argues, it is these developments, rather than pre-colonial security 
systems, secret societies or opportunism of disgruntled youth, which account for the rise of 
vigilante groups in the 1990s Nigeria.146  
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From what I have gathered from my study of vigilante groups in Plateau State Nigeria, it is 
clear to me that neither the cultural nor the rational arguments can stand alone. Rather the 
phenomenon I have studied in its historical form and observed in the contemporary speaks to 
both cultural and rational practices. In some cases, the state actively opposes a group, in an 
effort to maintain its monopoly on the means of violence and on the administration of justice, 
while in another case the state decides to look the other way, or give its tacit approval. There 
are other cases where the state seeks to infiltrate or influence, or even actively take the group 
over and reinvent it. I approach this study understanding that these terms are problematic, and 
not always separate and distinct – the lines are sometimes blurred, and there are several layers 
of understanding. While vigilantism may often serve as a vehicle for political, economic, 
generational, religious, and ethnic jockeying. An instrumentalist view, while relevant may not 
be able to explain the phenomenon of vigilantism, as we know it is about more than that – 
they are not just tools to be used by politicians. In the final analysis, all we can do is to 
present extensive understanding of specific contexts based on grounded local histories.147 This 
will facilitate comparative research on vigilantism in different contexts. 
 
From the foregoing analysis, four key conceptual perspectives and explanations of vigilantism 
drive this study. The classical conceptualization is that which understands vigilantism as a 
response to state policing failures: vigilante groups emerged and are still sustained because 
the failure of the post-colony (Nigeria) leaves gaps in the provision of services, security 
included. Vigilantism therefore feeds off unsatisfactory provision of law and order by the 
state. I do recognize that some of the vigilante groups that have been studied in different parts 
of Nigeria could be understood within this conception of a quest for order, directly or 
indirectly linked to the inability of the state to police the totality of its territory. However, I 
argue that this response to policing failures does not necessary amount to state weakness. 
Vigilante action could equally create a contrasting variation. Fourchard148 in his study of the 
Oodu’a People’s Congress (OPC) in southwest Nigeria makes this point quite convincingly 
where he argues that instead of looking at vigilante groups as a supposed decline of the police 
force or weakness and failure of the state, we should consider them as an attempt to introduce 
                                                            
147  Several  empirical  studies have  analysed  this  sub‐strand of non‐state  security  actors.  Some of which  are: 
Abrahams,  Vigilant  Citizens…,  Pratten  and  Sen,  Global  Vigilantes…and,  Rita  Abrahamsen  and  Michael  C. 
Williams  “Introduction:  the  privatisation  and  globalisation  of  security  in  Africa”,  International  Relations,  21, 
(2007), 13‐41, Bruce Baker, Security in Post‐Conflict Africa: The Role of Non state Policing, (New York: CRC Press, 
Taylor and Francis, 2010). 
148 Fourchard, “A New Name for an Old Practice…”  
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forms of community policing,149 clearly showing the bottom-up dynamic of non-state policing 
in Nigeria.150 Secondly, the approach and understanding of vigilante groups in this thesis are 
borrowed from the notion that understands vigilantism as everyday policing, as Buur and 
Jensen151 argue that there are contexts where vigilantism can be understood as a form of 
community based policing152, in constant interaction with the state (police) and with society. 
Consequently vigilantism is constitutive of a policing landscape that is characterized by 
plurality; a plurality of actors and practices.  
Thirdly, also important to the conceptualization of vigilantism in my work is the attention that 
Fourchard gives to the historical process.153 While an ethnographic understanding of vigilante 
practice is clearly useful, in agreeing with Fourchard I argue that we gain more insight when 
we explore the historical trajectory. I therefore trace continuities and discontinuities in plural 
policing practice from its early colonial and post-colonial versions of the more recent, 
organized and structured form. Finally Gratz’s analytical notion of vertical encompassment,154 
explains how vigilantes set out to gain legitimacy by demonstrating effectiveness over time, 
vertical encompassment helps us explain the evolution of practice from night patrols on a 
small scale to setting up road blocks, migrating from punishments informed by the given 
cultural context to mimicking statutory institutions (police and courts) showing movements 
and shifts of practice and punishment across historical periods, migrating from one legal code 
to another, and creating new legal codes that cover periodic time across different generations.  
 
My entry point and departure from these existing studies of policing is imbedded in my 
approach of understanding vigilantism as a constituted part of a plural policing landscape or 
what Hills155 calls ‘police system’. Through its practices, vigilantism has changed the way we 
think of policing at least in a Nigerian context, but policing has also changed vigilante 
                                                            
149  It must be observed though that there are some exceptions.  In some cases,  it  is not the state making the 
attempt; some vigilantes have been anti‐state. In Anambra state however, from 1997 to 2000 the state house 
of assembly passed a  law  to  transform  (co‐opt)  the Bakassi Boys hired by  traders’ association  into Anambra 
Vigilante Services. The coexistence with formal police was not smooth  
150 Fourchard, “A new name for an old practice”, 16‐40. 
151 Lars Buur and Steffen Jensen, “Introduction: Vigilantism and the policing of everyday  life  in South Africa”, 
African Studies 63, 2 (2004), 140. 
152 Note community based policing is different from community policing. 
153 Fourchard, “A new name for an old practice”, 16‐40. 
154 Tilo Gratz, ‘Devi and his Men: The Rise and Fall of a Vigilante Movement in Benin’ in Thomas Kirsch and Tilo 
Gratz, eds. Domesticating Vigilantism in Africa, (James Currey, 2010), 79‐97. 
155 Alice Hills, “Policing Africa”, 10. 
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practice, the interaction has created a certain kind of symbiotic interpenetration. Therefore, 
the history of vigilante practice is better understood when we equally track the history of the 
Nigerian police. I argue that studying policing solely within the boundaries of the Nigerian 
Police Force (NPF), a considerable category of policing is left out. From when it was 
established, the institution of policing in Nigeria was plural. Attempts to centralise it looked to 
have succeeded, but I argue only on the surface.  
 
3.6	Socialisation	as	Analytical	Framework		
The notion of socialisation is of course broad, broader than how it has been applied in this 
study. For this study, socialisation is used as an important key for analysis of institutions of 
policing. Two important activities are taking place, which have been captured as processes of 
socialisation. Firstly, the socialisation of identification and secondly, the socialisation of 
practice. The socialisation of identification is the process of experiencing commonality and 
connectedness, commonality being what a group shares: features and attributes, in our context 
this is manifest in social backgrounds, as most members of these groups are drawn from the 
lower scales of the ladder, and have minimal levels of Western education. On the other hand, 
connectedness is what makes them a unit –what connects and holds them together: there are 
bridges and then there are chains. By bridges, I mean a sense of duty, a sense of serving the 
community and doing well not just for the community but also for themselves. They want to 
secure a means of livelihood. In reference to chains, I speak of atrocities perpetrated in the 
course of doing the job. The social functions of perpetrating violence extrapolated in chapter 
7. In regards to the socialisation of practice, the main concern is to understand how 
individuals and groups engaged in policing obtain and come to have the specific competencies 
they exhibit. Whether we refer to the NAPF of the colonial era, or the Yanbanga of the 1970s, 
Community Policing initiatives of the 1980s, or more recently the Vigilante Group of Nigeria 
– what all share in common is that they are grass root based, and they are clearly authored 
with a considerable involvement of the state (local, provincial and national). This study seeks 
to understand the socialisation of practice, across this historical trajectory. Concisely, how 
have individuals and groups acquired the knowledge and gained the understanding of policing 
practice? 
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3.6.1	The	Socialisation	of	Identification		
Identity is an important category in the analysis and understanding of Nigeria’s social 
landscape. Scholars of Nigerian society have used the notion of identity to understand the 
dynamics at play in its different segments. Obviously, the literature offers different 
applications of identity. There are those who see identity as a distinguishing characteristic of 
social groups, identity as structured sameness, and a given identity according to such 
conclusions determines behaviour. This was influenced by the work of early 
anthropologist/colonial administrators.156 The other major conclusions we can draw from the 
literature are analysis that attribute agency to actors, actors shape identities and use same to 
further their interest. Drawing from empirical research amongst the Hausa minority group in 
Ibadan Nigeria, Cohen argued that ethnic identity is a form of political organisation where 
cultural boundaries are invoked in order to secure the group’s symbolic capital.157 Such 
conclusions though leave us with unresolved problems, the former ends up neglecting 
constant shifts over long periods and the latter on the other hand reduces impacts of notions to 
the conscious choices and strategies of key actors.158 This often leaves us with an 
instrumentalist view of religion and ethnicity. 
 There is the extrapolation initially influenced by Marxian frameworks that understand the use 
of identity (ethnicity and religion) as a tool for elitist political manipulation.159 Identity as a 
category of social belonging has also been deployed in analysis of conflict and sectarian 
violence. We find the interaction of ethnicity, religion and elite interest inextricably linked to 
historical and contemporary outbreaks of violent conflict.160 Suberu asserts that identity 
conflicts in Nigeria emanate from two sources, “The general socio-psychological struggle to 
secure, assert, affirm, enhance and promote ethnic (religious, or other) group worth, identity 
                                                            
156 In some cases, these two categories were separate; however, there are several instances where individuals 
doubled as administrators and anthropologists. 
157 Abner Cohen, Custom and Politics in Urban Africa: A Study of Hausa Migrants in Yoruba Towns, (London: 
Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1969), 193‐194. 
158 Geschiere, The Perils of Belonging, 31. 
159 Two major works make this point, see Yusuf Bala Usman, The Manipulation of Religion in Nigeria: 1977‐
1987, (Vanguard Printers and Publishers, 1987) and Okwudiba Nnoli, Ethnic Politics in Nigeria, (Enugu: Fourth 
Dimension, 1978). 
160 Samuel Egwu, Ethnicity and Religious Violence in Nigeria, (Abuja: African Centre for Democratic Governance 
(AFRIGON), 2001), and Higazi, “The Politics of Urban Violence in Jos”, Politique africaine, 3‐14. 
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or integrity and the competition among ethnic groups or more accurately among group elites 
for scarce material rewards or resources.”161  
From the foregoing, one can assert that in a Nigerian spatial and thematic context, identity is 
still useful in understanding the boundaries that delineate social groupings and the forms of 
mobilisation. Whether it is the invocation of ethnic and religious identities for purposes of 
political mobilisation, or the extreme form of mobilisation for purposes of collective violence, 
identity in this form of practice still has analytical currency. However, for our purposes I want 
to use an analytical conceptualisation that seeks to explain the multiple forms and various 
ways in which individuals and group members within a plural policing context as a collective 
attribute the significance of their role and function in society, and identity as conceptualised 
from the foregoing cases referred above falls short.  
Cooper and Brubaker have raised their concern on how identity has been appropriated as an 
all-explaining notion. To the extent that there is a tendency to “conceptualize all affinities and 
affiliations, all forms of belonging, all experiences of commonality, connectedness, and 
cohesion, all self-understandings and self-identifications in the idiom of identity saddles us 
with a blunt, flat undifferentiated vocabulary.”162 Furthermore, in pointing out another 
problematic of the value of identity as a category of practice and analysis Cooper and 
Brubaker point to how identity is attached to certain qualifiers and conceptualised as unstable, 
multiple, fragmented, and fluid – the question being, why a concept that is routinely 
characterised as “multiple, fragmented and fluid”163 should be conceptualised as identity, in a 
singularity. Instead of identity, Cooper and Brubaker suggest we rather use three clusters of 
more flexible terminology: “identification and categorization”; “self-understanding and social 
location”; and “commonality, connectedness and groupness.”164 In sum, their main point is 
that the concept of identity is too ambiguous to be of analytical value and thus to maximise its 
analytical potential and for clarity we are urged to break it down into component parts. 
                                                            
161 Rotimi Suberu, 1991 State and Local Government Re‐organization in Nigeria, (Ibadan: Institute of African 
Studies, University of Ibadan, 1994). 
162 Fredrick Cooper and Roger Brubaker, “Identity”, in Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History, 
Fredrick Cooper, (Berkeley, Los Angeles, London: University of California Press, 2005), 60. 
163Ibid., 63‐64. 
164 Ibid., 71‐75. 
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3.6.2	The	Socialisation	of	Practice	
The other component of the socialisation process is to understand how vigilantes learn and 
imbibe policing practice. The basis of this proposition is the understanding that socialisation 
in this context is a process of gaining competencies in order to practice, in other words 
learning how to do police work. What influences conditioned the NAPF and vigilante groups 
towards the methods and practices they adopted? Influences are from varied sources. Plural 
policing actors in Plateau State Nigeria have been influenced by their relationships with state 
security institutions like the police and the army. Also important is the cultural context, where 
and when vigilantism emerges. Understanding how plural policing actors learn policing 
practice also shows how policing methods are discarded and some cases maintained and 
carried on to succeeding generations of vigilante members. Over the decades the individuals 
engaged in local grass root forms of policing has changed, for instance in our study the ex-
servicemen recruited to serve in the NAPF are not the same as the retired soldiers who 
constituted the core leadership of the Yanbanga movement of the 1970s. While the vigilante 
group members who were formed as part of the community policing initiative of the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) era, have still remained active since the official 
registration of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria in 1999, the involvement of a younger crop of 
members, with different motivations has created a new dynamic. Different forms of local 
grassroots policing initiatives have come under different influences and socialisation 
processes. It is to again show how vigilante groups operate based on different legal codes, 
some statutory, others influenced by the historical experience of practice carried on from one 
generation of vigilantes to another. Another feature of vigilantism, which I have seeked to 
address in my thesis, is how vigilante practice is a means of earning a livelihood. This has not 
been adequately addressed in the literature. In our understanding of this process, we are able 
to show continuities and discontinuities concerning the role of actors as there are always 
members carried over from a preceding era of plural policing; equally, there are new members 
with new processes of socialisation and new practices.  
3.7.	Plurality	as	an	Analytical	Framework	
 The conceptualisation of plurality in this thesis is broadly taken from notion of legal 
pluralism. The concept of legal pluralism has been the subject of intense scholarly debate and 
controversy over the years. This debate has been on what Benda-Beckman165 refers to as a 
struggle for conceptual hegemony between legal scholars amongst themselves, and legal 
                                                            
165Franz von Benda‐Beckman, “Who’s Afraid of Legal Pluralism?,” Journal of Legal Pluralism, 47, (2002), 41. 
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scholars’ vs legal anthropologists. Benda-Beckman who by his own admission claims he 
started as a legal scholar and later metamorphosed into an anthropologist makes the point that 
many debates between legal scholars and anthropologists on the notion of legal pluralism 
suffer from constant misunderstandings. One of such misunderstandings is the tendency to 
bring the concept of legal pluralism into a one-dimensional level of discourse, in which he 
argues ‘authors look for the one correct or useful concept for both lawyers and social 
scientists, without appreciation of the fact that the other is engaged in a different 
enterprise’166.  
In a legal context, the law is very much normative and closely associated with the state, and 
legal pluralism for such thinking would only apply to cases where the state through 
legislation, court rulings and judgements recognises non-state law.167 An instance would be 
northern Nigeria where we find customary courts of appeal, and sharia courts of appeal with 
the same jurisdiction as the state high courts, presiding over specific cases that draw their 
legal codes from customs, traditions and Islam. My approach to the conception of law, is not 
to see it as strictly resident within the concept of the state, here it is diffused within a plural 
context. Law is conceived as a variable, the questions and methodology are focused on seeing 
law as an analytical concept,168 it is not given, and not normative; rather understanding and 
insight emerges from studying the context and subsequently engaging in comparisons over 
time and space. Law therefore has many existences, it could be embodied in written text, or it 
can also exist in the knowledge of a given people.169  
It is also important to note that, the notion of plurality as I used in this thesis does not suggest 
that legal codes or orders are on equal footing; my basic point is that they are in interaction. In 
my conceptualisation and understanding drawn from Plateau State Nigeria, any approach or 
notion that argues for the existence of a centralist mono-legal or policing construct historically 
or in the current landscape would remain at the level of myth. My conception of legal 
pluralism therefore draws from Sally Falk Moore, particularly where she claims that the social 
structure is constituted by several semi-autonomous fields, their definition is not given by 
                                                            
166 Ibid., 41. 
167 There are particular scholars of  legal pluralism who have argued  for the capturing of pluralism within the 
boundaries of state  law, or within one  legal order  for  instance see, Woodman, Gordon R.  (1998)  ‘Ideological 
combat and social observation: Recent debate about legal pluralism.’ Journal of Legal Pluralism, 42: 21‐59 then 
there are others who argue that this is not sufficient, and difference has to be rooted in different legal orders 
168 Benda‐Beckman, “Who’s is Afraid”, 40. 
169 Ibid., 65‐66. 
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how they are organised but by a processual characteristic, therefore Falk Moore argues that 
the aforementioned semi-autonomous social fields of a pluralistic context  
“…generate rules and customs and symbols internally, but that it is 
also vulnerable to rules and decisions and other forces emanating from 
the larger world by which it is surrounded. [It also has]…rule making 
capacities, and the means to induce or coerce compliance; but it is 
simultaneously set in a larger social matrix which can, and does, affect 
and invade it, sometimes at the invitation of persons inside it…” 170 
Of specific relevance to my conception of plurality is the notion of plural policing. I adopt a 
broad definition of policing, this refers to all organised activity and services provided by 
statutory and non-statutory institutions that seek to ensure and maintain law, order and 
security in a given society. In a traditional state-centric sense, the provision of security and the 
maintenance of law and order are seen as the responsibility of the state to citizens. State 
security and justice institutions are therefore statutorily mandated to provide security, 
guarantee the safety of citizens and secure public and private property. We are however, 
invited and encouraged to consider and adopt notions of plurality171 exactly because in 
various contexts around the globe the state is not alone in providing security and enforcing 
law and order. As I have already discussed in my conceptualisation of the Nigerian state our 
understanding is enriched when we consider the relationships and interactions between state 
and non-state actors in relation to administrative, law and order, and security functions, with 
notions like ‘twilight institutions’172, ‘polycephaly’173, and ‘heterarchy’174 proving useful to 
our understanding of policing. In this sense, policing is thus a phenomenon that is 
characterised by cooperation, co-option, and at times conflict amongst that varied actors 
engaged in the occupation of policing. It then follows that the conceptualisation of policing as 
I have used it and argued from the historical study but also the current state of affairs is a 
mode of statecraft, a means of governing, situated within a plural landscape, that is shaped by 
                                                            
170 Sally Falk Moore, Law as Process: An Anthropological Approach, (LIT James Currey with IAI, 2000), .55. also 
see “Law and Social Change: The Semi‐Autonomous Social Field as an Appropriate Subject of Study,” Law and 
Society Review, 7, (2000), 719‐720.  
171 Bruce Baker calls it Multi‐Choice Policing; see Baker, Multi‐Choice Policing in Africa… 
172 Lund, Twilight Institutions… 
173 See Bierschenk and Olivier de Sardin, “Local Powers and a distant state”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 
441‐468. and Bierschenk, “Powers in the Village”, Africa, 145 ‐173. 
174 Klute and Mbalo, The Problem of Violence… 
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political, economic and social interest and not simply a technical function of state confined to 
the lens of criminologist.175 
3.8.	Authority		
The conceptual framework is also built around the notion of authority, I recognise the 
historical and genealogical discourses around the notion of authority and in deploying it as an 
important pillar of my thesis, I focus on relationships and interactions, and secondly what they 
create. On one level, my thesis is about understanding historical and contemporary 
relationships and interactions. I focus on three-dimensional relationships – vigilante groups 
amongst themselves, vigilantes and the communities they operate in and vigilantes and the 
state. Here authority is deployed with all its relational properties, so who has authority and on 
what basis? Is authority fluid, or static? How is authority distributed? How is authority 
discharged? I begin though with a journey through a genealogy of the concept, of course 
informed by the specific relevance to my framework.  
  
My understanding and conceptualisation of authority is informed first from the Weberian 
conception. In his essay ‘The types of legitimate authority’176 published posthumously in 
1958, Weber proposes a theory of legitimate authority. For Weber legitimate authority is the 
coming together of two things. First there is ‘macht’ power, or better understood in English as 
domination, then there is ‘herrschaft’177 – the relations of domination, ‘to rule’ the probability 
that a command will be obeyed, this is understood as legitimacy. Therefore, power + 
legitimacy equals authority. Therefore, an individual within the social context is treated as an 
embodiment of authority when he possesses both power and the legitimacy to exercise it. 
Weber argues that there are three types of legitimate authority178. First, the legal rational 
authority, based on a system of rules or laws, and legal codes that are accepted by the whole 
society or a majority of it, and are all expected to abide by them. Legal authority therefore is 
not necessarily by agreement; it can also be established via imposition on grounds of 
                                                            
175 See Helene Maria Kyed, Review of Multi‐Choice Policing  in Africa by Bruce Baker, The  Journal of Modern 
African Studies, 47, (2009), 154‐155. 
176 Max Weber “The three types of legitimate rule”, Berkeley Publications in Society and Institutions, 41, (1958), 
1‐11. also see Max Weber Economy and Society: An Outline of  Interpretive Sociology, 2 Vols.  (Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, 1978), 215. 
177  Stefano Guzzini  further  elaborates on  the meaning of herrschaft; he notes,  “The  translation of Weber’s 
concept of Herrschaft  is notoriously difficult. For  its hierarchical element connected to the underlying  idea of 
force/violence,  ‘domination’  seems  most  appropriate;  ‘rule’  captures  better  his  interest  in  regularised 
command competence; and finally, ‘authority’ renders perhaps best his insistence on legitimacy mechanisms” 
in exercising power. See Stefano Guzzini, Re‐reading Weber, or: The Three Fields for the analysis of power  in 
International Relations, (Danish Institute for International Studies, DIIS Working Paper, 29, 2007), 17. 
178 Weber, “The three types”, 215. 
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expediency and utility, and it does not necessarily need to be a democratic society; all it 
means is that there is a system of law.  
 
Secondly, there is traditional authority, based on inheritance or simply put, what has already 
been; there is belief in the sanctity of age-old rules. This is linked either to tradition or to a 
gerontocratic order, and it is not necessarily imposed by force; obedience is hence designated 
according to traditional rule. The third typology in the Weberian concept of legitimate 
authority is charismatic. Like beauty, charisma is determined by the beholder – or the 
followers of a given ruler. An embodiment of charismatic authority is considered to possess 
exceptional qualities that can be constituted as being super-natural. For my purposes, I am 
particularly interested in Weber’s legal-rational and traditional conceptions of authority. It is 
interesting to note that Weber had also conceptualised power within the lens of a historical 
process, ‘a historical evolution of the means of coercion’ as against a Marxian notion of ‘the 
evolution of the means of production.’ Therefore, in the final analysis a Weberian process 
ends with a legal rational authority, where the power of coercion (violence) is expected to be 
the monopoly of the state.  
 
Also important for my understanding of authority is the contribution of Hannah Arendt, in her 
essay “What is Authority?”179 Arendt traces the conception of authority through what we 
regard loosely as the ‘pre-modern period’ developed by Plato, Aristotle, Machiavelli, and 
Weber. Arendt’s objective was to show the trajectory of thinking from traditional society to 
society in the time of the enlightenment, and to show the influence this had on understanding 
power and authority.180 Arendt’s major argument is to see traditional society in terms of 
authority being embedded within the traditional social order where obedience was expected. 
However, this obedience was also usually based upon some type of convincing, persuasion. 
She notes that it is when force or coercion is used that authority has failed.181 Arendt says 
“…Since authority always demands obedience, it is commonly mistaken for some form of 
power or violence. Yet authority precludes the use of external means of coercion; where force 
is used, authority itself has failed. Authority, on the other hand, is incompatible with 
persuasion, which presupposes equality and works through a process of argumentation.”182 
                                                            
179 Hannah Arendt “What  is Authority,”  in  the Portable Hannah Arendt, ed. Peter Baehr  (New York: Penguin 
Books, 2000), 462‐507. also see Hannah Arendt, Between Past and Future, (Penguin Classics, New York, 2006) 
180 Arendt, “What is Authority,”… 
181 Craig Van Gelder, “Defining the  Issues Related to Power and Authority  in Religious Leadership”, Journal of 
Religious Leadership, 6, 2, (2007), 2. 
182 Arendt, Between Past and Future, 92. 
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According to Arendt, and perhaps to put it quite bluntly violence (power) or in my research 
context Iko is the tool of the impotent, the weapon of use for those whom have failed to 
achieve their goals with authority. This would of course read in direct contrast to Weber’s 
celebrated argument of the legal rational authority as a stage where the state has a monopoly 
of the means of coercion (violence). First a little contextualisation on how we should 
juxtapose Weber to Arendt.  
 
Hannah Arendt’s political and social theory was much influenced by her experiences, 
particularly the Second World War. So when Arendt gave us insights on authority, the 
banality of evil, and on violence she was writing within the context of her time, and so was 
Weber, as he wrote before the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century. This is not a wholesale 
acceptance of everything Weber wrote, and there are fundamental questions and critiques of 
his work, not least by Leo Straus183 and Carl Friedrich184. Peter Blau185 notes that Weber’s 
work was subjected to some kind of opposing critique, for instance “historians criticised him 
for disregarding the specific historical conditions under which the social phenomena he 
analyses have taken place, which sometimes they claim leads him to combine historical 
events that occurred centuries apart into a conception of a social system.”186 Sociologists on 
the other hand Blau argues have criticised Weber of being “preoccupied with interpreting 
unique historical constellations, such as Western capitalism, instead of studying recurrent 
social phenomena which make it impossible to develop testable generalisations about social 
structures.”187 Perhaps of most relevance for me is Peter Blau’s critique on the Weberian 
conception of authority, Blau points out that “…the substantive theory has been criticised for 
focusing primarily on the beliefs that legitimate authority, while neglecting to conceptualize 
systematically the structural condition that gave rise to it.”188  
 
My departure from Weber therefore is to argue that all forms or types of legitimate authority I 
describe and analyse are legitimated by some form of law, norm, or legal code, but also by 
other variables that I do not describe as traditional, or as charismatic rather as the symbolic 
but also as customary. What I refer to as traditional-customary authority in my context is 
                                                            
183 Leo Straus, Natural Right and History, (University of Chicago Press, 1953), 35‐40. 
184Carl J. Friedrich, “Some Observations on Weber’s Analysis of Bureaucracy,” in Readers in Bureaucracy, Robert 
K. Merton et al eds (Glencoe, 1952), 31. 
185 Peter M. Blau, “Critical Remarks on Weber’s Theory of Authority”, The American Political Science Review, 
Vol. LVII, 2, (1963), 305‐316. 
186 Ibid., 305. 
187 Ibid., 305. 
188 Ibid., 316. 
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informed and backed up by state law. It is for example colonial state law that made the 
traditional ruler ‘powerful’ and relevant under indirect rule and thus created a system of 
decentralized despotism. It is the same state law, this time in the postcolony that then stripped 
the traditional ruler of all his executive local powers and replaced him with the educated elite 
cum politician. Yet still, the traditional ruler that I have studied also possesses such agency 
that propels him to creatively invent local systems like vigilantism for maintaining and 
sustaining relevance, and still exercise such power based on a hybrid legal code. Traditional 
cultural rights of being the custodian of the land and thus its protector but also expectations 
from the state that he contributes in keeping and maintaining peace constitute this code. The 
objective of my case studies is to show a fragmentation of the legal-rational authority. By 
differentiating actors I will therefore first show that, there are several legal-rational actors, 
then I will follow up by trying to deconstruct these categories and show the dynamics and 
basis for interaction. Also important for my analysis is the discussion of the historical 
trajectory that creates these varied contexts of legitimated authority.  
 
My approach is therefore set up to provide an understanding of state authority through its 
constituted parts and (Institutions, statutory laws, and practices) and its unconstituted parts 
(agents, non-statutory codes and practices). The question that follows would be to inquire how 
the state became formal and informal, hindrance and facilitator – It is constituted and 
unconstituted characteristics are a product of a historical trajectory. This trajectory is 
expanded through the lens of ‘decentralised despotism’ or stratified citizenship. When people 
of the colony found themselves at the bottom of this stratified ladder of citizenship, they 
emerge as subjects of state rule. This state rule is manifested in the creation of the ‘native’ for 
the purposes of providing labour. In the postcolony, the ‘native’ becomes a victim of physical 
violence and structural violence, as is the case in SAP. The historical process creates relevant 
dialectics as a basis for interaction. There is dialectic between the civil and the primordial 
publics; this dialectic is over the control of the economy. Then there is dialectic between 
‘traditional’189 and ‘modern’190 for authority as the control of the political. When considered 
together, we have a dialectic that has rumbled over time for the control of the political 
economy. This is how we should understand the relationship between the Nigerian police and 
vigilante groups. Through the content of these relationships and interaction, I then attempt to 
                                                            
189 Traditional here refers to traditional and customary leaders. 
190 Modern here is in reference to educated elites, who emerged on the wave of nationalism and by 
independence wrestled power not just from the colonialist but also asserted their authority over traditional 
rulers, who they always regarded as backward. 
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show what it then creates. Vigilantism has evolved through processes of negotiation, 
expressed through varied forms of practice. This practice ranges from the symbolic, the 
cultural, and the socio-political. It reveals forms of practice that seek to gain legitimacy and 
appropriate authority through the adoption of modern global policing practice, while still 
holding on to recognisable forms domiciled in the local context. In sum, the concepts of 
plurality and authority constitute entry points for our understanding of the dynamics of 
interaction. Plurality is about practice and authority is about how practice is legitimized and 
how practice is governed and regulated. 
 
 
Figure 4: The Diagram shows the Conceptual Framework illustrating the centrality of the two 
relational concepts used in this study. 
3.9.	Understanding	Violence		
The concept of violence as I have used it in this thesis is understood on two core 
conceptualisations. The first perspective is structural violence, which according to John 
Galtung, is violence that “is built into the structure, and shows up as unequal power and 
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consequently as unequal life chances.”191 Secondly, violence in this study is also understood 
in its basic meaning. This is as action or behaviour involving physical force intended to injure, 
impair or cause death of someone or something, “a form of power, it is a doing-to and a 
being-done-to, the object of which is the human body.”192 
 
Following on this premise, I contextualised violence in two particular analytical frameworks, 
violence as routinised everyday practice and violence as manifest by epic outbreaks of 
sectarian collective violence. What connects these conceptions is how I have deployed all in 
understanding a sociological history of plural policing. My conceptualisations of violence are 
informed by scholarly insights drawn from two key thinkers. I have relied on Walter 
Benjamin, and Slavoj Zizek. In his essay ‘The Critique of Violence,’ Walter Benjamin 
extrapolates the difference between divine and mythic violence. Mythic violence is 
understood as legalised violence. According to Benjamin, mythic violence has a close 
relationship with the law, in the sense that the instating and maintaining of the law requires 
coercion, which is inflicted on a body. Divine violence on the other hand is the antithesis of 
mythic violence; it is a break in accountability, divine violence stands in opposition to mythic 
violence. Benjamin writes, “…if mythic violence is law making, divine violence is law 
destroying; if the former sets boundaries, the latter destroys them; …if the former is bloody, 
the latter is lethal without spilling blood.”193 Relying on Benjamin as his theoretical 
inspiration, Slavoj Zizek develops an understanding of violence that is expressed in a dual 
conception. According to Zizek, what we identify and recognise as acts of crime, sectarian 
violence, and (physical violence) is subjective violence - there is a clearly identified subject 
responsible. Subjective violence is thus understood “as a perturbation of the normal peaceful 
state of things.”194 In contrast, objective violence is understood as violence, which is “inherent 
to the normal state of things.”195 Objective violence goes on according to Zizek without us 
noticing, because what we usually notice is a disruption of the recognised and accepted order, 
objective violence is that which is invisibly perpetrated so that the established order continues 
uninterrupted. 
                                                            
191 John Galtung “Violence, Peace, and Peace Research”, Journal of Peace Research, vol. 3, (1969),  167‐191. 
192Trutz  von  Trotha,  “The  Problem  of  Violence:  Some  Theoretical  Remarks  about  ‘Regulative  Orders  of 
Violence’, Political Heterarchy, and Dispute Resolution beyond  the State”,  in The Problem of Violence:  Local 
Conflict Settlement  in Contemporary Africa,   Georg Klute and Birgit Embalo eds., (Rudiger Koppe Verlag, Koln, 
2011), 34. 
193 Walter Benjamin, “Critique of Violence” in Reflections: Essays, Aphorisms, Autobiographical Writings, Peter 
Demetz, ed., (Schocken Books, New York, 1986), 297. 
194 Slavoj Zizek, Violence: Six Sideways Reflections, (London: Profile Books, 2008), 2. 
195 Ibid. 
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The relevance of Benjamin and Zizek to my understanding of violence is its mythic and 
subjective contexts. In regards to subjective violence, my understanding revolves around an 
extrapolation of violence as a tool for regulating societal order. The manifestation of 
subjective and mythic violence is therefore captured in my notion of routinised everyday 
violence. This violence is historically rooted in the colonial formation of the Nigerian state. In 
other words, state power in the socio-political context I study has always been accompanied 
or preceded by violence. To understand the objectives, dynamics and the consequent 
functions of state violence (colonial and post-colonial) I turn to Franz Fanon and Hannah 
Arendt. Contemporary scholarly debates on violence and politics are often wont to relate 
Fanon and Arendt as contrasting arguments.196 This is of course informed by the fact that 
Arendt’s book On Violence is a response to Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth. 
Unfortunately, On Violence is published years after Fanon’s passing and thus we are denied 
the conversation that would have ensued between the two, and perhaps some deeper 
understanding and synthesis. This we do not have. Therefore, in spite of the fact that Arendt’s 
book is a critical response to Fanon’s treatise, in this study I have drawn from both 
conceptualisations.  
  
Fanon’s articulation of violence is laid out in his famous book The Wretched of the Earth. On 
a broader theoretical logic, Fanon can be situated within the scholarly tradition that has 
articulated how violence and politics are constantly entangled. When read as a thesis, the 
main gist of the book is about the use of violence as an instrument of supressing, and 
exploiting the populations of the colonies. It is a sustained criticism of the foundations of 
colonialism through conquest, the dynamics and structures of colonial rule. Fanon equally 
extrapolates on the progressive properties of violence as a tool for liberation, having captured 
the condition and suffering of the colonised, violence is therefore a viable means to achieve 
the goal of liberation.197 Physical violence was used to inaugurate the colonial state, and along 
with structural violence, it was deployed to sustain it, as Fanon has claimed, “colonialism is 
violence in its natural state.”198 Consequently, violence had to be employed to enforce the 
                                                            
196  See  Elizabeth  Frazer,  and  Kimberly  Hutchings,  “On  Politics  and  Violence:  Arendt  Contra  Fanon,” 
Contemporary  Political  Theory,  7,  (2008),  90‐108.  and  Mark  Muhannad  Ayyash,  “The  Paradox  of  Political 
Violence,” European Journal of Social Theory,16, no. 3, (2013), 342‐356. 
197 Franz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, (Harmondsworth: Penguin Books, 2001) 
198 Fanon, Franz, The Wretched of the Earth, (Grove Press, 1968), 40. 
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colonial mandate. Metaphorically, in Fanonian conception violence is like a knife with the 
power to be channelled for good and equally for evil ends.  
 
Hannah Arendt’s main argument in contrast to Fanon is that violence is inherently anti-
political. In other words, obedience that is secured through coercion (violent means) is 
precisely the antithesis of power. Arendt challenges what she understands as a deeply rooted 
conception of power, as characterised by vertical relations of command and obedience. 
Arendt, charges us to rather see power in horizontal dynamics. She writes that “power springs 
up whenever people get together and act in concert”199 For Arendt, violence is destructive and 
therefore the instrument of the impotent, true power she argues, does not need coercion.  
 
However, when we read the conclusions drawn by Fanon and Arendt we find some striking 
meeting points and compromises in their thinking. It is these points of compromise that I find 
useful in my conceptualisation and analysis of violence. For instance, there is an agreement 
on the unpredictability of violence, a point that gravitates closer to Arendt’s initial thinking. 
This raises a paradoxical reading of Fanon, whereas large sections of the book are devoted to 
arguments that jollify violence, Fanon concludes with a note of caution by drawing attention 
to the corrupting and debilitating effects of violence, reactionary and revolutionary, impacting 
on perpetrators and victims respectively.200 Routinised violence therefore relates to forms and 
practices of legitimated violence inherent in state authorities, who make claims to what von 
Trotha has termed “regulative orders of violence.”201  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
199 Arendt, On Violence, 52. 
200 For a more elaborate analysis of this comparative features please see Frazer and Hutchings, “On Politics and 
Violence: Arendt Contra Fanon,” Contemporary Political Theory. 
201 von Trotha “The Problem of Violence”… 
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Chapter	Four:	The	Institutionalisation	of	Plural	Policing	(1945	to	late	
1990s)	
4.1.	Introduction	
This chapter examines the origins and tracks the process of institutionalising plural policing in 
Nigeria, with a specific focus on Plateau State. I argue that to understand the current state of 
plural policing and its institutionalisation, there is a need to grasp macro and micro historical 
trajectories of plural policing in Nigeria; the chapter is focused on the macro process. To do 
this the chapter is structured into two major sections. In the first section I focus on the debates 
and discourses within Nigerian politics for and against the decentralization of the police, 
referring not just to current debates but also drawing on such debates from the last decade of 
British colonialism. Firstly, I discuss police reform concerning the structure of the institution 
as it relates to discourses of centralisation and decentralisation, drawn from politics and 
partially from the academia. The macro level refers to the dynamic between the Nigerian state 
at the centre and its constituent parts202, and plurality or the attempts at plurality at the level of 
the governance of policing. I argue that the style of police reform or better put the lack of 
reform in the substance of political oversight has been partly responsible for the inability of 
this critical state institution that has the statutory mandate to provide security and guarantee 
the safety of citizens to meet the expectation of the teeming populace. 
The second section of the chapter shows how the historical trajectory of debates and policies 
at the macro level has influenced the process of institutionalising plurality at the micro level. 
The micro level refers to the plurality of actors engaged in everyday policing within my study 
area. The main question for this section is to account for how the administrative policies in 
Lagos and Kaduna (colonial and early post-colonial national and regional capitals) influenced 
developments in the Plateau Province, concerning the local administration and the processes 
of institutionalising plural policing. I focus on state processes that had a direct influence on 
policing and subsequently vigilantism. I contend that to understand the emergence of plurality 
we have to focus on two important policy reforms introduced by the colonial state and the 
early post-colonial state: the institutionalisation of paramouncy in the chieftaincy institutions 
of the Plateau Province of Nigeria from the early 1940s to the late 1950s and local 
government reforms in the 1970s. The chapter traces and shows an otherwise little known link 
between the plural policing landscape of colonial Nigeria and the evolution of a new plurality 
                                                            
202 Constituent parts here refers to Nigeria’s federated states starting with a creation of 8 states in 1967, 
currently there are 36, plus the federal capital territory. 
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of policing that began to emerge in the late 1970s and which has continued to evolve in 
response to changing political and social contexts. I then proceed to show how plural policing 
evolved within the case study areas. I argue that there are two important institutions involved 
in the process - the state (the police) and non-state policing structures. What is observed is a 
history of state-society relations that significantly makes clear how processes of state building 
are evolving, within the ambit of policing. 
4.2	Regionalisation,	Centralisation	and	the	Politics	of	Decolonising	the	
Police	
In the run up to independence, several issues had to be negotiated between the outgoing 
colonial power and the incoming Nigerian leaders. One of such issues was the future of the 
police, for instance there were considerations on the process of Nigerianisation of the police, 
and the ethnic composition of NPF detachments in the various regions. Several members of 
the Federal Parliament in the early 1950s lamented on the difficulties caused by the inability 
of police officers to speak the language of the people in their constituencies.203 This issue was 
soon settled and by August 1960, when the regional distribution of the NPF, according to 
place of origin allowed to the North 84.9%, East 93.6%, and the West 83.6%.204 The 
substantive issue of centralisation or regionalisation (plural policing structure, with federal 
and regional police forces) and the control of the police soon emerged as a more difficult 
issue to resolve. This became the subject of prolonged negotiations from 1954 to 1959. These 
consultations and negotiations were done along regional lines and soon became politically 
charged amidst a web of conflicting interest. Before examining the varied interests at the time, 
it is instructive to provide the political background of constitutional developments that 
culminated with these negotiations. 
In 1946 a new constitution was promulgated, the Richards Constitution (named after the then 
Governor General, Sir Arthur Richards) provided for an expanded legislative council 
empowered to deliberate on matters of national relevance. Houses of Assembly were created 
for the three regions to consider issues of regional importance. This laid the foundation of 
Nigeria’s federal principle, with a deliberate attempt to devolve authority to the regions – 
concomitantly, it also signalled the foundation of regionalism as a firm alternative to political 
                                                            
203 Tamuno, The Police in Modern Nigeria, 152. 
204 Ibid., 152. 
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unification. Thus, the formation and subsequent development of party politics took a regional 
dimension.205  
In 1951, following a demand for greater autonomy an inter-parliamentary conference drafted 
the terms of the Macpherson constitution. The Macpherson constitution further entrenched the 
dual course of national political development. It provided for a central government, with a 
council of ministers, giving more impetus to political participation at the national level. It also 
gave a boost to regionalism. Autonomy was given to the regional assemblies206 and the newly 
established federal House of Representatives could not override their powers. The Richards 
and Macpherson constitutions set the tone for subsequent discussions and negotiations of the 
Independence constitution, and this was based on regional interests. It is within this context 
that the debates, discussions, and negotiations on the future and role of the police are situated. 
When these negotiations and consultations commenced in 1954 in a four year build up to the 
independence constitutional conference in 1958, there were two main positions on the table 
for consideration. The first was to have a single centralised federal police deploying in all 
parts of the country. The alternative position supported a regional police force in all the 
regions alongside a federal police reserve responsible for the capital. The northern and 
western regional premiers canvased the latter. The British position, while they were still in 
control of the colony, was to maintain a single federal centralised police. The simple factor of 
cost as an impediment against a regional police force is very plausible, as some colonial 
officers mentioned.207 The additional expense regionalisation would incur was an argument 
against it. There were also concerns from the top echelons of the Nigeria Police Force at the 
time that regionalising the police could possibly result in serious deterioration of the force 
within a short period.208 The United Kingdom Government had also believed that tendencies 
to secession would be increased if the forces of public order were regionalised.209 Whatever 
may have informed the position, one point was clear: Lagos recommended and London 
approved that HMG (Her Majesty’s Government) would not and could not while still 
responsible for Nigeria, agree to the regionalisation of the police.210 Interestingly, when the 
                                                            
205 Adiele E. Afigbo, “Background to Nigerian Federalism: Federal Features in the Colonial State”, Publius, vol. 
21, no. 4, (1991),  13‐29. 
206 In the northern region a bicameral legislative system was established, a House of Assembly for elective 
representatives and a House of Chiefs for graded traditional rulers. 
207 NAK, No. CO554/1031, Chief Secretary, Lagos to Secretary of State, London, 16.0ctober.1956, 2. 
208 NAK, No. CO554/1031, C.S.K Bovell, IGP, Regionalisation of the Nigeria Police, no date  
209 NAK, No. CO554/1031, Chief Secretary, Lagos to Secretary of State, London, 23.July.1956 
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Colonial Government in Lagos was trying to build up its argument for a unified Federal 
Police, Lagos sought out the position on the police in England and Wales from the Home 
Office in London, even going outfield to other former colonies and federations. 
Unfortunately, the briefings that returned regarding the police in other federations, 
particularly countries with the diversity and population similar to Nigeria, stated that nearly 
all the precedents were against the British plan for a unified federal police. Australia, Canada, 
India, the USA, the Central Africa Federation211 all in 1956/7 had a form of a state, local or 
city police alongside the federal police.212 
When examined, the preference of the regional governments in regards a unified or a 
decentralised police force shows quite varied and conflicting interests. The Northern Region 
was in support of the regionalisation of the police as articulated by its premier Sir Ahmadu 
Bello, the Sardauna of Sokoto. The Sardauna was regarded in colonial circles as a consistent 
advocate of regionalisation. His attitude was believed to have been influenced by the 
preponderance of Igbos working in some federal institutions in the North - for instance, in the 
Railway Police, and the purported bad behaviour of some of them.213 There was unease at the 
scenario of having more police officers from other regions operating in the North. More 
substantively, as a regional premier, the Sardauna did not want a police commissioner 
operating in Kaduna with a federal police force answerable to Lagos; he found this 
unacceptable.214  
The Western Region, led by Obafemi Awolowo’s Action Group (AG), was also firmly in 
support of the regionalisation of the police. A briefing from Lagos to London in July 1956 in 
advance preparation for the Constitutional Conference of 1958 noted that the Action Group’s 
arguments for regionalisation had been carefully prepared, and may be very difficult to 
counter.215 The AG argued that denying the Regions police forces of their own was 
inconsistent with the principles that granted them self –government, more so since Regions 
are concurrently charged with the maintenance of public order they must be possessed of the 
instruments to carry out their charge. Awolowo found it illogical to be given concurrent 
                                                            
211 Formerly a British colonial federation comprising of present day Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Malawi (1953‐
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responsibility to maintain public order without jurisdiction over the main instrument on which 
public order depends.216 
There were also proponents of maintaining a unified federal police force. The Premier of the 
Eastern Region, Dr. Nnamdi Azikiwe, had consistently supported this position. He was 
convinced that “the control of the police and the prisons by the Federal Government was the 
most viable means of guaranteeing security of persons, and untrammelled enjoyment of civil 
liberties under due process of law.”217 Of note, here is the fact that the East had no Local 
Administration or Native Authority Police, unlike the North and West. This evidently swayed 
Dr. Azikiwe and his government in the east to favour a federal unified police force. 
Also supporting a unified Federal Police Force were some minority groups, from the Northern 
and Western Regions who feared that regional control of the police would allow for the 
misuse of party political power by means of physical force. In June 1955 when the Western 
House of Assembly debated the draft Local Government Police law, the members 
representing Asaba, Warri and Benin feared that the Local Government Police would become 
a secret Police Force in the Western Region.218 They wanted assurances of some supervision 
from the Federal Police if in an eventuality the police are regionalised. In the north, the 
Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU) that represented the opinions of ethnic 
minority groups in Northern Nigeria opposed any regionalisation of the police and informed 
the leaders of Nigeria’s major political parties represented at the London Conference and the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies accordingly.219 The desire of the British therefore 
converged with that of the minorities on a preference for a unified Federal Police Force. This 
position was further strengthened by the recommendations of Harry Willink’s Commission of 
Inquiry into Minority Fears in 1958. The Commission recommended the “dual responsibility 
for law and order of the Federal and Regional Governments should be recognised, and as 
between these two the Federal must prevail, there should therefore be one Nigeria Police 
Force which should serve both Federal and Regional purposes”.220 
The principle of regionalising the police force was rejected and the major recommendations of 
the 1958 constitutional conference, which were incorporated in the 1960, and subsequently 
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217 NAK, No. CO554/1531, Chief Secretary, Lagos to Secretary of State, London, 30.August.1958, 6 
218 Tamuno, The Police in Modern Nigeria, 155. 
219 Ibid. 
220 Harry Willink Commission of Inquiry into Minority Fears in 1958, Chapter 14 
 80 
 
1963 constitutions provided for the federal control of the NPF. This defined the status and 
functions of the Nigeria Police Council and the Police Service Commission.221  
4.3.	Missed	Opportunities,	the	State	of	Play	and	the	Way	Forward		
The conferences of the late 1950s were not to be the last time Nigerians debated the structure 
and control of police forces. In 1979, following 13 years of military rule, the then Military 
Head of State, General Olusegun Obasanjo fulfilled the promise of his assassinated 
predecessor General Murtala Muhammed and returned the country to civil rule. Part of the 
build-up to 1979 was the process of writing a new constitution. In contrast to the First 
Republic, Nigeria had jettisoned the Westminster parliamentary style for the American 
presidential system. The Constitution Drafting Committee (1975-1976) and the Constituent 
Assembly (1977-1978) became new platforms for continuing the debates on the 
decentralisation of the Nigeria Police Force. By the 1970s, states (first created in 1967) had 
replaced regions as the second tier of Nigeria’s federal system and the proponents of 
decentralisation argued that if state governments were allowed to run police forces, it would 
be easier to control crime and maintain law and order.222 The opponents of decentralisation 
were quick to cite the first republic scenario, when the Local Government Police in the west 
and the Native Administration Police in the north were accused of aiding and abetting crime, 
political thuggery and murder.223 As was the case in the late 1950s, the 1979 constitution 
maintained the centralised Federal Police. In section 194, it was outlined in the constitution 
that: “There shall be a police force for Nigeria which shall be styled the Nigeria Police Force 
and subject to the provisions of the section, no other Police Force shall be established for the 
Federation or any part thereof.”224 The same wordings were reproduced in the 1999 
Constitution as Nigeria was embarking on another transition from military to civil rule, this 
time recreated as Article 214, (1), retaining the same laws and missing another opportunity to 
reform the structures of the police. The 1999 constitution still maintained a somewhat 
confusing provision, which seemed to give state governors authority to direct deployment of 
the police when such action is considered necessary to secure public order and public safety, 
and mandated the commissioner of police to comply. The same section then provides a caveat 
allowing the commissioner of police to request for further directions from Abuja: 
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Subject to the provisions of this section, the Governor of a state or 
such Commissioner of the Government of the state as he may 
authorise in that behalf, may give to the Commissioner of Police of 
that state such lawful directions with respect to the maintenance and 
securing of public safety and public order within the state as he may 
consider necessary, and the Commissioner of Police shall comply with 
those directions or cause them to be complied with: Provided that 
before carrying out any such directions under the foregoing provisions 
of this subsection the Commissioner of Police may request that the 
matter be referred to the President or such minister of the Government 
of the Federation as may be authorised in that behalf by the President 
for his directions.225 
There is no doubt that the problems created by such contradictory provisions have influenced 
the operational effectiveness of the police. For instance, on occasions of sectarian violence, 
state governors are held accountable as they are regarded as ‘chief security officers’ of their 
states. In practice, such accountability is vague, as the governors are wont to give excuses of 
not having control and responsibility over the police. This is despite the fact that there have 
been cases where the state governors were clearly culpable because of their actions and in 
some cases inaction. Unfortunately, they have regularly hid under the guise of lacking 
constitutional control over the police.226 Alternatively, in the wake of incessant crime and in 
some cases severe deterioration of security, state governors have resorted to setting up ad-hoc 
interagency task forces. Seen as a throwback to the years of military rule, recruitments for the 
task forces are usually drawn from the military (army, navy, air force) and the police. Over 
the years, this state-level strategy of ‘policing by task force’ has been replicated in all the 36 
states of the federation. For example, Operation Zaki (lion), Borno state; Operation Flush, 
Lagos state; Operation Kunama (scorpion), Adamawa state; Operation Watch, Kwara state; 
Operation Checkmate, Ekiti state; and Operation Purge, Anambra state, are a few examples of 
this practice. The monopoly of policing responsibilities by the central government of Nigeria 
has contributed to the inability of the Nigerian government to resolve lingering security 
challenges. Few would doubt that if the Nigeria Police Force is to engender trust and improve 
                                                            
225 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999, Section 215, article 4 and 5,  
226 Such examples are Joshua Dariye Governor of Plateau state, (1999‐2007) and More recently Isa Yuguda, 
current Governor of Bauchi state. 
 82 
 
on the way it carries out its duties, there are many other areas that would require drastic 
reform and change.227 
Calls for an expanded (employ more policemen) reinvigorated (improve working conditions, 
and training) Nigeria Police Force as the somewhat sole panacea for achieving better policing, 
are missing the point, that the main challenge is the centralisation of the police. This 
centralisation and unification of command has proven to be not efficient in policing a federal 
state like Nigeria. One cannot argue against improving the conditions of service of police 
officers and officers, but to adequately police societies as complex and heterogeneous as is the 
case in Nigeria we need to decentralise the Police. Ekeh makes the point convincingly: 
…the Nigerian Police Force cannot cope with the expansive and security needs of 
Abuja and all state capitals; deal with the severe domestic security circumstances of 
such major cities as Lagos, Kano, Ibadan, Onitsha, Warri, Port Harcourt, Kaduna, (and 
indeed more recently Maiduguri); and then still take care of the domestic security need 
of small towns and villages that are now bearing the brunt of armed robbery and 
severe forms of crime.228  
What is required is a system that incorporates a multi-layered policing system as against the 
current unified policing structure, this is a combined legacy of colonial history and a legacy 
from Nigeria’s many years of military dictatorships. Areas of responsibility regarding crime, 
law and order are designated into federal, state and local governments. Unfortunately, at any 
point where the idea of decentralising the police force is muted the proponents of a continued 
unified police force are quick to recapitulate the experiences of the colonial period and the 
First Republic.229 We are continuously reminded of the atrocities of the Native Authority 
Police, ‘that a leopard does not change its spots’: politicians will not allow the police to 
function professionally.230 This argument is stale. While there is no doubt that some state 
governors will indeed play politics with the police, it is equally not in doubt that some 
                                                            
227 There is a large body of reports and studies from the stables of The Centre for Law Enforcement Education 
in Nigeria (CLEEN) leading Nigeria NGO on police research and advocacy work in Nigeria. CLEEN has led the way 
in driving police reform, unfortunately the evidence show that not much has been achieved. 
228 Peter Ekeh, A Review of HRW’s and CLEEN’s Report – The Bakassi Boys: The Legitimization of Murder and 
Torture  –  On  State  Sponsored  Vigilante  Groups  in  Nigeria,  (Urhobo  Historical  Society,  2002)  
http://www.waado.org/nigerdelta/documents/ConstitutionalMatters/PoliceVigilante/ReviewBakassiBoys‐
Ekeh.html  
229 For example, see I.C. Chukwuma and Etannibi E.A. Alemika, Analysis of Police and Policing in Nigeria, (CLEEN 
Foundation Lagos), 10. 
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governors will equally use the police professionally, to secure the safety of citizens and 
maintain law and order. The evidence to back up this statement could be likely generated 
from a performance index study of Nigerian states. There are 36 states and unfortunately, the 
major missing link is the absence of a robust unbiased measurement of performance among 
Nigerian states. A simple look at the governance and performance indices of Nigerian states 
as units, since 1999, will reveal the difference in the performance of state governors. In other 
words, we cannot continue to analyse Nigeria in strict negative analysis ignoring other 
constituted elements. When there is an expansion of police formations in Nigeria, some state 
and local police structures may fail, but others may prove to be successful. After all this is the 
consequence of a federal system.231  
While these debates were going on at the national level, a different kind of plurality has been 
evolving at the micro level, this process of an evolving and institutionalised form of micro 
plurality is not divorced from events and policy decisions at the macro level. The 
development and institutionalisation of micro plurality owes much to the interface between 
the different levels of government; national, state (provincial), and local. Hence, the path to 
understanding micro plurality takes us into two extended spheres.232 The first understands the 
broad historical origins of micro plural policing. This extends from the last two decades of 
British colonialism and is particularly significant because it helps make the local events of the 
period intelligible, and, principally, because it shapes the unfolding course of policing and the 
process of change it undergoes. Secondly, the interface between the macro and micro levels of 
government seeks to draw a critical link between events and policy decisions at the macro 
level and their impacts and in some instances, the unintended local consequences of such 
policies.  
4.4.	Indirect	Rule	and	the	Institutionalisation	of	Paramount	Chieftaincy:	the	
Origins	of	Plural	Policing	
In the literature that analyses the historical development of plural policing practice in Nigeria, 
key landmarks are singled out: the civil war (1967-1970) and its aftermath in the early 1970s; 
the impact of the Bretton Woods Institutions inspired Structural Adjustment Programme 
(1986 to the early 1990s); and the period since Nigeria’s return from military to civil rule in 
                                                            
231 Peter Ekeh,  A Review of HRW’s and CLEEN’s Report – The Bakassi Boys… 
232 This is analysed by using the extended case method of data analysis, for more on this please see 
methodology chapter. 
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1999.233 The insights generated from my research also show that the end of the civil war 
coincided with another important administrative reform, which had a strong impact on the 
emergence of plural policing in Plateau State. This was the dismantling of the Native 
Authority Police, one of the earliest components of Nigeria’s plural policing landscape. I 
recognise and analyse the significance of these landmark periods to the historical trajectory of 
vigilante practice in particular and other forms of the plural policing within the area of study. 
However, to fully understand these trajectories of plural policing, we need to go further back. 
The introduction of plural policing in Plateau Province can only be firmly grasped when we 
consider the implementation of the British Indirect Rule policy in the Plateau Province. The 
practical manifestation of Indirect Rule is the introduction of Native Administration, through 
the Native Authority first in the Northern Emirates, and then gradually to other parts of the 
country with varying levels of success.234  
Scholarly analysis of the Native Authority (NA) system has emerged with varied opinions. 
Whitaker, in one of the earliest publications and perhaps a conservative take conforming to 
modernisation thinking of the period argues that the NAs are to be seen as necessary 
participants in the process of transformation, a symbiosis of tradition and modernity.235 In 
other words, political developments did not take a linear process from “traditional” to 
“modern”; rather it was a complex fusion of both elements, and in creating a form of 
transformation something new emerges, which cannot be described as traditional, but cannot 
be said to be modern either. Dudley takes a different approach, arguing that the NA System 
disrupted the transformation process, arguing that the political authorities at the time were not 
receptive and adaptable to change and found useful tools in the Native Authorities.236 Dudley 
situates his analysis in the context of late colonial Nigeria and the early years of 
independence, within the roles the Native Authorities played during party politics. Dudley’s 
main contention was that because of the funds the NAs controlled at the time they were able 
to intervene at the local level in support of the parties of the state, and that they were actively 
                                                            
233 This is marking Nigeria’s return to civil rule after almost two decades of military rule. 
234 For a detailed analysis on the implementation of the indirect rule policy in other parts of Nigeria see; Adiele 
E. Afigbo, The Warrant Chief: Indirect Rule in South Eastern Nigeria, 1891 – 1929, (New York: Humanities Press, 
1972).  J.A. Atanda,  The New Oyo Empire: Indirect Rule and Change in Western Nigeria, 1894 ‐1934, (London,  
Longman: Ibadan History Series, 1973).  P.A. Igbafe, Benin Under British Administration: The Impact of Colonial 
Rule of an African Kingdom, 1897 – 1938, (New Jersey: Humanities Press, 1979) 
235 C.S. Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition: Continuity and Change  in Northern Nigeria 1946‐1969  (Princeton   
University Press, 1970), 31. 
236 Billy J. Dudley, Parties and Politics in Northern Nigeria (London: Frank Cass, 1968), 63. 
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involved in political mobilisation, coercion and oppression of all opposition. Furthermore, a 
system that situates so much power and control in an individual (an Emir or a Chief), placing 
high stakes on loyalty above all other thinking, is anything but transformative.237 Perhaps the 
most enlightening take on the Native Authorities is the viewpoint of Yahaya, in his study 
titled “The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria, 1950-1970”. The Native Authority is 
regarded as a political organism with corporate self-interest and an institution for the making 
and application of law at the local level.238 Yahaya rightly argues that,  
…to speak of N.A. interest implies that it is not simply an institution 
of local government, but an organizational manifestation of a social 
force in society. As a political institution, it will (sic) be expected to 
maintain law and order, to balance interests among the social forces, 
and to supervise the allocation of resources in the society. It is in this 
sense that the governments expected the N.As to function; however, 
they have been seen to act inconsistently. The discrepancy between 
the stipulated roles and the actual performance of the N.A. may not be 
fully understood until it is conceived as an organization of social 
force.239 
The NA as social force is an institutional interest group, composed of members of various 
social groups. At the local base, we find the traditional ruling class, which includes the Emir 
or Chief, the District heads, the village heads, titled officials, and employees of the Native 
Authority.240 In this study also included is the enforcement arm, the police. 
The Native Authority Ordinance enacted in 1933 had clearly spelt out the duties and 
responsibilities of Native Authorities. Section 4 of the Ordinance, on Duties and Powers of 
Native Authorities states that: 
It shall be the duty of every native authority to perform the obligations 
by this ordinance imposed and generally to maintain order and good 
government in the area over which his authority extends and for the 
fulfilment of this duty he shall have and exercise over the natives 
                                                            
237 Ibid., 63‐64. 
238 A.D. Yahaya, The Native Authority System in Northern Nigeria, 1950‐1970, (Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University 
Press, 1980), 4‐5. 
239 Ibid., 5. 
240 Ibid., 5. 
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residing or being in such area or such other persons as the Governor 
may by Order in Council declare to be subject to such powers the 
powers by this Ordinance conferred in addition to such powers as may 
be vested in him by virtue of any law or native custom for the time 
being in force.241 
Furthermore, section 6, sub-section 1 and 2 are clear on the powers given the 
native authority, specifically the police concerning crime prevention, and the 
authority to arrest and prosecute suspected criminals.242 Section 8 gives the native 
authority, amongst other things, the right to issue orders within its area of 
jurisdiction regarding: 
a) Prohibiting, restricting, or regulating the manufacture, distillation, sale, 
transport, distribution, supply, sale and consumption of liquor.  
b) Prohibiting, restricting, and regulating the carrying and possession of 
weapons. 
c) Prohibiting any act or conduct, that in the opinion of the native authority 
might cause a riot, a disturbance, or a breach of the peace.243 
In establishing Native Authorities, the Ordinance gave the Governor complete authority to 
establish Native Authorities by notice published in the Gazette. Furthermore, section 3(1) also 
gave the Governor powers to prescribe the manners by which such authorities were 
constituted and to direct that any native authority to be subordinate to any other native 
authority in such manner as he may think fit.244 Following the enactment of the Ordinance an 
amended list of Native Authorities were appointed in January 1934. In Plateau Province there 
were five (5) Divisions, namely Jema’a; Jos; Pankshin; Shendam; and Southern Division. 
There were over forty (40) Native Authorities across these Divisions. Jos had 15, Pankshin 
had 18 NAs, Jema’a Division had 4, and Shendam and Southern Divisions had 3 each.245 In 
May 1937 the Yan Doka of the Jos Division, formerly known as the Yan Doka Hausa Force 
                                                            
241 NAK, 1/29/225 Native Authority Ordinance, 1933, 4. 
242 Ibid., 7. 
243 Ibid., 9. 
244 Ibid., 3. 
245 NAK, 16062/222, Native Authority Ordinance: Secretary, Northern Provinces to the Hon. Chief Secretary, 
Lagos. January 1934. 
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was re-organised into a provincial headquarters unit, and divided into four companies in Jos 
and environs, and one company in Bukuru.246  
In his work on the formation of a political ruling class in the former colonial Plateau Province, 
Mangvwat shows how the Native Authority in Plateau Province represented the colonial state 
at the grass root level, instituting a regime of social control that was concerned with the 
maintenance of law and order through the use of local chiefs, colonial police, courts, and 
prisons.247  
The forebear of the Police in Northern Nigeria was the Royal Niger Constabulary (RNC), 
established in 1886. The RNC was the enforcement arm of the Royal Niger Company, 
principally founded to secure and advance British commercial - and imperial - interests in the 
territories of what became Northern Nigeria. The Royal Niger Constabulary played a vital 
role in forcefully suppressing the discontent of the ‘natives’, allowing George Goldie’s Royal 
Niger Company to carry on with the task of advancing British colonial interests.248  
By the early twentieth century, as colonial conquest took shape in the Northern territories, 
parts of the Royal Niger Constabulary naturally evolved into a colonial government police 
force. However, by 1907 a colonial policy to re-organise the police was already in place. The 
official reasons given for this re-organisation was the lack of coherence in police oversight - 
referred to then as the ‘dual control’ of the police, which was exercised by the Resident 
Officers on the one hand, and the Chiefs of Constabulary on the other. It was argued that this 
system led to a multiplication of duties, and misconception of authority.249 There were 
however more reasons beyond the official narrative. Rotimi rightly argues that it was 
principally to win the support of the northern emirs, as it permitted them to use their 
indigenous palace guards (dogarai) as police. Secondly, the policy was in line with the 
emerging colonial administrative policy shift from ‘rule through native chiefs to rule through 
native chiefs on native lines’.250 In fact the then High Commissioner of the Northern Region 
of Nigeria and Fredrick Lugard’s successor, Percy Girouard, in a memo sent out to the 
                                                            
246 NAK, 468/208 Jos Native Administration Yan Doka Force‐Duties of, May 1937. 
247 Monday Mangvwat, A History of Class Formation in the Plateau Province of Nigeria, 1002‐1960, The Genesis 
of a Ruling Class, (Durham: CAP African World Series, 2014), 31.  
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250 Rotimi, The police in a Federal State…, 14. 
 88 
 
Provinces on the issue of police reorganisation, among other things acknowledged how in his 
opinion, the previous policy had been inappropriate: 
When we took over the Northern Provinces five years ago we had no 
knowledge of their native government. Their police and prisons 
appeared both inadequate and cruelly oppressive. There rose therefore 
the necessity of giving Residents some force of police of a trained 
character to assist them in gradually evolving order out of chaos in 
native government. After several years’ experience and guidance of 
Native Administration, it became clear that in the north and 
Mohammedan (sic) communities, a native police organisation not only 
existed but was undoubtedly the best way of dealing with criminals of 
an ordinary class.251 
Significantly, this turning point marked the official recognition of local palace guards as 
Native Authority Police, starting in Kano and expanding to other parts of the northern 
territories in 1908.252 The Native Authority Police Force quickly gained traction and became 
quite prestigious in the northern emirates. This was, as Rotimi253 explains, because of a 
specific scheme that involved members of the ruling houses. The princely-liaison officer 
scheme as it was called had at its core the idea of choosing the Native Authority Police leader 
from among the princes of the emirate. Involving the aristocracy did not just make the new 
force acceptable; it also provided much needed social legitimacy. The introduction and 
implementation of the scheme owed its success to the elevation of H.R. Palmer as Lieutenant 
Governor of the Northern region (1925-1930). The significance of Palmer’s influence on 
Northern Nigerian administration at the time and the long-lasting legacies of the policies he 
implemented deserve close attention, because this had a direct impact on the NAPF and 
policing in general.254 
Palmer had been trained as an English barrister and joined the colonial service in 1904, his 
first posting was to Northern Nigeria at the time Fredrick Lugard was High Commissioner of 
the Northern Nigeria Protectorate. Palmer was sent to Katsina, where he was credited with a 
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reorganisation of the district system, by creating more districts that allowed for effective 
grassroots administration. He also effected dynastic changes in the emirates of Katsina and 
Daura, re-instating the pre-jihad Hausa dynasty in Daura.255 The paths of Lugard and Palmer 
were to cross again in 1912 when Lugard returned to Nigeria as Governor of the Northern and 
Southern Protectorates. Another area where Palmer was a colonial trailblazer was his role in 
the institutionalisation of the Native Treasury System.256 One of the early challenges the 
British had despite the introduction of indirect rule in Northern Nigeria was the lack of 
enough funds that would enable them run the administration of the region effectively. Indirect 
rule went a long way to solve the challenge of insufficient work force, but the challenge of 
generating revenue remained unresolved after conquest until 1908. Saeed concisely captures 
the role Palmer played:  
…the Native Revenue Proclamation of April 1906, which codified and 
legalised the various customary taxes, fixed fifty percent (50%) of all 
the tax returns to Government and limited the amount which could be 
levied. The first colonial Native Treasury in Northern Nigeria was 
established by Palmer at Katsina in 1908. He persuaded the Emir 
Muhammadu Dikko, (Whom Palmer had appointed) to provide a 
Budget for the expenditure of his (50%) share of the revenue and to 
convert his staff into salaried officials…In 1909; the Native Treasury 
was sanctioned by Governor Girouard and introduced into Kano, the 
richest emirate, by its newly appointed Resident C.L. Temple. 
Henceforth the Native Treasury or Baitulmali, which regulated the 
expenditure of the traditional rulers annually, was introduced all over 
the Northern Provinces. Indeed, in 1917 there were fifty separate 
Native Treasuries in the Northern Provinces with aggregate revenue of 
Four Hundred and Forty One Thousand Pounds (441,000.00). Their 
reserve funds stood at 255,600. By 1936, the number of Native 
Treasuries had risen to sixty-three. 257 
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The challenge of funding colonial administration in Nigeria was however to continue. As 
Anthony Kirk-Greene reflects,258  
 the biggest brake on progress, human as well as physical, in colonial Africa during the 
inter-war period was the palpable lack of funds. It was not until the British government 
changed its policy and introduced the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 
1942 and 1945, demonstrating that it was at last ready to grant money to the African 
governments rather than go on expecting them to raise the money locally for every 
new building or road…the colonial administration at last had real money to spend…259  
Of closer relevance to this study is the role Palmer played in the institutionalisation of the 
local palace guards (Dogarai – Sing, Dogari.) The Dogarai or palace guards date back to the 
Hausa city-states; they were recruited from amongst slaves. John Smith describes how in 
Kano emirate, the children of slaves were brought up as children of the household within the 
palace, enjoying all the privileges that came with such a status.260 It was while Palmer was 
Assistant Resident in Katsina that he began campaigning and actively advocating for the use 
of the Dogarai as local police.261 It was under his watch and direction as Lieutenant Governor 
of the Northern Region that the NA police was reorganised. At face value, Palmer’s goal was 
to eliminate unsatisfactory personnel, induce the best men to join, provide training and ensure 
improved organisation and control.262 Beyond the desire for credibility and efficiency, Palmer 
saw this reorganisation as the culmination of a long sought campaign to actually exclude the 
government police from the emirates.263 
Palmer served in important Northern Nigerian colonial positions, first as Assistant Resident 
officer in Katsina, then as Resident of the prestigious Kano emirate, and Bornu. Palmer was 
one of the more loyal prodigies of Lugard and a staunch advocate of the indirect rule 
system.264 Having served for over a decade in crown service Palmer had several ideas of how 
he wanted to make the NAs more inclined to achieving the objectives of government while 
leaving the emirs still in control, or rather feeling in control. In the eyes of the people, they 
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governed the emirs and some important chiefs were seen as very powerful. Last argues that 
among the emirates there was clearly a degree of continuity between the Sokoto Caliphate and 
the colonial caliphate, and asserts that the emirs had power and influence. It was also clear 
that the British could not have governed Northern Nigeria on their own. The Nasara265 were 
not all powerful, or able to do what they wished, asserts Murray Last.266 The NAs developed 
over time, from 1903 – 1960 – and they controlled the daily lives of the people. In an 
interview with a former colonial political officer, an account of his first meeting with the Emir 
of Kano reveals how even a junior Nasara was looked down upon by the Emirs. 267 
On the other hand, the British helped extend the Caliphate in terms of political rulership. Last 
makes the point that: 
 …in the 20th century the deep rural areas on especially the southern 
frontiers of colonial Dar al-Islam were still places where local masu 
sarauta268and their sarakai269 could be very oppressive towards non-
Muslim groups within their territory. Many of these new villages and 
district heads were outsiders, appointed from the emirate or provincial 
capital, and spoke Hausa rather than any local language. Areas that 
had once resisted the jihadi forces now found themselves under the 
descendants of those same jihadi leaders. In this sense, the ‘Colonial 
Caliphate’ was extended by the Nasara over a much wider territory 
than ever before; with Hausa becoming the lingua franca of this 
enlarged ‘Caliphate’.270 
4.4.1.	Chiefs	and	the	Native	Authority	Police	in	the	Plateau	Province		
Convinced of this new system of policing in the Northern Nigerian emirates there was no 
going back. The colonial administrators began to consider implementing it in the more 
decentralised, acephalous southern Provinces of the then Protectorate of Northern Nigeria. 
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This was against the advice of local administrative officers, principally because there was 
largely no existing culture of Dogarai among these groups.271 Eventually the NA police in 
these areas was filled with non-indigenes, largely from the northern Hausa groups.272 Between 
the late 1930s and the early 1940s, NA police were operating across the length and breadth of 
the Northern region. As Rotimi notes, in the Hausa emirates they had metamorphosed from 
being the personal staff of the chiefly authorities in pre-colonial times, with no fixed 
remuneration, to stipendiary officials of the Native Administration.273  
In the aforementioned southern Provinces inhabited by the acephalous groups or decentralised 
societies,274 however, a dynamic emerged and it created problems on two fronts. Firstly, the 
local colonial administrative officers who were daily relating to these people recognised the 
challenges, because of the introduction of the centralised emirate-like system among groups 
that were previously loosely organised socio-politically along clan structures, with priest 
chief-like figures at the clan level providing juridical and spiritual guidance. In this case, it 
should not be forgotten that the core reason for the success, or rightly put perceived relative 
success of indirect rule amongst the emirates of northern Nigeria was the presence of an 
existing aristocratic ruling class, from the time of the Habe Sarki Sarauta275 system to the 
Caliphate installed Fulani emirates. Under the Sokoto Caliphate the major changes, apart from 
the obvious dynastic changes from Hausa to Fulani ruling clans, included the introduction of 
strict Islamic legal code of conduct, and the Caliphate established an empire like system of 
emirates (separate political units), but the substance of paramouncy had evolved and 
developed over a long period of Hausa rule.276 John Smith, District Officer Kabba in the mid-
1960s, re-echoes this point; having previously undertaken several tours in the northern 
emirates, he describes how contrasting he found NA council meetings of the Igala and the 
Igbirra. To buttress the point I quote him at length. 
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The striking differences for me as a Nasara just posted from Kaduna 
was the fact that the Igala and Igbirra Chiefs just did not have the 
same status and backing of the northern emir. They had not grown up 
in this system; it was still very new to them. No one had groomed 
them for years in a sarauta (royalty) culture. So even when dealing 
with me as the district officer it was more open. For example, I found 
that there was a much greater independence of council members. 
There was more discussion and greater debate and less of this haka 
nan nai rankadade (Hausa phrase meaning to respond in consent to a 
superior), that you found in the emirate councils. In other words, in 
much of the Middle Belt heads of departments could be relied upon to 
be in charge. This was not the case in the Northern NAs, where there 
would be few head of departments who were very strong and powerful 
and knew what they were doing. In a council meeting in the emir’s 
presence, they would continually respond with haka nan ne 
rankadade. However, the moment you left – off they go to see the 
Waziri, Madaki or one of the emir’s close advisers. Therefore, you 
never knew if you had achieved anything or not, as several requests 
for amendments and changes would come after the meeting.277 
Among the different Plateau ethnic groups, the transition to a powerful paramount chief-like 
figure was resisted in most communities and the balance of stability and instability was 
precarious. To make this clear, it should be understood that the polities or ethnic groups of the 
Plateau, prior to British rule, did not constitute single political units. So while the Berom, 
Ngas, Goemai, Mwaghavul, Eggon, and Tarok for example, were in their own right ethnic 
polities with particular common languages and shared cultural practices, several separate 
independent political units constituted each group.278  
Thus, according to Mangvwat,  
… among the Berom there were the separate independent polities of Du, Zawan, Fan, 
Gyel, Forum, Vwang, Kuru, excetra. Among the Mwaghavul there were the 
independent polities of Pianya (Panyam), Kerang, Pushit, Bwonpe, Mpang, Mangun, 
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278 Mangvwat, “Warfare on the Jos Plateau” 115. 
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Kombun, etcetera. Among the Ngas, there were the Dawaki, Kabwir, Tuwan, Per, 
Ampang, Garram, Wokkos, etc.279  
Among the Tarok, there were the Bwarat, Sa’a, Che, Lagan, Jat, Laka, Gyang, Pe, Lohmak, 
Gbak, Singha, etc. Each of these small polities280 of a particular ethnic group had their own 
priest chief, or system of socio-political organisation. Therefore, when paramouncy is 
mentioned in this context of the Plateau Province, it refers to the British ambition to have a 
single overall chief for the Angas, Mwaghavul, and Tarok for example. This is what the 
policy of indirect rule set out to achieve amongst the ethic polities of the Plateau. 
4.4.2.	The	“Lugardian”	vs	The	“Cliffordian”	Ideologies	of	Native	Administration	
In the Annual Report of 1932,281 the Resident Officer of Plateau Province noted how difficult 
it was to establish the principle of indirect rule among communities who hitherto had no 
paramount chiefly institution. In Plateau Province, there were three exceptions282 where 
centralised emirate structures existed. Between 1908 and 1934, different schemes of Native 
Authority rule were tried within the area of study, but none succeeded. The Plateau area and 
its environs became a lab of testing colonial policy, but as previously observed it also became 
a ground for the clash of competing colonial ideologies. Mangvwat identifies four major 
phases in the development of the Native Authority System on the Plateau, based on the 
principles of indirect rule. The first phase, already alluded to, was the policy of creating 
paramount chiefs with full colonial powers. It was more or less a transplanting of the emirate 
system and it coincided with Lugard’s rule as Governor of amalgamated Nigeria. For the 
basic reason that this system tried to create bigger chiefdoms from the numerous groups 
across the Plateau area, without any pre-existing basis or justification, was enough to lead to 
its ultimate collapse and failure.283 An example of this policy applied in Plateau Province was 
to the Yergam (Tarok) people. Following the British conquest of the lowlands of what became 
Plateau Province, in the early 20th century, the Tarok were initially, albeit for a short spell 
administratively under the Emir of Wase. However, it soon became clear that this was an 
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unworkable arrangement, as although there were trade relations, there was no prior history of 
rulership or subordination of any sort.284 Wase emirate was by the stroke of a pen given 
administrative responsibility over areas where it had no traditional authority. The Tarok were 
granted an independent district in 1926 and Sarkin Langtang Datyem was appointed Chief of 
the Yergam (Tarok) District, with Third Grade status.285 The stool did not gain paramount 
status until 1957.  
The second phase was part of attempts by Lugard’s successor, Hugh Clifford,  
…correcting what he regarded as the shortcomings of the indirect rule system with 
respect to the creation of paramount chiefs where none had previously existed. He 
therefore ordered a revision of the criterion for the creation of paramount chiefs in 
such areas and, instead, suggested that the objective of creating bigger chiefdoms 
should be achieved by federating the various autonomous chiefs involved under a 
Chairman-chief where this was possible.286  
Clifford’s plan came to an abrupt end in 1925, before it was even fully implemented to its 
logical conclusion. This was following the departure of Clifford, a juncture that coincided 
with the elevation of H.R. Palmer as Lieutenant Governor of Northern Nigeria. As I have 
discussed in detail above, Palmer was a loyal initiate of Lugard and the staunchest of 
advocates for indirect rule. In fact, colonial political officers who arrived long after he was 
gone were still to hear the stories of his fanatically laced sermons on the merits of indirect 
rule.287 Therefore, it was no surprise that Palmer returned to the Lugardian system. First of all 
Palmer carved out and formally established Plateau Province, then against the advice of 
several of his Divisional Officers he set out to not just to create bigger “tribal chiefs” on the 
Plateau, but more problematically he also sought to rationalise and legitimise the imposition 
of District Heads of one community over another, notably in the Jema’a and Lowland 
Divisions Province.288 The Palmer policy came to an abrupt end in 1929 when he was posted 
to Gambia as Governor. While on the surface it looked like he was promoted, the relatively 
small colony of Gambia did not match the prestige of presiding over the vast and important 
Northern Region of Nigeria, of which he was obviously in awe. Palmer’s tenure as lieutenant 
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governor as the forgone accounts have shown was laced with bouts of conflict and infighting 
between Lagos and Kaduna. The Colonial Office in London, being often called upon to 
mediate, would have taken note.289 The policy of senior colonial officers like Palmer is 
perhaps best captured in the thinking of John Smith, himself a very experienced colonial 
officer who served on multiple tours290 across Northern Nigeria. For Mr. Smith, indirect rule 
was a necessity that was made into a dogmatic virtue.291 
In 1931 the governorship of Sir Graeme Thomson, who had to deal with what he perceived as 
Palmer’s incessant insubordination, ended.292 Thomson’s replacement as Governor of Nigeria 
was Sir Donald Cameron, Clifford’s protégé and former first chief secretary (1921-1924).293 
Like his former boss, Cameron was a known critic of the Lugardian-Palmerian formulation 
and application of indirect rule.294 Thereby another episode of the “Lugardian” vs 
“Cliffordian” feud on administering the British colony of Nigeria, particularly its Northern 
Region, was about to unfold. In September 1933, Cameron wrote a confidential letter to the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir Philip Cunliffe-Lister, in which Cameron strongly 
criticised aspects of the implementation of the Lugardian system of indirect rule: 
…I found Nigeria working under certain Memoranda written by 
Lugard many years ago, the principal one in 1917, which had become 
overlaid with error owing (1) to the attempt in the Northern Provinces 
to make the larger Native Administrations independent and throw off 
control by the Governor from Lagos, and (2) to the fact that Lugard’s 
Memorandum on Native Administration was quite unsuited to the 
circumstances of the Southern Provinces. It was not in fact intended 
for the Southern Provinces but they used it because there was nothing 
else. I may add that in the north the pagan areas had been greatly 
neglected, little interest being shown in them. The policy of indirect 
administration in Nigeria, it soon became apparent to me, required a 
new spirit to be breathed into it, and as a temporary measure, I 
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republished my Tanganyika Memorandum for the guidance of 
Administrative Officers here. I followed this up as you are aware, in 
my Annual Address to the Legislative Council in March last and the 
principles which I laid down in the address have received wide 
endorsement…I have been collecting material to write a new 
Memorandum on the Principles of Native Administration and their 
Application for Nigeria…The purpose of this letter is to enquire 
whether the Secretary of State would be disposed to give his approval 
to the principles enunciated in a new memorandum (with of course, 
such emendations as he might require) if I submit it for the 
purpose…It is of great importance to the future of Nigeria that 
principles and policy in this respect should be formulated in an 
authoritative manner; but there is little use in my doing so if my 
memorandum can be set on one side after my departure. I do not know 
if the Colonial Office ever consults Lugard in these days. If so, I 
should warn you that he appears to dislike my address to the 
Legislative Council and detests my new judicial reforms.295 
 Criticising Lord Fredrick Lugard on aspects of British Colonial administration at this time 
was still a rare occurrence. The respect and eminence in which Lugard was held in colonial 
circles, not just in Nigeria but also across the British Empire, was still towering. Cameron’s 
critique is perhaps more valiant because Lugard was still alive in 1933 and still had supporters 
in the Colonial Office who continued to consult him until his death in 1945. In furtherance of 
the changes he desired to make, Cameron instituted policy changes to the existing system he 
found on the ground, and he had a clear articulation of his planned ideas and their 
application.296 Following assurances from London, Cameron proceeded to articulate the 
changes in his Memorandum, “The Principles of Native Administration and their 
Application”, which he authored in July 1934. Cameron states that: 
…If the latter (the people) are not willing to accept the order of the so-
called authority, chief or otherwise, unless we compel them to do so 
then, of course, the administration is not indirect and the Native 
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Authority set up on such basis is a shame and a snare…The Native 
Authority that is not acceptable to the people and is maintained only 
because we imposed it on them is therefore almost certainly bound to 
fail and it would be better to endeavour in the first instance to 
administer the people directly.297 
As Mangvwat aptly notes,  
 Cameron’s conception and application of indirect rule as a system of local government 
centred on the ability of the colonial officers to identify and find the loci of pre-
colonial political authorities within and amongst the various communities and peoples 
of Nigeria through whom colonial political authority should mediate to the subjects.298  
To achieve this, Cameron directed for a Nigeria-wide research on the nature and structures of 
pre-colonial political systems and institutions of the various ethnic groups identified. 
However, for the purposes of our inquiry I will limit the discussion of Cameron’s reforms to 
the Plateau Province299, what Mangvwat identified as the fourth stage of colonial 
administration on the Plateau.300 As already referred earlier, Cameron made efforts to have a 
policy that was informed by pre-existing structures. In a memorandum written to provide 
advice and guidance for colonial political officers engaged in these enquiries and research, he 
made very clear what he expected: 
The proper way to search out the people is from the bottom. Build 
from the bottom; do not attempt, as I found in Nigeria when I returned 
there in 1931, to make, as it were, a crown or a king at the top and 
then try to find something underneath on which it might perhaps 
appropriately be placed. Begin with the people in the lower course of 
the structure, the family first, the extended family, and so on through 
the various grades right up to the authority, whatever it may be, that 
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they all acknowledge as the authority that has regulated the society of 
the unit according to their own law and custom.301 
The findings of these studies formed the basis of the reorganisation of native administration in 
Nigeria. In the Plateau Province the substance of the reorganisation on the ground was the 
creation of five divisions. The Divisions did not operate like a Native Authority; rather what 
obtained was a Division being constituted by a federation of chiefdoms, and these chiefdoms 
operated like district chiefs in some cases and in some other cases like the existing emirates in 
the Province, where the Emirs maintained their own bureaucracy.302 Despite this major 
breakthrough, the British could still not achieve the objective of creating paramount rulers to 
centrally administer all the different ethnic groups on the Plateau. This was to change in the 
final decade leading to independence.  
In 1951, the Macpherson Constitution replaced the Richards Constitution. Among other 
things, the new constitution provided for a bicameral legislative system in the Northern and 
Western regions of the country. In the north there was the Northern House of Assembly, made 
up of elected representatives and open to all adult citizens of the region, but the Northern 
House of Chiefs on the other hand was restricted to graded traditional rulers only, graded as 
first, second, third and fourth class depending on the size and history of the stool.303 The 
qualifications required for membership of this prestigious House of Chiefs implied that 
several of the non-emirate ethnic groups in Plateau Province, without a paramount graded 
chief, did not qualify for membership, thereby limiting their representation.304 It was at this 
moment that the educated elites of the Plateau Province, in contrast to their emirate northern 
colleagues, collaborated with, and in some cases persuaded the traditional rulers to accept 
creative means of forming chiefdoms that would meet the requirements for acceptance into 
the House.305 Mangvwat describes the process:  
In order to qualify for membership in the House of Chiefs, therefore, 
these Plateau communities devised ways of producing chiefs of 
similar status and grandeur to that of the emirs of the far north. 
Consequently, one ethnic group after another began to organize ethnic 
                                                            
301 Donald Cameron, Pagan Administration – Notes for the guidance of Officers engaged in enquiries 
302 Mangvwat, A History of Class Formation, 41. 
303 Whitaker, The Politics of Tradition, 57. Taken from Mangvwat, A History of Class Formation, 176. 
304 Mangvwat, A History of Class Formation, 176 
305 This alliance however did not last, after the chiefs were upgraded and began to attend meetings in Kaduna, 
they began to see the educated elites as a threat to their power in the chiefdoms. 
 100 
 
solidarity as the basis on which to create paramount chiefs…Even 
though these demands were straightforward, their articulation required 
some amount of literacy and knowledge of the changing times to 
succeed…the Christian intelligentsia, that is the educated elites, most 
of whom lived in the rural areas…took advantage (of the opportunity) 
to enhance their personal positions and fortunes.306 
In order to fulfil the requirements for particular grades, different minority ethnic groups 
willingly joined up and made demands for federated chiefdoms. The colonial government 
happily obliged and thus created several sub-Native Authorities in Plateau Province. While 
the reforms ushered in by the Macpherson constitution can be inadvertently credited with kick 
starting the process that led to the peoples of the Plateau Province to actually seek for 
paramount chieftaincies, in the final analysis the different administrative policies had the 
same purpose of achieving the goals and objectives of the colonial state. Thus within a 
decade, paramount chiefs had been installed as result of popular demand by groups who had 
previously resisted, and what the British had tried to do by force and failed for over four 
decades had been finally achieved.307 
During the colonial administration, the Yan Doka system amongst the ethnic groups of central 
Nigeria had already come under fierce criticism. In a memo to the residents of the Provinces 
in August 1937, the Chief Commissioner of Police was clearly concerned about the 
recruitment, training and efficiency of the Yan Doka. While he advocated for better training 
and improvement, he was resigned to the fact that Yan Doka in certain ‘backward’ (rural) 
parts would be relegated to the position of village guards.308 The Divisional Officer in charge 
of the Shendam Division (later renamed Lowland Division) of Plateau Province was even 
more damning. In an assessment of Yan Doka in 1944, he lamented that the Yan Doka had 
failed to efficiently discharge their functions, as the force was filled with illiterate and semi-
literate personnel who were little more than messengers.309  
It would be instructive to put these negative assessments into context and perhaps situate them 
in the context of the time. As Rotimi has argued: 
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Colonial laws and ordinances were written in English and couched in 
legal terms. While the few literate trainees might have had a 
smattering of knowledge of the laws, the majority could not have 
grasped the essence. Yet, they had the duty to enforce the laws and 
ordinances. These policemen worked in a largely illiterate society, 
whose members treated them as an ‘enlightened’ group. The 
policemen were prone to exhibit knowledge of the laws in a manner 
that left their victims bewildered. But the truth is that, many of them 
were as ignorant as their victims. The mutual ignorance was often 
exploited to the advantage of the policeman and the discomfiture of 
their victims.310 
As the forgone analysis has demonstrated, while the form and nature of policing changed in 
regards to nomenclatures, uniforms, and structures, leaving the Native Authority police under 
the command and control of the traditional rulers would suggest that in the substance of 
governance the status quo had remained. There was, however, more to the situation than this. 
The colonial government’s hope that the transformation of palace guards in the service of 
traditional rulers into Native Authority police officers would shift the emphasis and loyalty to 
the public rather than royalty, could perhaps be seen as unfounded or simply lip servicing 
while continuing with the status quo. The origins and initial processes of institutionalising 
plural policing from a top-down perspective were coercive and damaging. However, when 
studied from below, from the perspective of those who served in the NAPF, and those who 
witnessed this period and experienced the practices, the picture does emerge with different 
shades. It becomes more dynamic and ambivalent. We learn that alongside coercion and 
oppression a certain kind of different or form of policing work was equally going on. A 
sustained analysis on this is provided in chapter seven. What follows now is the next era of 
the macro plural policing trajectory examined in this study. 
4.5.	Local	Government	Reforms	and	the	Quest	for	‘Modernity’:	From	NAPF	to	
Yanbanga	(1970‐1980)	
Having served its purpose during the colonial era, the NAPF barely survived the first decade 
of an independent (post-colonial) Nigeria. In 1966, the Ironsi administration set up a panel on 
the Nigeria Police, Local Government and Native Authority Police and Prisons. The panel’s 
main term of reference was to examine the “feasibility of the unification of the Nigeria Police, 
Local Government Police and the unification of prisons in Nigeria…”311 Although General 
Ironsi was overthrown in a military coup in July 1966, the new military government under 
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General Gowon accepted the recommendations of the panel. The reforms were implemented 
in 1968 and the Nigeria police system was unified.312 As a result, local police forces like the 
Local Government Police in the Western Region and the Native Authority Police in the 
Northern Provinces were dissolved and their qualified personnel absorbed into the Nigeria 
Police Force.313 The paramount chiefs on the Plateau were just in the process of really 
consolidating their rule over the populations. Under the rule of Northern Nigeria’s 
independence Premier, Sir Ahmadu Bello, the chiefs practically became the undisputed rulers 
at the local level. As long as they toed the line of the northern ruling party, they were allowed 
to govern their chiefdoms with little or no interference from Kaduna. This however meant 
they were severally engaged in political schisms with local missionary educated elites. The 
dismantling of the Native Authority Police, however, was just the tip of the iceberg; there 
were still more reforms on the way.  
Peter Ekeh’s314 conception of the ‘primordial’ public finds meaning within a context where we 
can identify a certain group dynamic (ethnic or religious); it becomes diffused when applied 
in a heterogeneous context. In other words, the primordial invites us to conceive groups as 
homogenous, an ethnic community, and a given ethnic group with adherents congregating 
around a particular religion, sect or denomination. Ekeh identifies a historical dialectic 
between two groups contesting for legitimated authority – namely, traditional and chiefly 
institutions and educated elites. It must be pointed out that the roots of this dialectic can be 
drawn to rival policies of local administration favoured by succeeding colonial 
administrations analysed earlier, and represented in sum by colonial administrative ideals 
propounded by former colonial Governors, Fredrick Lugard (1914-1919) and Hugh Clifford 
(1919-1925).  
Okonjo has identified the two groups of opposing ideology as protagonists and antagonists, 
arguing that the rivalries came to a head not just because there was a strong disagreement on 
which system of administration is best for the colony; more significantly, it was related to the 
future course of Nigerian political development.315 The protagonists led by Palmer and other 
Northern Nigerian ‘Lugardian’ political officers who believed that the future of political 
development in Nigeria must be in the Native Administration316 - the traditional rulers were 
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the custodians of power in the past, indirect rule had made them custodians of power during 
the colonial period, and they were envisaged to continue in this role in the future. On the other 
side, were those who held antagonistic views towards the ideals of indirect rule as propounded 
by Lugard and implemented by Palmer. This group of officers considered that the only lasting 
benefit which British rule could confer was the development in each territory, of a type of 
government and judiciary modelled more or less after British institutions.317 To achieve this 
they favoured the gradual involvement of educated Africans in the administration of the 
colony, as the situation permitted. For the Lugardians, the ‘educated native’ constituted a 
positive menace to his ancient society. In the fanatical manner, indirect rule was being 
implemented, the Nigerian, at the time no matter his intellectual state, was being asked to look 
backward to his past for his route to future political progress.318 This was the case even 
amongst communities where the institution of paramouncy was anything but ‘traditional.’ In 
these communities paramouncy as developed by the indirect rule system did not necessarily 
create chieftaincy institutions and may therefore not be seen as invented traditions;319 rather it 
was a process of negotiating change, involving the coloniser and the colonised that modified 
existing tradition.320 Subsequently, in the Plateau Province the traditional rulers were striving 
to maintain some form of relevance amidst the policies of former educated elites turned 
politicians, who were bent on replacing chiefly institutions with what they regard as modern 
forms of administration. It is instructive now to examine some of the salient political changes 
that followed the collapse of the First Republic and the coming to power of the military at the 
national, regional and state levels. 
Jonathan Reynolds321 in his excellent account of the instrumentalisation of religion (Islam) in 
the quest for political legitimacy in Northern Nigeria from the 1950s to the late 1960s shows 
how the Native Administrative system became an institution of contestation. Reynolds argues 
convincingly that the Northern People’s Congress (NPC) was the party of the elites 
(aristocrats, and traditional rulers), and one of their goals was the preservation of their 
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and T.O. Ranger eds, (Cambridge University Press, 1983), 211‐62. 
320 As Ranger himself, in a reflexive follow‐up reconceptualised the notion of invented tradition as it relates to 
African colonialism suggesting that in its usage invention did suggest a fabrication of tradition, giving agency to 
colonial  fiat  and  disregarding  local  processes  of  agency,  and  change.  See,  Ranger,  T. O.,  ‘The  Invention  of 
Tradition revisited: the Case of Africa', in Legitimacy and the State in Twentieth Century Africa,  Terence Ranger 
and Olufemi Vaughan eds., (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 1993),  62‐111. 
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influence and power by safeguarding the Native Administration structures. The antithesis of 
the NPC was the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU). At the core of the NEPUs’ 
political objectives was the weakening of the powers of emirs and chiefs, by extending voting 
rights and democratic processes to local administration, thereby replacing traditional rulers 
with elected officials. While this political dynamic of Northern Nigerian politics in 1950s and 
1960s will be familiar to post-colonial historians of Northern Nigeria, Reynolds’ analysis for 
instance sheds light on how the two parties sourced support by not only reconstructing the 
history of the Sokoto Jihad, but also appropriating it for their contemporary political 
capital.322  
Another interesting point to draw from this intensive political battle between conservative and 
progressive northern Nigeria, is captured in what unfolded after the demise of one of the 
leading protagonists, Ahmadu Bello, who was assassinated in the January 1966 coup. Until 
his death, Bello had continued to strengthen the Native Administration, making sure they 
remained relevant in the administration of the Northern Region. The traditional rulers in 
return generally remained loyal to the NPC and constituted its power base. When the military 
government of Yakubu Gowon assembled its cabinet in mid-1966, it was to the First Republic 
outcast that he turned to. The pan-Nigerian first republic progressive alliance of Obafemi 
Awolowo, Aminu Kano, Anthony Enahoro, and Joseph Tarka were made Commissioners 
(Ministers) in charge of finance, health, information and transportation respectively. The four 
of them had been senior opposition party figures at the federal or regional levels during the 
first republic. As Rotimi rightly notes there would have been a high probability that they or 
their supporters had suffered or had been maltreated by the NAPF, particularly Aminu Kano 
and Joseph Tarka in the northern region.323 Mr Benjamin Voncir, a former member of the 
Yergam Union/UMBC alliance confirmed this and agreed that it was not a coincidence that by 
1969, the powers of the native administration were weakened with the dismantling of the 
NAPF.324 The dismantling of the NAPF led to the incorporation of about 9,000 former NAPF 
into the NPF.325  
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The dismantling of the NA police in 1969 constituted a victory for the NPF in the northern 
region. Owing to its status as a federal force, the northern regional administration had 
consistently viewed the NPF with suspicion. The primary concern being that any form of 
extended influence or recognition for the NPF to oversee the affairs of the NAPF would 
amount to degrading the NAs. The best example that captures this tense relationship are the 
responses and reactions from the northern region that accompanied a 1949 Report on the 
future of the NAPFs in British colonies. The report was authored by the office of the 
Inspector-General of Colonial Police, London following a tour of the colonies. Of note for us 
is what the report had to say on relationship between the NAPF and the main colonial police 
force. The report was incriminating, and took a critical stance regarding the organisation, 
impartiality and efficiency of the forces.326 Interestingly, as expected, the response from the 
northern region was the suggestion that the NAPF were far more critical to policing within the 
region than the NPF. To buttress this point the evidence presented highlighted the role of the 
NA system and its responsibility for maintaining law and order; secondly, it was also stated 
that the NAPF presence on the ground was three times more than the NPF – of a total number 
of 6,239 the NPF accounted for 1,223 and the remaining 5,016 were of the NAPF.327 
Accordingly, the response from Lagos to London backed the northern regional administration, 
thereby staying action on the NAPF.328 Therefore, the dismantling of the NAPF and the 
subsequent absorption of some of its men into the NPF had been a long-term desire of the 
NPF at the federal and regional levels. The interest in dismantling the NAPF and weakening 
the NAs was an idea that drew support from interest groups, with grounds that are as varied as 
the nature and form of the interest groups. In the few decades of its existence—in some areas 
a few years—the NAs had indeed stepped on many toes. 
 The political contestation around the dismantling of the NAPF particularly played out at the 
regional and provincial levels. There were varied interest groups at the different levels. 
According to Mahmud Yakubu,329 the process of emirs and chiefs losing their influence and 
subsequently statutory authority over local affairs initially played out at the top of the 
northern regional government, in the wake of the 1966 counter coup, which brought the 
Gowon administration to power. Although the then regional Governor, Major Hassan Usman, 
was a prince from the Katsina ruling house, the bureaucrats (educated elites) were able to 
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persuade him to undertake the most dramatic onslaught yet on chiefly authority.330 As Yakubu 
explains:  
…many of the bureaucrats saw themselves as meritocratic patricians 
ingrained in whose psyche was a feeling, no doubt owing to their 
Western education, broader outlook and career experience under a 
British-styled civil service, that merit must come (first), before 
patronage. Many had been opposed to the thoroughly authoritarian 
nature of the administrative system, especially to those they regard as 
half-educated, backward-looking political appointees giving them 
directives based on sheer political expediency. Most of them, given 
the opportunity, would not hesitate to sacrifice the emirs (and chiefs) 
in the interest of democracy and modernisation…They saw the 
military administration in which they were more influential than the 
emirs (and chiefs) as an opportunity to correct previous anomalies.331 
The military regime then set out to implement one reform after the other. Native Authority 
personnel were banned from taking part in partisan politics; in April 1967, all Emirs and 
Chiefs’ courts were abolished. This included the Grade ‘A’ courts, which had the jurisdiction 
to pass capital sentences. The Governor, meeting the northern emirs and chiefs in Kaduna in 
April 1967 outlined some of the anomalies rectified by the judicial reforms as follows: 
“1. We were the only country in the world in which there existed authorities on whom were 
vested the powers of legislation, adjudication and execution all at the same time; 
2. We were the only country in the world in which appointments to certain executive posts 
would automatically place the appointees as President of a court of law of unlimited 
jurisdiction; 
3. We were the only country in the world in which courts of law of unlimited jurisdiction 
might be presided over by persons who were not learned or trained in the law.”332 
The irony that such admonishment was coming from a military governor was perhaps not lost 
on the emirs and chiefs, and they attempted at protesting and expressing their disagreement 
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with the reforms. They saw the reforms as “...a subtle attempt to dilute their power, reduce 
their statutory authority, tarnish their institutional prestige and inflict financial constraint on 
the NAs which depended on court fines as part of their revenues. Above all they accused the 
soldiers of failing to consult them before these reforms were introduced.”333 Despite these 
protests, the government went ahead with the reforms and the courts were merged with the 
regional judiciary.334 
The role of Native Authorities in everyday administration was then systematically dismantled 
amidst local government administration reforms in 1976. The Guidelines of the 1976 Local 
Government Reforms were very clear in their objectives. The five main objectives were-  
  To institute an enduring viable Local Government Council System. The reforms 
provided for a new structure of administration, providing the local governments with 
significant roles and functions and the powers to deliver. 
  Such a system should serve as a catalyst for the development of the areas involved. 
  To have local governments with a uniform structure through a one-tier system such 
that a local government would not be less than 150,000 citizens and not to have a 
population of more than 800,000.  
  To insulate the exalted and respected position of traditional rulers from partisan 
politics. This provision reads like it is in the interest of the traditional rulers, but it 
must be pointed out that the spirit of the provision was rather geared towards curbing 
the excesses of the ‘royal fathers’. Their role was transformed from political and 
administrative heads of local administration to serving in advisory capacity to the 
chairmen of the local governments. 
 The reforms were also intended to check the insistent interference of state 
governments in local administration as the State Governments had continued to 
encroach upon what would normally have been the exclusive preserve of the Local 
Governments.335 
In Plateau Province, it was the emerging group of western/missionary educated elites that 
were to emerge as local government administrators after the local government reforms of the 
                                                            
333 Ibid., 260. 
334 Ibid., 259. 
335 Federal Republic of Nigeria 1976: Guidelines for Local Government Reform, Government Press, Kaduna. Also 
for analysis on the reforms of 1976 see J.E. Egbe, “Native Authorities and Local Government Reforms in Nigeria 
Since 1914”, IOSR Journal of Humanities and Social Sciences, 19, 3, (2014),  113 ‐127. 
 108 
 
1970s.336 The intense rivalry between the western educated elites and the emirs in the emirates 
was also replicated in the Plateau Province. The schism between the traditional rulers and the 
emerging educated elites began in the early 1950s and was sustained until the dismantling of 
the Native Authorities in 1975/76. This conflicting relationship was characterised by differing 
levels of intensity. In some NAs like the Langtang NA, it did become precarious, and in 
others like the Shendam NA, it was more controlled and managed. It would be instructive at 
this point to provide some detail, and instances of how this rivalry played out in the context of 
the former Plateau Province, Benue-Plateau State from 1967, and Plateau State from 1975. 
By the late 1950s up to the early 1970s, active groups of organised educated elites constituted 
the major threat to the authority of the traditional rulers. This elite group337 will for the 
purposes of our analysis be rendered here in two categories. The first category is made up of 
locals who had been selected from all the Northern Provinces, received special training at the 
newly established Administrative College in Zaria, and were subsequently appointed as 
Divisional Officers across the Northern Region. Several of these Nigerian ‘DOs’338 came 
from the Plateau Province. The native authority system soon emerged as a viable carrier 
opportunity for young men; more Nigerians were appointed as Divisional Officers and 
Assistant Divisional Officers. A former instructor at this college had this to say about his 
memories of the time: 
Well what happened was that you know we were all aware after 
World War Two and India (Indian independence) that some time 
independence would come for the African colonies; this was discussed 
amongst us political officers. There was therefore an interest in 
training and preparing more Nigerians, for us Northern Nigerians who 
could later join the civil service. This was why the Administrative 
College was established in Zaria, and I served a tour there as 
instructor.339  
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One of those selected from Plateau Province, Selcan Miner,340 in an interview recounts the 
reverence such a position gave individuals like him when they returned to their communities. 
The idea that he was holding the position of a DO, albeit in another division, was held in 
much awe. Miner had a distinguished civil service career beginning as Assistant District 
Officer, Jos Native Authority, in the late 1950s, with subsequent postings as District Officer 
to Gboko, Birnin Kebbi and Sokoto Divisions. The second category was made of those who 
had been influenced by having recently acquired western education, under the tutelage of the 
Sudan United Mission for the Tarok, and the Roman Catholic Mission for the Goemai. The 
Sudan United Mission established its major training centre in Gindiri with several educational 
institutions clustered together, including the Boys Secondary School and the Girls High 
School. A majority of the students were admitted from amongst the Plateau groups. Critically 
these two institutions were responsible for the embryonic grooming of future western 
educated Plateau elites. The graduates from Gindiri on return to their various communities 
were looked upon as torchbearers in the struggle for a new social order.341 “Gindiri was thus, 
more than a center (sic) for the production of various certificates and a means to eventual 
employment; it was, more importantly, in essence a big ideological center (sic) in which the 
various certificates were only attractions.”342 For the predominantly Catholic Goemai of 
Shendam, there were training centres in Jos, Zawan, Zonkwa and Vom. Shendam, as the 
political headquarters of the Goemai population, however, remained an important Catholic 
town with the Catholic mission station having been established in 1906 in what became the 
SUM (Protestant) dominated Plateau lowlands. As Mangvwat notes, though the SUM and the 
RCM sometimes argued on points of doctrine and spheres of influence, when it came to 
politics, they were solidly united. At that time, their constituency transcended the church and 
included all non-Muslim and non-Christian peasants.343 Furthermore, the mission stations of 
Langtang and Shendam were more than bases for the propagation of Christianity between the 
Tarok and Goemai; like other mission stations in Plateau Province, such as among the Berom, 
Ngas, and Mwaghavul, they were also centres for political mobilisation344 and 
conscientization of the people. However, the foremost impacts of these emerging elites on 
their communities were to come much later. 
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In the last decades of colonial rule, these young emerging elites had converged to form 
pressure groups, for example, in our research area, the Yergam Union was formed amongst 
the Tarok in 1950, and similar groups had been formed amongst the Berom, and Goemai. The 
groups aspired for ethnic-unity in pursuance of development and advancement of their 
communities. They embraced western education and frowned against what they referred to as 
ignorance {duhunci}. The Yergam Union {Jamiyyar Yergammawa}345 was established among 
the Tarok in December 1950 was quite clear on its goals and objectives. Its constitution, 
issued in 1950, states that: 
(a) The Union is established to strengthen association and love amongst the Yergammawa 
wherever they are in the world; rulers, and peasants, men and women, the elderly and 
the young. [Karfafa zumunci da soyayya tsakannin Yergammawa duka inda suke a 
cikin duniya; sarakuna da talakawa, maza da mata, manya da yara.] 
(b) To encourage consultation with one another, amongst the Yergam so as to know what 
each is up to, and to understand one another. So as to come together and overcome 
such challenges that may be beyond a single person, or a few people. [Son shawara da 
juna tsakannin kabilar Yergam domin su san ra’ayin juna, su fahimci junansu yadda 
za su hada karfinsu domin su yaki adinda zai fi karfin mutum daya ko biyu.] 
(c) To shine the lamp of education and advancement onto all Yergammawa, so that they 
can let go of all backwardness and ignorance, and understand the world situation, and 
how mankind is moving towards progress so as to allow the Yergammawa to prepare 
them for the future. [Haskaker fitilar ilimi da wayewar kai zuwa ga dukkan 
Yergammawa domin su zubasda duhun kai cikin jahilci su kuma gane abinda duniya 
ke ciki sa’annan su gyara zamansu.] 
 
(d) To intervene in all things related to the Yergam, and to advise and guide the rulers on 
what we want and what we do not want. [Sa baki cikin dukkan abinda ya shafi 
Bayargami ta wurin shawarta Sarakunan kasa da sauran masu mulki kan abinda 
muke so da wanda ba mu so.]346 
Objectives (a) and (b) of the Yergam Union’s constitution clearly had an altruistic objective 
of desiring to enhance the collective interest of the group, though it must be said that this was 
the period when the roots of ethno-identity politics were sowed, when ethnic groups began to 
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position themselves against one another, and competition became the dominant form of 
interaction and relations between ethnic groups. The location of the Plateau Province within 
the contours of Central Nigeria meant this competition was relatively much more acute than 
in other parts of the country. If objectives (a) and (b) were targeted towards ethnic unity, the 
target of objectives (c) and (d) albeit, indirectly, had the traditional rulers as targets. In calling 
on their kith and kith to embrace western education, advancement and shun ignorance the 
founders of the Yergam Union were informing the chiefs of the emergence on the horizon of a 
new dispensation that would usher in social as well as political changes. The Tarok educated 
elite of the Yergam Union sought to guide their people in the direction that the world was 
moving in. Finally, objective (d) reads more like an order than offered advice, as the Yergam 
Union officials were keen to advise and guide the traditional rulers on what they wanted and 
what they did not want. It is no surprise that conflict and contestation was soon to emerge 
between traditional rulers across the Province and the members of such pressure groups. 
In an interview with Benjamin Voncir, he recalls how he and a group of young Tarok men 
who had mostly been educated to a contemporary equivalent of secondary school level in 
teacher training, and he admits with considerable Christian missionary influence founded the 
Yergam Union in 1950. The Yergam Union as I had discussed above, was formed to build a 
particular kind of consciousness in Yergam (Tarok) society. A consciousness that would 
embrace what Benjamin Voncir and others understood as advancement, and socio-political 
development of their people. They clamoured for ethnic unity and discouraged clan 
considerations; they encouraged school enrolment and made funds available for children who 
showed promise. They embraced Christianity and frowned at aspects of indigenous religion 
that they regarded as backward. In a 1949 confidential letter to the Resident, Plateau Province, 
the then District Officer, Lowland Division, had this assessment of the growing influence of 
the emerging educated elites in the Yergam (Tarok) area: 
The Plain Yergam (Tarok) are the most progressive in this division, 
and a combination of S.U.M products and of ex-servicemen have 
started holding meetings at which they discuss local affairs. After their 
discussions, two or three of them go to the Ponzhi Langtang [then title 
of main Tarok chief; this changed with the unification of the graded 
stools in 1957] and more or less tell him he has to carry out their 
wishes. Hence, a good deal of Ponzhi Langtang’s awkwardness, 
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because he is being pressed by us on one side and by them on the 
other.347  
This sentiment was also expressed by Hunt’s successor as District Officer. In 1953, Mr E 
Broadbent wrote in an annual report about a certain form of crystallisation of consciousness 
amongst the Tarok. This was captured in the report as follows: 
Amongst the Yergam generally, the younger and more progressive 
elements have found a much needed forum in the new district council. 
The great majority of them are adherents of the Sudan United Mission 
and reveal a distinct interest in what may be described as ‘middle belt’ 
aspirations. The group of individuals also constitute the backbone of 
the Plain Yergam Progressive Union. So far, however, their concern 
has been mainly with local affairs and they appear to exert a healthy 
influence on the whole. In matters touching on farming and education 
the plain Yergam are outstanding for their industry and desire for 
improvement.348 
At first, the Yergam Union saw the traditional rulers as partners in their quest for societal 
enlightenment. This however changed drastically with the advent of party politics. The period 
between 1958 – 1966 witnessed deterioration in the relationship between the Yergam Union 
and the then Ponzhi Tarok, Garba Wuyep.349 Benjamin Voncir captures the highlights of this 
feud as follows: 
When the era of politics came towards independence we believed as a 
people, we should decide collectively where to pitch our tent (this was 
rendered in Tarok). We had to choose amongst the various parties, and 
we decided to go with the Action Group at the national level. To 
contest election for the regional assembly we had a Yergam 
Union/UMBC alliance with Tarka and his people. This was the most 
popular trend amongst groups in the middle belt. We did not want to 
align with the Sarduana because we felt he played religious politics. 
At the time, there was much pressure to support the NPC, but we went 
with the alternatives which we considered as viable alternatives….Our 
relationship with the Chief deteriorated because he was not following 
our advice on major decisions that involved the people. I will give you 
two examples; the first point is he went along with the NPC against 
our advice and alliance with the UMBC. Secondly, without consulting 
the Yergam Union the Chief built a Mosque in front of the palace in 
the early 1960s. At a point it became untenable for him to remain as 
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Chief and tried severally to remove him, in fact we wrote a petition, 
but it did not succeed.350 
These emerging elites therefore latched on to discourses of self-determination, and visions of 
the future that would culminate in the social and economic advancement of their 
communities, with them at the political helm. The fractious relationship between the chiefs 
and the pressure groups was punctuated at times, as there was a unity of purpose in pursuance 
of common goals. An example was the process for the unification of the Hill and Plain 
Yergam (Tarok) to create the Langtang Native Authority, and the Paramount stool of the 
Ponzhi Tarok in 1957.351 The desire and ambition of this emerging elite to have more 
involvement in the running of the Native Administration, however, meant that the relationship 
was more fractious than cordial.352 The traditional rulers at best were doubtful of the real 
intentions of these emerging youth groups and feared if left unchecked the young aspiring 
upstarts may aspire to usurp their power and authority, or even challenge the legitimacy of 
their rule. Therefore, the local government reforms of 1975 played into the hands of the 
emerging elite as they stripped the traditional rulers of their authority, with the elites replacing 
them as local government officials. For instance in Langtang Local Government Area, the 
first Chairman elected in 1976 was Ezekiel Yusuf, a former leading member of the Yergam 
Union. Several other active former members of the Yergam Union emerged as councillors and 
supervisors.353  
Another important point that explains the not so cordial relationship between these pressure 
groups and the traditional rulers was the fact that these groups had established strong alliances 
with the United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). The UMBC emerged out of the resistance of 
the non-Muslim groups of the central Nigerian Provinces to emirate rule and Islamic 
influence. Amongst other things, the UMBC positioned itself as an opposition party to the 
dominant northern ruling party, the Northern Peoples’ Congress (NPC), which dominated 
politics in the north for over two decades.354 A critical point was that the traditional rulers 
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were closely aligned to the NPC, particularly as they aspired to remain relevant members of 
the Northern Assembly of Emirs and Chiefs.  
To situate it within a historical geopolitical context, the Middle Belt refers both to the 
geographical area that stretches across the central axis of Nigeria and to the political project 
that began in the mid-1940s among non-Muslim minority ethnic groups in the former 
Northern Region of Nigeria. The mainly missionary-educated elites in non-Muslim areas of 
the North agitated for self-determination from what they termed as ‘Hausa-Fulani’ domination 
through the creation of a Middle Belt Region, to be carved out of Northern Nigeria. Amongst 
the Tarok and Goemai of Langtang and Shendam NAs at this time (late 1950s to early 1960s), 
the contestation was not about accepting the authority of the chief or the enforcement of law 
and order by the NA police. This threshold had already passed. The challenge as I have 
previously discussed was a rejection of the decision by the Ponzhi Tarok, Garba Wuyep, and 
the Long Goemai of Shendam, Adamu Nyelong, to join the NPC against the wishes of the 
missionary trained emerging elites, who rather saw their political future with the United 
Middle Belt Congress/Action Group Alliance (UMBC-AG). Interestingly enough most of the 
emerging elites who had turned down the ‘carrot’ offer of the NPC reconsidered their position 
and had a change of mind in the run up to the elections of 1963/64, as early as 1962. 
Benjamin Voncir recounts how the Yergam Union members on the side of the Tarok, changed 
their allegiance from the UMBC/AG alliance to the NPC: 
We were convinced that by joining the UMBC/AG alliance we had 
joined the right coalition. The challenge was we were finding it 
difficult to deliver to our community. Proposals for infrastructural 
development were either turned down or delayed. It was at this time 
that the then D.O in Shendam advised us, and emphasised the fact that 
while he understands our politics he thinks it is flawed in strategy, 
because we pay our tax to Kaduna, so why are we supporting a party 
based in Ibadan. This is why we had to reconsider; we then withdraw 
our support from the UMBC/AG alliance and joined the NPC. We 
advised our member in the national parliament late Solomon Lar to 
cross carpet to the NPC. Suddenly, things began to change, in fact, the 
Sardauna himself donated 75 pound shillings to support the building 
of our NA office, and it was also at this time that we built a new office 
for the NAPF.355  
With this move, the emerging elites had by and large acted out an act of acquiescence to the 
wishes of the ruling NPC, and in a sense abandoned their agitations and protest against the 
                                                            
355 Benjamin Voncir interviewed by Jimam Lar, 10.01.2015. 
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Hausa dominance of the region. It should be noted that though a Middle Belt region was never 
created, the sentiments of the movement, issues concerning minorities particularly discourses 
of self-determination from perceived and actual domination of a Hausa Fulani ruling elite, are 
still present. These are continually expressed in the context of violent sectarian conflicts like 
those that have affected Plateau State and southern Kaduna State.  
Figure 5: Map of Benue-Plateau State, extracted from the former Northern Region in 1967.356  
In sum, the local government reforms implemented by the Gowon regime in 1975 had varied 
impacts across the former Northern Region. In areas where there had been a long history of 
centralised chiefly political institutions like northern Nigeria’s emirates, the re-organisation of 
the role of traditional rulers in the day-to-day running of government, while stripping them of 
all their statutory powers, did not necessarily impact on their authority and social legitimacy. 
Traditional rulers in such areas continued to have status and the loyalty and support of their 
communities. A contrast was to be found among the minority ethnic groups of central Nigeria; 
particularly groups that prior to the colonial conquest had a socio-political system that was 
regarded as acephalous – or non-centralised. The local government reforms reduced such 
                                                            
356 Benue Plateau State was created by the administration of General Yakubu Gowon (himself a Middle Belter), 
this was seen as an atonement for what the Central Nigerian groups considered as the fiasco of the Willink’s 
Minorities Commission. 
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chiefs to mere ceremonial heads of their communities, as the role of chiefs as a sort of 
executive head of the community or ethnic group had not had sufficient time to develop and 
be recognised by the people. Compared to in the emirates, it was hard for chiefs in central 
Nigeria to legitimately stand on their own right without formal power, the paraphernalia of 
office and tools of exercising authority. Vaughan remarks that like many reforms preceding it, 
the Guidelines for Local Government Reforms of 1976 underscored the dilemma of 
chieftaincy in contemporary politics. According to Vaughan, 
 Traditional rulers are expected to endorse state policies, while at the same time 
shunning party political activities. Clearly, the line separating local governance and 
partisanship is in reality a very thin one. As critical components of entrenched regional 
and local interest, traditional rulers are destined to walk a tight rope between the 
demands posed by the holders of state power and those of local constituencies.”357 
The new system essentially created a third tier of governance. The traditional rulers still 
existed and were not going to go away, but they were left in an ambiguous situation. On the 
one hand, they had been stripped of their statutory authority and they no longer ran local 
administration. In the late 1970s amidst these reforms, an academic consensus emerged to the 
effect that the creation of a new, third tier of government at the local level. The Land Use 
Decree of 1978, and the abolition of local police forces and prisons were major blows that 
traditional rulers would be unable to recover from or regain any sort of relevance or social 
legitimacy.358 These arguments did not factor in the critical role that traditional institutions 
were beginning to play within ethnic communities, particularly in the Middle Belt. Within the 
context of emerging ethno-nationalism, traditional rulers had emerged as an important 
rallying point of ethnic identity. Even though emerging elites wanted to wrestle local 
administration from them, it was in nobody’s interest to revert to the pre-colonial era when 
these societies were organised and administered according to clan delineations.  
                                                            
357 Olufemi Vaughan, Nigerian Chiefs: Traditional Power in Modern Politics, 1890s‐1990s, (Rochester: University 
of Rochester Press, 2000), 141. 
358 Marenin, “Policing Nigeria: Control and Autonomy”, 76‐78. 
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4.6.	Structural	Adjustment	and	the	Quest	for	Order:	State‐Induced	
Vigilantism	
Another important epoch in the evolution of vigilante policing in Nigeria and particularly 
Plateau State is linked to the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
from 1986 and the impact it had on state policing.359 The provision of public security and the 
maintenance of law and order–a statutory responsibility of the police, which at the time it 
must be noted was already not in good shape-went from bad to worse. The government, in 
response to growing crime and lawlessness, turned to the citizens for a solution. Fourchard 
has argued that the motivation of the Nigerian government at the time was principally to 
restore the authority of the police following the activities of a notorious armed robber, Anini, 
who had terrorised Nigerians in southern parts of the country and eluded police arrest for 
several years.360 Following the introduction of structural adjustment, the prospects for 
institutionalising vigilante policing gained additional traction. In the decade from 1970-1978, 
the Nigerian military government enjoyed a period of high export earnings from petroleum 
revenue, the so-called oil boom that ushered in a rise in public spending. Public spending 
escalated, rising from1.1 billion Naira in 1970 to 6.5 billion Naira in 1975.361 The Nigerian 
military government embarked on a massive spending spree, hosting and organising 
international cultural festivals, for instance the Festival of Black Arts and Culture (FESTAC) 
and local sports competitions, giving huge bonuses to workers, and an array of public works – 
education, health care, public infrastructure – all without proper investment in the productive 
capacity of the economy. Unfortunately, the ‘oil boom’ was soon to become ‘oil doom.’ 
Following the international fall in oil prices the revenues of the Nigerian government 
dwindled. The reason for this was obvious: Nigeria was running a mono-economy. 
Agriculture, which was formerly the mainstay of the economy, had gone into decline. 
Olukoshi notes that manufacturing and unemployment had also gone into massive decline and 
from 1980 to 1983; over 1 million workers were retrenched.362 Despite huge public protests, 
the Babangida led military government implemented the prescriptions of the World Bank and 
                                                            
359 For analysis on the impact of structural adjustment on policing in other Nigerian communities see; Pratten, 
“The Thief eats his Shame”, 64‐83; and Fourchard, “A New Name for an Old Practice”, 16‐40. 
360 Ibid. 
361 Jibrin Ibrahim, “The Transformation of Ethno‐Regional Identities in Nigeria”, in Identity Transformation and 
Identity Politics under Structural Adjustment in Nigeria, Attahiru Jega ed., (Uppsala: Nordiska Afrikainstitutet, 
2000), 41‐61. 
362 Adebayo Olukoshi, ed. Crisis and Adjustment in the Nigerian Economy. (Lagos: JAD, 1991), 28‐33. 
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the International Monetary Fund to implement large-scale austerity. The austerity cuts were 
across all sectors of Nigerian society. This was a period of massive state withdrawal from 
public services.  
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Figure 6: The Newspaper cartoons capture the “signs of the time” as austerity occasion by 
SAP takes its toll; Nigerians had to find ways of cutting cost. 
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Consequently, the embracing of a market –determined access to security and justice, was the 
effect of reduced investment, including state security institutions.363 The market approach to 
security and justice further alienated citizens, particularly the poor.364 In an interview with 
Maiangwa Chenvong Vongbut,365 the current vigilante group leader of Langtang North LGA, 
he recalled the process of establishing the vigilante groups in the mid-1980s as follows:  
The then Ponzhi Tarok (Paramount Traditional Ruler of the Tarok – 
Chief) was called upon to Abuja (this is circa 1986)...they were told 
that there is a shortfall in manpower. We used to have 'yan sandan NA' 
but now they have been discarded.... and we only have the police who 
are grossly insufficient.... There is a need to select some people who 
would fill in the gap.... When they arrest any criminal, they should 
take such suspect to the nearest police station... for further 
investigation, so that we can restore order in the land.... When the 
Ponzhi Tarok returned, people were selected, and I was among those 
selected.... We were given appointment letters; the DPM of the local 
government signs the appointment letter.... We continued working 
[and] at the end of the month they give us allowances. 
The Yansandan NA referred to in the quote was the colloquial term used for the Native 
Authority Police. Police numbers were insufficient at this time due to the lack of resources 
from the government to employ new policemen, but also for the training and retraining of 
those already in service. DPM is an abbreviation for Director of Personnel Management, 
usually the head of administration, normally the most senior career civil servant at the local 
government level. The allowances mentioned were monthly stipends paid to the vigilante 
groups. The NPF at the time midwifed the introduction of Police Community Relations 
Committees (PCRC) in all State, Area and Divisional Commands across the country. It has 
been argued that the PCRC represented a shift in policing and crime prevention that was 
initiated following the increase in the rate of crime.366 Furthermore, its central idea was to 
redeem the image and improve public relations of the police by establishing a link between 
the police and the community. 
For those involved on the ground, the account is often narrated on the lines of a chief 
responding to his subjects' discomfort as they confront rising levels of crime. What they did 
not know at the time was that the Chief was acting on a government directive, and vigilantism 
                                                            
363 Funmi Olonisakin, Eka Ikpe, and Paschal Badong, The Future of Security and Justice for the Poor: A ‘Blue Sky’ 
Think‐Piece, (CSDG Policy Studies, no21, 2009), 16. 
364 Ibid. 
365 Interview with Maiangwa Chenvong Vongbut, Chairman Vigilante Group of Nigeria, Langtang North, at his 
residence Langtang, 14.08.2012 
366 CLEEN and NHRC, 40. 
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had been formulated as community policing.367 At the core of the implementation of the 
PCRC was the traditional ruler. Traditional rulers were equally critical drivers of the origin 
and transformation of vigilante practice. In other words, the PCRC and vigilantism found a 
meeting point in traditional rulers. It was the negotiating skills of the traditional rulers that 
enabled two contrasting initiatives to seamlessly coexist and entrench the practice of plural 
policing in Plateau State. Furthermore, there were traditional rulers who did not simply 
engage in mobilisation of young men in their community, but were personally involved in 
vigilante practice. An example of such is the former Ngolong Ngas, the late Adamu Gutus. In 
an interview, a former member of the VGN in Pankshin town, Sunday Philibus, recalls this as 
follows: “I joined the vigilante group in 1989. At that time His Royal Highness, the late 
Ngolong Ngas Mallam Adamu Gutus, was our chairman. Our secretary was the then principal 
of Government College Pankshin, Mr George Yakzum. We meet every evening at the chief’s 
palace before we go out on patrol for briefing, and we report again in the morning.”368 
This was a case of vigilante policing established by the state to respond to a shortfall in 
policing numbers, as a result of the state cutting down on critical social services. This was not 
unique to Plateau; community-policing initiatives sprung up in different parts of the country 
in the wake of the Structural Adjustment Programme. Fourchard has examined and analysed 
this amongst the Yoruba of South West Nigeria.369 He argues that among the Yoruba, 
specifically in Ibadan, the main source of his empirical data, ‘Vigilante' is a term initially 
proposed by the police in the mid-1980s as a substitute for an older practice present since the 
colonial period and referred to as the 'hunter guard' or 'night guard' system.370  
In public advertorials, citizens were encouraged to ‘help the police serve them better’.371 The 
mantra from the state police, borrowing from the international trend at the time, was all about 
community policing as a panacea for high crime rates. Benjamin Voncir recounts that the then 
military administrator of Plateau, Col. Lawrence Onoja, on a tour of the local government 
areas, encouraged the traditional rulers and the people to mobilize and embrace the 
                                                            
367 This argument is developed in Fourchard, “A New Name for an Old Practice”, AFRICA, 16‐40. 
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government’s community policing initiatives.372 This was the beginning of police/vigilante 
co-operation in Plateau State. The vigilante groups at that time began to believe they were 
operating as an extension of the state. The roles and functions of vigilante groups expanded: 
they provided information – intelligence – and arrested suspects and handed them over to the 
police.373 They also worked in conjunction with market authorities across Plateau State to 
maintain law and order in local markets.  
Meanwhile as the decade of the 1980s progressed into the early 1990s the traditional rulers on 
the Plateau, as was the case in other parts of the country, had conveniently re-established their 
authority. The chiefs in Plateau State began to seek out creative means to maintain a hold on 
their communities. They introduced the practice of bestowing traditional titles on prominent 
elites from the community or outside; the acquisition of a chieftaincy title confers some 
degree of legitimacy and status on the recipient.374 In contemporary Nigeria the obsession for 
titles and acquiring honours are manifestations of the ruling classes' craving to juggle between 
and at times satisfy the competing demands of what Ekeh referred to as the ‘two publics.’375 
Traditional rulers also codified legal codes to respond to the need of maintaining control of 
land, and land use, amid the federal military government’s reform of land use in Nigeria 
introduced in 1978;376 and they championed the introduction or continuation of traditional 
festivals and celebrations. The introduction of Customary Courts of Appeal provided a formal 
appellate court within the state judicial process that recognised these codified laws, and the 
custodian of the law was the traditional ruler. It is within such a context that traditional rulers’ 
facilitated the establishment of vigilante groups; they argued that this was to help maintain 
law and order within their domains.377 The vigilantes were commonly referred to as 
neighbourhood watch groups or vanguard groups, and colloquially they were referred to by 
the Hausa term 'Yanbanga (derived from the English word ‘vanguard’). This is a term which 
the contemporary Vigilante Group of Nigeria has tried without success to discard, preferring 
the term 'Vigilante Group of Nigeria', which is of course officious and demonstrates the 
group’s status as part of the institutional structure of policing.  
                                                            
372 Benjamin Wapkur Voncir, interviewed by Jimam Lar, 10.01.2015. 
373 The typology of these suspects ranged from armed robbers to petty thieves and even delinquent youths. 
374 P.O. Agbese, “Chiefs, Constitutions, and Policies in Nigeria”, West Africa Review: Issue 6, (2004), 4. 
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As previously, argued, traditional rulers under the Native Authority system were on occasion 
using the 'Yan Doka as their personal force, reducing them to Dogarai.378 What the state 
reforms of the late 1960s and the mid-1970s took away with the disbandment of the NAPF 
and the reform of local government was replaced with vigilante groups –'Yanbanga. In our 
area of research, the first generation of this practice was drawn from civil war veterans. In 
Langtang North, Langtang South, and Shendam local government areas (LGAs) of Plateau 
State, the idea to establish a community-based neighbourhood watch group emerged from the 
palaces of traditional rulers. In a council meeting in 1971, the then Ponzhi Tarok (the Tarok 
paramount chief) called the attention of his council to the rise of crime, robbery and general 
lawlessness in his domain. This was two years after the NAPF was disbanded and the number 
of police officers in the (NPF) detachment in Langtang was higher in number compared with 
the NAPF. He lamented that the unfortunate developments had a correlation with the 
dismantling of the NAPF without adequately replacing it with an alternative institution.379 
Specifically, what had changed was that they were no longer under his authority and control. 
Traditional rulers were concerned about their loss of an enforcement arm. The traditional 
rulers were stripped of all their administrative powers, alongside other processes that were 
unfolding that seemed contrary to their interests, as previously noted, traditional rulers were 
convinced that if they were to muster any sort of relevance and influence they had to be 
creative. The origins of the 'Yanbanga in the mid-1970s and its establishment in the 1980s is 
therefore understood as part of several initiatives by traditional rulers to regain some 
semblance of authority.  
Having made the decision to establish neighbourhood watch groups, the traditional rulers 
found a very reliable and ready-made group to champion the idea and become the major 
driving force for the return of a plural policing landscape. Civil war veterans, who were 
demobilized after the Nigerian civil war and were mostly frustrated at the ordeal of having 
their army careers cut short, and without having been considered for absorption by the NPF, 
were keen to lead the way in recruiting and training selected young men to serve their 
communities as Yanbanga.380 I encountered several men now in their 70s who had served as 
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Yanbanga in the 1970s and I met a few of the civil war veterans in Langtang North Local 
Government Area who were a critical part of the establishment of Yanbanga.381 Profiles of 
some of these individuals are discussed in chapter seven.  
In sum, what emerges from this chapter, and as Vaughan aptly observed, is the manner in 
which chieftaincy structures are continuously regenerated and adapted to a constantly shifting 
socio-political and economic reality.382 Generating his empirical case from amongst the 
Yoruba of south-west Nigeria, Vaughan shows the dynamism and resilience of chieftaincy 
structures in modern Nigerian politics. In Plateau State, the traditional rulers and the 
institution in general were equally resilient and creative. In a very competitive landscape of 
ethnic contestation and identity politics, traditional rulers emerged as rallying points for 
ethno-nationalistic projects. As we have noted elsewhere,  
While traditional and customary rulers have no constitutional role in Nigerian 
governance, their importance and influence are clear to see. Traditional rulers, by 
virtue of occupying an important bridge between state and society, emerge as critical 
and symbolic figures for the groups and territories they represent.”383  
Accordingly, the apparent limitation of Nigerian state structures, and a lack of penetrative 
state influence in regards to providing amenities at the grassroots, has consequently further 
enhanced the status of chiefs as important agents of mediation and negotiation. Traditional 
rulers continue to serve as a conduit by which the federal, state, and local governments access 
the people. In this sense, traditional rulers while not carrying constitutional power are by 
default still an extension of the state at the local level, and they have the social legitimacy to 
exercise authority. The 1979, 1989, 1995 constitutional attempts to diminish the role and 
significance of traditional rulers by denying them explicit executive and judicial powers have 
been largely unsuccessful.384 While the apparatus of the state denies them these roles, the 
agents of this same state (the bureaucrats) in their practices, recognise and respect traditional 
rulers. During elections Traditional rulers are not only canvased for political support, more 
importantly they are co-opted by politicians. Again, of importance here is the social 
legitimacy traditional ruler enjoy. Therefore, the institutionalisation of plural policing is 
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embedded within the processes that have institutionalised traditional and customary 
leadership. While vigilante group members have metamorphosed to a point where their 
continued existence no longer relies on the traditional and customary leaders, the logics and 
dynamics of vigilante practice continue to revolve around the chiefs.  
4.7.	Conclusion		
This chapter has argued that current forms of institutionalised plural policing in Plateau State, 
Nigeria can be traced back along a direct historical trajectory. This trajectory originates in the 
institutionalisation of paramouncy in the chieftaincy institutions of the Plateau Province of 
Nigeria from the early 1940s to the late 1950s: to the dismantling of the former Native 
Authority Police in the late 1960s; to the Nigerian government’s policy in the mid-1970s to 
reform local government, and to the attempt by traditional rulers to re-assert some semblance 
of influence and authority. The major link in this process of institutionalising plural policing 
is the institution of traditional rulership. The processes of negotiating change revolved around 
the traditional rulers. Furthermore, I demonstrated how the Nigerian state was involved in the 
formation of vigilante groups in the 1980s; the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) 
influenced this. The chapter argues that the contemporary plural policing landscape is a 
product of a socio-political historical process. The chapter has also explored important epochs 
within the historical trajectory on a macro level, and showed how these epochs influenced and 
affected the social landscape at the micro level, establishing links we otherwise may not have 
noticed. Hills, while analysing a different feature of reforming the Nigerian Police, reminds us 
that not only do we need to situate explanations within their proper historical and social 
contexts, but also we need to be nuanced in our assessments of drivers and effects of reform 
and change.385 In this chapter, I have tried to show that even though having evolved on 
different trajectories the macro processes analysed speak to the need to reform Nigeria’s 
current policing structures. The next chapter seeks to discuss the historical and contemporary 
processes of socialising /re-socialising of state and non-state policing actors.  
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Chapter	Five:	The	Socialisation	of	Policing	Actors	
5.1.	Introduction	
Recounting his time in Nigeria, Mr. Robin Mitchell,386 a former colonial police officer who 
served in Bauchi, Plateau (Jos), Sokoto, and Minna Provinces of Northern Nigeria, made the 
point that the effectiveness and efficiency of the NA Police varied across the region. It 
depended, according to Mr Mitchell, on the Chief or Emir overseeing the police and the 
general situation in each Native Authority. Some Provinces were easy to police and nothing 
much was heard from them, but there was constant turmoil in others, largely because of the 
activities of the NA police and the highhandedness of some Chiefs and Emirs. Mr Mitchell’s 
main point here is that the background and socialisation of NA Police - and one could say by 
extension vigilante groups that came after - was drawn from different sources, and these 
sources were by no means creating a harmonised policing outcome. My main objective in this 
chapter is to show how in spite of all the differences across the landscape of plural policing 
there was a convergence of influences. I show how it is possible to discern certain common 
features of a common socialisation of policing actors. It is therefore not just the institutions 
that shape practice; we have to also look at how agency is formed, by groups and actors. The 
insight that emerges shows us how exactly vigilante groups and the NAPF that preceded them 
learned the practice of policing.  
The previous chapter focused on how events and processes on a macro level impacted on state 
building processes at micro local levels. In this chapter, the focus is on the processes of 
transformation and institutionalisation of plural policing as experienced and described by the 
members of the NAPF and vigilante group members. What are the narratives from within 
these non-state policing institutions? I discuss the modus operandi of vigilante policing 
practice in historical and contemporary contexts, exploring the varied sources these groups 
draw upon to inform their practice. In the repertoires of vigilante practice, we find aspects of 
the strict ritualised practice of ancestral cults and forms of traditional policing, but we also 
observe practice that is informed by the army and police, culminating in diverse forms of 
vigilante policing. Of particular importance are the historical shifts in the processes of 
socialisation and how vigilantism and plural policing in general has been constructed and how 
this construction has changed over time.  
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5.2.	Local	Indigenous	Influences	
In this section I want to show how community-held ideas, norms, principles, and beliefs that 
in some instances predate British colonial administration have influenced the practice of 
Native Authority Policing and subsequently other forms of non-state policing. Socialisation is 
used here to explain the process of making individuals members of a society. The process of 
making young men social. A major manifestation of this socialisation is the extent to which 
ancestral cult worship constituted a major influence in the practice of local policing. This was 
the case in communities of the Plateau Province where there had been established practice of 
ancestral cults providing a specific variant of pre-colonial policing services. In spite of the 
major headway of Christianity, in the Plateau lowlands ancestral cults have retained 
considerable prominence and importance, in some communities up to the present. The 
scenario observed is best described as a landscape of religious coexistence, not to refer to 
adherents of different religions living together but rather, a considerable number of people 
who are simultaneously active/passive adherents of different religions. For instance, there are 
Christians who are active adherents and participants of masquerading and ancestral cult 
worship. The ancestral cult worship has different functions and cultural roles, ranging from 
the religious to the political and aesthetic.387 However, for our purposes we are concerned 
with the element that focuses on the enforcement of order within the community, and 
masquerades that emerge or come out to discipline errant members of the community, 
women388, children, and uninitiated.389 As I will later discuss in chapter seven, ancestral cults 
also play a critical role in times of collective violence, as an elderly Tarok informant recounts,  
The Orim are our ancestors; they keep us and they protect us, they are our spiritual 
guide. They help to maintain order and they have the authority to enforce our 
traditions and our inherited norms and values. The ancestors are also critical in times 
of war; when we need to defend ourselves they lead the way and guarantee victory.390  
To be considered qualified to serve in the Native Authority police from the late 1950s, when 
indigenous peoples were encouraged to join, until when it was dismantled in 1969, it was 
advantageous if an individual had been initiated into the ancestral cult. According to Danladi 
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Tanglar, at the time recruitment officers were keen to ask the question, initially the potential 
recruits feared it might disqualify them; some locals at the time equated the colonial regime 
and the church as the same, and believed the church would not support ancestral cult initiates 
serving in the police.391 For instance, Isichei citing Bawa notes that amongst the Goemai the 
purpose for relating masquerades and ancestral cults to non-state policing institutions is 
critically informed by the fact that they had the capacity to instil fear and dread amongst the 
people, particularly women and the uninitiated, and because of their anonymity and 
supernatural dread they were (still are in some areas) peculiarly well suited to enforce the 
unpopular decisions of the native authorities.392  
It must be taken into cognizance that most traditional institution groups like the ancestral cults 
or secret societies within the Province were never formally accepted as part of the Native 
Authority system. They were intermittently called upon on an informal basis by the chiefs to 
keep the young men in check, so also within this context and period it was a situation where 
the initiated were policing not only the initiated but equally policing themselves. The local 
officials had been fascinated by the ancestral cults and to an extent associated the ancestral 
cult with discipline, uprightness, and embedded legitimacy. Mahmud Mwangil393 offers the 
explanation that there were occasions where local colonial officials would condemn certain 
cultural practices in their annual reports as backward and barbaric, yet be pragmatic enough to 
initiate ways of using it. The existing systems of policing and maintaining law and order at the 
time were particularly useful because they were accepted by the people, and thus not difficult 
to enforce. More so, the colonial government despite its reservations recognised the close 
relationship between religion and law in most non-Muslim societies on the Plateau.394  
 The point to be inferred here is that policing was occurring at a time that these societies were 
undergoing a phase of transition. On a social front, the religious landscape was being altered 
by the transformations ushered in by Christianity. On the political front ethno-consciousness 
driven by the involvement of the Plateau minorities in the nationalist movement was equally 
ushering in significant changes, as I have discussed in the previous chapters characterised by 
the contestation for power and local authority between the local chiefs and the emerging 
educated elites. 
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To be sure, the colonial authorities were never keen on the idea of integrating ancestral cults 
and secret societies into local administration. The political and social roles, as well as the 
judicial or adjudicative roles of these groups were regarded as somewhat ambivalent.395The 
main objective of the colonial officers was to midwife the evolution of strong chiefs and a 
centralisation of power thereof. The intertwined entanglement of ancestral cult practice and 
local policing was therefore a phenomenon that emerged from within the negotiated space of 
local communities and their immediate local officials. Interesting enough it was not in all 
local areas that the NAPF was present and active, therefore while the colonial system 
depended on the chiefs to enforce order where there were no NAPF the traditional policing 
institutions in some cases ancestral cults continued unabated. The ancestral cults were not just 
influencing the policing practice of the NAPF; they were more importantly also providing 
policing services.  
 Another influence on non-state policing structures, particularly contemporary forms of 
vigilantism that was drawn from the ancestral cult worship, is the practice of coded language. 
This is a non-structured form of elucidating group belongingness. In linguistic terms, it is 
referred to as an anti-language. “An anti-language is nobody’s mother tongue; it exists solely 
in the context of re-socialisation, and the reality it creates is inherently an alternative reality, 
one that is constructed in order to function in alteration.”396 The adoption of such coded 
language allows non-state policing actors to create a community of practice, the anti-language 
by its nature has an anti-linguistic intention, and the language is used, or adopted so that non-
members do not understand what is said. This is still the practice amongst vigilante groups in 
Plateau State. I personally witnessed it while on patrol with vigilante group members in 
Langtang North and Shendam local governments. In Langtang North, it was a fusion of 
expired397 words from ancestral cult worship and the local Tarok language. In Shendam, on 
the other hand it was a coded language with influence from Hausa. Few words required for 
daily patrol operations were coded. I was informed that with mobile phones the VGN in 
Shendam were rarely relying on the coded language as they could communicate via text 
messaging and calls. Albeit, they complained that they often do not have money for phone 
credit. 
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In pointing out how such ancestral cult practices and secret societies influence contemporary 
youth practice Pratten has argued that masquerade practice constitutes repositories of idioms 
of youth initiation, and modes of collective covert and overt action,398 that appeal to youths 
making claim to securing and protecting their communities in several contemporary contexts. 
Consequently, there is therefore a dynamic contingent history of secret societies to trace (in 
my case ancestral cults) and an active, discursive use of the past in the present.399 As shown 
form the forgone analysis, the widespread presence of what Pratten describes is not in doubt. 
In considering its significance however, I differ from Pratten’s understanding. According to 
Pratten, the practice of imbibing and embedding secret society and ancestral cult practices 
within the repertoires of vigilante policing practice is a representation of claims to pre-
colonial legitimacy over rights to land and resource ownership; it is a means of making claims 
in opposition to the state. These groups, Pratten argues, construct moral communities, deploy 
physical and spiritual power, and determine when there is a just cause to use these for the 
good and protection of the community.400 “They are seen to draw on repertoires of practices 
and cultural logics linked to the ideology and practices of precolonial initiatory societies.”401 
From what I observed in the areas I studied, it seems Pratten’s insights do not apply to Plateau 
State. I would rather suggest that vigilante groups in our context are not in opposition to the 
state. These practices are not informed by opposition to the state or employed with the state as 
its target. Rather, they are to engender social legitimacy - vigilantes are not bringing back a 
forgotten pre-colonial practice. These practices have continued in spite of the arrival and 
growth of Christianity and Islam. We should perhaps look beyond formulations that 
understand this particular manifestation as a return of the occult, or secret society. Firstly, 
while these practices have undergone some changes, they have remained embedded in 
community consciousness and practices. Therefore, they are not necessarily coming back, 
which suggests that at some point they were abandoned. Secondly, I would suggest that what 
we are witnessing are young men deploying local cultural agency to combat manifestations of 
extreme socio-economic stress in the face of decades of ruthless economic and political 
restructuring. I argue that to take the appropriation of ancestral cult and secret society 
practices by vigilante groups as a serious form of return to cultural historical practice is to not 
understand its function. These practices should rather be seen as an entry point, a livelihood 
option – simply a means or tool to earn a living. A similar trend would be the boom in 
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clergymen as a response to the ruthless economic and political restructuring. When 
interviewed informants (theoretically) talk about the power of the ancestral cult, how it abhors 
cheating and backbiting, how it is against them breaking the law, how charms are sacred and 
sacrosanct etc., the next day (in practice) the same person is collecting a bribe. 
5.3.	The	‘Hausanisation’	of	Policing	Practice	
The Native Authority institution on the Plateau was also influenced by practices from the 
emirates. This was particularly because from its inception on the Plateau right up to the mid-
1940s, the Native Authority Police in Plateau Province and other Provinces in today’s Middle 
Belt zone of Nigeria were staffed by recruits mainly from the emirates.402 The fact that most 
of these NA policemen were of Hausa ethnic extraction emboldened the notion that the 
British had an agenda of foisting Hausa-Fulani Hegemony, which they had resisted before the 
advent of colonial rule.403 Ochuno’s notion of ‘Colonialism by Proxy’ is useful in our 
understanding of these dynamics.404 Rotimi aptly captured the sentiments of the Resident of 
Kabba Province, in his response to the proposed policy from the Protectorate headquarters in 
Kaduna to introduce emirate-style dogarai policing in all Northern Provinces. The Resident 
was keen to remind headquarters that: 
…there was no dogarai (in Kabba) and police work was done entirely by the 
Government Police. Because there was no chiefly political system in most of the 
Province, the Resident feared that ‘it would be impossible at present to start dogarai to 
replace police’. What was more, the people were too truculent to be dealt with by an 
unarmed body of men. He then warned that for a ‘people who have of old successfully 
held off the Fulani owing to their mountain strongholds and independent characters’ 
the introduction of an institution associated with the Fulani would smack of giving 
victory to an enemy through the back door.”405 
However, the traditional rulers who were put in control of the NA police did little to 
discourage the recruitment of non-indigenous officers. As long as they were in control or 
perceived to be in control, they had no or few misgivings.406  
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The importing of police from the Hausa emirates entrenched emirate culture and certain forms 
of palace practice, including turbans, horse riding patrols, and a host of other practices. 
Significantly, Hausa language was adopted as the official language of the NAs and the titles 
used for emirate officials were imported into chiefdoms in central Nigeria. Prior to British 
colonialism, the factors that influenced the spread of Hausa across the middle belt were 
geographical, cultural, political, and most importantly commercial.407 Detail accounts of the 
extensive influence of Hausa trade networks are documented in Lovejoy’s two excellent 
accounts, on kola nut408 and salt.409 For our study area, Hausa functioned mainly as a 
language of commerce. Some parts of Plateau State, were not just markets for these 
commodities, they were also rest stops for the merchants. In the later periods, two important 
processes made Hausa significant for the linguistic landscape of the area. With the arrival of 
Christian missionaries, Hausa was further entrenched as a language of evangelism, 
conversion, and belief. Then significantly, preference for recruits from the emirates to serve 
as NA Police was equally informed by this adoption quite early, as Hausa had become the 
language of administration, thus also the language of policing.  
 The authorities in Kaduna seized all opportunities they had to underline the importance of 
Hausa as the language of administration in the North. An example is a 1936 response to the 
IGP (Inspector General of Police), Major A. Saunders, in which among other things it was, 
stated “In the Northern Provinces practically all Native Administration work and records are 
conducted in Hausa. Literacy in Hausa is far more important than in English, save in the 
townships, which are now policed by the Nigerian Police.”410 Consequently, proficiency in 
Hausa became a pre-condition for employment as a NA police officer. This was already 
ensured by the use of Hausa as the medium of instruction at the Police Training Depot (PTD); 
the police recruit training school in Kaduna. According to Mr. Robin Mitchell, a former 
colonial police officer (1956-1965), Native Authority police parades and drills were 
conducted in Hausa411. One of the requests at the time that emanated from the non-emirate 
Provinces on the Plateau was for the government to consider providing language courses for 
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prospective recruits rather than demanding that all recruits should demonstrate proficiency 
before being considered.412  
Referring to a memorandum prepared on the subject of 'Yan Doka for the 1935 Residents 
conference, Rotimi comments that the government, 
Demonstrating its insensitivity to the disadvantage of this policy for the non-Hausa 
speaking areas…declared that the AIG (Assistant Inspector General), Nigerian Police 
Force, was unable to accept for training at Kaduna men who could not speak Hausa 
which was the language of instruction and wondered why some native administrations 
wished to employ as Yan Doka men who could not speak Hausa.413  
The ethnic composition of the NAPF of the Plateau Province reported in a 1939 provincial 
police report demonstrates the large presence of ethnic Hausa police officers. Out of a total 
number of 206 NAPF men, 68 were Hausa; 34 of Igbo descent, 18 Fulani, and 15 Kanuri 
followed this. The report goes on to state that considerable difficulty had been experienced in 
finding recruits of suitable standard in the Province.414 The standard stated here specifically 
referred to medium level of English literacy. One would however have to question the 
expectation that in 1939 there would be individuals with the required levels of education who 
would have fancied a job as an NA police officer. In the 1930s, Hausa literacy was also 
considered for the very low ranks. In general, the dearth of recruits from the Plateau Province 
was to only begin to massively change in the wake of post WWII recruitments of ex-
servicemen from the Province into the NAPF. Now I turn to the dynamics of involving ex-
servicemen in policing practice and the consequent impacts of the policy.  
5.4.	The	Influences	of	Ex	‐Servicemen	
When the NAPF was introduced in Plateau Province, there was an initial reluctance to recruit 
men from the area to serve as NA police. As I have discussed in the forgone section, the 
policy of the colonial government in regards to eligibility meant that for the Northern 
Provinces a majority of recruits for the NAPF were drawn from the Hausa emirates. The large 
number of Hausas in the NAPF was also importantly informed by the fact that Hausas 
constituted a large number of ex-servicemen who had served in the Northern Nigerian 
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Regiment during the First World War most of the men were in the Cameroonian theatre of the 
war. In fact, in the first decade of the twentieth century, Nigerians recruited to serve in the 
colonial army had been almost entirely drawn from the Hausa and the Yoruba. The two 
groups provided over 80 per cent of the serving soldiers in the Northern and Southern 
Regiments respectively.415  
John Barrett in his study of the rank and file of the colonial army during the First World War 
states that by the time the war broke out the Yoruba and Hausa were no longer as keen as 
before to join the colonial army; rather they preferred to pursue careers in commerce as 
traders.416 The British therefore switched attention to the “excellent pagan tribes available.”417 
Thus by 1916 the majority of men being recruited were drawn from the Fulani, Kanuri, 
Munchi (Tiv) and other numerous ethnic minorities of the then Northern Provinces, who were 
simply classified in the records as ‘pagan tribes.’418 It was thus logical that a higher number of 
NAPF personnel had an army service background. Importantly, the colonial administration 
also made it possible for World War I veterans to learn specific skills, which would help them 
in the process of settling to civilian life. For example, training centres organised 
schoolmasters to provide English classes for soldiers to improve on the ‘pidgin’ English 
acquired from the war experience.419 There was also intensive training in driving and 
mechanical maintenance.420 This was particularly the case for the higher echelons of the 
NAPF.  
By the late 1930s to early 1940s when the British were recruiting for the Second World War, 
a considerable number of men were from the non-emirate groups of the Northern Provinces. 
Colonial military service in the Second World War created an opening for the recruitment of 
men for NAPF service from the specific communities where the chiefdoms were established. 
In 1946, following the end of the Second World War, there was a windfall of recruits in the 
wake of massive demobilisation and resettlement of Nigerian ex-servicemen who fought as 
part of the Nigerian Regiment of the British war effort in Burma. While several ex-
servicemen rebuilt their lives as farmers in colonial established agricultural programmes, 
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others embraced forms of handwork like carpentry, trading, and tailoring. The main source of 
employment for ex-servicemen was the N.A. Police, which took the opportunity to increase 
its force.421 A decade earlier, the report of a Conference of Residents, Northern Provinces, 
held in Jos in 1937 commented that recruitment should be encouraged as much as possible 
from the ranks of ex-soldiers and government police. The report went on to encourage the 
recruitment of N.A. Police, particularly ex-servicemen from outside of the Province. It stated: 
“The idea that a tribe or local community will not stand a Dan Doka other than of its own 
tribal stock seems nowadays out of date. If a suitable candidate of local stock is available, 
well and good, - if not, the disciplined ex-servicemen from elsewhere are preferable to the 
local never do well who takes on the post as a soft job.”422 John Hare, a former colonial 
district officer in the Adamawa Province, recalls the importance of ex-servicemen to the 
workings of the NAPF in the following words: “ex-soldiers from the Second World War were 
very important for discipline and efficiency of the NA police”.423 
Providing further insight on this point, Danladi Tanglar, a former NAPF officer who served in 
Langtang and Shendam Native Authorities, pointed out that in the late 1940s most recruits of 
the NAPF came from WWII veterans, precisely because 
At this time, no educated person found the job of Yan Doka attractive. In the 1920s, 
Yan Doka were Dogarai of Chiefs. However, by the 1940s when Provinces and 
divisions were created District Officers needed a security force to maintain law and 
order, but also to assist in collecting taxes. As a former NA police officer, it was very 
clear to see that the Northern Regional government established the NAPF to provide 
security and a policing institution for the DOs, Chiefs, and the staff of the local 
administration.”424 
In his Annual Report of 1926, the Resident of Plateau Province providing updates on the 
recruitment of Yan Doka in the Province reiterated this point as he noted that, “…as far as 
possible the forces (NAPF) are recruited from men of good character who have served their 
time in the Nigeria Regiment.”425 Another example that illustrates the reliance on ex-
servicemen for NAPF work in the Plateau Province is the 1946 Annual Report: Shendam 
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Division, by the Divisional Officer L.J. Logan. Logan reporting to the higher echelons of 
colonial authority in Northern Nigeria claimed “…the general level of the Yan Doka is 
improving, by the retirement of less suitable types in favour of ex-soldiers of good quality.”426 
He goes on to commend the Yan Doka, noting “…some ex-soldiers have already shown 
ability in police work in difficult cases. The present Sarkin Yan-Doka is an ex-Regular 
Regimental Sergeant Major and a fair percentage of the rank-and-file have had two or even 
three stripes [ranks] in the army.”427 The recruitments in 1926 represented the engaging of ex-
servicemen from the World War 1, and the recruitments in 1946 were drawn from World War 
II veterans.  
The colonial principle of recruiting ex-servicemen as local police and as staff of the Native 
Administration in the Plateau Province began after WW1 and continued after WWII. While 
these men were being recruited to engage in police work, their major source of socialisation 
and experience had been in the art of soldiering. The hope of the colonial government was 
that with the right training, they could create local police officers from war veterans. While 
the ex-servicemen constituted the core of the NAPF, the colonial provincial government made 
the effort to also recruit ‘suitable’ young men to blend with the ex-servicemen.428 Particular 
training schemes were subsequently designed to prepare both categories of recruits for police 
work. Therefore, the scenario that unfolded was a situation where men who had been 
conscripted, trained and deployed to Burma to fight during the Second World War were 
recruited to serve in the NA police force. They brought with them not just the experiences of 
soldiering, but also the characteristics and ranking systems of the army. An examination of 
the structure of the NA police does lend more to being a unit of the army, rather than the 
police. For instance, an officer with the rank of a Regimental Sergeant Major (RSM) runs the 
NA police at the level or grade of a divisional headquarters like Shendam Lowland Division; 
the Sarkin Yan Doka carried the badge of an RSM. In NAs with a grade lower like Langtang 
and Wase, the Sarkin Yan Doka was a Staff Sergeant, with the Madakin Yan Doka (2nd in 
Command) a Corporal.429  
While the chiefs in the Plateau Province welcomed the designation of 50% or more of recruits 
coming from ex-servicemen430, there was a concern in the emirates that recruiting such a large 
                                                            
426 NAK, JosProf 1/1/6451/1947, Plateau Province Annual Report for 1946 
427 Ibid 
428 Ali Dakshang, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Dadur‐Langtang North, 7.10.2012. 
429 Ibid. 
430 Benjamin Voncir, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Langtang, Plateau state, 10.01.2015 
 137 
 
percentage of NAPF from ex-servicemen could potentially undermine the Emir’s authority 
and thereby alienate the force.431 In fact, the then colonial Inspector General of Police, who 
was more in tune with the practice amongst the emirates, commenting on the high numbers of 
ex-soldiers availing themselves for NAPF recruitment across the northern Provinces, is 
quoted to have quipped that “ex-soldiers though excellent raw material have little or no 
knowledge of police duties.”432 The Assistant Commissioner of Police, in a report on 
recruitment and training of NAPF for the Plateau Province expressed the same sentiment, 
voicing his dislike for ex-servicemen; though he did concede, “one or two are useful for drill 
purposes.”433 However, in view of the fact that the recruitment of NAPF was handled at the 
Provincial level ex-servicemen did constitute the bulk of recruits of Yan Doka in the Plateau 
Province, until the mid-1950s when the NAs in Plateau began to actively seek recruits with 
some level of Western literacy to take up responsibilities in administration. This was a decade 
after the end of WWII so there were no unemployed servicemen left to recruit. The Plateau 
lowlands, particularly the Tarok community, continued to have a long history of military 
service during the subsequent decades after independence. Therefore, over the decades, there 
were a growing number of retired military men resettled within Tarok society and other parts 
of the Plateau lowlands serving as vigilante group members. Ex-servicemen continually 
influenced the activities of non-state policing institutions.  
The point taken from this section is the fact that in the inter-war years and post-1945 the 
socialisation of NA policing was based on army ideals and practice. As I have argued 
previously, in spite of all the efforts and training schemes employed by the government at this 
time, the socialisation gained from soldiering remained the major influence on policing 
practices of the NAPF. This was clearly, because most recruits in the first decades of the 
NAPF were ex-servicemen. This however began to change when the NA police began to 
recruit Middle School graduates from the early 1950s to the mid-1950s. As more war veterans 
retired and the NPF instituted more training regimes for the NAPF, the NAPF was informed 
increasingly by the competencies gained from police training and practice. The annual reports 
in the 1950s praised the work of the NAPF in the Province. For instance, the Annual Report: 
Lowland Division434 1950 noted how “…the N.A. Police force continues to show 
considerable improvement both in its general turn out and discipline and in its ability to 
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contribute towards the maintenance of law and order.”435 The 1955 Annual Report of the 
same Lowland Division showered glowing commendation on the NAPF, the District Officer 
D.H. Lloyd-Morgan, was happy to lavish the NAPF with praise, referring to it as “one of the 
more satisfactory aspects of the Division, under the admirable leadership of the Sarkin Yan 
Doka (Chief of Yan Doka) it has done some excellent work in the maintenance of law and 
order and the rounding up of criminals.”436  
Similar to the NAPF the Nigerian military, particularly the army, had much influence on the 
socialisation of vigilante groups and vigilante policing. This was informed by the continued 
involvement of war veterans; in this case, veterans of the Nigerian civil war have continued to 
constitute the core-training component of vigilante groups. In my study of the current 
vigilante formation, the VGN, we can clearly identify military influences and practices. I will 
highlight two instances. In most of the local government branches studied in this thesis, the 
retired soldiers were responsible for providing training. Retired police officers were 
responsible for training in Yelwa town in Shendam LGA and some of the vigilante groups in 
Jos metropolis. These were the exceptions I encountered, but in Langtang North, Pankshin, 
and other parts of Shendam LGA retired soldiers were prominently involved. In the next 
section, I turn to colonial police training and how this influenced the policing practice of the 
NAPF. 
5.5.	Colonial	Training	and	‘Improvement’	of	NAPF	
At a Residents’ Conference in 1928, the term Yan Doka was accepted as a suitable 
nomenclature for the reorganised local policing forces. It was decided to delineate the 
Dogarai from the Yan Doka. The Dogarai were reverting to their original duties as Emirs’ 
bodyguards and messengers and the Yan Doka as a local police force, to be strengthened and 
trained towards handling policing responsibilities more competently. The colonial 
government in Northern Nigeria considered specific measures that would raise the 
competence and prestige of the Native Authority Police force. In regards to competence, the 
government acknowledged the need of developing the Native Authority Police into an 
efficient local police force, with the required skill and training to achieve the purpose of 
colonial policing.437 On the question of prestige, the government considered measures that 
would aid in raising the status and prestige of the N.A. police within their communities 
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throughout the Northern Provinces. The government had also acknowledged that the methods 
of achieving these objectives would vary from one Province to another. For instance, the 
policy of appointing a member of the royal family as the head of the NAPF enhanced the 
prestige of the force within the Northern emirates and encouraged a spirit of loyalty to the 
Emir even in times of crisis.438 For a Province like Plateau, where several groups did not have 
a long history of paramount rule, such a policy was unlikely to achieve the same outcome. In 
sum, the important point to note here is that within the context of the Plateau Province, the 
early decades of the NAPF (1920s-1930s) were characterised by inefficiency and 
incompetence. For example, a reading of several pages of archival documents of written 
communications between the Resident of Plateau Province and the District Officers of the five 
divisions through the 1930s is replete with the lamentations of the poor conditions of the Yan 
Doka. In response to this, the Resident suggested handing over the responsibility for police 
duties in the Native Administration area to the NPF, consequently relegating the Yan Doka to 
the position of village guards.439 Though repeatedly complaining of NAPF incompetence the 
DOs were nevertheless not suggesting the dismantling of the NAPF; they rather tried to 
emphasis the advantages NAPF had over the NPF. For instance, the DO of Pankshin, L.H. 
Goble in a 1937 response to the Resident pointed out the advantages that the Yan Doka had 
over the NPF; he stated, “The existing system of local Yan Doka forces has certain 
advantages over the Nigeria Police. On the whole Yan Doka are recruited locally and have 
advantage of knowledge of local languages and customs, apart from closer contact with the 
population among whom their duties take them.”440 The DO of the Southern Division S.H.V. 
White, in his response to the Resident, reiterates on the preferred status of the NAPF for the 
specific duties of local policing. He however equally provided what may be considered as the 
way forward, raising the status and improving the conditions of Yan Doka.441 Here, his point 
was not just about raising efficiency of Yan Doka; also critical was the need to improve their 
conditions of service: salaries, uniforms, and accommodation. 
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5.5.1	Recruitment	Guidelines	and	Training	
In collaboration with the Nigeria Police, the Colonial government at the Provincial levels 
came up with a general recruitment eligibility guideline for NAPF in the Provinces; this was 
adopted at the Northern Residents’ Conference in 1942.442 For the purposes of this chapter I 
will highlight three eligibility criteria, first regards the classification: what sort of man was 
required; the second point was the individual’s age; and third was in regards to literacy, which 
was also important. First, the government was keen to have men who were believed to be 
from a “good family.” It would be instructive to elaborate from which lens the colonial 
government understood the notion of a “good family” in 1942. There are the obvious 
requirements of not having a record of delinquency, breaking the law or having and not 
having a relative who had such a record. Recruits were drawn from families of Native 
Authority officials, ranging from clerks and messengers to more important representatives of 
the system like village and district heads.443 Moreover, the “good family” was not just 
prioritised for current recruitments; the government was equally planning. The memorandum, 
among other things, encouraged Divisional Officers to ensure “…free education should be 
given…for all sons of N.A. Police entering the Elementary Schools, as an encouragement to 
literacy amongst the next generation of recruits.”444 Under this process, the traditional rulers 
primarily initiated the job of recruitment; after all, the NAPF when fully trained would be 
working within a Native Authority structure and answerable to a traditional ruler. In respect to 
age of recruitment, the colonial government regarded the best age set as 18-21, and not to 
exceed 30, unless for a special reason.445 In regards to literacy, the memorandum encouraged 
that literates should be encouraged and singled out by the award of shoulder straps, which 
would be uniform throughout the Native Administration: dark yellow for a literate in Hausa 
(or the local vernacular) and dark green for a literate in English.446 English literacy or levels 
of Western education here should be qualified; from 1940, Standard II was the required level 
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in the north.447 By the mid-1950s, the recruitment levels were revised to Middle level, with 
examples like Tanglar’s cohort joining in 1957 with Middle level education. 
There was another interesting process that was unfolding in late 1942 in Plateau Province. 
The Superintendent of Police (SP) A.T.G. Trumble,448 in charge of the NPF in a 
memorandum to the Resident had brought forward several suggestions aimed at improving 
the standards of the NAPF in Plateau Province. Of all he suggested, three points are relevant 
for our present discussion on training of the NAPF. His first suggestion was to unify the 
NAPF of the Province as units of the same force, rather than forces within a division. His idea 
was to place all the men on the same list, and conduct promotions centrally from Jos and not 
leave it to the divisions. Second point, he was critical and disappointed with some of the 
Sarkin Yan Doka across the Province. In this letter, he particularly mentions those of 
Pankshin, Southern Division, and Kafanchan. His impression of some of the divisional NAPF 
chiefs is damning “…not one of these men is capable of imparting any instruction and they 
exercise very little control. They have ceased to have, if indeed they ever had, any interest in 
police work; generally speaking they regard themselves in the light of pensioners entitled to 
be kept for the rest of their lives because of past services.”449 Finally, he recommended a pre-
promotion course at Province headquarters, Jos, for all NAPF, assuring the Resident of the 
willingness of the NPF officers to assist in training, supervision and advice. 
In his response, the Resident E.S. Pembleton was quite appreciative and supportive of what he 
described as “improvement by amalgamation of the various Native Administration police 
forces in the Plateau Province.”450 He felt the proposals would not interfere with the NAs' 
control of the forces; he expressed and hoped the proposals would encourage the recruitment 
of ‘local tribesmen’ – a major emerging theme that was to take centre stage after the Second 
World War. However, before the proposals came into practice he desired the views of the 
Native Authorities. In 1942, there were five divisions in the Province; the federated system of 
having several NAs within a division with one main NA was still the case. The divisions at 
the time were Jos, Jema’a, Pankshin, Shendam, and the Southern division. The DOs of the 
Southern, Jos, and Jema’a divisions favoured the proposals to amalgamate the NAPF of the 
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Province; the DOs equally reported the support of the traditional rulers.451 The Pankshin 
division was also willing to give the new proposals a trial; the DO however equally expressed 
some disagreement and mild protest on the charge of incompetence levelled against the Sarkin 
Yan Doka of the division.452 Interestingly, of all the responses from the DOs the one that 
particularly stood out was that of Shendam division. The first important point was that the 
traditional rulers in the division, particularly the Long Goemai, were not enthusiastic about 
the new proposals. This was largely informed by a reluctance to accept proposals and policies 
they considered as being formulated at headquarters and of more befitting use for the Jos 
division. This reservation is expressed in points raised by the DO in his response. Having 
noted the concerns of the chiefs, he states that: 
Consideration of the course syllabus indicates that a fair proportion of 
it is designed for the constable serving in a populous urban area, while 
a review of the four subjects in which examinations are held (squad 
drill, commanding squad, turn out, and criminal law and evidence) 
discloses that three of them are not really good criteria of an 
individual’s ability to perform police duties…While appreciating the 
potential benefits of the proposals under consideration, I feel that a 
great many of the N.C.Os of the bush forces perform the police duties 
required by the area in which they serve adequately enough and hardly 
deserve to be supplanted for the small steps in promotion open to 
them, by strangers possessing greater sophistication in variety of 
service and, possibly, environment.453  
In supporting his NA, the DO summed up his own reservations in questions that required 
elaboration, specifically concerning the suitability of the proposed system of promotion. He 
desired to know who would decide upon promotion. What steps would be taken to ensure that 
the bush Yan Doka will be given as good a chance of getting on as the product of metropolitan 
Jos from whose force it is stated that the accelerated promotions, as it were, will at first, in 
any event, be largely made.454 The Residents of the Plateau Province with the active support 
of the regional government in Kaduna therefore employed certain measures, which in their 
thinking would improve the competence, efficiency and prestige of the NAPF in the Province. 
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Figure 7: Map of Plateau Province showing the five Divisions. 
The idea of the government was to develop training schemes that would provide specific 
training in the particular branch of work the selected NAPF would be involved in, as was the 
case with the Forestry, Agriculture, Medical and Educational Departments. Training 
programmes for Yan Doka included drills and paramilitary training to instil discipline, 
training on the rudiments of police work and training in traffic control for those posted to 
towns. The schedule of the course of instruction for NAPF training included amongst other 
things: elementary squad drill; care of uniform – washing, starching, ironing, etc.; laws and 
powers of police- the powers they can legally exercise in the matter of arrests, searches, 
confessions, evidence, and on police work – patrol, watch and escort duties; motor traffic 
control- this included the learning of block letters and numerals; elementary knowledge of the 
traffic liquor and firearms ordinance; court procedure and evidence; use of batons; and the use 
of firearms (this was eventually expunged).455  
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Recounting his experience in Kaduna when he was on Police training, Danladi Tanglar 
Wuyep states that the course covered how and when to effect arrest of a suspect, record 
keeping (criminal records), procedures on prosecuting duties in court, how and when to give 
evidence, traffic duties, unarmed combat, drill, first aid, and basic police regulations.456  
“The norms of behaviour” Rotimi notes, that were “…desired by the colonialist were codified 
in a plethora of laws, ordinances and regulations, some of which were adopted as bye laws 
and regulations by the native authorities. The police were presumably socialised into the 
norms through their training programmes. They were expected, thereafter, to use their 
position as agents of the state to bring the citizenry into similar awareness.”457 
5.5.2.	Arming	the	NAPF	
There were other attempts to reform the Yan Doka institutions and provide better training for 
the men. In the late 1920s, the colonial administration of the Northern Provinces desired to 
arm the Yan Doka (Native Authority Police). The idea emerged from the office of the 
Lieutenant Governor of the then Northern Provinces, with input from his Residents and strong 
support from the Commissioner of Police, Northern Provinces. The Lieutenant Governor had 
in fact already recommended the importation of the first batch of weapons for the use of the 
Kano, Sokoto, and Ilorin NAPFs. The belief was that arming such Native Authority police 
might be useful in cases of emergency and for the arrest of dangerous criminals.458 In a letter 
to the Secretary of State in charge of the Colonies, the Officer Administering the Government 
(OAG)459 at the time, having expressed his support for the policy then went on to discourage 
it in the same letter. It is worth quoting him at length. He wrote:  
The policy of Government, however, with regards to the maintenance of 
armed forces by Native Rulers is set out on page 304 of Political 
Memoranda (1918 edition), and on page 325 it is expressly stated that 
Native Administration police may not carry firearms. If the Native 
Administration police are armed, it may easily happen, as the system 
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develops, that within a measurable period of time there would be a large 
body of armed men, directly under the control of native chiefs, the potential 
danger of this (sic) cannot be overlooked….460 
Therefore, at this time the Native Authority Police were not given arms. The situation was 
however continuously revisited by succeeding Commissioners of Police but without the 
required support from London and Lagos, it was not achieved. In the report of the 1929 
Residents’ Conference, the sub-committee on Yan Doka virtually brought the matter to a 
nullifying closure. The first paragraph, from appendix C of this report, did not leave any 
doubts. It stated, “…the question of arming has now been authoritatively decided, and as the 
Secretary of State is unable to agree that members of the Native Administration Police should 
be allowed to carry firearms, much of the correspondence contained in the memorandum on 
this subject is automatically nullified.”461 This was eventually changed six years after 
independence. In October 1966 Tanglar Wuyep, a former NAPF Corporal, was amongst 54 
NAPF men chosen from across the Northern Region to be trained in firearms.462 Squad 36 
was at the Police College for six months, Tanglar had already served for nine years as a 
NAPF in Shendam and Langtang. When they returned after the course in August 1967, the 
Nigerian Civil War had just broken out in July. Having just finished firearms training, amidst 
the mobilisation for the war effort the option was given to join the army and proceed to the 
war front, and several NAPF men took the option and joined the army.463 Selcan Miner 
emphatically insists that the Native Authority System and its policing arm were not 
necessarily disbanded; rather it was phased out. He argues that the process should be seen as a 
transition from “law and order to development administration.”464 
5.6.	Traditional	Rulers	as	Authors	of	Local	Policing	Initiatives	
As I have discussed in the preceding chapter, the plural policing landscape (Nigeria Police 
Force and Native Authority Police Force) that the colonial government bequeathed to the 
newly independent Nigerian state in 1960, specifically in the Northern region, was dismantled 
after a decade of independence. The Native Authority Police Force was dismantled in 1969; 
the competent were absorbed into the Nigeria Police Force and those who were regarded as 
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not fitting the standards were disengaged.465 The military government had withdrawn the 
responsibility for policing, as well as the prisons, from the local administration. While the 
traditional rulers were still licking their wounds, the major onslaught on their administrative 
authority was unleashed with the enactment of the local government reforms decree in 1976. 
This was a drastic overhaul of local administration, stripping the traditional rulers of 
responsibility for local administration, and the coffin that was indirect rule had received its 
final nail. However, what was to unfold revealed that relieving traditional rulers of 
responsibility for local affairs via local government reforms could not render the institution 
dormant. In the wake of the 1969 dismantling of the NAPF and the 1975-76 local government 
reforms, the non-Muslim traditional rulers in the Plateau Province, who were just coming to 
grips with their newfound paramouncy, had one major issue to contend. This was a 
straightforward question, of how to enforce their authority.466 They had emerged as a very 
important and powerful institution, and suddenly their responsibilities had been stripped and 
their tool of enforcing authority no longer existed. Moreover, the responsibility of collecting 
poll tax remained as one of the few that traditional rulers retained; this was an exercise that 
sometimes needed to be enforced.467 
The traditional rulers of the Plateau Province responded creatively to these reforms, which 
they had regarded as an affront to their authority. It is my contention that this policy, which 
was authored with the objectives of relieving the traditional rulers of all local administration, 
including policing, and reducing their status to an advisory role, was inadvertently responsible 
for ushering in a new chapter of plural policing. The Yanbanga or vigilante groups of the 
1970s were thus a creative response by the traditional rulers to maintain some level of 
policing control and relevance within their communities. They were geared towards 
maintaining a particular kind of socio-traditional order, which was informed by customary 
legal codes. The Yanbanga (vigilantes) of the 70s were largely answerable to traditional 
rulers, and cultural norms, traditional codes of law and order determined their actions and 
functions in the communities. However, at the time Christianity had also gained root amongst 
these communities, the Christian religion was equally influential in informing what vigilantes 
regarded as a contravention of law and order. This created a scenario particularly concerning 
issues where Christianity and tradition agreed there was a convergence of codes of law and 
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order. It was not all smooth sailing as points of disagreement emerged in situations where the 
dual codes were in conflict. One such scenario was the denigration of traditional ancestral cult 
practices by Christians amongst the Tarok: here the church found itself opposing the 
traditional religious adherents, and several adherents of traditional religion were equally 
members of the vigilante group. Vigilante membership included both Christians and 
traditional religion adherents and often there were tensions between these groups.468 
Another important feature of these groups at the time was the fact that they were organised at 
the community level. Their roles were largely limited to preventing and responding to robbery 
and petty crime in the community. The punishments they meted out to suspected culprits who 
were found to have contravened societal norms and values and broken traditional codes was 
varied depending on the crime committed. Two kinds of crime are instructive here. First was 
the most common crime of theft, one of the classical reasons for establishing vigilantes. The 
object of theft ranged from small-scale domestic livestock such as sheep and goats, to cattle 
and stored grains. Where a suspect was found to have committed such a crime, the routine of 
punishment would involve public flogging, usually at the chief’s palace or the town square, 
followed by a procession with the suspect dancing at the front amid songs of mockery and 
jest.469 The Yanbanga of this period tended to merge societal legal codes with traditional 
religious practices. Secondly, capital punishment was also acknowledged as possible 
punishment for contravening serious codes of the ancestral cult such as leaking secrets of the 
cult. This was a case of vigilante policing informed by different codes of law and different 
values. Therefore, within a given territory, there were different legal regimes at work, and to 
some extent a plurality of practice and punishment. Judgements and subsequent punishment 
were restorative and largely punitive. An individual found guilty of an offence such as theft 
could be fined a goat and publicly flogged, and subjected to the dance of shame around the 
village or the market square.470  
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5.7.	Socialisation	by	the	Police		
Previously I have shown how the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme 
(SAP) affected policing as it had on all other social services and public employment. There 
was a decline in employment opportunities and the commercialisation of education, for 
instance, influenced the transition of youth moving from secondary to tertiary education.471 In 
response to the obvious policing challenges that emerged,472 the Nigerian government actively 
mobilised the population to embrace forms of non-state policing in the guise of community 
policing.473 Therefore, the period of the 1980s ushered in a major change in the socialisation 
process of vigilantes, from being socialised by majorly ex-servicemen to being socialised by 
the Nigeria Police. Largely until the mid-1980s, the most critical institution to which plural 
policing was linked (the Nigerian Police Force) had not had a substantial impact on vigilante 
policing. I gathered this much in-group interviews conducted with former vigilantes in Dadur, 
Langtang North LGA474, and Shendam, Shendam LGA475. In both cases, individuals who had 
volunteered during the era of structural adjustment had to be registered with the Divisional 
Police Station and had to participate in a training programme organised by the police. 
However, as I have earlier mentioned the continued participation of ex-servicemen, at this 
period veterans of the Nigerian civil war meant that police training did not replace the military 
influence; it rather blended and intermingled with it. The NPF absorbed about 10,000 
demobilised soldiers from 1976-78.476 The mannerisms and behaviour of the police as an 
institution was equally influenced by the long years of military rule and the legacies 
bequeathed. That said, there are aspects of vigilante policing practice that were impacted by 
the Nigerian Police Force. I consider some of these practices and influences.  
5.7.1.	Police	Practice:	The	Methodology	of	Policing		
One of the more prominent and visible forms of policing that the vigilante groups have copied 
from the police is the operational idea of the patrol. This remains the most feasible operational 
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method of checking and curtailing the activities of criminals. For the vigilantes patrol is often 
not motorised, as there only but a few vigilante detachments that have patrol cars.477 Vigilante 
patrol is foot patrol, mostly at night when the community is sleeping. The vigilantes are up 
awake engaging in the hard work that allows the community sleep safely at night. In all the 
interviews I conducted with retired and current vigilante members, the patrol is common 
practice. The patrol was the very first policing practice that vigilante groups’ members 
imbibed. Similarly, as the Nigerian police instituted the practice of roadblocks and 
checkpoints into patrol practice, vigilante groups began doing the same. The practice of 
vigilante patrols has continued to be part of contemporary vigilante policing practice. The 
basic operational equipment vigilante members require for night patrol include flashlights, 
warm clothing, raincoats, boots, and whistles. I present two accounts drawn from my 
observation of vigilante patrols in the next chapter. 
5.7.2.	Record	Keeping	
Vigilante groups have also become proficient in the practice of record keeping, or to be more 
precise keeping evidence against suspects and offenders. One of the essential aspects of police 
practice is the process of collecting evidence and information and processing it. It is critical to 
assemble the facts of a case, obtain and record statements, and ensure that all exhibits are 
collected, labelled and safely kept. All these documents and materials are stored in case files. 
Vigilante groups have adopted this practice but because of limited literacy levels vigilante 
policing, rather than collect written statements, prefers to collect oral statements of suspects. 
On completion of interrogation, the photographs of the suspect are usually taken with the 
stolen item in cases of theft and robbery. The photographs are then printed and used as 
evidence handed over to the police. During interviews with the vigilante public relations 
officer of Pankshin LGA, Monday Joshua, the pictures of offenders taken over the years were 
used to render the account of what transpired in each case. He narrates the procedure of 
handing over evidence to the police: 
 
We learned this practice from our elders. Those who started this work 
in the 1980s. Whenever we catch a suspect and confirm that he 
committed the offence or crime, when we are handing over to the 
police, they require evidence; usually, an oral statement is not 
adequate, this was why the former vigilante members began taking 
pictures and we still do it. For example if it is a case of theft or 
robbery, we always snap the thief with the stolen items and when we 
                                                            
477 However, as of July 2015 while I was concluding the thesis the Plateau state government distributed patrol 
vans for the VGN in the 17 local government areas. 
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go to court we do not need to talk much, the picture does all the 
talking.478  
 
 
Pictures are also relevant for the wards and units to communicate to the local government 
commander that they are not resting on their laurels. The following pictures show some 
suspects being displayed with the stolen items recovered from them. 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                            
478 Monday Joshua, Interviewed by Jimam Lar, Pankshin, 08.01.2015. 
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Figure 8: Picture of Jing Vigilante, Pankshin LGA, suspected thief with recovered sheep 
(ewe).  
Figure 9: Another Picture of Jing Vigilante, Pankshin LGA, with recovered motorcycle. 
Photos provided from VGN file. 
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5.7.3.	The	Uniform	
For a vigilante group member aspiring for recognition as part of the policing system - 
‘stateness’ is bestowed by the mastery of how to talk (the language of policing), how to act 
(the everyday practice of policing), and what one wears (symbols of policing).479 The uniform 
is the principal symbolic marker of stateness, the instinctive symbol of officiousness; it is a 
signifier, an insignia of authority. It bestows on the police and the vigilante the legitimacy to 
act. The expectation is that such action will be in the interest of the public good, but as I have 
shown in this study, it is not always the case. Osoba captures the role of the uniform in the 
misappropriation of authority when he notes that, “There is no tyrant more vicious, narrow-
minded, self-centred and insufferably exhibitionist than a primary educated Nigerian dressed 
in a brief robe of authority.”480 However, as I have repeatedly argued there is more to it than 
this, as the power of the uniform is twofold: it grants a person the power to construct a 
livelihood, a relationship, and access to state services, as well as the power to destroy a 
livelihood, a relationship, and access.481 In a sense, the uniform speaks to the aspirations of 
vigilante group members desirous of being part of the state policing system; it also shows the 
public, the community, that the vigilante can act for and on behalf of the police. Once in 
uniform, the vigilante member is not required to convince of his authority. The uniform as 
Poppe has argued is visible proof that one is entitled to act as a law enforcer. In this sense, 
they (vigilantes) emerge as mediators between the state and the community.482 
The uniform is equally a symbol of hierarchy. Another abiding evidence of the combined 
influence of the army and police on vigilante policing practice is the hierarchical structure of 
the vigilante rank system. The titles of the ranks carried by vigilante officers and men are 
tailored more towards the military and the police. Some examples will suffice: The rank of the 
National Chairman is designated as the Commander General, with six Deputy Commander 
Generals. There are Commanders in charge of Community Security, Arms Control, Conflict 
                                                            
479 Steffen Jensen, “Security and violence on the frontier of the state: vigilant citizens in Nkomazi, South Africa,” 
in Violence and Non‐Violence in Africa, Pal Ahluwalia, Louise Bethlehem, and Ruth Ginio, eds. (London and New 
York: Routledge, 2007), 118. 
480 Segun O. Osoba, “Factors Militating against Creative and Socially Relevant Intellectual Activity in Colonial 
and Post‐Colonial Nigeria,” in The Indigenous for National Development, G.O. Onobonoje, K. Omotoso and D.A. 
Lawal, eds. (Ibadan: Onobonoje Press and Book Industries, 1976), 71‐97. 
481 Julie Poppe, Julie “The Power of the Uniform: Paramilitary Foresters and Rangers at the W Park, Burkina 
Faso.” Sociologus, vol. 63, (2013), 28. doi:10.3790/soc.63.1‐2.11    
482Ibid., 28.  
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Resolution, Anti-Robbery, and Anti-Terrorism. Designations of a commanding officer are 
more of military practice; the police have more of inspectors and superintendents. When one 
looks at lower ranks, the similarity to police ranks is evident. The local government Chairman 
of the VGN is designated a Superintendent, a ward head has the rank of an Inspector, and a 
unit head usually in charge of a village detachment is designated as a Sergeant.483 The ranks 
on the uniforms are not just for the sake of it, it is much more than window dressing, a 
superior vigilante officer does have authority to give orders and commands to his subordinates 
and the subordinates are obliged to obey. More so, there are sanctions and penalties in the 
event of disobedience or insubordination. The following three pictures illustrate how the 
uniform of vigilante group members has evolved over the years. 
 
 
Figure 10: Vigilante Members Dadur, Langtang North 1988. 
                                                            
483 Alhaji Garba Juji, interviewed by Ibrahim Yunus, 26.09.12 
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Figure 11: VGN Pankshin LGA, at state training camp, 2014.  
Figure 12: VGN Langtang North LGA, LGA leaders, 2012. (Pictures retrieved from VGN 
File.)  
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5.8.	Conclusion	
The current plural policing landscape in Plateau State, Nigeria, is a product of different 
influences that have been exerted in the course of the past century. Some influences have been 
consistent, while others were restricted to particular periods. The earliest and most profound 
influence on policing was that of the military. This process of socialisation has been midwifed 
by Nigeria’s war history (First and Second World Wars and the Nigerian Civil War). In this 
chapter I have shown how from the NAPF to the VGN, the alternative policing structures that 
engaged in policing alongside the NPF have absorbed war veterans and retirees in quite large 
numbers. Socialisation was based on army ideals and practice because most recruits in the 
first instance were soldiers. I have shown how influence of the military was so pervasive that 
even when the police engaged in socialising vigilante groups from the early 1980s, and 
particularly after the implementation of structural adjustment programme, military 
socialisation continued. After decades of military rule, the police themselves had not come out 
of it unscathed. In sum, the Nigerian military had played an instrumental role in the 
socialisation of institutions, groups, and individuals who make claim to providing policing 
services and the maintenance of law and order.  
Influences drawn from the immediate socio-political landscape, cultural templates of law and 
justice, and the interventionist state-sponsored socialisation, as manifest in the influences of 
the colonial and post-colonial state police, have all affected the institutional development of 
plural policing in Nigeria. Vigilante groups simultaneously draw on state and non-state 
registers.484 What emerges from this chapter and analysis of socialisation is that we are 
currently witnessing an advanced stage of institutionalised plural policing, but it is not yet 
definitively formed. This explains why I have been cautious not to designate the current forms 
of plural policing as hybridisation. Rather, the process is yet still unfolding. The recent active 
involvement of vigilante groups and hunter associations in the fight against the Boko Haram 
insurgency in northeast Nigeria, to cite an example, has created new dynamics of 
socialisation, institutionalisation and legitimation of plural policing. If this chapter was about 
how the NAPF and the vigilante groups learned policing practices, the next chapter turns the 
spotlight on what constitutes the practice of policing by the NAPF and the vigilante groups. 
                                                            
484 Poppe, The Power of the uniform, 31. 
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How has this plurality of socialisation influenced policing practice historically and in 
contemporary Plateau State? What kind of policing practices does this socialisation create? I 
now consider this discussion. 
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Chapter	Six:	The	Plurality	of	Policing	in	Practice	(c.1945	to	late	1990s)	
6.1.	Introduction	
In this chapter, I focus on micro narratives - on the factors and practices that have transformed 
plural policing from its starting point based on relations of power, to its current form based on 
relations of authority, as power and legitimacy have converged. State policing in Nigeria from 
the onset was instituted on a plural basis; the colonial Northern Nigerian policing landscape 
comprised the Nigerian Police Force and the Native Authority Police Force. I argue that 
plurality within the context of Nigerian policing has to be approached and understood by 
studying three periods. In this chapter, two of the three periods are examined. First is plural 
policing in Plateau Province during the colonial era. Secondly, the emergence of vigilante 
groups in the late-1970s, following the dismantling of Native Authority Police in 1969. This 
period extended to the mid-1980s with mobilisation of vigilante practice as community 
policing amidst the Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP). In sum, the key objective of this 
chapter is to examine the historical trajectory of plural policing from the lens of the NAPF 
and later variations of plural policing actors. Of relevance are the historical dynamics that 
have driven everyday practices. Who joins, and why? How did (do) vigilante group members 
see their roles? How has the composition changed over time?  
 
Therefore, plural policing is explored as practice, with its varied dynamic empirical 
manifestations. Also of importance is a consideration of the relationship of the NAPF, 
vigilante groups and the NPF, seen particularly from the lens of the NAPF and the vigilante 
groups. How did they understand their roles within this plural policing landscape? How did 
the NPF regard them? The chapter also analyses violence as policing practice. Again as with 
the preceding chapter, this chapter’s narrative is historicised. 
6.2.	Plurality	and	the	Practice	of	Policing	on	the	Plateau	(1945	–	1970)	
As was the case in other British colonial territories, the work of the police was informed and 
guided by the provisions of a Police Ordinance. Among other things, the ordinance laid out 
conditions of service, disciplinary matters and offences, the powers and duties of police 
officers – including the powers of arrest, search, and control of assembly and use of arms.485 
In theory, the colonial police force was established along principles of British policing 
philosophy, the idea of preserving order and the prevention of crime being the primary 
                                                            
485 Anthony Clayton, The Thin Blue Line: Studies in Law Enforcement in Late Colonial Africa, Oxford 
Development Records Project Report (1), (Oxford: Rhodes House Library, 1985),  6. 
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concerns.486 Secondly, police are to be seen as agents of the law rather than agents of 
government. However, as I have argued in previous chapters the police in colonial Nigeria 
were structured and organised to serve the state rather than the people. This has been a major 
theme in the literature on Nigerian colonial policing.487 The point to consider is that while this 
is true, it is a simple narrative and does not adequately account for the colonial policing 
landscape. While engaging in the service of the colonial government, for the Nigeria Police 
Force, and the Native Authority for the NAPF, both institutions also engaged in basic policing 
work. 
Drawing on existing literature and my own research on colonial policing it is convincing that 
the establishment of the Native Authority Police was driven by the desire to offset the 
insufficient manpower that was not available to police the length and breadth of the colonial 
territory. It was not feasible to enforce colonial authority with the limited constabulary forces 
that may have been adequate for conquest; administration presented different challenges to 
the colonial government. As I have discussed in chapter five, having established Native 
Authority structures as part of the indirect rule system, a local policing arm as part of the 
blueprint was seen as a logical need.488 As Ahire has argued, the “NA police were needed to 
sustain the authority of indigenous rulers and, in that way, to maintain order within the 
framework of ‘customary law’”489. He goes on to make the point that: 
 The NA police were therefore charged with the control of 
conventional crime, not because of their expertise in state law, but 
because they were versed in custom and tradition. The materially and 
institutionally weak colonial state formally recognized and 
incorporated ‘customary law’ into the overall legal system… the NA 
police undertook the maintenance of order, and thus enabled state 
authority to flow into colonial society through ‘customary 
channels’.490 
 These were the origins of instituting plural policing. The formalisation of this policy came 
along with the Native Authority Ordinance of 1918, which amongst other things granted all 
                                                            
486Ibid., 3. 
487 This argument is well developed in Ahire, Imperial Policing.... In addition, Rotimi, The Police in a Federal 
State... 
488 SNP Zaprof. 5193/1908, Memo on Police Reorganization by the High Commissioner, Percy Girouard, 
1908.p.1 
489 Ahire, Imperial Policing, 45. 
490 Ibid. 
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recognised emirs and chiefs the responsibility of maintaining law and order in their domains, 
consequently empowering them to employ NA police in pursuance of this mandate.491  
The job of a NAPF officer on a given day could range across a number of duties. Normal 
station duty could include tax collection enforcement, policing the local market – which 
would include regulating the use of weights and measures inspection, and arresting unlicensed 
traders - protection for a visiting colonial officer - this could be the Resident or a senior police 
officer from the provincial headquarters - and the parade ceremony occasioned by such a visit. 
Aside from their primary role of policing the designated Native Authority area, the NAPF 
remained a very important and significant enforcement arm of the traditional rulers, and a 
critical policing arm of the colonial state. Though the introduction and deployment of NAPF 
in the Plateau Province came after the force had been established in the northern emirates, by 
1939 the Plateau Province had more NAPF than any other Northern Province. This number 
increased during the Second World War, and when sub-native authorities were established in 
the 1950s more NAPF had to be recruited. 
Table 5.1 Distribution of NAPF in Northern Province in 1939492 
Province Number 
Adamawa 69 
Bauchi 123 
Benue 66 
Bornu 149 
Ilorin 91 
Kabba 187 
Kano 338 
Katsina 177 
Niger 104 
Plateau 375 
Sokoto 361 
Zaria 141 
Total: 2,181 
                                                            
491 Native Authority Ordinance, (No.14 of 1916), pp.800‐806.  
492 Source: Memorandum on the training and instruction of Native Administration police in Nigeria, by 
Inspector General, Colonel A.S. Mavrogodato, 18th March 1939, Culled from Ahire, Imperial Policing, 47. 
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6.2.1.	NPF	and	NAPF	Relations	
There are sufficient archival records and insightful interpretations of these records493 to 
conclude that the relationship between the NPF and the NAs in northern Nigeria was more 
fractious than cordial. The caveat is that while this was the case at the regional administrative 
level, at the provincial and divisional level there was more variation. The northern regional 
government had continually resisted the idea of subordinating the NAPF to the NPF in 
Northern Nigeria and consistently resisted any policy move or proposal from police 
headquarters in Lagos that suggested doing this. For several decades, the relationship between 
the NPF and the NAs was defined by a 1919 policy generally referred to in the literature as 
the ‘Uniacke code.’494 The main thrust of the policy was the subordination of government 
police to the then Dogarai and later NAPF, concerning all matters that were of local 
interest.495 As earlier discussed when Palmer assumed duty as Lieutenant Governor in Kaduna 
in 1925, the relationship between Lagos and Kaduna further deteriorated. 
Subsequently, succeeding Inspector Generals of Police at the Lagos headquarters of the force 
would consistently attempt to challenge or circumvent the code without success. As they had 
to contend with the northern colonial administration that had been convinced and won over by 
what they considered an effective means of enforcing local administration, they were not 
going to allow the NPF take over the running of the NAPF.  
The relationship between the NPF and the northern regional government speaks to a broader 
contextual conflict within colonial Nigeria, a conflict between colonial administrative officers 
serving in the north and their counterparts in the south. For British nationals who served as 
NPF officers it was normal to be transferred from south to north and vice versa.496 This was 
not the case for administrative officers. Once posted to a region, they were rarely transferred 
out. After a tour, an Officer would be transferred to another Province within the same region. 
Over time, they developed loyalties for the systems and administrative structures they were 
presiding over.497  
                                                            
493 Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State, 44‐59. 
494 The policy was named after its initiator, the then Inspector General of the Police Forces for the northern 
region Captain A.G. Uniacke. 
495 For more on this see Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State, 18. 
496 The Thin Blue Line… This point is clearly highlighted in a publication that documented the experiences of 
British colonial police offciers. 
497 John Smith, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Cheltenham, UK, 17.08.2012, and John Hare, interviewed by Jimam 
Lar, Kent, UK, 21.08.2012. 
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6.2.2.	The	Native	Authority	Police	Adviser(s)	
An aspect of operational work where the NPF and NAPF did come into cooperation, albeit 
with occasional cases of friction, was the secondment of NPF officers as Native Authority 
Police Advisers (NAPF Adviser). Robin Mitchell is a British former police officer who served 
in Northern Nigeria from November 1955 to July 1965. He had a stint (single tour) in the Jos 
Minefields from 1960 to 1961 and before that was NPF Adviser Bauchi Province, from 1959 
to 1960, and he had this to say about the role of the NPF Adviser: 
To be sincere with you our job as Adviser required a lot of discretion. 
To start with, it depends on which Province one was posted. Looking 
back my impression was that the NA police did generally okay. 
However, one has to point out that it did vary across the region; some 
places were effective and other places not so effective. In very simple 
terms, some were very good, some were indifferent, and some were 
bad and inefficient. In Bauchi, I can remember several instances 
where N.A. Police conducted investigations and provided evidence for 
subsequent prosecution. The N.A. Police in some instances came to 
court and presented the evidence, mostly in Hausa but by the late 
1950s also in English.498 
 To explain the broader national context of the relationship between the NPF and the NAPF, I 
refer to an instance that highlights the rivalries that existed at the time. In 1936 a 
memorandum was authored by the then IGP of the NPF, Major A. Saunders. In this 
memorandum, Major Saunders among other things sought to regulate the activities of the 
NAPF through some novel terms and conditions he proposed to introduce in the procedure of 
seconding European police officers to serve as NA Police Advisers.499 The Northern Nigerian 
government rejected his proposals, by recapitulating the Uniacke code from 1919 and stating 
their preference for the NAs to continue to have administrative and operational control over 
the NAPF. There was, however, a caveat, at the Residents’ Annual Conference of 1937. 
While not forfeiting control of the NAPF in any form or manner within the emirates, the 
Northern regional government, i.e. the Lieutenant Governor and his Residents, did concede 
that the NPF could have an upper hand in the southern Provinces of the Northern Region; 
what came to be referred to as the Middle Belt. This was of course a part of the region that 
was referred to in derogatory terms, as ‘pagan tribes’ or ‘certain backward areas’.500  
This again reveals the double standards that obtained in the politics of the Northern Region. 
The Northern Government was often preoccupied with the interest of the emirates and not 
                                                            
498 Robin Mitchell interviewed by Jimam Lar, Kent, UK, 21.08.2012. 
499 For more details on this, see Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State, 46‐47. 
500 Ibid., 48. 
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necessarily the entire region. However, even in the so-called ‘backward areas’ there were 
occasional feuds and resistance to the activities of NPF officers posted to serve as advisers, 
albeit of a different kind. These problems emerged largely because when posted to the 
southerly Provinces of the region, to places like Plateau, the advisers tended to want to serve 
in executive and operational capacity and not as advisors or training officers as the NAs had 
thought of them. An apt example of this from the Plateau Province is a fractious feud that had 
ensued between Audu Bako, the NPF Police Adviser, and the Jos NA Council from 1956-57. 
Rotimi501 highlights two issues that had characterised the row between the council and its 
NPF Adviser. The first concerned the council’s attempt to curtail irregularities in the payment 
of NAPF salaries. Previously, it was within the Advisers schedule to pay the NAPF salaries. 
However, in its attempt to check the aforementioned irregularities the council decided to 
appoint a treasury staff to pay in collaboration with a police officer appointed by the Adviser. 
Bako saw this as an attempt by the council to encroach into his sphere of influence; it was 
also a contravention of the rules. Interestingly, my two main former NAPF informants 
Danladi Tanglar and Rufai Abubakar both praised Audu Bako as a professional and dedicated 
officer whom they believed improved the discipline and efficiency of the NAPF in the 
Province. As he was based in Jos, Rufai Abubakar recalled the feud over salary payments, as 
follows: 
…for several months, we were not sure where to go and collect salary; 
there were several memos and counter memos. To be sincere with you 
at our level, I was not sure what the problem was; remember I had 
joined in 1953. We heard stories of problems between our Maigida502 
(our Boss) and the Chief, but we never confirmed the details. To be 
sincere with you we did not particularly care about who was paying; 
as long as we were paid, we continued with our work.503  
The second issue was the council’s long standing agitation to have an indigenous head of the 
NAPF. The council had favoured an indigene to replace the soon to retire Chief of Police, 
Mamman Doso, who was Hausa. Again, Bako rebuked the council for going beyond their 
jurisdiction, advising them to seek for his advice on critical decisions and desist from taking 
decisions and merely informing and instructing him to carry out. This feud rumbled on until 
Bako was transferred, and eventually the council had its way with the appointment of Sgt 
Sallau Udu as Chief of NA Police in 1957.504 As Rotimi has noted, the feuds between Audu 
                                                            
501 Ibid., 88. 
502 Maigida in Hausa means head of the household; here it is used in an honorific manner. 
503 Rufai Abubakar, interviewed by Yunus Ibraheem, Jos, 05.12.2014. 
504Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State, 90‐91. 
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Bako and the Jos NA Council has to be situated within the politics of the time. The Jos NA 
Council at this time was led by the Chief of Jos and President of the NA Council, Rwang Pam 
(Berom), and dominated by members from the indigenous groups who never liked the staffing 
of the NAPF with Hausa men, and in fact all ‘non-indigenes’.505 In fact, ethnic competition 
between the Berom and Hausa was, in effect, competition to control political power, 
economic wealth, and maintain patronage circles, and this manifested in various disputes. 
Importantly, the disputes included attempts to control the police, appointments to the NA, and 
the allocation of land.506  
The Resident of Plateau Province in 1950, C.R. Niven, in a letter to the Snr. Asst. 
Superintendent of Police (NPF) in Jos, responded to what he regarded as “confusion over the 
position of the Police Officer attached (NPF Adviser) to the Province to advise on NA Police 
matters.” This was of course several years before Bako’s feud with the Jos NA. This 
demonstrates that in 1950 this was already an issue. Amongst other things, Niven noted 
“…there is a tendency for the Jos NA Police to be treated as though it were part of the Nigeria 
Police. Though it is important that there should be very close co-operation between these 
forces the accepted policy is that they should be treated as distinct bodies with distinct 
control.”507 Niven further states that 
I am aware that the situation here is not as simple as it is in the emirates but the 
principles are the same…the police officer attached for these special duties is required 
to advise the NAs on the use of their Police and to superintend their training, 
equipment and action on duty and so on. His duties in this respect are not confined to 
Jos, but he is expected to tour and advise in the other divisions.508  
While trying to protect his NAs against perceived ‘over bearing’ control of the NPF Niven 
was conceding the privilege to the NPF Adviser to tour the NAPF detachments and supervise 
the NAPF.  
The response of the Police Superintendent was more of a rebuttal than an acceptance or 
confirmation. In spite of this, the offer to tour the divisions for instance can only be seen as a 
privilege that was not easy for the NPF Advisers to secure in the emirates. As previously 
discussed, the disputes within the police in Jos NA were minor in comparison to the conflicts 
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506 Dudley, Parties and Politics, 237. 
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that the NPF Advisers had in the emirates. An instructive example is taken from the Zaria NA 
in the mid-1950s. From 1955-1957 the Zaria NA disregarded several complaints of four 
successive NPF Advisers regarding the incompetence and corruption of an NAPF Chief of 
Police.509 Rotimi highlights examples from Kano, Katsina and Adamawa NAs where, as was 
the case in several other emirates, the NAPF Chief was of royal exclusivity, with occupants of 
the position not only held in high prestige, but also subsequently graduated to Emirship.510 
Opposition to the decisions and actions of the NPF Adviser in Jos were not informed by the 
same factors that drove opposition to NPF Advisers in the emirates. The Jos NA Council was 
not directing its opposition to Lagos or the NPF as was the case in the emirates; rather they 
believed they were resisting northern Hausa domination, being foisted on them by the British. 
In spite of these rows, when considered over time and when the Plateau Province is taken as a 
whole, the NPF Police Adviser was one of the rare areas where the NPF and the NAPF did 
cooperate in Plateau Province. In spite of the conflicts and crisis with some of the chiefs and 
NA councils, the NPF Advisers actually had a professional and cordial relationship with the 
NAPF. The NPF Adviser was in practice a de facto head of NAPF policing in the Province. 
For instance, while it was difficult for the NPF to institute inspection of NAPF detachments 
amongst the northern emirates,511 this was routine practice in Plateau Province. The NPF 
Adviser undertook regular inspection tours and visits to the divisions. The itinerary of such 
trips included an honorary inspection of drills and parades; a review of cases, to ascertain that 
rules and procedures were being diligently followed; and holding meetings with the police 
officers, usually aimed at providing any new updates from headquarters, but also to hear any 
concerns or needs of specific divisions.512 Danladi Tanglar recalls some of the NPF Advisers 
and other areas of collaboration with the NAPF: 
…in those days when I joined the NAPF, we had ASPs attached to the 
Provinces. They called them Advisers of NA police. The adviser visits 
all NA police stations at the divisional, and sometimes NA and sub-
NA headquarters. Sometimes, if there are arguments on command, 
drill, investigation, or how we should behave the station officer will 
direct that we wait for the Adviser to come, clarify, and instruct. 
During my years of service, we had five NA Police Advisers. There 
was Mr Bako (Audu Bako), Mr Futungoe, Mr Obiri, Alhaji Yahaya 
Doma, and the last Adviser before we were absorbed by the NPF in 
1969 was Mr Obanero... In regards our relationships with the NPF, 
                                                            
509 Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State, 86‐89. 
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sometimes when there is a major operation, like a major government 
event - a VIP is visiting the division for instance, or there is a major 
political rally - then we collaborate with the NPF. We also collaborate 
when there is a major case to investigate like homicide, or suicide. In 
a case like suicide, it could be drowning or fire; this is a coroner’s 
case. Usually we work in collaboration with the NPF, relevant forms 
are signed by the DO, and then the Magistrate gives the order for a 
post-mortem examination. The CID handles all other matters after 
this.513 
 
The District Officer of the then Lowland Division in his annual report for 1953 commended 
the cordial relationship between the NPF and the NAPF, also mentioning collaborations in 
criminal investigations. Mr E. Broadbent had noted, “Relations between the N.A. force and 
the local detachment of the Nigeria Police have continued to be satisfactory and they have co-
operated successfully in a number of criminal investigations.”514 
6.2.3.	The	Nigerian	Police	Special	Branch:	Understanding	Local	Intelligence	
One of the most important areas of cooperation between the NPF and the NAPF was the role 
the NAPF played in gathering local intelligence and keeping the NPF and the government at 
the provincial headquarters informed. In the 1939 Annual Report on the police in the Plateau 
Province, Senior Assistant Superintendent A.T.G Trumble was already commending that the 
“very close cooperation between the Nigeria Police and the Native Administration Police has 
resulted in the successful investigation of a number of burglaries and tin stealing crimes. 
There has been a regular interchange of information between the Nigeria Police and the 
Native Administration Police which has led to the recovery of stolen property and the 
apprehension of criminals.”515 To understand this critical role, a brief historical background of 
the Nigeria Police Special Branch (SB) is instructive. The core obligation of the Special 
Branch was policing all activity that the colonial government regarded as subversion and 
sabotage. O’Sullivan,516 one of the important police officers who drove the development of 
the Special Branch in Lagos and Kaduna, serving as the Northern Nigerian head of the SB 
from 1948 to 1958, in his memoir noted that between 1948 – 1954 there was no serious 
security problem in the north, only minor ones like chieftaincy disputes, labour unrest, and 
militant Islam.517 O’Sullivan recounts how he restructured and reorganised the northern wing 
of the SB. First, he reorganised the records, adding new material covering past years, 
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producing an intelligence survey and an assessment with a summary of counter-intelligence 
targets. Secondly, he commenced the retraining of his core staff in counter-espionage and 
counter subversion, and reporting intelligence. Furthermore, he emphasised the importance of 
local intelligence and the recruitment of agents and informants.518 
In the Plateau Province, the major security challenge that confronted the colonial government 
and kept the SB engaged was the political activity that swept across central Nigeria in the 
1950s. From the mid-1950s, central Nigeria became a major hub for the emergence of ethnic 
unions. An example of this in the Plateau Province is the Yergam Union profiled in chapter 
five. These ethnic unions emerged with aspirations of ethnic advancement and enlightenment, 
embracing Western education, and frowning on behaviours, which they regarded as 
‘backward’. However, they also became politically active and established alliances with larger 
nationalist parties agitating for more administrative emancipation, and eventually self-rule. 
The colonial government at the time relied on the NAPF to provide information on the 
activities of the key leaders of these ethnic unions. Danladi Tanglar Wuyep519 and Rufai 
Abubakar,520 former NAPF officers who served in Shendam, Langtang and Jos Native 
Authorities, relate how it was obligatory to produce weekly intelligence reports on the 
activities of the ethnic unions. 
According to Tanglar Wuyep, local politicians in Shendam briefed them on two occasions. 
The politicians were members of the then Northern People’s Congress (NPC) and the main 
thrust of the briefing was to receive directives to specifically monitor the activities of 
opposition politicians in the run up to the elections. According to Tanglar, 
There was this day we were called to a meeting and one of the local 
politicians informed us he had a message from the Wazirin Shendam 
(Michael Buba, a frontline NPC member and regional minister during 
the First Republic). Largely the main points were on the need for us to 
be on the lookout for opposition politicians and their anti-Arewa (anti-
north) propaganda. However, the UMBC won the elections. I 
remember at the time - not sure of the year - but George Yilgwen was 
elected to the Northern House of Assembly, to represent Lowland 
West constituency.521  
Rufai referring to similar experiences in Jos recounts how the NAPF were charged to monitor 
and report on the activities of the Northern Elements Progressive Union (NEPU), which was 
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519 Danladi Tanglar Wuyep interviewed by Jimam Lar, 12.01.2015. 
520 Alhaji Rufai Abubakar interviewed by Yunus Ibraheem, 05.12.2014. 
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very popular amongst the Hausa of Jos. Interestingly, Rufai himself was a NEPU sympathiser. 
Again, this gives credence to the point that the NAPF were not all ‘zombies’ in the service of 
the NPC keenly waiting for orders to arrest and detain opposition politicians. As members of 
their various communities, they were also politically engaged, and informed. Rufai recalls 
how NAPF officers with sympathy for NEPU engaged in leaking operational details of arrest 
orders. According to Rufai, the more common charge against NEPU members was concerning 
their holding of political meetings without the necessary permit; along with this was ‘the 
charge of conduct that disturbs the peace.’ Rufai explains that,  
As members of the NAPF, we were expected to be loyal to the NA. 
The Jos NA was NPC, but NEPU was very popular in Jos, particularly 
amongst the Hausa. There were several of us who secretly supported 
NEPU. We could not show this, and to keep our jobs we had to be 
loyal and follow orders. Sometimes we leaked information through 
our NEPU contacts on plans to arrest NEPU members. The problem 
we had was there was not many of us who were NEPU, most of the 
NAPF were loyal to the NA, and the NPC. At this time we were not 
living in the barracks, we lived amongst the people. This was seen as 
an advantage; so that we cannot just monitor criminals and maintain 
order. We were also responsible for collecting information on local 
NEPU members and passing this on to the NA.522  
 
In sum, the NA police were a critical part of everyday policing, in the Province and other 
parts of the northern region. There were more NAPF officers than there were NPF, and by the 
1950s, recruitment from the Province had increased exponentially. Most NAPF recruits were 
largely posted within their divisions and NAs. The communities they were tasked to police 
were their own, creating tension for the officers between the community and the NA, 
particularly when the orders and directives were considered to negate community values and 
norms. Serving the NA as a police officer did not equate to serving the community; however, 
the community was served through the choices the officers took in everyday policing 
decisions. 
6.2.4.	Profiling	the	NAPF	(Yan	Doka)	
In my analysis of the history of institutionalising plural policing from the top, the lens of 
inquiry was focused on grand processes. Meta narratives of local administrative and policing 
history – on the national level and the impacts on the former Province, now Plateau State. 
Profiles of individuals help us incorporate the local and dynamic micro narratives – here the 
focus is on people, their aspirations, experiences and practices. These men who actually made 
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up the lower ranks of colonial local policing, how did they see their role and how did they 
function? They were an essential component of colonial rule; therefore, their voices and 
experiences are important to record. 
The following four profiles are an attempt to illustrate the two categories of men that 
constituted the NAPF after the institutionalisation of the Dogarai system. The Dogarai who 
were transformed to Yan Doka are not included here. The two categories profiled here are, 
firstly, the group of Yan Doka recruited from ex-service men,523 and secondly the Yan Doka 
from the 1950s recruited from Middle School graduates.  
1.	Sarkin	Yan	Doka	(Chief	of	NAPF)	Bako	
Sarkin Yan Doka (Chief of NAPF) Bako served for eighteen years in the Mounted Infantry 
and the Royal West African Frontier Force, attaining the rank of Sergeant. He saw war service 
in the Cameroons from 1914-1916, was a marksman, and his character on discharge on 15th 
December 1921 was given as ‘exemplary’. After his discharge, Bako was employed by the 
Jos Native Administration, first as Head Warder, and then promoted to the position of Sarkin 
Yan Doka. His age was given as approximately 43.524 As was the case with Bako, in most of 
the divisions the position of Sarkin Yan Doka (Chief of NAPF) was reserved for ex-Sergeants 
of the R.W.A.F.F.525  
2.	Officer	Naiya	
Officer Naiya served for eighteen years in the Royal West African Frontier Force as a Private, 
and also fought in the First World War in the Cameroons 1914-1916, was a Marksman, and 
his character on discharge on 1st March 1922 was given as ‘very good’. As at 1930, Naiya had 
completed four years active service in the Jos Native Administration Police and was listed as 
one of the ‘Senior Yan Doka’. His age in 1930 is given as approximately 41.526 Both Bako 
and Naiya were of Hausa origin. This is not to discount the fact that there were recruits from 
among the Plateau groups who served during the First World War, but compared to the Hausa 
recruits this was minimal. A 1912 breakdown of troops of the Northern Nigerian Regiment by 
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ethnicity shows that out of 2,917; 1,171 were Hausa and an unclassified grouping labelled as 
‘pagans’, where the Plateau groups were clustered, had a total of 432 men.527  
3.	Danladi	Tanglar	Wuyep	
Danladi Tanglar Wuyep was recruited into the Native Authority Police Force in Shendam, the 
divisional headquarters of the then Lowland Division of Plateau Province, in November 1957. 
This was after graduating from Middle School in 1955. Tanglar recounts that the then Sarkin 
Yan Doka, Adamu Fanzan, a Youm from neighbouring Garkawa was looking for Middle 
School graduates to take charge of administrative and investigative tasks at the divisional 
headquarters.528 Tanglar served in the Native Authority Police Force at the divisional 
headquarters in Shendam, from November 1957 to October 1960, when he was transferred to 
Langtang Native Authority. In October 1969, following the dismantling of the NAPF and 
having served as a NAPF officer for 12 years, Tanglar was among the NAPF men whose 
services were transferred to the Nigeria Police Force. He served with the NPF in Langtang for 
nine years, retiring in 1978. 
After training, Tanglar’s first posting was to normal guard duty. He recounts that as a police 
guard one’s posting was changed weekly. Over a period of six months he was posted to guard, 
the Long Gamai’s (Chief) Palace; the local administration office; the general hospital (then 
combined hospital); the workshop; and the local airstrip. He was then posted as a revenue and 
inspection officer. His main task was revenue collection and inspection patrols, which 
included apprehending unlicensed bicycle and dane gun owners. In 1958, Tanglar was 
appointed the Shendam NAPF divisional station writer. This entailed working on schedules of 
duty postings, for guard duty, patrol and special duty. His next posting was to Bincike 
(investigations). His main job was to record statements and then writes the FIR (First 
Investigation Report), compile a case file and hand them over to the prosecutor. When 
required he also gave testimony and witness statements in court. Tanglar was then made the 
prosecutor for the Langtang NAPF in February 1962 and served in this position for three 
years. 
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Figure 13: Researcher with Mr Danladi Tanglar Wuyep, former NAPF Officer, 12.01.2015 
 
When challenged on the reputation that the NAPF had as an oppressive arm of Chiefs and 
Emirs, Mr Tanglar refers to an interesting episode in 1964 that occurred during the general 
elections. In the run-up to the 1964 elections there were two main political parties canvasing 
for support in the Lowland Division of Plateau Province. There was the northern regional 
government’s ruling party, the Northern People’s Congress (NPC), and at this time, most of 
the Chiefs across the region supported this party and were keen to have its candidates elected. 
Unfortunately for the Chiefs the associations of emerging educated elites across the Province 
preferred the opposition United Middle Belt Congress (UMBC). In the Yergam / Resettlement 
NA, the stage was set for a political clash between the Ponzhi Tarok Garba Wuyep, 
supporting the NPC, and the leaders of the Yergam Union, who fielded candidates in alliance 
with the UMBC. When it became apparent that the UMBC-Yergam Union alliance was 
making serious inroads, the Ponzhi Tarok ordered the arrest of its leaders. This is where 
Danladi Tanglar appears. Tanglar was directed to arrest of one of the Yergam Union’s 
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prominent leaders, Wuyep Zitta, popularly known as ‘Mallam WZ.’ Tanglar, grinning with 
satisfaction, recounts how he declined to carry out the arrest. “I questioned who issued the 
warrant, and what was the offence? I requested to know on what basis I should generate the 
warrant. I asked what particular crime was Mallam W Z accused of committing. When all of 
these were not forthcoming I simply declined.”529 Tanglar further disclosed, “During the 
elections the Yan Doka did in some cases obey the orders of Chiefs and Emirs – as is the case 
with the Nigerian Police today. However, we also engaged in doing police work and had a 
sense of justice and fair play.”530 It should be noted that the NPC won this particular election.  
4.	Alhaji	Rufai	Abubakar	
The fourth profile considered here is that of Alhaji Rufai Abubakar531. After completing his 
elementary education, he was recruited into the Native Authority Police in 1953 and served 
with the Jos NAPF, retiring in 1966. Rufai recalls serving two NAPF Chiefs: Sarkin Yan 
Doka Mamman Doso, 1943-1957, and Sarkin Yan Doka, Mallam Sallau Udo, 1957-1966. 
Alhaji Rufai recalls that the process of recruitment at the time he joined the NAPF was based 
on volunteering, with elementary education required to be eligible. At the time, the 
recruitment officers looked out for potential recruits with good interpersonal skills, while the 
tactical and technical skills came with training and improved on the job. 
Alhaji Rufai talks about the main challenges of the NAPF when he served. The lack of 
housing was an acute problem, as at this time the NA police lived among the people and not 
in barracks. While this helped for information gathering and community policing, Rufai 
believed that it undermined the effectiveness of the NAPF.532 Rufai served in different 
capacities within Jos NA. His first stint was in the minefields as a guard for two years. After 
this, he was posted to the Native Authority Office, then referred to as Gidan Taska, as a 
guard. In 1957, he was posted to the crimes department. He recalls handling cases that ranged 
from petty crimes such as pickpockets and theft or stealing in the market, to more grievous 
offences like burglary and tax evasion. Having served in an urban NA Rufai and his NAPF 
colleagues came into daily contact and interacted more with the NPF. This is in contrast to 
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NAPF in more rural NAs who only met NPF when they visit for criminal investigations, or 
the occasional visit of a NA Police Adviser.533  
6.3.	Vigilante	Policing	Practice	(1980‐1998)		
In this section, the focus is on analysing how vigilante policing practice unfolded following 
the implementation of the Structural Adjustment Programme, from 1986. The Nigerian 
government believed it was introducing a novel initiative in response to policing challenges; 
this has been examined in chapter five. On the ground, the traditional rulers and former 
vigilantes were mostly remobilising. In discussions with individuals who were involved and 
witnessed this mobilisation, what is revealed is that vigilantism through socialisation 
influences from the police was further institutionalised. What constituted vigilante policing 
practice at the time? What was the response of the communities? I examine these issues in 
this section. To begin with, who were these vigilante group members?  
6.3.1	Vigilante	Profiles	(1980s‐1998)	
To capture the context, background and experience of vigilante practice during the SAP era I 
have selected five profiles. Two from Jos, one each from the Muslim and Christian quarters of 
the city, and one each from the then Langtang, Pankshin and Shendam Local Government 
Areas. Biographical profiles of vigilante members allow us to see socialisation processes 
unfolding; we are able to discern what a vigilante career looks like.  
1. Kador	Miri	(Dadur,	Langtang	North	LGA)	
Kador Miri became a vigilante member in 1989. He responded to a call for recruitment from 
the Langtang local government council. At the time, he was unemployed, having previously 
worked as a security guard in Jos. According to Kador Miri, he and 11 others from his district 
were selected and informed by the Chief that they had been chosen as vigilante members to 
providing policing services in the community, and he recounts how uniforms were issued to 
them. “After we were selected, there was a briefing by the Chief and the Police inspector on 
what is expected of us. Some retired soldiers in our town trained us in drill and patrolling 
skills. The local government provided uniforms for us and other equipment required doing the 
work. We were given torches, whistles, boots, and cow tail whips. Our uniforms were a light 
shade of black, not like the Police.”534 
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Figure 14: Kador Miri, VGN member attached to Reak Police Outpost. Photo taken after 
interview 07.10.2012. 
 
The vigilante groups established at this time, according to Kador Miri, were based in villages, 
towns and their immediate communities. Their activities were mainly restricted to night 
patrols and they were deployed in pairs. Kador Miri describes a standard night patrol: 
We start work at 10:00pm, we report at our Shugaba’s (Boss) house where our office 
was also located. From there we proceed to patrol, if we come across someone we 
establish where he/she is coming from and where he/she is going. If we are not 
satisfied, or if the individual is acting suspiciously, we detain him till morning to 
continue investigation; if we are convinced we let the person go. There are times that 
we have caught thieves, with livestock or other stolen items.”535  
I queried further to establish how Kador and his colleagues verify that such individuals were 
thieves. He expands on the point of ‘acting suspiciously’ –  
“Sometimes we come across someone carrying a goat at night with the mouth of the 
goat gaged with a piece of cloth. Such a person explains that he does not want to 
disturb people who may be sleeping, or you meet an individual with a bag of cotton at 
night, and he claims he wants to arrive at the market very early in the morning. All of 
this is suspicious behaviour. We also caught a man; his name is Shini, sleeping with 
his neighbour’s wife in the primary school classroom.536  
So what punishment did the vigilante group hand out to proven criminals?  
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Once we complete interrogation and establish that we have caught a thief or an 
offender, the severity of the punishment depends on the offence. Usually, if it is a case 
of theft we would beat the person and then tie him to the pole with a rope, I mean 
electricity poles. Before the poles, we would tie the person to a tree in front of our 
office until daybreak. In the morning, the thief would dance in the market square for 
people to see him, carrying what he stole on his head. If he stole a goat, he has to carry 
the goat. If he stole a motor bike, he will hang the key on his neck, and if he stole a 
bag of cotton, he will carry a piece of cotton on his head.537 
The local government council was supporting the vigilante groups with monthly stipends. 
This, however, did not last for long. Kador states that they eventually had to continue as 
volunteers, relying on public goodwill to sustain their activities. 
 
As is the case with other vigilante groups in the 1980s and 1990s, Kador Miri’s group had a 
short lifespan. In this case, the disbandment of the vigilante group was caused by, incessant 
complains of some parents whose children had been beaten and shamed by the vigilante 
group. Kador Miri recalls that,  
After some time parents of suspects and disgraced offenders were intervening and 
saying that, we should allow them deal with the matter at home. They will go behind 
our back and talk to the owners of the stolen property and we will be constrained to 
allow them settle the issue at home. In some instances, parents would lodge 
complaints at the Chief’s palace; some would protest that we are beating the suspects 
too much. We got fed up of this and we decided to stop before they disbanded us. We 
had reliably gathered that there were plans to disband us at this time.538  
My research visit to Bwarat district in Langtang North LGA in September and October 2012 
coincided with the most recent mobilisation of vigilante groups. This time it was mobilisation 
to join the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN). I witnessed the recruitment process in the 
neighbourhood, and then at the level of ward head, where some individuals were screened out. 
The successful names were then taken to the District Head and the final selection was done by 
the local government Commander of the VGN and Divisional Police Officer, represented by a 
police officer in charge of patrol. Kador Miri was re-recruited in 2012. 
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2. Mallam	Idris	Aliyu	(Shendam	LGA)	
The second vigilante profile from the era of structural adjustment is that of Mallam Idris 
Aliyu, a 64-year-old adviser of the VGN in Shendam LGA who was part of the vigilante 
group members recruited in the mid-1980s. He gives an account of how he was recruited. 
“Our vigilante group started following a directive from the Long Goemai (Chief). There was a 
high level of stealing at this time, and the policemen could not deal with the problem.” Aliyu 
narrates how events unfolded in the late 1980s, where similarly like the case in Langtang the 
vigilante groups of the Structural Adjustment Programme era were constituted at the instance 
of the Chief, His Royal Highness the Long Goemai of Shendam. “The Madakin Shendam and 
the Long Goemai called the attention of retired soldiers and requested them to organise a 
group of men to help the police. One of these retired soldiers was Corporal Hassan. It was 
Hassan that recruited me into the vigilante group.”539 Mallam Aliyu is a tea seller; in local 
parlance, he is called a Mai shayi (Hausa words for teal seller). He has been doing this 
business for almost 40 years, though he is now retired from vigilante work, Aliyu still sells 
tea. 
Aliyu’s narration of the activities of the vigilante group in Shendam is in striking similarity to 
Kador Miri’s account of almost the same period in Langtang LGA. I impart this section of my 
conversation with Mallam Aliyu in the following dialogue: 
JL: You have referred to vigilante practice when the late Chief, the 
father of the current Chief was on the stool, can you relate to us how it 
began at that time?...and you said you forgot the exact year, can you 
remember who was [Nigeria’s] President at the time? 
IA: Babangida (General Ibrahim Babangida) was ruling. 
JL: Do you remember who was governor of Plateau State? 
IA: Uhhhhhhmmmm, I think it was the Idoma soldier, from Benue. 
JL: Lawrence Onoja? 
IA: Yes, Onoja!540 At this time how it started was that criminals were 
disturbing us with stealing, the Madaki and the Chief called Garba 
Hassan he is not alive now he is dead, an ex-soldier and told him to 
organise and mobilise some youth and train them to support the police 
in fighting crime in the community. The Chief promised his support. 
He encouraged us to put effort (sic) and that even if it is his son that 
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we caught that we should not play with him. We would usually 
assemble at the District Office at 11:30, and then at sharp 12:00 
proceed on patrol. Now if we should catch anybody outside after 
midnight if the person is merely loitering and not with stolen property, 
we will arrest him/her - no beating, we will bring him here541 to sweep 
and the people should see you and mock you then we would release 
you to go. However, if we should catch a thief, we would tie him to 
the pole in front of our office until daybreak, when people have seen 
him then we tie the rope to his waist. We inform the Chief so that he 
knows we have caught a thief. Then we place the stolen goods on his 
(thief’s) head, one of our men will hold the rope. At that time, we had 
a drummer called Gudumwa. Gudumwa will carry his drum, and beat 
the drum for the thief to be dancing and anybody that has kobo or 
naira542 will give us. If we should gather that money then we use it to 
buy battery and share for everyone. At this time, the government did 
not give us allowance as they are doing for the current vigilante 
members.543  
 
Mallam Aliyu also reflected on the relationship, between the vigilante and the police at the 
time. He notes that, “As we were working as vigilante members in a town like Shendam we 
had to interact with the police on a daily basis. Our relationship was very cordial; they were 
pleased that we were assisting them to maintain law and order. We also cooperated with the 
police, when a thief has danced round the town and in the market place, we hand them over to 
the police for prosecution, especially when it is a serious offence like assault or robbery. If the 
case is serious, we are sometimes invited to court to serve as witnesses for the police.”544 
 
3. Monday	Gokum	(Pankshin	LGA)	
The third example I have profiled from the SAP era is Monday Gokum, the current Chairman 
and Commander of the VGN in Pankshin LGA. Monday’s vigilante career began in Lafia, 
present day Nassarawa state545 capital where he worked as a mason.  
I did not start vigilante work in Pankshin. I started in Lafia in 1979, at 
that time I was working as a mason. There were high cases of criminal 
activity – particularly robbery. The Emir of Lafia called ward heads 
and requested them to submit names of individuals to serve as 
vigilante members to curb the high rates of robbery. Therefore, I was 
amongst those that were selected. I worked as a vigilante in Lafia for 
five years. We were taking shifts at the time, so in a week I would be 
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542 Nigerian currency. 
543 Idris Aliyu, Interview by Jimam Lar, Shendam, 14.11.2012. 
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on patrol for three to four nights. I continued with my profession, as 
we were not paid, but occasionally given allowances. 546 
 
Monday Gokum moved back to Pankshin in 1985, and was residing there when the 
community-policing mobilisation of the SAP era was taking place. Accordingly, because of 
his experience in Lafia he was made one of the officials responsible for coordinating the 
organisation and training of new recruits. He narrates how the process unfolded in 1988. 
 
We had been engaging in vigilante work for several years, just 
amongst us here in Pankshin but everything changed in 1988. A letter 
came to the DPO (Divisional Police Officer), to mobilise and select 
members of communities to support the police as community policing 
initiative. The letter was taken to the Ngolong Ngas, and he noted that 
since there are some of us already working as vigilantes we should be 
given this new responsibility. I became the Chairman; I had to leave 
my business at this time because I was always receiving duty calls 
from all quarters of Pankshin town. We worked very hard with the 
police and we reduced the rate of crime in the town. Unfortunately 
when they transferred the DPO, the new DPO at that time did not give 
us continued corporation, and we had to stop. Finally, when the VGN 
came to Plateau, I again emerged as Chairman and Commander of 
Pankshin; I was also elected as a state official of the VGN.547 
 
Monday Gokum provided substantial information on the ongoing operations of the VGN in 
Pankshin LGA; I expand on these activities in the next chapter. Regards the SAP era of 
vigilantism, Gokum equally provided some interesting insight on strategies of patrol, 
gathering information and evidence that is handed over to the police. Because of his long-
standing experience in vigilante practice, Gokum introduced several initiatives when he 
became Chairman of the vigilante group of Pankshin town in 1988. Two instances will 
suffice, first when deploying his members for patrol at night Gokum made sure that 
individuals were not deployed to areas of the town where they lived. For two reasons, first 
they may catch someone they know and be enticed to let the person go. Secondly, in case of 
tiredness there could be an inkling or inducement to go home and sleep, thereby abandoning 
duty.548 The second strategy relates to how vigilante group members gathered evidence, 
Gokum introduced the practice of taking photographs of caught suspected thieves with the 
stolen item. The pictures were then handed over to the police as evidence alongside the 
                                                            
546 Monday Gokum, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Pankshin, 10.12.2012. 
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documented confession of suspects.549 These practices have continued. I came across several 
pictures taken by VGN members. In fact, some VGN branches have specifically recruited 
professional photographers as members, and they are responsible for documenting all photo-
evidence of caught suspects. 
 
4. Joseph	Zhimmah	(Jos	North	LGA)	Plateau	State	VGN	Training	Commander	
The fourth profile drawn from the 1980s is that of Joseph Zhimmah, the present Training 
Commander of the VGN in Plateau State. The 46550 year old is a theologian by training but a 
photographer by profession. He has also been working as an evangelist since 2002, and a 
vigilante member since 1989. Zhimmah recalls that before he joined in the late 70s to early 
80s there were vigilante members in his community but he was too young to join at the time. 
His narrative follows: 
 
 When I was still young in the 1970s, Rissau my area was very 
notorious and then known as Angwan Barayi551 (ward of thieves). 
This was why the community decided to form a vigilante group to 
help turn the tide. Fortunately, for the community, things did begin to 
change and the community was very proud of the vigilante members. 
This really motivated some of us to join and I joined in 1989.552 
 
Having worked as a vigilante member for over two decades, with the occasional interruptions 
Zhimmah has several accounts of successful investigation and arrest of suspected criminals. 
The highlight of these accounts was how he arrested his boss the vigilante group Chairman of 
Rissau community for fuel theft in 1992. He provides additional narratives as follow: 
 
I was made the Deputy Chairman of the Rissau vigilante group in 
1990. In December 1992, as you would know when Christmas 
approaches we experience scarcity of petroleum products. Therefore, 
at this period in 1992, there were several cases of fuel theft from the 
Bima filling station (petrol station) and we found it difficult to catch 
the culprits. In those years we did not patrol on a daily basis, it was on 
and off. I realised on the nights we go out no fuel theft, however, on 
the nights we did not go out it occurs. I suspected an insider from 
amongst the vigilante group was leaking information and working 
with the thieves. I selected five trusted members and we decided to go 
out for patrol on one of our off days, and we caught our Chairman 
with 50 litres of petrol. He begged me to show mercy and let him go, 
                                                            
549 Ibid. I also witnessed this practice in other VGN branches across the state, it however seems it first started in 
Pankshin in the late 1980s. These were mostly pictures of thieves trying to steal on market days (Mondays). 
550 Joseph Zhimmah was 46 as of 2012; I met and interviewed him again in 2015 when he was 49. 
551 Angwa in Hausa means ‘quarter of town’ – Angwan Barayi translates as ‘thieves’ quarter’. 
552 Joseph Zhimmah, interviewed by Jimam Lar, 7.11.2012. 
 179 
 
but I refused. Our job is very critical he was like a bad egg; if you do 
not remove bad eggs, it will stink and make all the other eggs bad. We 
tied him to a pole, because this was our practice at the time and in the 
morning all, the people saw him and he was disgraced and removed 
from his post.553 
 
Following the removal of the former Chairman in 1992, Zhimmah was made Chairman of the 
vigilante group in Rissau. In 2008, he was appointed Secretary of the VGN in Jos North LGA, 
and in 2011 appointed State Training Commander. In his current role, he is in charge of 
organising state training camps and liaising with the National Executives, and other state 
training commanders to organise national training camps.554 In January 2015, Zhimmah was 
appointed as the VGN representative to the Jos North LGA Security Committee, he serves in 
this capacity alongside the local government Chairman, and all security agencies operating in 
the local government.555  
 
5. Mallam	Yau	Ali	Wanzam	VGN	State	Commander,	Plateau	State	
The last profile of vigilante group members from the 1980s is that of Mallam Yau Ali 
Wanzam. Yau Ali was one the first initiators of vigilantism in Jos, and became the state 
Commander of the VGN in Plateau State in 2008. Following a mild stroke in 2010, he was 
paralysed and could not continue in his position as state commander.556 The Deputy State 
Commander Chenvong Vongbut who also doubles as the VGN Commander of Langtang 
North has been acting as State Commander since 2012. As is the case with vigilante work 
Mallam Yau Ali’s practice was intermittent, that notwithstanding prior to his paralysis and 
indisposition Mallam Yau Ali’s profile provides us with over two decades of experience as a 
vigilante group member. Before examining this, it is instructive to provide a background to 
the situations that prevailed in the Hausa neighbourhoods of Jos in the early 1980s and 
necessitated Mallam Yau Ali and his colleagues to initiate vigilante practice. 
 
Organised vigilantism began amongst the Hausa communities of Gangare and Dilimi in the 
early 1980s. These are conterminous neighbourhoods in central Jos metropolis where one of 
the key tin mining centres during British colonial rule was located. The Nigerian Railway 
terminus built as far back as 1915, linking the railway from Port Harcourt in the southeast to 
Maiduguri in the north east of Nigeria is also located in this area. This equally lured business 
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interest to the area557, it soon emerged as a major commercial hub in the city. Soon the area 
was littered with shops, roadside vegetable stalls, car spare parts dealers and quite importantly 
when the state government considered a location to build the famous Jos Main Market558 a 
location equidistant to Gangare and Dilimi was selected. The Gangare-Dilimi area essentially 
emerged as the heart of Jos’s entrepreneurial central business district. In 1985, the Jos Ultra-
Modern market was commissioned. The market had substantial capacity, 4,290 stalls, parking 
for 300 cars, 600 trailers, and 200 buses. There were also 44 eating-houses, 2 banks, 1 
restaurant, and 1 post office.559 The status of the area as a major business district also meant 
that it attracted criminal elements. This resulted in a rise in criminal activity, specifically 
armed robbery and theft. Evidently, it was therefore in Gangare that the first known organised 
vigilante group in Jos was established,560 specifically to combat the rising crime that had 
accompanied the thriving commercial environment. Yau Ali recounts the process of 
organising the vigilante group in Gangare: 
…this was an era of bandits, burglars, and armed robbers. There were 
notorious criminals and gang leaders like Mai Adda, and Haruna 
Badman. These gangs were terrorising our community, and the 
government at the time did not have enough men to provide the 
required security for us. We had to do something, so in response, four 
of us called a meeting at the abattoir, which was then situated near 
Gangare, and we agreed to form a vigilante group. We became the 
officials of this group and the people gave us the required support.561  
 
It was amidst this criminality that in 1983 Mallam Yau Ali, Mallam Magaji Adamu, Mallam 
Hassan Dan Hadeja, and Alhaji Inuwa Mahauchi established a vigilante group.562 They 
continued with their activities through the late 1980s and the 1990s, and when the Vigilante 
Group of Nigeria was established and registered as a national organisation in 1999, Mallam 
Magaji was selected to serve as Chairman and State Commander. After Magaji passed on in 
2003, Hassan Garba took over following his appointment by the national headquarters. 
Mallam Yau Ali emerged as the Plateau Sate Chairman and State Commander of the VGN 
after the death of Hassan Garba in 2008.  
                                                            
557 Ibid. This point was also made by Alhaji Garba Juji, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Jos, 04.11.2012. 
558 The Jos Main Market, which was commissioned and opened for business in 1985, was destroyed and burnt 
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Mallam Yau Ali states that the success of the vigilante group members at the time he was 
active was largely due to the support they received from state authorities. The police openly 
recognised the vigilante groups and encouraged joint patrols with police officers, thereby 
legitimising vigilante practice within the various neighbourhoods they operated. He recalls 
that: 
We started doing this work when Shagari was President, and Solomon 
Lar was Governor563 and we continued after the military took over 
power. The authorities supported us actively, as our objective was to 
support the police and help in the maintenance of law and order. The 
local police Divisional Office supported us, for example, when 
Solomon Awasak was the DPO of C-Division ten (10) police officers 
were deployed to patrol with our men at night. Following the success 
of this initiative in Gangare, Awasak also encouraged the introduction 
of police - vigilante group patrol in other parts of Jos.564 
 
I traced and talked with Solomon Awasak in December 2014. Now retired, he runs a private 
security company based in Jos. He not only confirmed the account by Yau Ali, but also 
praised the work of Ali and his colleagues in supporting the police to fight crime, specifically 
robbery. He states that: 
 
…from my experience, I would say at the time, the Hausa community 
was more organised, and the leaders of the vigilante groups were very 
strong and respected. It was strictly a local arrangement, community 
based and it started in Gangare. I was the first DPO in Jos to provide 
police officers to go on patrol with the vigilante group members, we 
trailed it and it was quite successful. My other colleagues decided to 
initiate this cooperation in other parts of the city and environs and we 
witnessed a drop in crime. We were better informed and our work was 
more effective. It was a very successful initiative, unfortunately, the 
local governments could not support the vigilantes with allowances 
and eventually they got discouraged.565  
 
Mallam Ali also recollects the support the vigilante group got from the military governor of 
Plateau State. He narrates a particular episode, when a newspaper reported that the vigilante 
group members in Jos had cut the fingers of a robber as penalty, thereby taking the law into 
their own hands. After reading this report the Military Governor, Samuel Atukum ordered the 
arrest of the vigilante leaders, and invited the editor of newspaper to his office to confirm the 
validity of the story before considering what kind of action to take. Ali recalls that: 
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On this day, I was invited to C-Division police station, on a call from 
the DPO. I thought it was in relation to some patrol briefing or update 
on our work with the police. When arrived I saw that my colleagues 
Hassan and Magaji had also been invited. At C-Division, the DPO 
joined us in the police van and we went to the office of the 
Commissioner of Police. The Commissioner informed us that the 
Military Governor wanted to talk to us; we were confused and 
anxious, as it was a rare occurrence to be invited by the Governor. On 
arrival, the Governor confronted us with this report, we denied, as we 
had never done such a lawless act. We confessed that when we arrest 
suspects, or catch criminals like thieves and robbers we do flog them 
before handing over to the police. Cutting fingers was however 
completely unthinkable. Unknown to us the Governor had also invited 
the newspaper editor and the individual who we were accused of 
cutting his fingers. It was eventually established that the story was 
unfounded. The Governor praised us and encouraged us to sue the 
newspaper for defamation of our character. We decided not to pursue 
this, since we had been cleared before the Governor himself there was 
no need to sue, but we demanded for an apology. The apology was 
published and I kept a copy of this newspaper, but it was 
unfortunately burnt during the crisis.566 
 
Mallam Ali also recalls that one of their criteria’s for eligibility to be recruited was having a 
job, profession or some business that earned an individual regular income. He recalls that this 
was one of their yardsticks to measure responsibility.567 At the peak of their activities in the 
mid-1980s to the early 1990s, the vigilante group amongst the Hausas of Jos had seventy-
seven members.568 
	6.4.	Narrations	of	Vigilante	Policing	Practice:	Voices	from	the	Community	
Interviews with members of the communities reveal the views and opinions of the people 
whom the vigilante groups served. This demonstrates how expectations and opinions varied 
amongst different groups in the community. The dominant narrative that emerged attributes 
the 1980s rise of vigilantism as a response to a spate of crime across the state. According to a 
group of women I interviewed in Dadur569, Langtang North, this was a period when they 
began to get actively involved in small-scale business and entrepreneurship. They were 
participating in the local economy as brewers of local beer, opened shops to sell local soup 
condiments, eateries, producing vegetable oils, etc. They were therefore earning regular 
returns of income. However, on a small scale this was nonetheless enough to further invest. 
Such investment would include rearing livestock, goats and sheep. Some of the women 
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though were saving their earnings. They therefore became the target of theft by ‘wayward’ 
young men. A second reason for the establishing of community vigilante groups according to 
the women was what they regarded as indiscipline. This as I found out referred to a rise in 
pre-marital sex amongst teenagers and consequently a rise in cases of pre-marital pregnancies. 
In communities like Dadur, and Pil-Gani in Langtang North and Shimankar in Shendam LGA, 
cases of pre-marital sex and pregnancies were greatly frowned upon. In fact, the societal 
norms and values are such that the blame resides more with the mother of a girl found 
pregnant, than the girl. As one of the women noted: 
 
Apart from the stealing, there were also high levels of indiscipline by 
our children. When I was growing up it was not possible that your 
mother goes to sleep before you, it never happened, unless you were 
working in the kitchen. At this time, you had boys and girls hanging 
out on the streets at night, doing all sorts of nasty things, they had no 
fear for their parents, they did not fear God. Our traditions and culture 
also did not permit this.570  
 
The women further described how the community mandated a retired soldier, and two others 
mentioned in the interviews as Danburam, Dantata, and Babale to form a vigilante group in 
Dadur. The vigilante members were locally referred to as ‘Orim a’danburam’ Danburam’s 
Masquerades. The vigilantes are remembered to have been unsympathetic and 
uncompromising to the offenders that they caught, duly reversing the state of helplessness that 
had held sway. Again, one of the women recounts how, “Danburam’s masquerades were very 
effective when they were formed. They caught a number of thieves. I remember, there was the 
man that stole a goat. He was tied to the tree in front of Danburam’s house (vigilante leader’s 
house). There were other cases of stolen mattresses, beds, grains, and money that were 
recovered.”571 
 
Describing a similar scourge of robbery in Jos in the early 1980s Alhaji Sabo Kebur, states, 
“historically Yanbanga emerged in Jos in response to theft and armed robbery. The situation 
in those days was so bad that it got to a point whereby gang of armed robbers had the courage 
to send notification letters to people to prepare for their arrival at night.”572 He recalls the 
gangs had their hideout at the top a rocky hill within the metropolis called ‘Dutsen Cowboy’ 
Cowboy Rock. The rise in crime and violence by youths in the mid-1980s in the Angwan 
                                                            
570 Group Interview Dadur Women Association, by Jimam Lar, Dadur, 21.10.2012. 
571 Ibid. 
572 Sabo Kebur, interviewed by Yunus Ibraheem, Jos, 25.09.2012. 
 184 
 
Rogo Hausa quarters of Jos, for instance is attributed to the incursion and infiltration of 
remnants of Maitasine sect members who had fled from Kano because of the governments 
clamp down on them at the time.573 Alhaji Kebur commended the Yanbanga for arresting the 
leaders of the then gang Mai Adda, and killing him. This prompted the other gang members to 
flee.574  
 
More evidence of local mobilisation for vigilantism in the early 1980s comes from Shimankar 
town in Shendam LGA. Shimankar is one of the main towns in Shendam LGA, a major 
breadbasket in the local government with a very heterogeneous population. In a group 
interview with current and former vigilante members, we learn how vigilantism began in the 
area during the second republic575 – “vigilantism started in Shimankar when Shagari was 
President and Solomon Lar was Governor. At the time stealing was very rampant and out of 
control, so the community decided to set up a vigilante group.”576 Over the last three decades, 
there were two interregnums, when vigilante policing in the area was suspended. The first was 
in the mid-1990s, and the second period more recently in 2002. In both cases, the vigilante 
members attribute it to a lack of motivation and support from local authorities. At times that 
they were active, the vigilante members had done very well and earned the trust of the 
community. Community leaders praised the work of the vigilante group in Shimankar. They 
gave them much credit for the low level of crime, particularly theft in the area.577 The group 
has equally had a long-standing cooperation with the police in the town. In fact, I was 
informed of two periods in 2000 for 4 months and another instance, when the vigilante group 
temporarily took over the running of the police station in the town. 
 
Another account of vigilante success from the 1980s is a narration laced with humour from 
Pankshin town, circa 1985. The story had been rendered to me initially by Sunday Philibus a 
former vigilante member at the time. It was however, retold by a group of community elders 
in Pankshin. “In the 1980s the vigilante Chairman was the then Ngolong Ngas (Chief) Adamu 
Gutus578, and his Secretary was G.G. Yakzum, the then Principal of Government College 
Pankshin”579, a state boys secondary school in the town. According to Sunday Philibus, 
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At the time, we usually have our parade in the grounds of the palace. 
Some of our members were retired soldiers and they helped to train us 
and prepare us for patrol. The first person we caught stole a video 
(VHS Player) from Bala Jatau. Bala Jatau was the first person to bring 
a video player to Pankshin. We were just patrolling around 2:00am 
and we saw this individual, we called on him to come and he started to 
run. We chased him and blew our whistle, he ran into the stream but 
we pursued him and caught him. We asked him questions, what was 
he carrying? Where was coming from? He merely said he was sent on 
an errand, and does not even know what he was carrying. After 
beating him, he confessed that he stole it but refused to tell us where 
he stole it. We handed him over to the police, without knowing that 
the item was a video player. In the morning, Bala Jatau came to report 
that his video player was stolen. The police called our attention, and 
Jatau gave us monetary reward.580 
 
The community elders praised the work of the vigilante group, and particularly commended 
the 1980s groups for doing a great job with minimal incentives. They recalled how the 
vigilantes became an important part of the policing system in the Pankshin Monday market. 
Because of their patrols around the markets, the vigilantes curbed the activities of pickpockets 
who were usually circuiting the markets in the local government area. 
 
The Nigeria Police force hierarchy at the Jos headquarters were also weighing in with their 
commendation. The general tone of the police views in the newspapers was a very positive 
assessment of the role of the vigilante groups in curbing crime. The police at the time were off 
course feeling the austerity that was ushered in by the implementation of the Structural 
Adjustment Programme. In an October 1989 report, carried in the Standard newspapers, the 
then Police Commissioner Alhaji Laminu Z. Mamadi commended the combined efforts of the 
police and vigilante groups in fighting crime.581 In another report, Mamadi called on the 
Divisional Police Officers (DPOs) in charge of the local governments to seek creative means 
of working with the vigilante groups, and maximise the potential that the vigilantes offered in 
crime prevention and maintenance of law and order.582 In an interview with Solomon Awasak, 
who served as DPO with the Plateau State police command in the mid-1980s, he recounts 
some of his experiences with the vigilante groups in Jos at the time: 
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I served with the Jos, police command from 1979 to 1991. I started 
with C.I.D general investigation. The period when I was involved with 
the vigilante groups is from 1986, when I was appointed D.P.O 
Laranto (a very ethnically mixed quarter in Jos), and later D.P.O A 
Division (a police area of command covering large parts of Hausa, 
Igbo, and Yoruba quarters of Jos). The vigilante groups at that time 
were not organised under a single state or local government leader. 
Every neighbourhood had their own, this made it very difficult for us 
to coordinate and have a coherent cooperation with them. There were 
so many vigilante group leaders coming to my office. Inspite of this, 
generally they were very helpful and provided us with information in 
regards to criminal suspects in the community and local gangs 
involved in drug abuse, particularly Indian hemp. It was also during 
this period that we got them uniforms and identity cards, to curb cases 
of impersonation.583 
 
While there were several people who praised the emergence and work of vigilante groups in 
the 1980s across Plateau State, I also encountered voices that were critical of vigilante 
practice. At times, the same people who had commended the vigilant groups were also 
eventually regretting their emergence. Far from being altruistic, and committed community 
members providing security and helping to maintain law and order, vigilante practice is 
equally fraught with wrongdoing. As it is wont to be the case with unregulated vigilant 
practice, they have a high tendency to get out of hand. The data gathered from interviews, but 
also newspaper reports reveal how the same communities that commended vigilant groups 
equally condemn them when they embrace and perpetrate criminality.  
 
In a group, interview a women association in Dadur, Langtang North local government area 
lamented how overtime the vigilantes began to engage in criminality. Two forms of 
misdemeanour are mentioned. They began demanding for money from small-scale owners of 
business in the town, and they fined the women. The vigilantes claimed they were keeping the 
town safe for the women to do business so they expected them to pay for the services 
rendered. More grievous though was the fact that the vigilantes were violating the very rules 
they were established to enforce. The women explained that, “the whole vigilante work was 
undermined when the vigilante were catching themselves with stolen property. They also 
began to show favouritism. When they arrest a friend or colleague, they would let the person 
go free. It got out of hand, so the traditional rulers and the police had to stop it at that time.”584 
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However, after sometime when the stealing began again it was reintroduced. “We had really 
supported them but they unfortunately disappointed us.”585 
 
The peak of citizens’ frustration with the excesses of the vigilante groups was in 1989. A 
reading through the archives of the Plateau State government owned Nigeria Standard 
newspaper is revealing. I came across several letters of remonstration, and opinion pieces by 
Plateau residents from different local governments published in the Standard. A few examples 
drawn from Shendam, Langtang, and Lafia586 Local Government Areas, capture the mood and 
frustrations at the time. On Wednesday, January 11th 1989, an opinion piece was published in 
the Standard. Authored by the then Deputy Chairman of Lafia local government area, A.M. 
Liman, the piece was titled ‘The Vigilante and Law Enforcement Agents’. Liman’s core 
argument was that vigilante group practice had gone out of control and the police were tacitly 
and to a lesser extent actively supporting groups who have contravened the law, “had no 
respect for fundamental rights of citizens to dignity and due process of the law.”587 Liman 
recounts that his concern on the matter was informed by what he witnessed on one of his daily 
visits to the vendor he “witnessed a tumultuous crowd in a mixed frenzy of anger and 
euphoria. The centre of attraction was a young man tied to a pole…having received a 
thorough beating by the vigilante group.”588 According to Liman, his feeling of revolt to 
vigilante practice and police complaisance occurred when he went to the police station to 
enquire whether the young man had been handed over to the police. He was informed that the 
vigilantes had not yet finished. They would have to parade him around the town, so that 
everybody would identify him as a thief. A second instance according to Liman was the “grim 
and gruesome experience of 5 young men who were suspected to have stolen 10 cows. These 
people were handed over to the police on 24, December 1988. On the 28th December, the 
suspects were released by the police to the vigilante group, which subjected these people to 
the most barbaric form of brutality.”589 On the police, Liman frowns at the passive if not the 
conspirational attitude of the police towards the illegal activities of the vigilante group. 
Criticizing the police for abdication of responsibility, Liman writes, “Unfortunately the police 
seemed to tacitly approve this. It is a shameful state of affairs for the police to promote not 
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even to condone the activities of a group of men, not recognized under the law to constitute 
itself into an unofficial police force and court for that matter.”590 
 
The complaint from Shendam town was published in the Sunday Standard of 22nd, October 
1989. In a letter, titled ‘Vigilantes in Shendam’ three residents of the town Abdul-Razaq B. 
Muhammed, Muhammed Bashar M. Hassan, and Abubakar Usman were concerned about the 
activities of Yanbanga in Shendam. They disapproved how “the Yanbanga (sic) had taken the 
law into their hands, by brutally harassing and torturing citizens unnecessarily.”591 The 
Yanbanga they claimed “had resorted to meting out both corporal and psychological 
punishment on people and this is not stipulated in the law of the land. Since the law 
enforcement agents exist the vigilantes have no right to torture a mere suspect”592 They 
proceeded to give two examples, in order to express the enormity of their concern, I present 
the examples in full: 
We were witnesses to what the so-called vigilantes did to a suspect on 
the 15th September 1989. They mercilessly tied him to an electric pole, 
rubbed pepper in his eyes, forced him to eat some pepper, and then 
they severely beat him up causing bodily injuries. They then tied a 
rope round his waist forcing him to dance from street to street with the 
suspected stolen item; a bed on his head…Another example happened 
on the 7th of October, 1989 when the vigilantes savagely beat up 
another mere suspect and forced him to carry a huge bag of guinea 
corn that was suspected to be stolen. There are many cases of such 
behaviour; in fact, one of the suspects almost lost his life.593 
 
They conclude with an appeal to the rule of law but also admonishing the vigilante groups 
with religious injunctions on punishment. They state, as follows: 
 
This type of action, apart from being unconstitutional is also not 
encouraged by any religious denomination worldwide. Though 
different religious bodies provide punishment for a deviant when 
proved guilty, non (sic) of the punishments are as brutal and savage as 
the one inflicted by the vigilantes in Shendam…the proper thing that 
the Yanbanga should do is to take any arrested suspect to the police.594 
 
In contrast to the foregone views, I also came across opinions that had an alternative take on 
the vigilante groups. These citizens though critical of vigilante practices, recognised the 
                                                            
590 Ibid. 
591 The Nigerian Sunday Standard, October 22, 1989. 
592 Ibid. 
593 Ibid. 
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usefulness of the groups. Also suggesting how the community and the local government could 
benefit by introducing initiatives that provided training, regulating and monitoring the 
vigilante groups. An example of this viewpoint is a letter published in the Standard newspaper 
of Wednesday, 15, February 1989. Titled ‘So wither the vigilante’ it was featured as an 
opinion piece, the author Wuyep Nanyah Gaven firstly expressed the unsatisfactory and 
unacceptable levels of insecurity, particularly referring to high rates of crime in Langtang 
local government area. He then noted how “the social phenomenon (crime) had led to the 
gradual loss of confidence and credibility in the state institutions (police), hence, the 
emergence of the vanguard or vigilante groups.”595 The author then proceeds to present a 
counterbalanced assessment of the practices of the vigilante groups. He writes that despite the 
supposed lack of legal foundations, vigilante groups had contributed to ensuring peace and 
order in the community. “…in terms of role and control they have of recent operated 
alongside the police force. In some cases because of the lapses in the police force, vigilantes 
now operate independently.”596 Gaven is also critical of the vigilante groups, “the vigilante 
groups from time to time equally have lapses, and cannot claim immunity, from the law when 
they display outrageous behaviour and show no humane feelings, and they have on occasion 
tortured individuals who were later found to be innocent of the charges of 
robbery…eventually the local government officials banned the vigilante groups.”597 In spite 
of this, the author’s conclusion was that the positive role of the vigilantes outweighed the 
occasional incidence of excesses. “The vigilantes though might have erred in this town, must 
it be swept off? Must it wither away?”598 
 
What does this tell us about vigilante practice prior and after the introduction of austerity? I 
would suggest two main points come into consideration. First, we see a manifestation of what 
Kirsch and Gratz599 have referred to as the conditionality of vertical encompassment by 
vigilante groups. According to Kirsch and Gratz, vigilante groups substantiate their existence 
by gradually expanding their range of activities and developing new modes of action.600 This 
was the case with the vigilante groups on the Plateau, they began with small-scale 
neighbourhood night patrols and then graduated to roadblocks and policing local markets. 
                                                            
595 The Nigerian Standard, February 15th, 1989. 
596 Ibid. 
597 Ibid. 
598 Ibid. 
599  See  Thomas  Kirsch  and  Tilo  Gratz,  “Vigilantism,  State Ontologies  and  Encompassment:  An  Introductory 
Essay”,  in  Thomas  Kirsch  and  Tilo Gratz  (eds.), Domesticating Vigilantism  in Africa,  (London:  James  Currey, 
2010), 1‐25. 
600 Ibid., 18. 
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This is done to demonstrate effectiveness within the community but also as a means of 
gaining legitimacy with local state security actors. Therefore, within the bigger picture and 
framework of the historical process of the institutionalisation of vigilantism and plural 
policing the period from the late 1970s to the early 1990s is critical and of high importance. 
This was the period when the government of Nigeria, as represented by the state governments 
encouraged the formation and support for vigilante groups. Equally critical, is role the police 
began to play in socialising vigilante groups. The introduction of uniforms and identity cards 
as I have argued previously in chapter six further gave the vigilante groups legitimacy, and 
continued the slow process of institutionalisation. Secondly, it is also clear that local officials 
at the local government level were supportive of the initiatives to establish vigilante groups. 
The police were also keen, in fact more so following the impacts of austerity to involve the 
vigilantes in policing, specifically in regards to patrol and arrest of suspects. What was 
however lacking were initiatives that would have provided adequate preparatory training for 
the vigilante members, also lacking was continuous regulation of vigilante police practice. 
The extent to which the vigilante groups were becoming excessive and overbearing after a 
decade of operations, demonstrates the consequences of a lack of oversight, and regulation. 
 
The origins and creation of security institutions in Nigeria was done with the foundations of 
instituted violence as a key tool of exercising the act of governing the colony, the post-
colonial legacy of military rule has further entrenched this approach in policing. What follows 
are some instances that illustrate violence as a form of plural policing, these are instances 
from the NAPF and vigilante policing. The era of decentralised despotism discusses structural 
violence, as experienced during the colonial period. I then proceed to violence in the era of 
vigilantism. 
6.5.	The	Era	of	“Decentralised	Despotism”	
The different phases changed the form of colonial administration at the local level, but what 
remained constant was the nature of how the local chiefs administered their chiefdoms, and 
how they used the Native Authority Police to assert their will. So in the lens of the people in 
these societies the chosen individuals were not just made paramount chiefs; they were also 
provided with a tool to oppress and intimidate. To elaborate on this I would precede with the 
discussion under three sub-headings, taxation and forced labour which the chiefs actioned, but 
first highlighting the prominent place of corporal punishment as a favoured sentence for the 
NAs, and NAPF.  
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6.5.1.	Corporal	Punishment	
Corporal punishment (flogging and caning) was constitutive of colonial policing, and a 
regularly applied punishment for breaking the law. As Toyin Falola, has aptly noted, “nothing 
represents the permanence of violence in Nigerian political culture better than the police and 
the army.”601 Under the NA system the NAPF were responsible for executing the sentence 
following conviction by the courts, however as I gathered from several interviews of those 
who experienced NA policing in the 1950s the NAPF were wont to administer corporal 
punishment, even to suspects prior to arraignment.602 Archival records603 reveal transmitted 
reports of corporal punishments inflicted in the colony, comprising of the Northern and 
Southern Provinces. For instance, the returns of 1934 for the Northern Provinces were in two 
categories: corporal punishments inflicted by order of Native Courts and corporal 
punishments inflicted for Prison offences in Native Administration Prisons. In the records 
corporal punishment is listed as whipping, for 1934 there were 1,637 offenders, with the total 
number of strokes at 18,711. Majority of offenders were convicted for stealing 885, their 
penalty in total for the year was 11,434 strokes. Stealing with violence was a separate 
category; here there were 39 convictions with a total of 441 strokes. Other highlights include 
180 convictions for assault, a total sentencing of 1,976 strokes. This simply illustrates the 
prevalence of corporal punishment as a penalty for everyday offences like stealing, fraud, 
extortion, and slander. The colonial authorities were convinced of the expediency of corporal 
punishment; traditional rulers used corporal punishment or the threat of corporal punishment 
in literally whipping people in to line. The chief justice of Nigerian as early as 1908 is quoted 
to have quipped “…the only way to correct black people was to flog them.”604 The statement 
captures the mentality and approach of the colonial officials, the preference for corporal 
punishment as the ideal statutory penalty was there right from the beginning. The peoples of 
the colony were treated as ‘backward people’ who will only succumb to the threat of 
whipping, or an actual conviction and administering of the sentence; the most natural means 
of inflicting pain, a language that all living creatures understand. Corporal punishment 
continued to be applied as punishment and has remained in Nigeria’s law books. This is 
discussed in more detail in subsequent sections. I now consider other forms of violent policing 
during colonial rule.  
                                                            
601 Toyin Falola Colonialism and Violence in Nigeria, (Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, 
2009), 178. 
602 Alhaji Ali Dakshang interviewed by Jimam Lar, Dadur, Langtang North, 7.10.2012. 
603 CO583/198/11 Corporal Punishment, 1934. 
604 Times (London), October 12, 1908, 7, quote taken from, Falola (2009) Colonialism and Violence, 67. 
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7.5.2.	Taxation	
Tax or Gandu,605 used in some communities and in other communities they refer to the more 
conventional Hausa term Haraji (poll tax) collection, in the Plateau Province was organised in 
such a manner that it enabled the active involvement of the various levels of the Native 
Authority. The village heads, the district heads, and chiefs all partook at various points in the 
mapping, assessment, collection, and delivery of tax to the relevant colonial authority.606 
There are several accounts of corrupt and fraudulent practices by the chiefs, where the chiefs 
exploited the people by collecting illegal tax in the name of the colonial state and then 
embezzling it. Mangvwat narrates how the: 
 Chiefs… and their relatives enjoyed the period of tax assessment and 
collection, which usually took place from October to December, 
because it afforded them the opportunity to amass plenty of livestock 
and grain, which the peasants (people) had to auction in order to 
obtain cash for the payment of taxes. This was in addition to the 
outright confiscation of properties by some chiefs, purportedly for 
entertaining tax officials on tour even when no taxes were due. 
Indeed…some of these chiefs forced some of their subjects to pay 
taxes twice a year by refusing to issue receipts to the latter when they 
had duly paid their taxes in the first instance.607 
The people also became wary of the chiefs and began to devise strategies to outwit them. An 
elderly man Ali Dakshang in Dadur town of Langtang North local government area, now in 
his nineties narrated a case of how he outmanoeuvred the local chief in the 1950s.608 In one 
account, the local chief was wont to demand for livestock to entertain visiting colonial 
officers (Divisional Officers on tour), in such cases, whoever was called upon to provide was 
expected to oblige. However, the people became suspicious when it was realised that some 
livestock collected were to later end up in the chiefs’ herds. The most fattened of animals that 
were made ready for the market were sent out to relatives in more remote villages out of the 
                                                            
605 Since tax collection was a new administrative practice most of the groups who in any case had not 
developed centralized political structures had no designated term for it, so the Hausa word Gandu was adopted 
in some communities. It is still used today in some communities to refer to tax. Gandu originally referred to a 
family farming unit, a household production unit with social economic purposes. 
606Mangvwat, A History of Class Formation, 43. 
607 Ibid., 44. 
608 Once the name of the particular chief is mentioned, it is easy to establish the period when the events being 
recounted occurred. 
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sight of the chief.609 The atrocities perpetrated against the people of the Plateau Province by 
the chiefs during tax collection formed an important dimension of colonial exploitation, but it 
also engineered fervent resistance, sometimes leading to open riots, with cases of some of 
these chiefs murdered.610 The colonial accounts and oral records from this period show how 
the Dogarai and the Yan Doka, as the enforcement arm of the chiefs were involved in cases of 
arbitrary arrests on the orders of the chiefs, there also cases of indefinite custody of persons 
designated as accused over long periods without trial.611 The idea that the Native Authority 
Police Force (NAPF) was largely made up of a ‘stranger’ population – in several chiefdoms 
brought in from other Northern Provinces – worsened the situation of day-to-day policing.  
7.5.3.	Forced	Labour	
The chiefs’ reign of terror on their communities also extended to how labour was organised as 
people were forced to undertake several colonial approved projects. This is rendered clear by 
the example of road construction to open up and access the interior parts of the Province. 
There are several instances of road construction across the Province from the 1920s, and the 
1950s. The roads constructed were: 
…the Jos-Bauchi road, completed in 1922; the Jos-Akwanga road; the 
Jos-Pankshin-Shendam road, completed 1926; the Bauchi Light 
Railway, from Zaria to Jos between 1911 and 1914; (in the original 
account of Ames, this was completed in 1915); and the Panyam-
Shendam road constructed from 1953-1958, (right on the eve of 
independence). These colonial construction projects provided the 
District Heads with opportunities to demonstrate their newly acquired 
power by coercing their subjects to the various construction 
sites…some of these chiefs, the main agents of recruitment, turned the 
occasion of these construction projects into making personal fortunes 
by exploiting their subjects and amassing wealth…apart from taking 
bribes from unwilling subjects so as to avoid reporting at construction 
                                                            
609 Alhaji Ali Dakshang interviewed by Jimam Lar, Dadur, Langtang North, 7.10.2012. 
610 Mangvwat, A History of Class Formation, 44. 
611 Ibid., 45. 
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sites, many chiefs embezzled monies meant for payment to their 
subjects for services rendered.612 
There was also forced labour for the construction of rest houses613 for the European colonial 
officials. All districts had to build and maintain a rest house for the use of the colonial 
officials, such usage in some instances may be once or twice in a year. “For example, 
Shendam Division, comprising of seven districts at the time had a total of 24 rest houses 
maintained with a token of 20 pounds.”614 The chiefs took advantage of such a system to 
exploit and oppress their people.  
The Native Authorities were also critical in mobilising forced labour for the Jos tin mine 
fields, the tin on the Plateau became very critical to the British war effort after the loss of the 
Malaya tin mines to the Japanese in early 1942.615 Subsequently, the colonial government 
made efforts to step up production, if tin mining on the Jos Plateau required labour to be 
stepped up, it would be necessary to introduce a forced-labour policy.616 This was despite the 
fact that the colonial regime had passed a Forced Labour Ordinance in 1933 that banned 
forced labour in Nigeria.617 The cooperation of the Native Authority was decisive for 
purposes of rounding up, conscripting, and maintaining labour on the minefields.618 There 
were gross abuses in the recruitment process. Freund mentions several of such cases, and I 
quote two cases from the Plateau as follow. “At Bisischi in 1943, workers claimed that they 
had been tied up with rope at a groundnut purchase station and sent to the mines. Another 
group of recruits reported being locked overnight in a UAC canteen at Maidobi and then 
packed off for the Plateau mines.”619 Freund shows how the Plateau Province where the 
minefields were located emerged as a major point for conscripting labour; he states that:  
With some exceptions, Plateau labour was considered ‘voluntary’. 
However, as with the formal conscript totals, the volunteers were 
actually often the product of strong-arm methods on the part of the 
Native Authorities. Moreover, mines managers took to bribing chiefs 
                                                            
612 Ibid., 42‐43. 
613 These are more or less guesthouses for any colonial official on tour or for that matter on any official 
assignment. 
614Mangvwat, A History of Class Formation, 43. 
615 Bill Freund, Capital and Labour in the Nigerian Tin Mines, (Essex: Longman Group Ltd, 1981), 137. 
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to augment the labour supply. Emberton620 commented wryly at the 
end of 1942 that many a ‘pagan’ chief was to be seen wearing 
splendid new outfits on the proceeds of his take in this labour 
trafficking.621 
The numbers of forced miners from the Plateau chiefdoms continued to rise, as the war 
demand increased and the enthusiastic appetite of the chiefs to earn more from the mine 
managers also increased. By the end of 1943 in addition to 14, 098 enumerated workers from 
Pankshin and Jos district there was another 11, 000 miners, and another 41, 500 from 
Shendam and South Pankshin districts, all designated with some ‘voluntary’ label.622 When 
the conscriptions began for an increase in tin mine labour in the Plateau lowlands, the chiefs 
sold the idea as ‘opportunities to go and work for the white man,’623 hence there was some 
keenness amongst the ‘volunteers’.624 The workers soon realised the nature of work and the 
spate of desertion began. It should however be noted that despite the bad conditions and the 
desertions the pressures of taxation there were always individuals available for recruitment to 
the mines.625 The Native Authority Police were thus not just deployed to conscript and escort 
labourers to the mines, they were also critical in supervising and holding labourers on the 
mines.626 The Native Authority Police in the Plateau Province were subsequently adequately 
rewarded for the services rendered during the peak period of forced labour in the tin mines. In 
1947, the Superintendent of Police, Nigeria Police Force in charge of the Province, with the 
support of the Plateau Resident made a case for increased pay for the men of the Jos Native 
Authority Police Force.627 They argued that, unlike the NA police in other Provinces, the NA 
Police in Jos were responsible for the maintenance of law and order in the tin mines and 
camps, the securing of mine products, and the security of the mine officials. The request was 
                                                            
620 J.J. Emberton was the administrative director for minerals production and the central figure in the forced 
labour programme. 
621Freund, Capital and Labour, 145. 
622  Ibid., 144.  In  interviews  I  conducted  in  Langtang and Shendam  in September 2012,  these accounts were 
recounted when I inquired for memories or stories of the impact of the Jos Plateau tin mining on the Lowlands. 
623 In an interview, Ali Dakshang in his 80s recounts how, in the district and divisional headquarters those who 
worked  for  the  colonial officers  and missionaries  as  cooks,  and messengers were held  in  a  certain  level of 
esteem.  The mine  conscript  actually  though  this was  the  nature  of working  for  the white men  they were 
expecting.  
624 Alhaji Ali Dakshang, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Dadur, Langtang North, Plateau state, 07.10.2012 
625 Bibiana Bawa, “The Movement of Tarok into Wase and Shendam Resettlement Scheme: Successes and 
Failure”, in Mandyeng: Journal of Central Nigeria Studies, Early Rains, (2011), 73. 
626Rotimi, The Police in a Federal State, 177. 
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granted and the NA police working in the mines found another reason to do their masters 
bidding.628  
6.6.	Violence	and	Vigilante	Policing	
6.6.1.	Understanding	Vigilante	Interrogation	
Drawing from accounts of past interrogation episodes and more recent witnessed acts of 
interrogation, we can attempt to understand the process of vigilante interrogation. 
Interrogation in vigilante practice means a plethora of acts, this varies from one town, and 
village to another. The universal acts would include caning, slaps, threats, and some specific 
forms of stress positions. From the information gathered, it is clear that most of these 
practices with some exceptions like flogging first began with the community based vigilante 
groups of the early 1980s. To illustrate what vigilante interrogation entails I present two 
instances of stress positions vigilante groups’ use in interrogating suspects and coercing 
confessions. These are drawn from Shimankar, Shendam LGA and Pil-Gani in Langtang 
North LGA. According to the vigilante members in Shimankar, their interrogation methods of 
choice are firstly, subjecting the suspect to frog jumping not as a muscle strengthening 
exercise and pastime rather frog jumping as a pain inducing, humiliating prelude to 
inquisition. Very popular in Nigerian secondary schools, it entails the holding of ears and 
jumping while in a squatted position. When done repeatedly the thighs are strained and it does 
become very painful. The suspect would be subjected to frog jumping until he/she agrees to 
confess and tell the truth, usually accepting responsibility for stealing. The vigilante members 
added that, there are instances when the suspect is whipped while frog jumping, this is to 
increase the pain and expedite confession.629 The vigilantes in Shimankar also use another 
stress position technique as an interrogation tool locally referred to as lilon Mecca630 (Mecca 
Swing). Lilon Mecca entails hanging on a pole with the arms tied to the ankles; the pole is 
situated on two branches of a tree or alternatively supported by two pillars with the suspect 
hanging on the pole, held up by the arms. The strain and pain is felt on the shoulder joints, 
and the hollow under the base of the shoulder. The vigilantes recounted that lilon Mecca is 
particularly reserved for stubborn and headstrong suspects. It has been used for interrogation 
since the 1980s, and is still used by the current vigilante group members in Shimankar. 
 
                                                            
628 Ibid., 178. 
629 Group Interview, current and former vigilante members, Shimankar, by Jimam Lar, 15.11.2012. 
630 As much as I tried, none of the vigilante members interviewed could explain why the technique was named 
lilon Mecca. 
 197 
 
The vigilante group in Pil-Gani, Langtang North talked to me about another technique used in 
interrogation, aptly named the ‘talk true.’ As the name suggest, this technique is used to get 
the suspect to tell the truth, or to confess to an offence he/she is believed to have committed. 
The ‘talk true’ is basically four slim wooden bars about 10 inches in length, held in pairs by 
four short iron rods, with screws used to tighten the grip of the wooden bars on the offenders 
lower legs, top of the ankle. During interrogation, a strike on the wood impacts on the bone, 
the vigilante members continue the process until they induce a confession. With such 
excruciating pain, it is possible; the vigilante members agree that confessions could be made 
out of duress. However, they argue that when they subject suspects to such interrogation 
techniques usually they have already gathered substantial evidence proving culpability. This 
practice has equally been in use since the vigilante groups of the early 1980s and is still part 
of the interrogation techniques of current vigilante groups. 
6.6.2.	The	Arenas	of	Public	Shame	
I could not establish where and when the much preferred vigilante punishment of subjecting 
suspects to the ‘dance of shame’ originated. What is however clear from the data, as 
demonstrated by the vigilante profiles examined in the forgone section above, it was the 
penalty of choice adopted by vigilante groups across the state in the 1980s, and is still 
practiced by rural based vigilante groups. It is my contention that, in subjecting an individual 
to this dance of shame what we see are specifically crafted stages in a performance that 
comprises multiple objectives, namely: to punish the offender, to generate income and to gain 
and sustain social legitimacy. 
Sandra Walklate631 has written about ‘public arenas of shame’ in her analysis of informal 
crime management in Salford, Greater Manchester, UK in the 1990s. She makes a very apt 
point about the function of shaming offenders who contravene societal norms and values in 
public places where the community usually converges for commercial and social exchanges. 
According to Walklate, such public arenas of shame are usually areas where:  
…nearly all the local amenities are located: a supermarket, a chemist, 
a betting shop, a job shop, a post office, a public house and hardware 
store. This area provides the physical location and space for ‘public 
shaming’ ceremonies. In other words, if there is graffiti to be written, 
and if there is graffiti to be written about a particular person, who it is 
believed has ‘grassed’632 , then their name will appear in this location. 
                                                            
631 Sandra Walklate, Informal Crime Management in a Northern British City: Crime Fear and Locality, in Informal 
Criminal Justice, Dermot Feenan ed., (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002), 86. 
632 According to Walklate, grassing was the local colloquial name for snitching. The interesting point being that 
there were accepted offences of which gang members would not be expected to snitch about others. 
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It is here that people are named for the rest of the community to see: 
and since this is the only place where there are any local amenities in 
this locality, it serves its purpose as a public arena of shame very 
well.633 
 
In the towns and villages of 1980s Plateau State, the public arenas of shame are the local 
market squares. There are usually designated market days, this range from major hubs of 
commerce to small village markets where people will converge to socialise while enjoying the 
local brew. The act is stage managed to not only expose the suspected offender to public 
ridicule, also important is to demonstrate that the VGN in the area is working. In some towns 
like Langtang and Shendam local amenities will include a supermarket shop, a local drugs 
store, bars and eateries, small scale vegetable sellers, a barbers shop, etc. In the major towns 
like Langtang and Shendam, and the state capital Jos, vigilante members no longer practice 
the dance of shame. The urban vigilantes have a higher ambition to be seen more like the 
police; therefore, they have discouraged such practices as they refer to it as “olden day’s 
vigilante practice.” Amongst the rural vigilante members however, the dance of shame is still 
part of their practice. It is still constitutive of vigilante practice. In villages as Shimankar in 
Shendam LGA, Pil-Gani and Dadur in Langtang North LGA the market square is of modest 
levels and while there is indeed commerce going on, people regularly congregate to socialise 
and catch up with the latest news. Therefore, the market square becomes the best location to 
demonstrate that vigilantes are working hard to rid the community of undesirable elements. 
Furthermore, displaying such offenders also serves the purpose of reminding community 
members of their responsibility to the vigilante group. This is by showing their appreciation 
with monetary gifts. 
 
I witnessed such practice on the out skirts of Pil-Gani town in October 2012. The dance of 
shame is referred to locally as tabakaka. The case I witnessed involved two young men, in 
their early twenties. The local vigilante members caught them with two goats the night before. 
According to the young men, the goats belonged to their father and had gone missing; they 
had simply found them and were taking them back home. The vigilante members were not 
satisfied with the story. They detained the boys until morning and on inquiring from their Dad 
found as expected that the two had lied. Following further interrogation and flogging the 
young men confessed to have stolen the goats from a neighbouring village. The ordeal began 
late afternoon, the young men were stripped of their shirts and given goat-hides to carry on 
their heads a local drummer with a constant repetitive beat followed them around the village 
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as they made their way to the market square. Soon a drove of young children mostly under 
tens congregated around and followed the boys singing and making jest of the now publicly 
confessed and convicted thieves. It is a remarkable sight, sweaty, fatigued and clearly 
embarrassed the two young men had to not only dance but also repeatedly sing with the group 
of children responding in unison. The song sang in Hausa goes somewhat along this line: 
 
Two Young Men: Alalo Alalo 
Group of Children: Tabakaka 
TYM: Alalo Alalo 
GOC: Tabakaka 
TYM: Na yi sata  
 I have stolen 
GOC: Satan mene?  
What have you stolen? 
TYM: Satan akuya  
I stole a goat 
(Sang repeatedly) 
 
 
After the dance of shame,634 in this case, the whole episode lasted for 2 hours, the vigilante 
groups handed over the suspects to the police and returned the goats to the owner. The 
grateful owner of the goats gave a monetary gift of 2,000 Nigerian Naira (10 euros) to the 
vigilante group. I witnessed people dropping money into a polythene bag as we made our way 
round the village and in the market square; however, I was not told how much was raised 
from the dance of shame. This is just an example of what transpires. Witnessing it one can see 
how once labelled a suspect an individual loses all rights and claims to dignity. Rather the 
suspect is an object of scorn, disgrace and embarrassment. Pratten has argued that, shaming 
through this public performance should be seen against a range of social control mechanisms, 
in his study of vigilantism amongst the Annang, of southern Nigeria the important 
mechanisms identified were oath taking and songs.635 What is at play here in our context is a 
display of the convergence of the moral and legal community at work. The language used to 
interrogate, and declare guilt is drawn from the legal penal community. The act of punishing 
                                                            
634 For a similar comparative example of the practice, see Pratten, “Singing Thieves”, 195. 
635 Ibid. 
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inculcates the contextual moral community, to be punished is to be disgraced and to be 
subjected to pain: physical and psychological. The first step in this process is the process of 
labelling, as a suspect, a qualification to be interrogated and as an offender, a qualification to 
be punished. Ray Abrahams, in an attempt to explore the role of language and especially 
rhetoric in different areas of vigilante activity636 considers the question of the negative 
implications of the human capacity for classification and labelling.637 According to Abrahams, 
when vigilante groups construct moral codes of good and evil, they consequently can easily 
be led to mistake the label for the labelled. What follows in practice is that these labels once 
invoked tend to follow in a linear progression, once an individual is designated a suspect; it is 
a matter of time before he becomes an offender. A label, as Abrahams has argued often has a 
lethal quality as it can be accompanied by beatings, torturing, and lynching.638 
6.6.3.	Corporal	Punishment	and	Vigilante	Policing	
The relevance of corporal punishment in vigilante policing is best expressed in the vigilante 
group’s authority to punish. In a sense it performs two functions, first it confirms the vigilante 
group’s capacity and ability to punish the suspect by applying physical pain. The offender is 
not only exposed and humiliated; he/she is also subjected to physical pain. The recognised 
capacity to punish further legitimises the vigilante group’s authority within society. Secondly, 
while vigilante members attribute their preference for corporal punishment to the socialisation 
they received from the police, police extra judicial practice has been understood as ‘police 
vigilantism’. Police vigilantism is when the police (individuals or groups) though being a 
legally constituted authority mimic the informal solutions of vigilante groups by engaging in 
extra-judicial action.639 
 
Police practice in Nigeria is rife with accounts and cases of brutality and violence, 
characterised by physical assault, harassment, illegal arrest and detention. There are reports of 
police excesses during crime control operations, this range from crowd control, 
demonstration, and protest management to harassment at checkpoints. Police brutality also 
occurs in form of extra-judicial killings, and summarily executions of suspects.640 Owen and 
                                                            
636 Ray Abrahams, “What’s in a Name? Some Thoughts of the Vocabulary of Vigilantism and Related Forms of 
‘Informal Criminal Justice” Informal Criminal Justice, Dermot Feenan ed., (Dartmouth: Ashgate, 2002), 37. 
637 Ibid., 33. 
638 Ibid. 
639 Ibid., 14. 
640 For statistics and more detail on police brutality and violence in Nigeria see E.E.O. Alemika and I Chukwuma, 
Police Community Violence in Nigeria, (Lagos: Center for Law Enforcement Education, 2000), and Folashade B. 
Okeshola, “Human Rights Abuse by Nigerian Police in Four Selected States and the Federal Capital Territory, 
Abuja,” British Journal of Arts and Social Sciences, 13, no.11, 2013), 242‐250. 
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Cooper-Knock have referred to this phenomenon as ‘police vigilantism’.641 They specifically 
offer this explanation as a better way of understanding the phenomenon of extra-judicial 
corporal and capital punishment by the police. In sum, such police practices can be 
understood as a response to a critical public demand for vigilante policing. The expediency of 
punishment that vigilante policing offer appeals to citizens more than the sometimes 
cumbersome and tardy process of juridical prosecution and trial. This is a useful departure 
from arguments that situate such practices strictly within discourses of human rights abuse, 
with little or no effort to understand why the police engage in such practices.  
 
Interestingly, this excessive culture of fierceness and severity in policing practice is also 
imbibed from police training and orientation, which is deliberately tilted towards the objective 
of creating policing men that are unruly and hardened. While this approach could find 
justification in dealing with hardened criminals, it has unfortunately alienated the police from 
the population it is meant to serve. This is still part of the processes of training and socialising 
new recruits in the military and the police.642 Corporal punishment for instance still remains 
as a legal penal sentence in Nigeria’s law books. Suspected criminals often than not suffer the 
ordeal of severe beating, and harassment from the police and indeed from vigilante groups. 
Sometimes this follows arrest and on other occasions as part of interrogation. The Penal Code 
equally provides for offenders to be sentenced to flogging. A basic scan of contemporary 
Nigerian newspapers reveals several reports of offenders convicted and sentenced by lower 
courts to flogging. I conducted such a survey myself in December 2014 while on field 
research in Nigeria. The main newspaper I used was the Daily Trust Newspaper; the sentences 
ranged from 10 strokes for attempted suicide,643 another offender got 15 strokes for criminal 
trespass and theft.644 In another report, a court in Abuja convicted and sentenced an offender 
for the joint act of house breaking and theft, to 6 months in prison and 6 strokes of the cane.645 
 
This form of violence (corporal punishment) was not however, restricted to “regulative 
orders” in different manifestations, but within the same logic it has been entrenched in a 
historical sense and it permeates the society. Violence has been to an extent legitimatised in 
                                                            
641Olly Owen and Sarah Jane Cooper‐Knock, “Between vigilantism and bureaucracy: Improving our 
understanding of police work in Nigeria and South Africa”, Theoretical Criminology, (2014),  
doi: 10.1177/1362480614557306.   
642 The Police officers I interviewed repeatedly made this point. The point out that such practices are 
particularly prevalent in the training and orientation of lower rank police officers. 
643Daily Trust, Abuja, 22.12.2014, 46.  
644 Daily Trust, Abuja, 29.12.2014. 
645 Daily Trust, Abuja, 20.11.2014, 48. 
 202 
 
Nigerian society, varied agents of socialisation have ingrained this. For instance, in Plateau 
State the culture of ‘disciplinarity’ was a key feature of the church and educational 
institutions. The concept of discipline introduced within the educational system in Nigerian 
included the celebration of corporal punishment as an important tool of socialisation. This is 
also articulated in the law books. Article 55 (1) a. of the Penal Code with jurisdiction in 
Northern Nigeria clearly states that “Nothing is an offence which does not amount to the 
infliction of grievous hurt upon any person and which is done by a schoolmaster for the 
purpose of correcting his child or ward such child or ward being under eighteen years of 
age.”646 The Criminal Code operative in the southern states of Nigeria equally has a similar 
provision that accepts violence as a means of socialisation. According to article 295, a blow or 
other force, not in any case extending to a wound or grievous harm, may be justified for the 
purpose of correction. The orientation of responsible and good parenthood within the religious 
context was and still includes corporal punishment as an important form of parental 
punishment. The Penal Code (North) again article 55, “Nothing is an offence which does not 
amount to the infliction of grievous hurt upon any person and which is done: by a parent or 
guardian for the purpose of correcting his child or ward such child or ward being under 
eighteen years of age.”647 
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
	
 
                                                            
646 The Penal Code (Northern States), Article 55, (1), a. 
647 Ibid. 
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6.7.	Conclusion	
In this chapter, I have tracked and analysed everyday policing practice from the lens of the 
NAPF and vigilante groups. On one hand, this means understanding the practice of the NAPF 
and vigilante groups as it relates to plural policing during British colonial rule, when the 
NAPF were active and the period from the late 1970s to the 1990s, which tracks the 
emergence and acceptance of vigilante groups as part of the policing landscape. We follow 
how vigilante groups are able to substantiate their existence by gradually expanding their 
activities and imbibing new modes of practice. On the other hand, this micro narrative focus 
has equally offered insight into the relationship between the NAPF / vigilante groups and the 
Nigerian Police Force, again this has been historicised from the lens of the NAPF and the 
vigilante groups. Personal accounts of NAPF and vigilante group members are presented 
within the same argument in the same chapter. Furthermore, I have argued that, we should 
understand the emergence and transformation of vigilantism as a successor practice to the 
NAPF institution it is vital to point out that the objective of this analysis is not to argue that 
being a vigilante and being a member of the NAPF is being equated. The two were not the 
same; while the NAPF was officially recognised from its inception and was paid by the state, 
vigilante practice took time to institutionalise its practice. It moved from local and ad hoc 
with irregular payment to its current profile. What is however, explicitly suggested is the 
narrative that Plateau State moved from an era dominated by the NAPF to an era where 
vigilante groups are operating side by side with the Nigerian police. 
 
Using profiles of NAPF men and vigilante group members we are able to weave together an 
intimate history of plural policing. This is in contrast to some existing literature,648 thus, it is 
in such ventures that this thesis makes effort of departure from existing literature. If there is a 
core thrust of this chapter, it is the argument that macro analysis of policing while important 
in presenting and understanding grand trends ultimately provides a partial and insufficient 
analysis of what transpired. In our context, as I have argued the institution of policing in 
Nigeria has gone through different periods and experienced different processes. The 
composition, its structures and ultimately practice have not remained static. To understand 
these processes, yes, the macro level is important, but the picture is only complete when we 
extend the analysis to the micro narrative. Analysis that focuses on macro dynamics, I would 
suggest are not necessarily wrong, they are simply incomplete. As part of this micro focus, the 
later parts of the chapter present a discussion of violence as policing practice. This refers to 
                                                            
648 See for example Ahire, Imperial Policing… 
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the everyday use of violence by the NAPF, and by the vigilante groups that succeeded the 
NAPF. The main point taken from this societal approval of routinised violence is the 
realisation that the violent practices of policing actors are adopted and imbibed not just from a 
history of the formation and development of state security institutions, but also influenced by 
wider Nigerian society. The next chapter focuses on contemporary plural policing practice. 
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Chapter	Seven:	A	Case	in	the	Present:	The	Vigilante	Group	of	Nigeria	
(VGN)	
7.1.	Introduction		
In this chapter, focus is on the contemporary practice of vigilante policing, and the plurality of 
policing practice since 2001is considered. Taking the Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) as an 
important case study, this covers Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999 when the (VGN) was 
registered with the Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). The chapter examines how 
historical processes have crystalized in contemporary practice. Two levels of practice are 
considered: First, crystallisation is characterised by official practice at different levels, 
federal, state, and local government. Secondly, crystallisation and the process of 
institutionalisation have also been enhanced by the practices of the VGN. The VGN has been 
active by engaging in policing practice and also situating its activities within a broader law 
and order policing system, this is through its interactions with local communities, the police 
and other government officials. These relationships are analysed through the concept of 
authority, which is deployed to conceptualise the different repertoires that the VGN has used 
to build legitimacy. I conclude the chapter with profiles of some members of the VGN I 
encountered during my field research. Apart from detailing what it entails in a comparative 
sense to be a VGN member, the section also provides ethnographic recollections of three 
episodes from my observation of VGN patrol. 
7.2.	Institutionalisation	of	Plural	Policing:	State	Practice	
One of the core arguments I have returned to all through this thesis is the view that plural 
policing practice (vigilantism) has thrived on the critical role, which the state has played in 
sanctioning and legitimating non-state actors. In return, vigilante groups have through their 
practices acted as agents of state power and thus contributed in legitimating the authority of 
the state. This is inspite of the fact that on occasion, vigilante discourses have seemed to be 
against the state, their actions however have revealed an unqualified ambition to be part of the 
state policing system.  
 
In the preceding chapters, I have shown severally how the state has actively midwifed the 
processes of institutionalising plural policing. The rationale behind the colonial state 
establishing the NAPF amongst the Northern Provinces was to extend the reach and authority 
of that government. Nigerian governments since the 1980s have in differing guises supported 
the establishing and practice of vigilante policing. This has continued with the current 
political dispensation. From 1999 when the country returned to civil rule to the present, we 
 206 
 
can designate important governmental policies, declarations and actions that contributed to 
the legitimation of vigilante policing, also leading to the further institutionalisation of plural 
policing in general. 
7.3.	The	Vigilante	Group	of	Nigeria	(VGN)		
With its headquarters in the city of Kaduna, former capital of the Northern region at 
independence in 1960 and current capital of Kaduna State, the VGN is the officially 
recognized umbrella body of vigilante groups. According to the group’s national leader Alhaji 
Ali Sokoto, the group has members and branches in all the 36 states of the federation.649 
Though the VGN was registered in 1999, the origins and history of vigilante groups in 
Nigeria and Plateau State as I have shown in preceding sections, however dates back further. 
On the 18th of February 1999, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria was registered with Nigeria’s 
Corporate Affairs Commission (CAC). The importance of this registration was twofold. First, 
the certificate of registration officially recognised the VGN as a corporate legal entity; prior to 
this, the group had existed on a fluid basis merely as a Non-Governmental Organisation, with 
varied levels of operation across the country, particularly in northern Nigeria. The second and 
perhaps more important factor was strategic, in 1999 Nigeria was on a path of transition to 
civil rule. Having failed to garner the needed support from the military government, beyond 
being seen as part of community policing initiatives the VGN leadership thought a 
government led by civilians may offer a better opportunity. The group’s founder and current 
Commander General, Alhaji Ali Sokoto lays out the history of how the group was established, 
and I quote him at length: 
The VGN was established in September 1993. I will not forget the 
date because I vividly remember I was in Poland, buying trucks. I was 
an oil transporter at that time; I travelled to Europe buy oil trucks for 
my business here in Nigeria. It was the day Babangida left office, and 
it really made me realise how fluid and unpredictable life is. One 
moment he was the most powerful person in the country, the next he 
was gone. I realized if I continue as a contractor I may inherit the 
world and loose heaven. At a time, I had 35 trucks and supplied oil for 
African Petroleum. When I returned, I made consultations on what 
was the most serious challenges society was facing which I could 
                                                            
649 It is hard to verify the extent to which this network of vigilantes are organised and structured across the 
landscape of the country. I can however confirm that for states that I visited mainly Plateau and neighbouring 
Nassarawa, Kaduna, and Bauchi, there were vigilante groups on the ground that recognised Alhaji Ali Sokoto as 
the national leader. 
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help. We realised crime was a major challenge particularly, that and 
arm robbery. Vigilante groups had been operating, but on a local level. 
From village, to town across northern Nigeria you could find vigilante 
groups. I decided to use the funds I had to establish an organisation to 
bring vigilante groups under one umbrella. That is how we founded 
the VGN. The early years coincided with a lot of turmoil and 
challenges, but in the build-up to democratic rule we decided to 
register the group.650 
  
Figure 15: Researcher with Alhaji Ali Sokoto Commander General VGN. VGN HQ, Kaduna 
– 17.12.2012. 
Accordingly, registering the group in 1999 was to strategically position the group to be 
favourably placed to support the Nigerian police as the country was transiting to civil rule. 
Alhaji Ali captures this point in an interview I conducted in his Kaduna office, the VGN 
headquarters in 2012: 
We hoped that a civilian government would be more disposed to 
supporting us in our attempt to assist the government in maintaining 
                                                            
650 Alhaji Ali Sokoto, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Kaduna, 17.12.2012. 
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law and order. The government made the right declarations, but 
unfortunately, things did not work out well.651  
When I persisted that Alhaji Ali should give me any instances he could recall where the 
Nigerian government made declarations to support vigilante groups, he insisted that 
while he could not remember specific instances he recalls that such declarations had 
been made around 2000 to 2001. My initial research around this question rather than 
unearth declarations of support led me to the Nigerian government’s attempt to proscribe 
vigilante groups who had been considered to engage in illegal activities that amounted to 
criminality. This is a reference to groups like the Bakassi Boys652 of South east Nigeria, 
the Oodu’a People’s Congress (OPC) of the Yoruba heartland of the south west, and the 
Hisba, Islamic police.653 In a bill entitled “Prohibition of Certain Associations Act” the 
federal government of Nigeria at the time, articulated its position on vigilante groups 
that were actively pursuing goals that not only coalesced with sectarian projects, but also 
were engaging in recurrent displays of violence meted out on suspected offenders 
without recourse to legal processes. The bill gave the President the powers to proscribe 
“any group of persons, associations of individuals or quasi-military groups which in his 
opinion (the President) is formed for the purposes of furthering the political, religious, 
ethnic, tribal, cultural or social interest of a group of persons or individuals contrary to 
the peace, order and good governance of the federation and the provisions of this act.”654 
While the literature on these groups has provided varied understandings of why they 
emerged, and what they represent, some scholars have particularly highlighted how 
vigilantes contest state legitimacy and how they have rooted their social legitimacy 
within identity discourses, drawing on ethnic and religious registers.655 I contend that 
such descriptions do not shed light on our understanding of the VGN, in view of the fact 
that the VGN did not necessarily tick these particular boxes – understanding vigilantism 
within the frames of identity politics, and contestation with the state. As I have severally 
argued elsewhere in this thesis, the VGN takes us on a different path. Its origins, 
objectives, and modus operandi of operation are in contrast to the vigilante groups that 
have received and dominated scholarly attention around vigilantism in Nigeria. The 
                                                            
651 Alhaji Ali Sokoto, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Kaduna, 17.12.2012. 
652 The Bakassi Boys were eventually proscribed by the administration of President Olusegun Obasanjo. 
653 The emergence of Hisba followed the introduction of sharia law in some northern states of Nigeria. 
654 Quotation  taken  from  “Nigeria:  Vigilante  violence  in  the  south  and  south  east”,  Amnesty  International, 
November 2002, AFR 44/014/2002, 5.  
655 Johannes Harnischfeger, Ethnicity, Religion and the Failure of ‘Common Law’ in Nigeria, in Thomas G. Kirsch 
and Tilo Gratz, eds., (James Currey, Suffolk and Rochester, 2010), 51‐78. 
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political environment at the time meant that vigilante practice was criminalised by the 
state – it also transpired that its appearance in the literature was also not complimentary, 
except for a few scholars who drew our attention to more nuanced understandings and 
conclusions.656  
Having given up on finding any government declaration that supported vigilante groups 
since the return to civil rule in 1999, though Alhaji Ali was adamant this was the case I 
was considering going along with the narrative with his interview as my evidence, on 
reflection I decided I needed more concrete evidence to make the argument. Moreso, for 
the fact that the Obasanjo government in his first term is remembered more for 
proscribing vigilante groups rather than supporting them, relying on Alhaji Ali’s account 
would have amounted to threading on thin ice. My prospects however changed when I 
visited the archives of the Standard Newspapers in Jos Nigeria, in December 2015. 
Amidst, the dusty confines of old newspapers I came upon an August 2001 newspaper 
with the headline – “The insecurity question: Presidential security retreat endorses use of 
vigilante groups.”657 In October 2001, Nigeria’s President Olusegun Obasanjo convened 
a Presidential retreat on National Security. Amongst other things, the retreat examined 
factors that were considered to pose a threat to individual and collective security, and 
outlined actions and measures in response. 
The retreat endorsed the use of vigilante groups in the maintenance of law and order as 
complementary partners to the police. Held two years to the 2003 general elections, 
there was concern over breaches to security, caused by political thuggery and violent 
clashes of rival political party support groups. The relevance of this narrative to my 
arguments in this chapter are summed up in two points. These declarations emerging 
from a high level governmental panel was received by the VGN leadership as the 
government’s endorsement of its objectives and practices. In the context of this study, 
this can be seen as another instance of the Nigerian state, having rejected the idea of 
multi-level policing yet indirectly lending its weight behind the further 
institutionalisation of plural policing. On a governmental level, such declarations further 
encouraged state governments to create a quasi-version of state police by further 
legitimisation of vigilante practice, through the signing into law of bills that recognised 
                                                            
656 Fourchard, “A New Name for an Old Practice”, Africa, and Ukiwo, “Deus ex machina or Frankenstein 
Monster?” 39‐51. 
657 The Nigerian Standard Newspaper, 13, August 2001. 
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vigilante groups as statutory institutions of state policing; this was in contrast to the 1999 
constitution.658 Having come to terms with the difficulties of maintaining law and order 
with a unified, centralised policing system state governors were keen to establish 
policing institutions of their own. As I previously noted in chapter 4, state governors 
were chief security officers of their respective states without the tools to maintain law 
and order. Unavoidably, the return to civil rule meant that the state governors sought to 
assume a more important political role in security at the state level. 
It was therefore no coincidence, that in the period from 2001 to 2002 several state 
governments passed laws establishing state vigilante groups,659 a phenomenon that 
Meagher referred to as a process of hijacking ‘civil society.’660 Within the same Nigerian 
polity, the VGN was equally navigating the terrain trying to find its footing and sourcing 
avenues as pathways to consolidate state and public legitimacy. The VGN was also 
looking for patrons, they were looking for support. Unfortunately, as they eventually 
came to realise the VGN as constituted in the early 2000s did not fit into the political 
class’s logic of the right vigilante group to hijack-using Meagher’s notion. As Alhaji Ali 
Sokoto recounts the group’s period of frustration as they tried without success to get the 
support and backing of state governors, he notes:  
We realised that most state governors, while accepting the need to be 
more creative and pragmatic in supporting the police to maintain 
public order and security actually wanted something different. We had 
written congratulatory messages to several governors after their 
swearing in (May 1999). We paid courtesy calls to several traditional 
rulers to talk to the governors on our behalf; this also failed to yield 
any breakthrough. After the 2003 elections we realised the governors 
wanted to organise youths to serve as political thugs, this clearly was 
not our objective. 
The state governors did not see the VGN as the panacea to the challenges they were 
encountering in regards to state level policing. Considering the options which some of them 
did turn too, perhaps the VGN was too ‘civil’ and less ‘primordial’ using Ekeh’s logic661 to be 
                                                            
658 The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Article 214 (1) on the establishment of the Nigeria 
Police Force does state that ”…subject to the provisions of this section, no other force shall be established for 
the federation or any part thereof.” 
659 Examples of some of these states, in August 2001 ‐ a bill establishing a vigilante group was tabled to the Edo 
house of assembly; it was a similar case in Ebonyi state where such a bill was passed by the house of assembly 
in June 2002. 
660 Meagher, “Hijacking Civil Society”, Journal of Modern African Studies, 89‐115.  
661 Ekeh, “Colonialism and the two publics”, Comparative Studies in Society and History, 17. 
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of any benefit for the governors. The VGN’s pitch to the new civilian administration was very 
comprehensive; they made all effort to convince that they had congregated based on an 
altruistic agenda. The aims and objectives of the VGN as defined in Article (4) of the 
Constitution, comprises of the following: 
a. To assist the police and other law enforcement agencies to curb crime; 
b. To protect and preserve public property; 
c. Assist the Police in crowd control and maintenance of peace at public functions where 
the need arises; 
d. With the clearance of the police, assist public agencies in the protection of their 
establishment plants and equipment; 
e. To give information to the police and other security agencies of criminals or wanted 
persons residing in the ward or Local Government; 
f. To locate the permanent or temporary residencies of receivers of stolen properties and 
419 (fraud) practitioners for the purposes of enabling the police to arrest or monitor 
their activities; 
g. To make positive and useful contributions to the advancement, progress and well-
being of the community by mobilising and assisting in communal development 
efforts; 
h. To abide by the constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and all relevant laws 
and byelaws.662 
While the mere stating of rules and regulations in a constitution does not necessarily entail 
adherence, it is clear that in setting out its objectives the VGN recognised the Nigerian Police 
Force as the core state institution, without whom aspirations for recognition and 
institutionalisation would remain unsuccessful. The ideas expressed in the constitution are 
equally emphasised repeatedly in conversations, but also in meetings and training sessions. In 
my many conversations with current VGN leadership, at the local government, state, and 
national level the mantra is to support the police. The VGN’s ambition to be part of the 
policing system is understood within a context that situates the group alongside the police, not 
above or as replacement, as some scholars have argued.663 
 
The police have reciprocated this approach. The Nigerian Police Force has initiated several 
means of supporting the VGN at the local and national levels. With the approval and close 
                                                            
662 Constitution of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, National Headquarters, Tudun‐Wada, Kaduna (Revised 
Edition), p.1. 
663 For more on this viewpoint see Baker, Multi‐Choice Policing… 
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supervision of the Nigerian Police Force varied local and international NGOs, and private 
security companies have organised training camps and workshops for VGN members. While 
some of these NGOs and local PSCs, use these programmes as means of extending their 
economic base there are others who do add value and improve the competence of vigilante 
members, in sum this is an attempt to further perfect the operational competence of VGN 
members. How this works, is by selecting members from all states of the federation who 
converge in Abuja, the national capital for a few days, to be trained by police officers and 
other experts drawn from other security agencies. A few examples of such programmes will 
illustrate the point. In October 2013, the VGN national headquarters organised the first of 
such seminars, the National Awareness Security Seminar. The seminar was themed around 
the title: The Roles, Participation and Relevance of Vigilante as a Tool to Other Security 
Agencies in the Sustenance of Nigeria Security System. The content of the seminar papers 
focused around the role and use of vigilante groups to supporting state security agencies, with 
speakers drawn from the police, the army, the immigration service and the National Drug Law 
Enforcement Agency. The Commander General of the VGN, Ali Sokoto was confidently sure 
that the success of the first seminar his leadership organised opened the doors for state 
security agencies, and expert NGOs to support the VGN.664 This support created avenues for 
organising training camps, security retreats, and seminars on the importance of community 
policing at the national level, but also at the zonal levels and the states. In Plateau State, the 
state government through the state legislative assembly passed bills, which were signed into 
law supporting cooperation between state and non-state security agencies. These state 
practices have gone a long way in not just legitimising the VGN, but also has improved 
vigilante policing practice.  
7.3.1.	The	Vigilante	Group	of	Nigeria	in	Plateau	State	
Since the return to civilian rule in 1999, the intensity and virulence of the conflict on the 
Nigerian landscape have regularly punctuated attempts to promote peace and engender 
democracy and the rule of law. Plateau State represents one of the most volatile of these 
theatres of violent conflict. Since September 2001, Jos North and other local government 
areas have witnessed incessant episodes of sectarian violence. Several thousands of people 
were killed in communal violence in Plateau State (not just in Jos city but this includes 
casualties of violence in other conflict theatres of Plateau State, particularly in the southern 
senatorial zone) in the period 2001-2011. While there is much controversy and contestation 
over the ownership of Jos, discourses on where the blame lies for the several episodes of 
                                                            
664 Alhaji Ali Sokoto, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Tudun‐Wada, Kaduna, 17.12.2012. 
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violence is a major topic of debate. What is however clear is that vigilante groups have been 
very active in perpetuating collective violence. Before discussing the role of vigilante 
members and collective violence first a background of contemporary vigilantism in the state. 
In the 17 local government areas of Plateau State, there are vigilante groups operating with 
clear hierarchical structures, drawn from and recognized by the communities they serve. 
These groups are local branches of a national organization, the Vigilante Group of Nigeria 
(VGN). The VGN in Plateau State is led by Alh. Yau Rikkos, as he has been indisposed the 
Zonal Coordinator Alh. Juji acted in his place for a period. The current Acting State 
Commander is Nuhu Vongbut, the Chairman VGN Langtang North LGA. Both Alhaji Rikkos 
and Alhaji Juji are Hausa, and Muslims. The fact that the VGN in Plateau State is led by 
Hausa-Muslims, given the recent sectarian violence in the state with reoccurring episodes in 
Jos metropolis is significant and I will return to this subsequently. Firstly, though, a historical 
process accounts for the fact that Hausa-Muslims, a minority in Plateau State are prominently 
placed in the leadership of the VGN, this is in regards to the emergence of vigilante groups in 
the state before the establishment and official registration of the VGN. 
Based on available data gathered from my research it is plausible to suggest that organised 
vigilantism in Plateau State began amongst the Hausa of Jos, in Gangare and Dilimi In the 
early 1980s. These are conterminous neighbourhoods in central Jos metropolis where one of 
the key tin mining centres during British colonial rule was located. The Nigerian Railway 
terminus built as far back as 1915, linking the railway from Port Harcourt in the southeast to 
Maiduguri in the north east of Nigeria is also located in this area. This equally lured business 
interest to the area, as it soon emerged as a major commercial hub in the soon bourgeoning 
cosmopolitan city. Soon the area was littered with shops, roadside vegetable stalls, car spare 
parts dealers and quite importantly when the state government considered a location to build 
the famous Jos Main Market665 a location equidistant to Gangare and Dilimi was selected. The 
Gangare Dilimi area essentially emerged as the heart of Jos’s central business district. The 
status of the area as a major business district also meant that it attracted criminal elements. 
This resulted in a rise in criminal activity, specifically armed robbery and theft. Evidently, it 
was therefore in Gangare that the first known organised vigilante group on the Plateau was 
                                                            
665 The Jos Main Market, which was commissioned and opened for business in 1985, was destroyed and burnt 
down following a fire incident in 2002. 
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established in 1983,666 specifically to combat the rising crime that had accompanied the 
thriving commercial environment. Yau Rikkos the current state chairman of the VGN in an 
interview recounts the process of organising the vigilante group in Gangare: 
…this was an era of bandits, burglars, and armed robbers. There were 
notorious criminals and gang leaders like Mai Adda, and Haruna 
Badman. These gangs were terrorising our community, and the 
government at the time did not have enough men to provide the 
required security for us. We had to do something, so in response, four 
of us called a meeting at the abattoir, which was then situated near 
Gangare, and we agreed to form a vigilante group. We became the 
officials of this group and the people gave us the required support.  
It was amidst this criminality that in 1983 Alhaji Yau and Mallam Magaji Adamu, Mallam 
Hassan Dan Hadeja, and Alhaji Inuwa Mahauchi established a vigilante group. The first 
leader of the community vigilante group was Magaji Adamu. The community vigilante group 
continued with their activities through the late 1980s and the 1990s, and when the Vigilante 
Group of Nigeria was established and registered as a national organisation in 1999, Mallam 
Magaji was selected to serve as Chairman and state Commandant, Plateau State. After Magaji 
passed on in 2003, Hassan Garba took over following his appointment by the national 
headquarters. Alhaji Yau emerged as the Plateau State chairman after the death of Hassan 
Garba in November 2008. The organisational chart of the VGN, Plateau State branch largely 
mimics the command structure of the NPF state command. The group is led by a state 
chairman/ commander. A state executive council and commanders at the local government 
level assist him. 
 
 
 
                                                            
666 By organised vigilantism, I refer to the practice of vigilantism that began to gain prestige and also had a 
structure, with hierarchy and instituted collaboration with the police. As I have argued previously there were 
already vigilante groups organising in rural plateau state in the 1970s. 
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Figure 16: This is the current map of Plateau State. 
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Figure 17: Leadership Organisational Chart of the Plateau State VGN from the state 
commander to the unit leader, usually in charge of a village in rural areas or a neighbourhood 
in urban areas like Jos. 
7.3.2.	VGN	Recruitment	
The transformation of the recruitment processes constitutes a major means by which the VGN 
has seemed to not only gain the recognition of the state government and its agencies but also 
gain social legitimacy. While conducting field research amongst the vigilant groups some 
specific repertoires demonstrate how vigilante groups seek to exercise authority and build 
legitimacy. The recruitment process in particular has been made officious and formal; the 
process can be divided into three main stages: the application form of membership; vetting by 
the local chief (usually ward head); and interview by the local police and final selection. For 
the successful few, uniforms are procured; identity cards are issued and rudimentary 
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paramilitary training given. As part of a national association, vigilante members in the current 
typology are keen to be identified as extensions of state institutions. Primarily an individual 
has to volunteer. In this regard, vigilantism in this study still maintains one of the classical 
traits of the early 1980s. From my discussions with current VGN members, different factors 
and influences inform their decision to volunteer. There is always the response of being 
desirous to help and assist the community. As Monday Joshua, P.R.O VGN Pankshin L.G.A 
noted, when I inquired for his motivation to join. “The main motivation is a desire to eradicate 
crime in Pankshin, this is why I joined. We are volunteers, whether we get financial incentive 
from the local government or not, we do this job with pleasure.”667 There are some members 
of the VGN who had attempted to join the army, the police or state paramilitary agencies and 
did not succeed. The VGN then for such individuals becomes an option to still have a carrier 
in a uniform profession, again the allure of the uniform as a symbol of authority comes 
through very convincingly.  
 
How then we should understand this, what is it then that really motivates individuals. I 
contend that, yes we should not ignore the responses from VGN members that attribute 
motivation to a desire to serve one’s community, whatever eventual benefit that comes with 
membership there is no guarantee at the point of application that such benefits will indeed be 
realisable. In making a decision to join the VGN, risk taking is involved. In the context of 
these societies, what clearly emerges is volunteerism that emerges from embedded logics of 
young men performing the duty of protecting and securing the community from criminals. 
Often when I pushed the VGN members further to elaborate on why they joined, they retort 
wittingly expecting me to understand that as young men it is their responsibility to protect, 
guard and secure the community – usually the response would be along the lines of “if we do 
not do it, who will do it for us. Are you expecting men from another community to come over 
and secure our community for us?” At the heart of the motivation are practices that Pratten, 
has separately described as “constitutive of inclusive boundary mechanisms…of masculine 
identity”668 and as “a marker of youth and the basis of local citizenship.”669  
Again drawing from my conceptualisation of processes of socialisation670, forms and logics of 
masculinity are replete in vigilante practices, indeed vigilante recruitment for long periods 
                                                            
667 Monday Joshua, interviewed by Jimam Lar, 08.01.2015. 
668 Pratten, “Bodies of Power”, 119‐120. 
669 Pratten, “Singing Thieves”, 188. 
670 See conceptual framework and analysis of vigilante socialisation in chapter six. 
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was the sole privilege of young men, and as I have shown subsequently only changed because 
of the desire to imitate the police and other state security agencies who recruit both men and 
women.  
Within a context of contested citizenship, a Nigerian problem with Plateau State being one of 
the more violent theatres as manifest by the explosion of sectarian tensions in the last few 
decades. The logic concealed in the desire of one regarded as a ‘non-indigene’ is explained in 
the idea of being a member of young men who defend, secure, protect the community is 
clearly an entry point to local citizenship. To this logic, I would consider and refer to the 
strategies of the Igbo and Hausa VGN members of Shendam, who in joining the VGN benefit 
from the inclusive rights and privileges that comes with the responsibility to secure the 
community. Another motivation that drives the individuals who seek the membership of the 
VGN that is not explicitly discussed in conversations but is clearly observed from vigilante 
practices is the simple factor of seeing VGN membership as a means of livelihood. There is 
strong political economy logic to vigilante practice; the evidence of this argument is discussed 
further on in selected episodes I have presented from my experiences on night patrols with the 
VGN members in Langtang, and Shendam. 
Joseph Zhiman, the state training commandant of the VGN Plateau State in an interview in 
January 2015, categorised VGN members in Plateau State into categories of registered and 
non-registered. The registered members are those who have filled the application form, with 
their guarantors having vetted that they are of good character and law-abiding citizens, and 
have gone through other procedures of recruitment.671 Zhiman claims that according to their 
records there are 10,000 registered VGN members in Plateau State. While he has no figures 
for the unregistered members, he believes it is more than 10,000. When individuals volunteer 
to join the VGN, membership is not automatic, actually the process of membership starts by 
procuring the VGN membership application form.672 The procurement of a membership form 
as part of the process of applying for membership is a development that is unique to the VGN. 
Previously, once an individual volunteered if he had no known record of criminality within 
the community, membership was almost automatic. The application form and other rigours of 
the application process were introduced by the VGN leadership as another means of 
demonstrating the officious nature of the VGN as an organisation. In this regards, there are 
                                                            
671 Joseph Zhiman, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Jos, 12.01.2015. 
672 For copies of the VGN membership application form, please see Appendix. 
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specific criteria’s of eligibility. According to the article (5) of the VGN Constitution, 
membership shall be open to all Nigerians who: 
a. Are not less than 18 years of age; 
b. Are of unquestionable character; 
c. Are physically and mentally fit; 
d. Reside in the community where they work; 
e. Have not been convicted of any criminal offence; and 
f. Have pledged to abide by the rules and regulations of the organisation and the laws of 
Nigeria.673 
Additionally, there is an existing principle in the VGN that potential members should be 
gainfully employed, the understanding being that the VGN is seen as a voluntary organisation. 
Procurement of the application form is an integral part of the process of 
employment/recruitment to join the military, police or para-military service in Nigeria. In 
adopting this procedure, the VGN demonstrates the legitimacy they have as a part of the 
policing system. The VGN membership application form is in four parts. Page 1 is the main 
form with the applicants personal details, and photograph, there are copies of the form with 
Hausa translation for those who are non-literate in English. The information required on the 
form includes, amongst other things the applicants personal details: name, birth date, local 
government of origin, district, and full address. Also required for an application to be 
considered are three guarantors that can vouch for the good character of the applicant. It is 
required that two of the guarantors should be the village and ward heads of the applicant. The 
second form requires other data on the applicant like height, colour of eyes, colour of hair, 
and fingerprints. It reads like a reproduction of an official secret service recruitment form, 
what the VGN what but excessively over doing the logic. The third form in the application 
format is titled ‘members nominal roll’ again earlier questions of name, address, sex, age, 
height but additional required information, included marital status, blood group, and 
genotype. The fourth and last form is a declaration, more or less an oath of office. This is the 
final step to membership; following the declaration, the applicant signs the form to become a 
VGN member. Before the declaration is signed and membership of the VGN is confirmed 
there, are stages between procuring the form and become a member. 
                                                            
673 Constitution of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria, National Headquarters, Tudun‐Wada, Kaduna (Revised 
Edition), p.2. 
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In an interview with Monday Gokum the VGN commander, Pankshin LGA I tried to establish 
how the VGN recruiters ensure that they do not recruit individuals who have a history of 
misdemeanour into the group. According to Gokum: 
We have over the years refined and made our recruitment process 
better than it was before. Here in Pankshin, we do not just recruit like 
that. Before we recruit, we must go to the district heads. They can 
provide the best reference point on members of their community. 
They know the people who are best suited for our work, and they 
know those who have committed crimes in the community. The ward 
and district heads know they will also be held responsible if it emerges 
that one of those they vetted has a criminal record, so they support the 
process with high levels of seriousness.674 
 
On his part Ibrahim Choji Dusu, the Mai-Angwan (Ward Head) of Chwelyap – one of the 
formerly mixed quarters of Jos, describes the recruitment process for VGN members in his 
area.  
Formerly, I have to say that the practice of vigilante groups was not 
organised, it was just any young person that volunteered was accepted. 
For us as a community things changed after the 2001 crisis, which had 
a serious impact on my community. As you would know, the incident 
that ignited the violence occurred in my neighbourhood. We had to 
screen individuals, it was not enough to volunteer, and we had to 
check their backgrounds. There was another round of screening by a 
committee led by the DPO (head of police) of Nassarawa Division. 
After this, those selected are given uniforms and identity cards of the 
group. In the evening before they proceed on patrol they must first 
report to the police station, on occasions, they go on patrol with the 
police, but normally they go on their own.675 
 
Muhammed Lawal Isiaku,676 a VGN member, Shendam LGA recounts his recruitment to me 
in the following dialogue:  
 
JL: How were you selected? How did you join the VGN? 
 
MLI: Forms were given to ward heads to select the most suitable individuals who they believe 
can do the job. It is our area head that selected us; he referred us to the district head. We 
submitted our forms with passport size photographs. A date was fixed and we attended 
interview at the Police station.  
                                                            
674 Monday Gokum, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Pankshin, 10.12.2012. 
675 Ibrahim Choji Dusu, interview by Jimam Lar, Jos, 18.10.2012. 
676 Mohammed Lawal Isiaku, interview by Jimam Lar, Shendam, 10.11.2012. 
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JL: You were all interviewed. 
 
MLI: Yes in the presence of the DPO (Divisional Police Officer). They wanted to make sure 
that there was no criminal or ex-convict amongst us. After the interview we went to the SSS 
office, there we were issued with a form of introduction we filled the form, attached passport 
size photographs again and submitted it. The last stage was a meeting at the local government 
inter-faith office. They gave us talks on inter-religious coexistence, and the benefits of 
working together with each other.  
 
The police led committee mentioned in the interviews is a critical stage in the process of 
recruitment. Police involvement speaks to the logic of plurality deployed throughout this 
thesis; it also demonstrates another strand of authority. What comes across is an 
understanding by the VGN that as it seeks to cultivate varied means and processes by which 
the group seeks to further deepen its institutionalisation and recognition as part of the policing 
system, then subordination and acceptance of police hierarchy and practices is a constitutive 
part of this process. I sat in such a screening meeting during my fieldwork in late 2012. This 
was to screen potential new members to be recruited to join the VGN in Dadur, Langtang 
North LGA. This particular committee constituted of a representative of the Divisional Police 
Officer in charge of the area, representatives of the community (a traditional ruler and youth 
leader), and the local VGN Commander. To get things started the VGN Commander 
welcomed all present and addressed the applicants who had been nominated from different 
villages and wards of the district, encouraging the applicants to be truthful and forthright in all 
their engagements with the committee, and wished them luck. The traditional ruler and youth 
leader also took turns to address the potential VGN members. Interview questions largely 
focused on the applicant’s motivation to join, the VGN commander and the representative of 
the police severally created possible crime scenarios and inquired how the applicant would 
deal with such. It was a fascinating experience to witness these interviews, the officiousness, 
and the wholehearted commitment of the interviewers and the interviewees again clearly 
lends to the argument of multiple authorities regulating the local component of a plural 
policing system. Police interaction with the VGN goes further and beyond recruitment 
processes. It also manifest in policing practices, the next section of the chapter examines some 
of the methods and manners where these interactions manifest. 
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7.4.	Representing	the	Community,	Acting	for	the	State:	Police,	Vigilante	
Interaction	
 
Different forms of interaction define police and VGN interrelations. My approach throughout 
this thesis while studying ‘non-state policing actors’ has been not to neglect state actors. Of 
particular importance for understanding policing within the spatial and historical context 
studied has been understanding the interface between what we designate as ‘state’ and ‘non-
state’ policing actors. One of my key contentions is therefore not to designate the two as de 
jure and de facto but rather to show the different forms of engagement and interaction. As 
Bellagamba and Klute677 remind us that the state has not rolled back, but is rather engaged in 
negotiated interactions for supremacy and authority with other actors. In other words the state 
and non-state should not be seen as opposing poles, rather what I show in this section is that 
they constitute two poles of a continuum of practice. In regards to linking the forgone analysis 
to the micro level plurality, my main point is a departure from arguments where vigilante 
groups are shown to reject the politico-legal authority of the state.678 For instance 
Harnischfeger has argued that Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 1999 rather than “unite the 
people had actually set ethnic and religious groups against each other.”679 Furthermore, what 
was in contention as seen from the lens of these groups and organisations was “the right of 
ethnic or religious communities to control their territory and resources, to live according to 
their own ideas of law and justice, and to be free from the ‘internal colonialism’ of other 
ethnic groups.”680 Harnischfeger proceeds to conclude, “with the transition to democracy, 
under which citizens could express their loyalties more openly, it became obvious that central 
control was widely resented. As many Nigerians no longer aspire to live under common laws, 
the project of nation-building has come to an end.”681 This statement is as extreme, as it is 
inaccurate, transitional periods are often times of uncertainty and could be explosive and 
present fervent expressions coalesced around social groupings. Our task is however to 
interpret this with caution rather than making sweeping statements that have no grounding in 
the historical nuances of the phenomena we study and the context of which they exist. Again, 
this demonstrates quite clearly the folly of capturing a temporal manifestation and using same 
                                                            
677Alice  Bellagamba and Georg  Klute “Tracing Emergent Powers in Africa‐Introduction” in Beside the State: 
Emergent Powers in Contemporary Africa, Alice Bellagamba and Georg Klute,  eds., (Cologne: Rudiger Koppe, 
2008), 7‐21.  
678 Harnischfeger, “Ethnicity, Religion and the Failure”, 51‐78. 
679 Ibid., 51. 
680 Ibid. 
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to conclusively declare the end of the project of nation building. Some transitions take long to 
take shape; this is where the historical study yields invaluable insights.  
	7.4.1.	NPF	and	VGN	Cooperation	
There are broadly two categories of vigilante cooperation with the police: those who are 
embedded in the police stations subordinate to the police and those who work independently 
but in close cooperation with the police. In current practice, we observed the adoption and use 
of two legal codes: a statutory code based on vigilante groups understanding of state policing; 
and vigilante codes drawn from historical practices. 
Interestingly, as I have referred previously, the NPF as it has been argued also engage in what 
Owen and Cooper-Knock682 have referred to as ‘vigilante policing’. This is a departure from 
definitions that regard vigilantes solely as ‘non-state actors’.683 Vigilante policing as 
understood by Owen and Cooper-Knock suggests that the Police can behave in ways that 
mimic non-state actors who are termed as ‘vigilantes’. This again, is informed by the 
argument that police violence is a misnomer; as such, it is described as vigilante violence – 
when police as group or individuals act like vigilantes. As I have shown across this thesis, but 
particularly in chapter seven such violence should be seen as constitutive of policing practice. 
This violence exists to keep the normal run of affairs. This is not a debate of the rights and 
wrongs of such violence; the objective is to understand it for what it is, and further to explain 
how it functions. Herein lies the complexity, the police perpetrate violence as part of policing 
practice but they are also the authority that regulates it. In other words, the police endeavour 
to ensure that violence is controlled and as much as possible remains within the domain of 
policing.  
                                                                                                                                                                                         
681 Ibid. 
682 Owen, and Cooper‐Knock, “Between vigilantism and bureaucracy” Theoretical Criminology, 11‐12.  
683 Johnston, “What is Vigilantism?” British Journal of Criminology, 220‐223. 
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Figure 18: ASP. Dung, (in blue ad black) NPF Patrol and Guard Officer (P&G) Langtang 
North, next to ASP. Dung is Mr Nuhu Vongbut, VGN Commander, Langtang North LGA.684 
10.01.2015. 
In an interview with the Patrol and Guard Officer (P&G) in charge of Langtang North, there is 
a tacit acceptance that violence has a place in everyday policing practice. The P&G’s daily 
chore is posting police officers on patrol beats and guarding post across the town. He also 
goes round inspecting and supervising, and attends to emergencies that may arise. The 
important point relevant here is his admittance of violence, which he describes as the 
“occasional necessity of ill treatment to bring out the truth”, in his own words: 
We made the VGN to understand how our work and theirs is very 
similar, and for them to appreciate the importance of professionalism. 
They have been working very well, in fact, we are indeed satisfied, the 
local government officials and the ward heads are also satisfied with 
the support and work of the VGN. The VGN have also learned how to 
deal with difficult situations, while we do not support torture and 
excessive violence – we understand when they have to use occasional 
                                                            
684 The event is the weekly ‘lecture’, every Saturday morning VGN unit leaders converge in Langtang, the local 
government headquarters to give updates on their activities and to receive any important information. 
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ill treatment to bring out the truth. This can be tolerated because it 
helps to catch criminals and prevents criminality. We are always 
giving the VGN men lectures and closely supervising them.685 
 
The police as I understood their logic have minimal problems as long as vigilante groups 
operate within the auspices of the NPF – or what the police hierarchy happily refer to as an 
aspect of community policing. What the police actually despise is when they (the police) do 
not have ‘authority’ over VGN practice. In sum, it is not the perpetrating of violence or 
illegality that the police find problematic. What is frown upon, to levels of condemnation is 
when such is carried out independent of the police. On joint patrols which i was part of 
consisting of the police and members of the VGN in Langtang North, and Shendam LGAs the 
police witness VGN members engaging in acts of policing violence and no observation or 
complain is raised. The same police officers requested the VGN local government chairman 
of Langtang North to reprimand two of his men for beating a motor cycle operator who they 
accused of not paying market tolls in December 2012. Also in Langtang North LGA, the 
police Inspector in charge of the Reak out-post suspended a VGN member for inflicting 
severe wounds on a man suspected of breaking into a local provision store. The Inspector 
used the VGN member’s monthly allowance to pay for the suspect’s medical bills. The police 
it seems are particularly concerned when vigilante excesses are followed by public outcry, so 
the police acts to not only demonstrate to the VGN who is in charge but more importantly to 
maintain, and in some cases regain social legitimacy.  
 
Another dynamic I observed was the different ways in which senior police officers, like 
Commissioners of Police at state headquarters and their subordinates at the local government 
level understood the role and place of the VGN in the policing system. Senior police officers 
preferred to incorporate all citizen policing groups and formations within the ambit of 
community policing. The Divisional Police Officers (chief police officers) in charge of these 
local government areas are aware of the existence of these vigilante groups, and were more 
pragmatic. The extent to which the police are aware of the activities and operations of these 
groups varies across the state. In some local government areas, there is close monitoring and 
supervision; in others, the situation is much more relaxed. In discussions with community 
leaders from selected communities,686 it was clear that some communities had adopted 
collective strategies to manage and prevent conflicts from breaking out into violent clashes. 
                                                            
685 Daniel Dung (ASP), interviewed by Jimam Lar, Langtang, 10.01.2015. 
686 District Head of Angwan Rukuba/Farin Gada – Jos, and  John Bot, District Head of Rikkos. 
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They identified constant communication and meetings between community leaders, 
establishment of neighbourhood watch committees with youths from the different groups that 
make up the community working together with the VGN.687 The neighbourhood watch 
committees also serves as a quasi-early warning committee, focused on identifying likely 
threats to community peace, the committees serve as a bridge between the two main groups. 
The community leaders identified rumour control and management as a major achievement of 
the neighbourhood watch committee; by its activities they argue the committee has on several 
occasions curbed the outbreak of violence by identifying, investigating and if necessary 
correcting and reversing damaging rumours. 
They however continued some of the practices and punishments from their predecessors of 
the 1970s. The dance of shame was continued in some cases as a precursor, before suspects 
were handed over to the police.688 The practice of tying armed robbery689 suspects to trees 
particularly when they were caught or arrested at night was widely practiced. Corporal 
punishment was equally continued. Again as with the vigilantes of the 1970s, within a given 
territory there were two key jurisdictions at play: a plurality of practice and punishment 
characterized by vigilantes working in cooperation with state institutions and observing 
statutory practices on the one hand, then on the other hand still drawing from their own codes 
of punishment.  
In contemporary practice, there are more cases of joint operational patrol with the police in 
urban and semi urban areas. Some accounts from the field capture the flavour and critical 
importance of patrol to vigilante practice; the accounts equally link this to the interaction of 
the vigilante groups with the police. In a group interview with vigilantes in Pil-Gani town, 
Langtang North LGA the breakdown of their contribution to policing in the town had been 
negotiated with the police and collectively they agreed upon a mode of operation. The 
chairman recounts the mode of operation as follows: 
When we make an arrest of a suspect, our mandate is not to spend 
more than 24hours investigating and interrogating a suspect, we need 
to hand over to the police. We also help the police to re-arrest suspects 
that escape from the police, sometimes during arrest other times from 
the police station. We also help the police to arrest suspects who 
                                                            
687Ibid, 
688 The dance of shame refers to a practice of punishment that entailed parading the individual found guilty of 
an offence around the village or the market square in more larger towns, the objective being to humiliate but 
also to deter. 
689 In this robbery with machetes and small axes, not guns 
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refuse to honour court summons. Finally, we also have a mandate to 
be ready and prepared to serve as prosecution witnesses.690  
 
What is recounted in this quotation speaks to the VGN’s role in precursory policing practice. 
This refers to what happens to cases handled by the VGN before they reach the police station. 
Nansoh Danladi a Corporal with the Langtang North Divisional Command corroborates this. 
He notes that, “the VGN is very useful for us in doing our work. They conduct investigations; 
they also track down suspects and arrest them. Some of the police outposts in the local 
government area are manned by VGN members; they serve as the first policing point of 
contact to the people.”691 Another example that buttresses the point of VGN 
institutionalisation is how selected VGN chairman at the LG level were invited to join the 
local government security committee. The VGN training officer Plateau State, Joseph Ziman 
and the local government commander, Langtang North Chenvong Vongbut, are concrete 
examples of this practice. The VGN actively participate in policing duties such as arrest, 
detention and interrogation of suspected criminals. In most cases, they hand over the suspects 
to the police. Here the VGN members are not necessarily interested in what is captured in the 
respective laws and codes that guide policing; of importance is what they regard as practice. 
Policing practice as carried out by the NPF. Here the police are again the authority that is 
regulating practice, plurality is therefore operating within a dynamic that has structure and is 
organised.  
The question then emerges, on how we should make sense of these complex dynamics 
described in this section. I will suggest we take Bellagamba and Klute’s notion of 
heterarchy692 as an entry point; however, our departure would be not to situate heterarchy in 
opposition to hierarchy. What is vital in understanding the policing landscape I have studied is 
to see the two notions as interacting. In other words, when we approach this context with 
policing institutions as our unit of analysis, we discover a clear hierarchy – with the NPF 
having clear authority and supremacy over all other policing actors. However, if we focus our 
lens on the local and consider the role and every day practices of individuals, heterarchy 
becomes a viable notion for our analysis. An example of this heterarchical relationship is the 
status of the VGN chairman in Langtang North, Jos North and Shendam LGAs serving as 
members of the local government security committees alongside the Divisional Police Officer 
                                                            
690 Group Interview, VGN Pil‐Gani Langtang North LGA, 23.10.2012. 
691 Nansoh Danladi, interview by Jimam Lar, 22.10.2012. 
692 For more on the concept of heterarchy see Bellagamba and Klute, “Tracing Emergent Powers”, 7‐21, also 
see Georg Klute, “African Political Actors in ‘Ungoverned Spaces’: Towards a Theory of Heterarchy” in Actors in 
Contemporary African Politics, Georg Klute and Peter Skalnik eds., (Zurich and Munster: Lit Verlag) 1‐24. 
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(DPO), (the head of police detachments at the local government level). In such capacity, there 
is a symbolic feeling of equality, inspite of the reality that the DPO is a clear superior, in fact 
in practice the boss of the VGN chairman. 
7.5.	Vigilantism	and	Situational	Epic	Violence	
Since 2001, sectarian violence has played an important role in emboldening and providing 
social legitimacy for vigilante group members. From my observation during research across 
Plateau State, and insights from literature on the violence, this point had already been 
established. However, it was further made clear to me in a short dialogue I had with a VGN 
member in Bukuru, Jos South LGA of Plateau State. Having finished a group interview with 
the VGN members from the Hausa community in Bukuru on the outskirts of Jos, as we were 
leaving it was time for prayers we walked up towards the Mosque; several other people 
making their way to the Mosque were stopping to pay compliments to the vigilante members 
with us. I quipped to one of them that it is quite clear they are quite important and relevant in 
the community; he smiled and simply said in poetic Hausa:  
“Aia a da suna mana dariya, suna mana ganin asara, yanzu idan sun 
gan mu sa su sara – ikon, Allah - ai ka san duniya juyi juyi ne”  
 
“In the past they laughed at us, they saw us as failures, now when they 
see us they salute us (greet us) – You know the world turns in circles, 
or in life we take turns.” 
 
In a sense, what this quotation accentuates is a process of redemption for individuals who 
were hitherto at the very bottom of the societal ladder. We understand how the vagrant 
members of the community emerge as its security providers. Before the outbreak of violence 
in 2001, some of the young men who were to later join the VGN were engaged in casual low-
scaled part-time jobs. There are examples like Tsenyen and his colleagues, porters in the 
Shendam Saturday market. Part-time commercial motorcycles operators in Langtang, and 
seasonal sugar cane sellers in Pil-Gani Langtang North. These individuals were members of 
local community vigilante groups, and when the VGN was established, they were to become 
the core of its membership. Consequently, this meant that a bulk of the VGN ‘rank and file’ 
are young men who were considered to have not been successful in their attempts at acquiring 
education, and equally failed when they turned to learning other trades like carpentry, or 
apprentices with car mechanics repairers.  
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When the violence broke out along sectarian lines in 2001, vigilante group members adapted 
to the new insecurity and were important local actors in the crisis. Polarized along religious 
and ethnic lines, their significance metamorphosed from vigilance against crime within the 
community to constituting the most serious threats posed by armed militias.693 As Higazi has 
argued, the intersection of vigilantes and militias was situational; where there was less 
violence vigilantes were more prominent, but elsewhere their functions merged.694 Vigilante 
groups hitherto responsible for providing security within their immediate communities 
emerged and were mobilized as ‘ethnic’ and ‘religious’ militias. The situation of violent 
conflict, which is considered here best, captures the condition, which Judith Butler has 
referred to as precarity.695 Heightened conditions of insecurity, uncertainty, and hopelessness, 
a situation that more than anything else demonstrates how the state may be unable or 
unwilling to protect its citizens.  
This condition - temporal situation also creates the opportunity for vigilante groups, 
particularly individuals seeking for redemption. This role of ‘defending the community’ in 
time of violence thus bestowed a particular kind of legitimacy on vigilante members, that 
legitimacy which comes from the ability to protect the community during times of violence 
being perhaps the most important696 – this is situated within cultural and historical notions of 
masculinity. It is important to however to make the point that vigilante groups were not 
themselves homogenous and young men from different religious and ethnic backgrounds 
constituted them. Therefore, during periods of violence where mobilisation was around ethnic 
and religious identity, the yanbanga were themselves polarised along ethnic and religious 
lines during the crisis in areas affected by violence. These divides have remained in some 
areas; there is however, towns I visited during my fieldwork where vigilante practice has 
emerged as one of the forums that are actually bringing feuding communities together again. 
A prime example is Yelwa, formerly a major commercial centre of the Plateau lowlands; 
Yelwa was devastated following several episodes of violence from 2003-2004, in fact it was 
the unfortunate massacre of Muslim residents of Yelwa in May 2004 that necessitated the 
Nigerian government to declare a state of emergency in Plateau State. 
                                                            
693 Higazi, “Social Mobilisation and Collective Violence” Africa, 108‐135. 
694 Ibid. 
695 Judith Butler, Performativity, Precarity and Sexual Politics, Revista de Anthropology Iberoamericana, 4, no.3, 
(2009), www.aibr.org/antropologia/04v03/criticos/040301b.pdf  
696 Hüsken, Thomas / Klute, Georg (2008), “Emerging Forms of Power in Contemporary Africa ‐ a Theoretical 
and Empirical Research Outline”, Diskussionspapiere 101, Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag. 
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As I have previously argued, the role of ‘defending the community’ during and after episodes 
of sectarian violence thus bestowed a particular kind of legitimacy on vigilante members. 
Legitimacy, which comes from the ability to protect the community during, times of violence 
being perhaps the most important697 – this is situated within cultural and historical notions of 
masculinity. It is important to however make the point that vigilante groups prior to the 
several episodes of violence were not themselves homogenous; they were constituted by 
young men from different religious and ethnic backgrounds. Therefore, during periods of 
violence where mobilisation was around ethnic and religious identity, the vigilantes were 
themselves polarised along ethnic and religious lines during the crisis in areas affected by 
violence. This was to become a more permanent feature of vigilante groups in Jos metropolis 
and its immediate surroundings.  
To understand this more deeply, we have to consider the manner in which the violence in Jos 
has reshaped the settlement pattern in the city, enforced and at times voluntary displacement 
has significantly altered the settlement patterns of the city. Following the several episodes of 
violence, hitherto mixed quarters of the city have become segregated along mainly religious 
lines. This is however not to suggest that all neighbourhoods of Jos have always been mixed, 
it should be emphasised that residential differentiation along religious and ethnic lines in 
some instances has always been a feature of some parts of the city, the violence has however 
made the situation widespread. Neighbourhoods like Angwa Rogo-Angwan Rimi, have since 
2001 lost their Christian residents most of whom were employees of the University of Jos, 
which is located in close proximity to the neighbourhoods. Equally, Muslims have been 
forced to vacate neighbourhoods like Eto Baba, and Jenta. The reality of ‘no go areas’ has 
drastically altered patterns of residency, transportation, and business.698 Accordingly, as 
vigilante groups first point of organisation is the immediate community, and equally owing to 
the fact that mobilisation for violence is along religious and ethnic lines the residential 
realignment of the city has influenced the composition of the vigilante groups in particular 
neighbourhoods.  
                                                            
697 Thomas Hüsken and Georg Klute, “Emerging Forms of Power  in Contemporary Africa  ‐ a Theoretical and 
Empirical Research Outline”, Diskussionspapiere 101, (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 2008). 
698 For more sustained analysis on this see Jana Krause, A Deadly Cycle: Ethno‐Religious Conflict in Jos, Plateau 
State, Nigeria, (Working Paper: Geneva Declaration Secretariat, Geneva, 2011), 44‐46, also see Shedrack Best 
and Carole Rakodi, Violent Conflict and  its Aftermath  in  Jos and Kano, Nigeria: What  is  the Role of Religion? 
(Working Paper 69, Religions and Development Research Programme, University of Birmingham, 2011) 
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In an interview with the Ward Head of Chenlyap699 Ibrahim Choji Dusu, this point is further 
explained as follows. 
The major difference in the work of our vigilante groups before the 
2001 crisis and after is the lack of trust. The police tried their best to 
bring us together but there was anxiety on both sides. We could not 
organise joint patrols, Christians did not want to cross over to the 
Muslim side and Muslims do not want to cross over to the Christian 
side. We have a boundary, so our vigilante patrol up to our boundary, 
we cannot operate the way we used to. For example, there are times 
our vigilante will be pursuing a thief once he crosses over to the 
Muslim side, at Bumbula, they cannot follow…We thank God now we 
have security personnel on ground, and usually they patrol on the 
boundary between us.700 
The district head of Kabong701 Da702 Sallah Mandyeng Sha on the other hand narrates how 
vigilante policing seized in his area following the outbreak of violence in 2008. The local 
authorities had blamed the vigilante groups for exacerbating violence in the guise of 
defending their neighbourhoods. However, recently amidst rising cases of robbery in the area, 
the local community development association (Kabong Development Association) has 
remobilized to reintroduce the vigilante groups in the area. The district head recounts the 
process as follows: 
As you can see, because of the crisis the Jos Main Market was 
relocated to my area of jurisdiction, on Rukuba road. In the last five 
years there have been many businesses opening up in my district, 
vegetable market, grains market, provision stores, car spare part 
dealers and several others. This also means we have had more cases of 
robbery and theft, all these boys who have no work come in the night 
and break into people’s stores. When it got very serious the KDA 
(development association) Chairman came to me and requested that 
we re-establish the vigilantes to help the police, so I talked with the 
local authorities, and with the police at A Division, my area is under A 
Division and we succeeded in recruiting 47 boys across the district, 
but mostly from Rukuba road and Jenta Adamu…This is strictly 
Christians boys, they were screened and trained by the police, we 
cannot recruit Muslim boys because they have all left, they have 
resettled because of the violence.703 
                                                            
699 Chelnyap Ward comprises of  the urban neighbourhoods of Tudun Peri, Anguwan Bulubula, Dogon Dutse, 
and Tudun Peri. 
700 Ibrahim Choji Dusu, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Chelnyap, Jos, 18.10.2012. 
701 Kabong district comprises of four (4) wards, namely: Rukaba road, Alheri, Jenta Adamu, and Angwan Suya. 
702 This is the Berom title for addressing older men (community elders). 
703 Sallah Mandyeng Sha, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Kabong, Jos, 24.10.2012. 
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In a group interview with the Vigilante Group of Nigeria members of Yelwa in November 
2012, I could see a semblance of cooperation amongst the Christian and Muslim residents of 
the town, the local leader of the vigilante group Alhaji Dahiru Garba a retired police officer 
pointed out that:  
 …after the crisis here, still there was lack of trust amongst the 
Christians and Muslims, so you see the stakeholders in the community 
suggested that there should be a joint vigilante group, as it was before 
the crisis. Every Sunday evening we meet here (at the vigilante local 
office where we were having the interview) for brief lectures, about 
two hundred of our members. we know the law and we usually do 
parade just as the police do, so religious leaders and the peace 
committee saw how we were successful in our work they immediately 
identify with what we are doing saying they will support us, and we 
are currently living and working together with no problem. 704  
In interviews we had with district heads and community leaders, their idea of conflict 
management and resolution was largely centred on self-defence mechanisms.705 While they 
note that, they have been invited to several meetings and participated in several forums 
organised by government and NGOs alike, at the community level emphasis is on 
“defending” and protecting the community in times of outbreaks of violence. The 
phenomenon of self-defence or protecting communities to an extent explains the growing 
sophistication of weapons employed in the several episodes of violence since 2001. Today 
Plateau State is flushed with many light weapons, which are acquired through smuggling 
networks by religious, ethnic and community development organisations. The neighbourhood 
watch associations previously established across the Nigerian urban landscape as a response 
to crime, particularly theft and armed robbery have been restructured and reorganised in parts 
of the state as some kind of quasi “defence forces.” Its membership is varied but largely it is 
made up of mainly youths, loosely coordinated by community leaders and prominent residents 
of the communities. Most of these groups are armed, this key transformation in self-defence 
and community response largely occurred over a period of years, definitely after the 2008 
local election violence it became more widespread.  
                                                            
704 Group Interview, Vigilante Group of Nigeria, Yelwa Town Branch held at Local office, Yelwa 15.11.2012. 
705All community leaders we talked too referred to “community security mechanism” 
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7.5.1. Violence, Vigilantism and Ethnic Politics 
Following several circles of collective violence across Plateau State, the fractious interaction 
of violence and ethnic politics has also affected vigilantism. The key dynamic here refers to 
the relationship between the vigilante state leadership and the Plateau State government, 
specifically the administration of Jonah Jang (2007-2015). During the administration of 
Joshua Dariye (1999-2007), who preceded Jonah Jang, the VGN had made several approaches 
to get the support of the government. Despite all their efforts, this was not forthcoming. The 
government did not offer any support to the VGN, and neither was the VGN antagonised. 
However, following the election of Jonah Jang as governor in 2007 a new dynamic emerged. 
The group leadership is convinced that the Jang administration had not just declined to 
support their activities, but more damaging was the fact that key members of the 
administration had antagonised and undermined the VGN in Plateau State.706 The VGN 
leadership argue that the evidence for this is made apparent by the attempt to factionalise the 
group. A rival state Vigilante Group of Nigeria was established in December 2009, by Bitrus 
Yilkudi Goleng707 a retired Nigeria army captain. Goleng claims to be the rightful chairman 
and leader of the VGN in Plateau State. He claims the vigilante group, which he leads, was 
launched in 2009 as a non-governmental organisation. More so, he also claims to have 
inaugurated vigilante group leaders in all the local governments of the state.708 The Alhaji 
Yau Rikkos led leadership has however taken Captain Goleng to court. In a suit filed at the 
Jos High Court, in January 2010, they challenge his claim of being the leader of the VGN. 
They argue amongst other things that the vigilante group of Nigeria though only registered in 
1999 had been in existence informally, operating both locally and national as a non-
governmental organisation. Furthermore, as I have noted earlier, the Alhaji Yau Rikkos 
leadership is convinced that the state government to destabilise their leadership sponsors 
Captain Goleng.709 
Their claim does have some merit, because Captain Goleng does have ties and connections to 
the Jang administration. From 2007 to 2011, he was a senior special assistant to the state 
governor. He has been appointed as member of administrative panels to investigate the role of 
particular individuals in episodes of violence in parts of the state. 
                                                            
706 Alhaji Garba Juji, interviewed by Ibrahim Yunus, 26.09.2012. 
707 Captain Bitrus Yilkudi Goleng, interviewed by Jimam Lar, 19.10.2012. 
708 Ibid 
709 Alhaji Garba Juji, interviewed by Ibrahim Yunus, 26.09.12; Chenvong Vongbut, interviewed by Jimam Lar, 
02.09.2012. 
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Figure 19: The signboard of the VGN office established by Captain Goleng, (12.10.2012) in 
contrast the office of the VGN led by Alhaji Yau, which is relatively lowly and 
unostentatious. 
 
He was also appointed to Chair a Task Force on revenue mobilisation in 2012, in this role he 
was reporting directly to the state Governor. In my interview with him, Captain Goleng does 
concede his ties to the government; he however denies that the government is involved in his 
tussle with the Alhaji Yau led leadership of the VGN.710  
To understand why the Jang administration or officials within the government would want to 
undermine the leadership of VGN, we have to perhaps consider the existing political context 
of Jos and the prevailing security dilemma. This amongst other things refers to the fractious 
relationship between Governor Jang and the Hausa community of Jos, the ‘Jasawa’. This has 
been documented and analysed in detail.711 Since he became governor in 2007 Jonah Jang has 
had an ongoing political feud with the Hausas in Jos. This revolves around the governor’s 
efforts to determine who emerges as Chairman of Jos North. Jos North local government area 
is the key metropolis local council in contestation between the Hausas who claim to have 
‘founded’ Jos, and the Berom, Anaguta, and Afizere, the ‘indigenes’, who claim to ‘own’ Jos. 
                                                            
710 Captain Bitrus Goleng, interviewed by Jimam Lar, 19.10.2012. 
711 Ostien, “Jonah Jang and the Jasawa”… 
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This has continued to generate insecurity and tension, between the Berom dominated Plateau 
State government of Jonah Jang and the Jasawa (Hausa) in Jos North.  
Governor Jang and his advisers never gave the VGN a chance to prove their loyalty, or 
otherwise. Presently across the states where the VGN operates, the organisation relies on state 
support and public goodwill. An organisation that solicits for patronage to support its 
objectives of assisting the police. The Plateau State government failed to look beyond the 
Jasawa (Hausa) led leadership of the Plateau State branch of the VGN. Significantly, they 
would have discovered that the leadership of the VGN in the state is multi-ethnic, and multi 
religious. Thereby, reflecting the heterogeneous landscape of the state- for instance the 
executive council roaster of the group’s executive reveals officials from across the state. I met 
and interviewed some of these executive members.712  
Emerging from this narrative of segregation, and identity politics three key points can be 
deduced. First, discourses of domination and oppression targeted at major ethnic or religious 
groupings by minorities while useful, is a single lens of interpreting the socio-political 
landscape. In other words when given the opportunity minority groups equally seek to 
dominate and marginalise other minority groups. Second, while the impact of succeeding 
episodes of violence has been a segregation of urban and rural spaces across Plateau State. An 
interrogation of different social groupings, specifically in our case for purposes of maintaining 
societal order reveals some exceptions. In its composition, the VGN is religiously and 
ethnically mixed. Unfortunately, the Plateau State government sought to engage with a single 
lens, the lens of ‘identity politics’. In any case, a closer look beyond the Hausa-Jasawa 
Muslim led leadership is a heterogeneous grouping that for all purposes is soliciting for 
patrons, irrespective of religious or ethnic affiliation. The task of making complete the 
institutionalisation process does not provide the VGN with options of who to choose, and who 
to reject. They rather deal with whoever faith has brought their way. In this context, whoever 
is the governor of the state, the commissioner of police or a state official the VGN is disposed 
to receiving support and recognition. They are willing to pursue all available ideas that would 
take them a step closer to consummating the institutionalisation process. The third and final 
point, the politically powerful and state agents in high office still hold onto discourses of 
exclusion, while it is people at the lower levels who seem more keen and active to seek means 
and strategies to better manage differences.  
                                                            
712 For instance, I interviewed the state Deputy Chairman Chenvong Vongbut a Tarok Christian from Langtang, 
and the state training commander Joseph Zhiman from Jos, and Moday Gokum, branch Chairman Pankshin 
LGA. 
 236 
 
7.5.2.	VGN	Policing	Practice:	Accounts	from	the	Field	
Between September and October, 2012 I went out on patrol with the VGN, Shendam branch 
for eight nights observing the practice of plural policing patrol in Shendam town. These 
patrols are a joint operation with the Shendam Divisional Police Command. In December 
2014 to January 2015, I spent four days observing vigilante policing at checkpoints mounted 
on the major road linking the Jos Plateau to the Plateau lowlands. The checkpoints observed 
were specifically mounted to counter a wave of armed robbery on this major road. My 
participation in these night patrols and checkpoints was important because it reveals first-hand 
the dynamics of operational interaction between the police and the VGN at the local level. 
Furthermore, it gives us insight into how the VGN actually does policing work, the insight 
gathered from observation informs our understanding of what motivates and drives 
individuals to join the VGN, beyond what is presented in interviews. The following accounts 
attempt to render this clear. 
	
Account	One:	The	Check	Point	‐Night	Road	Patrol	(Shendam)	
To patrol the town at night means not only policing the town’s residents: you are also policing 
night travellers who are either arriving in the town or passing through to a neighbouring or a 
distant destination. Usually from 11:30pm or 12:00 midnight road blocks are set up with logs 
of wood and wood planks with a line of nails dangerously sprouting out, a motorist who wills 
to defy and not stop will of course have his/her tyres punctured. From afar an approaching 
vehicle sees the bright light burning off a thread soaked in kerosene. At first commuters 
would assume that policemen man the checkpoints; only when one arrives at the roadblock 
does one realize that one is dealing not just with policemen but also with a local town 
vigilante. Sometimes the routine takes just a few minutes: asking about identification, where 
the travellers are coming from, and their destination. If the vigilantes are satisfied, they allow 
the vehicle to proceed; if they are not, they request the commuters to disembark and they 
commence a check. I have witnessed episodes where drivers arrived at our checkpoint with 
their palms fisted motioning to hand over money, but on some occasions they were berated 
and accused of trying to hide something. The area is still part of a larger conflict zone and has 
witnessed cyclical violence, so such drivers could be accused of trying to hide arms. On other 
occasions, the vigilantes take the money and allow the vehicle to pass. Usually in the 
morning, all the men assemble at the local chief’s house for some kind of a debriefing session, 
after which they are dismissed until the evening. The checkpoint is more than a security post, 
it is equally a place where men, young and old converge and engage in discussions over a 
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variety of issues. There is conversation about local politics and gossip, about wives and about 
girlfriends. Also of interest are discussions about football from the European leagues, usually 
people are able to watch the matches live for a small entrance fee. The live transmission is 
courtesy of cable sports networks like the South African company Super Sports. Discussions 
and debates on Real Madrid and Barcelona, Manchester United, Arsenal and Chelsea can get 
very frenzy and heated. I remember this particular night when the police sergeant in charge of 
patrol on the day had to remind the football enthusiast that it was actually late at night and 
they were on patrol not in a beer parlour. There are some nights when individuals take turns 
narrating and taking stock of the day’s events. The checkpoint therefore becomes a social 
foroum where friendship is cultivated and nourished. For these individuals it is a place where 
police and vigilantes meet, here as fellow members of the policing institution. The VGN 
members enjoy the camaraderie that accompanies their association with this police. It is 
another reminder of the active practice of the VGN members to be recognised by the 
community as policing against of the state.  
The group of individuals on duty usually take turn to wait at the checkpoint and to patrol 
around the neighbourhoods. On a given night, there are usually 8-10 personnel on duty around 
this quarter of the town. Four to five individuals remain by the checkpoint while others go on 
patrol in pairs, or in groups of three. For those operating the checkpoint, there are normally at 
least two armed police officers with two or three VGN members. Those on petrol usually 
have at least one-armed police officer, with two VGN members. There were however, 
instances where I accompanied two VGN members without a police officer with us. When on 
patrol, there is usually awareness not to make too much noise. The idea of patrol is to catch 
offenders, and not to alert them and allow them to escape. There are however some exceptions 
to this patrolling norm. After a couple of nights on patrol I observe some specific trends, to 
start with I was not allowed to choose which patrol team I would accompany. I was always 
with the local government deputy leader of the VGN. When I did suggest going out with a 
different group, the local government provost marshal (discipline officer) of the VGN joined 
me. This objective of this could be read in two different ways; one could conclude that they 
thought it expedient to have a minder following me around, to limit me to what they wanted 
me to see. Alternatively, we could also see it in positive light that such actions were taken for 
my own security. After all, shortly after my arrival in Shendam I was taken to meet the 
Divisional Police Officer (DPO) in charge of the local government police command to 
introduce myself and fix a date for an interview. The DPO told the VGN commander that I 
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was the responsibility of the VGN and he should take care of me. This could be understood 
literally.  
On my substantive points about the pattern of the patrol, I noticed how the VGN patrol targets 
neighbourhoods of prominent people in the community. The local government chairman, 
other local politicians, leading businessmen, residences and business premises. The political 
economic logic is very clear. The financial patronage that comes from prominent members of 
the community does encourage the VGN to give more attention and security to them. Two 
instances illustrate this point. The first relates to a particular night while on patrol we were 
passing the house of a member of the local government legislator. Interestingly, we did not 
just pass by, rather we dwelled around the house – the constant barking of dogs got the 
legislator out. Realising that it was the VGN he commended them for their services to the 
community and asked the leader of the team to meet him in the morning at the local 
government headquarters. On a different night, while on patrol we went round the house of a 
prominent businessman. He called out from the bedroom and the leader of the VGN informed 
him it was the VGN/Police patrol. Relieved the businessman also came out and presented a 
gift of some money and a bottle of gin. This also as I previously noted is the political 
economy of vigilantism. 
From the forgone example, it is fair to suggest that motivations for joining the vigilante are 
twofold. First, as already mentioned, being a vigilante brings prestige and authority. The idea 
of going on patrol, having the power to arrest and to punish is a huge motivation for the young 
men that get involved. The Chairman713 of the vigilante group in, Shendam Local government 
sums it up in the following conversation I had with him regards vigilante policing in rural 
parts of Shendam local government area:  
Lar:  Do you go for patrols with the police? 
Chairman: Yes, even with soldiers sometimes but not with civil defence. 
Lar:  Do you punish offenders? 
Chairman: First, this is mainly in the rural areas where our men are by and large the police 
officers - we beat the person – [only] a bit so he doesn’t get injured - and we later tie him and 
                                                            
713 Interview with The Maiangwa of Longla, and Chairman Vigilante Group of Nigeria Shendam, at his residence 
13.11.2012 
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take him round the community (dance of shame). After that, we take the person to the police. 
We give them details and sometimes act as witness in the court. 
The second motivation relates to a certain kind of political economy of being a vigilante. 
Simply put it creates a means of a livelihood. At first glance though this is not clear; when 
you first pose the question of what motivates individuals to volunteer, earning money and 
favours is not admitted as a motivation; rather altruistic factors are mentioned. However, 
when you spend several weeks on night patrol with the groups it becomes clear that 
vigilantism is not an altruistic pastime. The post 1999-vigilante groups in Plateau State and 
other parts of northern Nigeria demonstrate how vertical encompassment714 evolves fully. 
Vigilantism has increased in prestige, consequently social legitimacy and popular acceptance 
is high within the communities these groups operate in. The forgone description refers to a 
contemporary manifestation, and further evidence of the institutionalisation processes. When I 
first conducted field research in 2012, in interviews recorded with leaders and members of the 
VGN, most of them lamented the lack of support from the local government and a general 
lack of uniforms, boots, torchlights, and other policing paraphernalia. The always took the 
opportunity to emphasise the dire situation in which they were doing the job. When I returned 
in 2015, the change in the fortunes of the VGN was conspicuous. Lamentations had not 
necessarily seized, but they were now tempered with some level of contentment. New 
uniforms had been procured and distributed; the cooperation with the police had been 
deepened. Activities like the highway checkpoint described previously, provided the VGN 
with high levels of visibility, recognition and legitimacy. I soon realised that some VGN 
members who had been reluctant to talk to me previously, were suddenly more enthusiastic. 
They had an erroneously believed that I had a hand in their turn of fortune. To their 
disappointment I made it politely clear that while I had made effort my intervention was not 
responsible for the ongoing process of their institutionalisation, and perhaps it was more 
probable the security situation in the state would be a more convincing and plausible catalyst. 
Account	Two:	The	Checkpoint‐Daytime	Highway	Patrol	(Pankshin‐Dengi‐Langtang	Road)	
In December 2014 to January 2015, I returned to Plateau State on a short field trip. This was 
to fill in some emerging gaps in my thesis. I encountered a VGN that had in two years since 
my last research visit become more emboldened and more active in its policing practice. An 
illustration of this point is the highway checkpoints located on the Pankshin-Kabwir-Dengi-
                                                            
714 See conceptual framework, notion taken from Gratz, “Devi and his Men” 79‐97. 
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Langtang road. The critical importance of the checkpoints is to carry out security checks on 
travellers, in an attempt to curb the menace of robbery along the road. The background of the 
checkpoints is a consequence of the sectarian violence that swept the area a decade ago – the 
legacy of the violence is the proliferation of small arms. It is these arms that criminal elements 
have used to perpetrate crimes on the highway. The Kanke local government commander of 
the VGN, Nicodemus Ngozi Chukwu, a motorcycle mechanic who arrived in the area in the 
early 1980s outlines the objectives behind setting up the checkpoints: 
…the major challenge we had was a sudden rise in arm robbery 
on this road. In the past, these were occasional cases at night, 
those responsible were outsiders. Unfortunately as a result of the 
crisis and violence there are so much arms circulating and when 
you have a lot of young men with no livelihood, no jobs this is 
what happens. The robbery cases were particularly alarming 
because it was occurring in the daytime. We had consultations 
with the police and it was agreed that we mount the checkpoints. 
It was our initiative and the divisional police officer in charge of 
the local government area said we should go ahead.715 
The VGN take turns in working at the checkpoints. The commander prepares a weekly roaster 
of three duty schedules, morning; afternoon; and evening. There are three checkpoints on the 
road, manned by the Kanke local government VGN. The first checkpoint is between Kabwir 
one of the main towns in the area and Kwall, the local government headquarters. The second 
checkpoint is between Kwall and Amper. The third checkpoint is located on the Amper-Dengi 
road, in close proximity to the local government boundary between Kanke and Kanam local 
government areas. During a duty schedule, I observed that there are normally 6-7 men 
operating the checkpoints. This number is not constant as sometimes some VGN members 
take excuse to attend to pressing family matters. The checkpoints are made with large stones 
situated on the road to create a single zigzagged lane. This means the way of passage is 
alternated between the opposing directions. On busy market days like Monday, Thursday, and 
Saturday – Pankshin, Dawaki, and Amper markets respectively, there is more traffic on the 
highway. Motorist would therefore spend more time at the checkpoints. 
                                                            
715 Nicodemus Ngozi Chukwu, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Kabwir, Kanke Local Government Area, 09.01.2015. 
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Figure 20: Plateau State map showing Local Governments where research was conducted and 
road network. 
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The procedure I witnessed is essentially routinised. A car arrives, after an exchange of 
pleasantries the VGN ask the driver of his point of origin and destination. After which they 
inquire what the driver is carrying in the boot of the car. Often if the car is on commercial 
business, the boot would contain the personal effects and luggage of the passengers. The next 
decision is the critical one for the vigilante members on duty, and more so for the driver and 
passengers. Whereas the forgone exchanges may last for a few seconds at most a minute or 
two, if the vigilante members decide that the car should be checked then the driver and 
passengers could be held up for a period of thirty minutes to an hour, while the vigilante 
members conduct their check. Bags are opened and the car seats are searched. This therefore 
means that in an attempt to avoid the check, and the delay that comes with it, some drivers 
decide to pay-off the vigilantes and hope to get expedient passage. I have witnessed a varied 
reaction to this – while on very rare occasions the VGN members would frown and still 
demand to search the cars, often it serves, as a means of easy passage and the search is not 
conducted. The challenge here is that VGN members are sent out to patrol without much 
incentive. Therefore, it is not unexpected that the checkpoint is not a point of checking the 
proliferation of arms; rather it becomes a means of generating funds. The arm robbery may 
have been curtailed as the VGN commander proudly reports during my conversation with 
him. However, another practice is inadvertently recreated. 
 
Figure 21: The Checkpoint-Daytime Highway Patrol (Pankshin-Dengi-Langtang Road) 
9.01.2015 
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The VGN members turn out in a mixture of attires, some are kitted in the complete VGN 
uniform, others are garbed in a combination of VGN, police, military, and the National Youth 
Service Corps (NYSC) uniforms. As one of the vigilantes responded when I inquired why 
they wear such a mix “…to look official he answered.”716 Again, the importance of the 
uniform as a symbol of authority and legitimation is made clear. Another feature of the 
checkpoints is the tool used for the job. The VGN members also carry an assortment of 
weapons; some have den guns (popular amongst hunters), machetes, sticks etc.  
7.6.	Vigilante	Profiles	
1.	Dakachi	(Ward	Head)	Alias	‘Hot’	
The VGN Chairman of Shendam is also the Ward Head of Shendam town. The Dakachin 
Shendam, alias Hot – a name he acquired in his youth as one of the ‘tough boys’ in the 
community. Now 42, Hot a man of average height about 5.8, is a respectable local community 
leader and Chairman of the VGN in the Local Government, when you arrive at his house in 
the morning, there are people gathered waiting to have audience with the Dakachi. Some with 
cases to settle, others are vigilantes converging to report on the previous night’s patrol. Hot 
sits in his Zaure Asked for an introduction or a mini bio Hot is keen to make the point that his 
has not been an easy road, noting how it was tough but he is quite pleased to be where he is 
today: 
I was born here in Shendam, and when I was old enough I went to 
school, I finished primary school and was enrolled in secondary 
school. Unfortunately I did not finish, I left school in SS1 (senior 
secondary 1, formerly form 4). So you see I cheated myself…but by 
God’s grace I started farming, then my contemporaries made me 
youth chairman of this area, I was youth chairman for 15 years. Then I 
joined the vigilante work, under our former chairman Delong, I also 
worked under other chairmen. You see, in this work we start and stop, 
and start again. Then when it was re-established in 2004, I was one of 
the leaders and I was made chairman in 2010, and the Local 
Government began giving us allowance. My Dad was the Dakachi, so 
when he died my family said I should contest the position, and I was 
favourable considered by His Royal Highness and his council. 
                                                            
716 Group Interview, VGN Kanke, by Jimam Lar, at Checkpoint, Pankshin ‐Kanke‐Langtang Road, 10.01.2015. 
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Therefore, I use all my experience as youth chairman, and vigilante 
chairman to do my work as Dakachi, and for me the two roles do not 
clash, because I think they complement one another.717…We work 
with the police, and collaborate with them in different ways. However, 
we are not working for the police we are working for the people, so 
we are like the police but our work is not the same with them…I hope 
you get my point? We are official, we are registered, but we are not 
like community-policing committees, would need more recognition to 
do our work better. 
Dakachi Hot’s profile as shown in his own narration is an example of plurality. Embodied in 
his individual is the traditional institution, secondly his role as VGN commander provides 
another type of authority. As he noted, social legitimacy is also critical for his practice. 
Therefore, his role as VGN commander and traditional ruler raises the profile of the VGN 
within his community. 
2.	Mai‐Angwan	Ndaushep	Chenvong	Vongbut	
Then In Langtang North LGA we find the much older, 63 year old Maiangwa Ndaushep 
Chenvong Vongbut, Ward Head of the Nassarawa quarter of Langtang town and chairman 
VGN Langtang North LGA. Vongbut had a contrasting carrier path to Hot; he had no formal 
education, as a young man he had worked on the Lagos docks as a porter with the Nigerian 
Ports Authority returning to Langtang in the late 1970s as he vividly remembers the spectacle 
of Nigeria hosting FESTAC 77718 just a year before he returned home. In the late 1980s, 
Vongbut was selected amongst others to constitute Langtang’s Yanbanga (vanguard) group, 
in response to rising crime waves and shortfall in police personnel and equipment.719 When 
the Vigilante Group of Nigeria was registered in 1999, he emerged as Langtang North 
chairman and was also selected as the Plateau State Deputy Chairman. He works closely in 
collaboration with the Divisional Police Officer in recruiting and training new members of the 
group in the local government. He has attended several courses organised by the National 
body of the organisation, including a course on using firearms.720 For Vongbut the DPO is his 
                                                            
717 Dakachi Hot, Interview by Jimam Lar, Shendam, 10.11.2012 
718 FESTAC 77 is an acronym for the Second Black and African Festival of Arts and Culture. Held in Lagos, Nigeria 
in September 1977 it was organised by UNESCO and under the patronage of the then Nigerian military 
government led by Olusegun Obasanjo. 
719 See previous section of Socialisation from the Police. 
720 Ndaushep Chenvong Vongbut, Interview by Jimam Lar, Langtang 22.10.2012. 
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boss, but also his colleague as they attend local government security meetings together721, he 
is quick to show and display documents and pictures of himself and his men taken over the 
years, during parade drills and attending training courses. This further explains why, even 
when superior police officers at state headquarters frown at the suggestion of the existence of 
a plural policing landscape,722 rather preferring to see the VGN as part of community 
policing. Police officers down the ladder in charge of Divisional Commands at the local 
government level while accepting the opinion of their superiors in theory, in practice however 
embrace the VGN and regard them as partners in the maintenance of law and order. 
The ward heads profiled here are however local leaders, so the next point is to consider is 
what sort of young men do they lead. In contemporary Plateau State what precisely is the 
profile of a vigilante member, profiles of vigilante ‘rank and file’ can equally shed light on 
how the duality of belonging manifest, the following are two examples of vigilante voices, 
specifically outlining their backgrounds. In regards to daily jobs of urban and rural vigilantes 
we find butchers, vulcanisers723, vegetable and grain market porters, Okada or Going 
(commercial motorcycle operators),724 farmers, fishermen, carpenters, secondary school 
students, and as I was told, ‘applicants’725 (the unemployed). 
3.	Joseph	Tsenyen	
Tsenyen as he prefers to be called is one of the vigilante group members in Shendam town, 
one of Hot’s men. Tsenyen is lean but not frail, as the physical demands of working, as a 
porter on market days requires a certain level of muscularity and sturdiness. Formally, he is 
without regular employment, at least he does regard his three days a week job, of loading 
lorries as a part time job. On the first asking, he responds that he is a farmer, in his words the 
carrier of his ancestors. Tsenyen had very little formal education, primary school and 
secondary school up to the junior secondary 3. He was one of the first to be selected and 
trained by the police in the early 2000s, he has also attended state courses organised by local 
NGOs that support the VGN on issues of rights advocacy. For Tsenyen and his colleagues 
they are selected and trained to serve the community, to try to rid it of crime. They narrate of 
a process, which is precisely made to be official. The job of being a vigilante member requires 
                                                            
721 Ibid 
722 Olakpe, COP, Plateau State, interviewed by Jimam Lar. 07.01.2014. 
723 Refers to mechanics who engage in filling air, and repairing tyres for cars and motor bikes. 
724 ‘Okada’ is more widely used in Southern Nigerian cities; in Plateau ‘Going’ is more commonly used. 
725 In an attempt to maintain some level of dignity and amidst the very high rates of unemployment, the 
unemployed would introduce themselves as applicants. This occurs even in cases where the said individual may 
have been without a job for 5 to 10 years. 
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one to go through some particular steps, in other words, one is part of a select group, and this 
point comes out clearly in the following excerpt of Tsenyen describing the selection process: 
JL: How were you selected? Can you briefly recount the process? 
JT: First of all, forms were given to area heads to select the suitable people who can do 
vigilante work. Therefore it is the area head that selected us, we filled the forms and attached 
a passport photograph and submitted the form at the District Office. Then we were invited to 
the DPO’s office, where we were interviewed. 
JL: You were all interviewed? 
JT: Yes, the DPO was present…they wanted to make sure that there is no criminal or ex-
convict among us then they handed us over to the SSS Department (State Security Service). 
After we got clearance from the SSS, then we went to the Local Government Inter-Faith 
committee726. Religious leaders Christian and Muslim advised us on the importance of 
working together as one. You know we have experience religious crisis, but today we work 
together Christians and Muslims. Since then we have been working very well with each other, 
we work together with the police, and the community appreciates our sacrifice. 
4.	Ponbin	Takaduniya		
Ponbin Takaduniya (after wards referred to as PT) hails from Limun village in Bwarat district, 
Langtang North LGA. His odyssey through formal education terminated after primary 
education, and he turned to farming, which he regards as his current occupation. PT is an 
adherent of the Tarok traditional religion, and he has a deity that he worships, accordingly 
there are specific days that he worships the deity, it is a family deity that he inherited from his 
father. PT provides us with an interesting brand of a vigilante member; 44 years old, he has 
been a vigilante for over twenty years. First recruited in the late 1980s, he continued working 
even during the periods when collective vigilante practice ceased.  
I was selected as a vigilante from Limun, my village. Then there was a lot of crime in our 
community and the Chief gave the directive to Moses Vongchak and Katangko to organise 
and select some young men from the different clans to serve as yanbanga (vanguards) in the 
                                                            
726 Having emerged from several episodes of violent sectarian conflict, potential vigilante members are advised 
and counselled by a committee of inter‐faith religious leaders. 
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community. Katangko trained me, he is a retired police officer he trained us in police drills 
and parade, and how to be disciplined and obey the orders of superiors.727 
In the current dispensation, he is one of few who are embedded within police stations. He 
reports to duty every morning at the Reak Police Outpost, Bwarat District, Langtang North 
LGA and takes orders like the regular police officers from the officer in charge of the outpost, 
usually an Inspector. PB is self-kitted in all black attire, looking more like an officer of the 
Nigeria Police Force, and less like his colleagues of the Vigilante Group of Nigeria whose 
uniform is a surprisingly bright pink.728 His weapon of choice is a baton, made of wood and is 
of arm’s length. He also carries handcuffs in his pocket, as he makes the point that “you never 
know when duty calls”.729 He is the reference point for vigilante achievement in Bwarat 
district, traditional rulers praise his good work, and police officers commend him and speak of 
him in glowing terms.730 
5.	Alhaji	Dahiru	Garba	(ASP,	rtd.)			
Current vigilantism in Plateau State is also influenced by the presence of retired police 
officers who have joined vigilante practice after retirement. Amongst such of those we 
encountered is Dahiru Garba, the 68-year-old head of the VGN in Yelwa town, Shendam 
LGA. Yelwa is a market town straddled by a T-junction bringing together routes to Shendam-
Lafia, Ibi in Taraba state, Mabudi-Fajul in Langtang South LGA, and Langtang-Wase. All the 
above-mentioned towns are located within a rich agricultural belt, thus making Yelwa a major 
commercial hub in the lowlands of Plateau State. As a major commercial centre, Yelwa is 
equally diverse as different ethnic groups have over the years settled there. The religious 
geography of the town and its environs is equally diverse, with Christians, Muslims and 
traditional religion adherents. Yelwa (Nshar) is administratively part of Shendam Local 
Government Area. Yelwa gained notoriety for outbreaks of violent sectarian conflict in 2002, 
and twice in 2004 (February and May). Therefore, Alhaji Dahiru presides over a local branch 
of the VGN that has emerged from a period of violence mobilised along sectarian lines. As 
Alhaji Dahiru points out: 
                                                            
727 Ponbin Takaduniya, interview by Jimam Lar, Dadur, 21.10.2012. 
728 When I returned in December 2014, the VGN uniform had been changed to dark brown. 
729 Ponbin Takaduniya, interview by Jimam Lar, Dadur, 21.10.2012.  
730 These points made at a community meeting Dadur town on modalities to revamp vigilantism, in attendance 
were Traditional rulers, Community Elders, Youth Leaders, selected Vigilante Members, and the Police Officer 
in Charge, Reak Police Outpost. 
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Our vigilante group in Yelwa under my leadership was formed in 
2006, to respond to high rates of crime but to also bring about unity 
between Christians and Muslims following very serious violence. 
Working together as Christians and Muslims, we get to understand 
how best to live together. We started with 50 men; today we have 250 
men, 130 Muslims and 120 Christians operating in the different wards 
of Yelwa town and its surroundings. So we are sacrificing not only too 
bring security but also try to unify our communities.731 
 
6. Female	Vigilante(s):	Tokenism	in	Search	of	Institutionalisation	
 
When I set out to study vigilante policing, the assumption i had was that I was going to be 
studying, men – young men to be precise. However, during my fieldwork I came across 
female vigilante members, whom I interviewed.732 I tried to pursue this finding further and 
tried to make sense of the basis of the female vigilante. What informed their membership? 
What was their role in the VGN?  
 
From what I gathered in the field from discussions but also from observation, I would initially 
suggest that the recruitment of female members should be seen as another attempt to 
institutionalise vigilante practice. Prior to the establishment of the VGN in 1999, vigilante 
policing as practiced in the areas I have studied had strictly been a young man’s job. Local 
notions of masculinity, young men defending the community as I have previously argued in 
chapter 5 was dominant in the consciousness of the people. This is as it particularly relates to 
their thinking on the provision of security and the maintenance of order in their community. 
However, the VGN leadership believed that one of the strategies to draw recognition from the 
police and other security agencies was the recruitment of female members. The national 
leader of the VGN, Alhaji Ali Sokoto made this clear to me when I interviewed him in his 
office at Kaduna: 
 
                                                            
731 Alhaji Dahiru Garba, interview by Jimam Lar, Yelwa, Shendam LGA, 15.11.2014. 
732 Kande Bako and Hannatu Moses, Female VGN Members Kaduna, 17.12.2012. I do not have profiles of any 
female VGN members because I did not come across any female members in Plateau state, though I was told 
that there had been and there were plans to recruit women  in 2015. The female members  I talked too were 
from the Kaduna state command. 
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In regards to women members. We have realised that we have to also 
recognise the importance of having women members. There are some 
investigations that require the involvement of women. For example, if 
you have to go into a compound where purdah is observed, as a man 
this can be complicated. Therefore, in such cases we would require 
female members to take over. Also generally, we have to recognise 
that women are part of our society and they can serve the community, 
and help to maintain security. This is very important.733 
 
Not all the members however carry the opinion and views of the national leader. During a 
group interview, I asked the VGN members of Shimankar town on their thoughts on the 
potential recruitment of female members, and the following conversation transpired: 
 
JL: Do you have any female members? 
Res.: No we don’t. 
JL: During recruitment, do women have interest in joining the VGN? 
Res: Yes, but we do not allow them. 
JL: Why don’t you allow them? 
Res: The reason is that most women and girls here prefer to go to school and work in the 
hospitals. A girl who joined the group in the past, unfortunately, her parents discouraged her 
and asked her to leave the group, and she resigned. Women cannot participate in night patrol; 
morally it is even not a good idea. Therefore, for now, the idea does not work, but maybe in 
the future we can reconsider.734 
 
This is the general sentiment. I found the response on the recruitment of female members 
mixed. While the more senior leaders supported the idea, members expressed general 
reservation. This was equally tempered with caveats on different roles and functions for 
female vigilante members. For example as it was stated in the quotation, the night patrol was 
not considered as a function that the female members would engage in. These reservations 
largely agree to what I witnessed in practice while observing patrols. There are given ways of 
which men are expected to behave, and to react to danger. Often on the patrol, one hears a 
patrol leader encouraging a VGN member to ‘act like a man, and not show fear like a 
woman.’ This could be in response or reaction to a dog barking as we passed by a residence. I 
would therefore suggest that we should see the idea of female vigilante members as part of the 
institutionalisation process. The VGN seeks to be similar to the police; they have achieved 
                                                            
733 Alhaji Ali Sokoto, interviewed by Jimam Lar, Kaduna, Nigeria, 17.12.2015. 
734 Group Interview, VGN Shimankar, 15.11.2015. 
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this in varied ways. In the structure of the group, and in their general practice of policing – by 
embracing the paraphernalia of officiousness; uniforms, and identity cards. The recruitments 
of female members for the VGN I would contend are part of a tokenistic strategy to 
institutionalize vigilante policing. The challenges, aspirations, programmes on how to 
improve the participation of women and other groups and segments of society in the provision 
and maintenance of security has been clearly articulated.735 Whether this will be actively 
pursued is however a different subject matter. 
 
 
	
Figure 22: Researcher with Commander General, a National Official and two Female VGN 
Members. National Headquarters, Kaduna, Nigeria. 17.12.2012. 
 
                                                            
735 For more on this see Funmi Olonisakin, and Awino  Okech,  Women and Security Governance in Africa, 
(Pambazuka Press: 2011),  This articulation is found in the practice of the Nigerian government, for example 
the first batch of female cadets recruited to the Nigerian Defence Academy commenced training in September 
2011. 
 251 
 
	
7.7.	Understanding	Vigilante	Identification	and	Belonging	in	Practice	
 
Drawing from Geschiere and Cooper,736 I argue that as part of a policing system the VGN 
strives for belonging, the level or extent to which a social grouping feels and experiences a 
sense of recognition, respect, and importance.737 Belonging as I have outlined in the 
conceptual framework earlier, becomes of interest when we are able to understand its 
function, and how it serves purposes of inclusion and exclusion.738 The preceding profiles 
demonstrate the manifestation of my notion of the duality of belonging on three different 
levels, accordingly this follows from the category of individuals and how they have been 
socialised. On the first level are Vongbut and Hot, holders of traditional positions of authority, 
and custodians of power at the local level, yet doubling as vigilante leaders. Then we have 
Alhaji Dahiru Garba in Yelwa and Yakubu Adamu in Shendam, both retired police officers, 
relied upon by the community for their know how and as former colleagues they are trusted 
by the policemen the vigilantes collaborate with, their participation in vigilante practice 
further entrenches legitimacy to the VGN, this is through the experience of policing they 
bring, this is very important, but as Dakachi Hot notes, they also help the VGN to navigate its 
relationship with the police: 
Sometimes Alhaji Garba comes to see me in Shendam and we go to 
see the DPO together, and the DPO I think has more respect for us, 
Alhaji Aliyu advises us how to engage with the police, but also how to 
gather information on likely criminals and suspects. As I told you, we 
are a very serious organisation, with retired police officers and 
respected people as our members. Some people like to write us off as 
idle people and vagabonds, but that is not true. We take care to select 
our members, not everybody who fills the form is selected, and we 
screen applicants very well. They have to pass the interview with the 
DPO, and we also engaging in training. In Shendam LGA Alhaji 
Garba has been very good for us, very, very good.739  
                                                            
736 Geschiere’s use of belonging delineates functions of inclusion and exclusion. Cooper challenges us to employ 
concepts that are flexible enough to satisfy the requirement of relational constructivist social theory, yet robust 
enough to have purchase on the phenomenon we try to understand. 
737 Higazi and Lar, (2015) “Articulations of Belonging… 
738 Geschiere, Perils of Belonging, 32. In Geschiere’s analysis, this functions within the context of social 
groupings, aptly deployed by Geschiere to understand how identities are mobilised. In our context when non‐
state policing groups aspire to ‘belong’, it is to be included as part of a policing system, but equally to exclude 
particular forms of community policing. 
739 Dakachi Hot, interview Jimam Lar, Shendam, 10.11.2012. 
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The third category is the ‘rank and file’ of the VGN, the ground soldiers, who engage in 
everyday patrol. The likes of Tsenyen in Shendam town, Ponbin in rural Bwarat district 
Langtang North LGA, or the individuals who narrated their experiences in-group interviews 
in Shendam, Shimankar, Yelwa, Pil-Gani and Dadur. Collectively, they are bounded by a 
certain articulation of belonging. For non-state security actors, and particular the 
contemporary manifestation examined in this study (the Vigilante Group of Nigeria) their 
identification as a social grouping engaged in policing practice has a function of inclusion and 
exclusion.  
Vigilante group members seek to exclude on two different levels. Though they are part of a 
policing system, they seek to delineate themselves from the police. There is a conviction 
amongst vigilante members that their social legitimacy is enhanced based on differentiating 
themselves from the police. Secondly, the VGN also strives to see itself as different from 
everyday structures of community policing, rather VGN members insist on their importance 
as a legitimate social grouping with responsibility to secure, protect and punish.  
In his study of mobilisation for security in South African townships in the suburbs of Cape 
Town, Fourchard urges us to consider community policing and vigilantism as two processes 
to be analysed together as mobilisation, the former from the state and the later from 
community members.740 As it relates to the process of mobilisation, particularly the role of the 
state where we find that within the historical trajectory, both community policing initiatives 
and some forms of vigilantism have emerged from a strong top-down dynamic, Fourchard’s 
contention should be considered, more so senior police officers interviewed have rejected the 
idea that vigilantism is distinct from community policing.  
However, in extending Fourchard’s point we observe the practices and listening to 
contemporary experiences of vigilante members, one is convinced to the point of suggesting 
that there are manifestations of vigilante policing where we find clear distinctions with 
community policing, to be sure, the vigilante group members are convinced that this is the 
case. Vigilante members have been socialised to regard themselves as distinct from the police, 
but a constitutive part of a plural policing landscape, and yet still not to be seen as part of 
community policing initiatives.  
                                                            
740 See Laurent Fourchard, “The Politics of Mobilization for Security in South African Townships” in Africa 
Affairs, (first published online August 16, 2011,) doi:10.1093/afraf/adr046, 3. 
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7.8.	Conclusion	
 As the thesis has demonstrated, the Nigerian context has a popular history of vigilante groups 
responding to waves of theft and armed robbery. It is however also clear that since the return 
to civil rule in 1999 vigilantism has further proliferated. My main objective in this chapter has 
been to show how the aforementioned proliferation has unfolded, and what it means for 
policing. I have examined how state and non-state policing actors have interacted, through 
cooperation and negotiation. I argue that this recent manifestation should be seen as the latest 
stage of a process of institutionalising plural policing. What has emerged from this chapter 
reveals that the vigilante groups that emerged from the historical process of 
institutionalisation of plural policing actually support the state and its agencies. Therefore, 
while the Bakassi Boys, the OPC and the Hisbah were emerging on to the scene the VGN was 
being registered, consequently the structures, organisation, and practices of vigilantism were 
being further transformed with the active approval and involvement of the state. I am in 
agreement with arguments that have cautioned us from always concluding that the increasing 
prominence of non-state security actors is an automatic feature of state decline in power and 
authority.741 Therefore, plurality in this context refers to a policing landscape that actually 
bridges the state and non-state divide, particularly at the micro level. Conclusively, on this 
point in terms of the provision of security, and guaranteeing law and order we can no longer 
remain strictly statist. However, in regards to regulation, the capacity of existing institutional 
arrangements to monitor and control the plural policing landscape still raises many questions; 
this is however beyond the contours of this thesis. Equally, questions pertaining to legitimacy, 
effectiveness, equity, and human rights742 will continue to draw vexed discussions and remain 
to be addressed in different plural policing context and policy. 
 
 
                                                            
741 For more on this see Fouchard, “ A New Name for an Old Practice”, Africa…also Rita Abrahamsen and 
Michael C. Williams, Security Beyond the State: Private Security in International Politics, (Cambridge University, 
Press, 2011) 
742 Loader, “Plural Policing”, 324. 
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Chapter	Eight:	Conclusion	
8.1.	Recapitulating	the	Research	Questions	
There is a long intellectual history of studying the police and vigilante practice as separate, 
the police as state (formal) and vigilante groups as non-state (informal).743 My study 
contributes to the work of scholars who have in recent times studied vigilantism as 
constitutive of policing. This is situated within the argument that across the globe, many 
policing systems are plural and when we focus only on the police, a lot of policing practice is 
left out. At the beginning of this thesis, I established the fact that the policing landscape of 
contemporary Nigerian society is plural. At the core of this plurality is the Nigerian Police 
Force. However, as the concept of plurality suggest other actors constitute this plural policing 
system. The Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) represents one of the components of this 
present-day plurality. I have also argued that the VGN and the contemporary plural policing 
landscape should also be understood as the latest manifestation of a historical trajectory of 
plural policing. Therefore, the principal question of my inquiry is: To what extent can we 
account for the history of plural policing in Plateau State Nigeria? In accounting for this 
plurality through the chapters of my thesis, I sought to locate the origins of this plurality, and 
to understand the drivers and catalyst of the transformative dynamics across the decades. The 
question of who constitutes the policing actors was also of interest, I sought to document 
profiles of NAPF officers and members of the VGN. I was fascinated by how the category of 
these policing actors changed over time. I asked the question – to what extent can the 
socialisation of policing actors be accounted for? How have they been socialised? How have 
they responded to changing political and social contexts? My inquiry was also interested in 
the relationships between the police and other policing actors. The research problem is 
therefore not solely about understanding processes of state building, but also about notions 
and understandings of the state, through the lens of institutions of policing from a historical 
perspective. 
Using selected local governments in Plateau State, central Nigeria as case studies my thesis, 
has provided insight on our understanding of policing and plurality, authority and society, 
socialisation and violence, and institutionalisation. To conduct this research I have deployed a 
historical methodology, to specifically account for the origins and changing forms of plural 
policing. To examine the contemporary manifestations of plural policing, selected 
                                                            
743 In a Nigerian context, my Doctoral project is the first extended historical study that attempts to study the 
police and vigilante groups as constitutive components of a plural policing system. 
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ethnographic methods are used to complement the historical method of data collection. I have 
categorised my major findings and core arguments into four main themes, namely: 
institutionalisation: macro and micro dynamics; socialisation, violence and ambivalence; on 
plurality and policing; and authority, society and policing. I finish with a consideration of the 
comparative dynamics that I draw from my major arguments. 
8.2.	Institutionalisation:	Macro	and	Micro	Dynamics	
The theme of institutionalisation relates to how I have situated plural policing within a 
diachronic logic, this is complemented by the extended case method, which has been 
deployed to show the interface between macro and micro dynamics. In specific terms, this 
relates to the exploration of the historical relationships and interactions between the macro 
and micro levels of the state and the practices of its agents across the different epochs. In 
regards to the first epoch, (1945-1969) I have argued that the plural policing system of 
present-day Plateau State Nigeria originates from the colonial government’s indirect rule 
policy that transformed the chieftaincy institutions of the then Plateau Province. I describe 
and analyse a direct historical trajectory to the institutionalisation of paramouncy in the 
chieftaincy institutions of the Plateau Province of Nigeria from the early 1940s to the late 
1950s this culminates with the dismantling of the former Native Authority Police in the late 
1960s. The macro-micro interface of this period studied the dynamics of implementing 
indirect rule. Studying relations between Lagos (the national government), Kaduna (the 
northern regional government), Jos (the provincial government) Shendam (the divisional 
administration) and the various native administration headquarters across the division 
revealed several interesting insights about how the colonial administration operated 
particularly as it concerned the administration of policing at and between the different levels 
of colonial administration. For instance, I have shown how the divisional officers, chiefs, and 
the native authority administration became empowered as the result of the regional 
government’s mistrust and tense relationship with Lagos. The regional northern government 
particularly during the tenure of Palmer, and also with succeeding governors were very 
suspicious of the Nigeria Police Force and feared that they may usurped the powers and 
authority of the traditional rulers at the local level, and by doing so undermine the regional 
government. The consequent impact of this regional policy was the strengthening of the chiefs 
and the NAPF. 
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The second epoch is defined by the 1970s, and became manifest in the 1980s, critical also are 
the years preceding the 1970s. I argue that there were key events at the macro level, which 
had a profound impact on the micro level and thus transformed the history of plural policing. 
A recompilation of the main instance of this interface during this epoch is instructive. In 1966, 
the military took power and terminated Nigeria’s first republic. I show in my thesis how the 
major beneficiaries of the emergence of the military were a fluid coalition of the opposition 
parties during the first republic. These were the opposition leaders whose members, and on 
occasion personally suffered in the hands of the NAPF during the first republic. Therefore, it 
was not a coincidence that a federal military government, with the likes of Chief Obafemi 
Awolowo, Mallam Aminu Kano, Chief Anthony Enahoro, and Joseph Tarka as federal 
commissioners (ministers) disbanded the NAPF, and laid the foundations for striping 
traditional rulers of all constitutional powers over local administration by the mid-1970s. The 
implication of this as I have argued, was that traditional rulers had to devise creative means of 
maintaining local relevance in order to re-assert some semblance of influence and authority. 
Again, this was a direct response to the Nigerian government’s policy in the mid-1970s to 
reform local government. It is within this context that we are to understand the re-emergence 
of plural policing at the local level, only that this time in the form of community vigilante 
groups. The preceding narrative of these epochs (1st, and 2nd) is what my thesis has 
contributed to the literature on the history of plural policing in Nigeria. The concluding part of 
the second epoch however is already well established in the literature on plural policing 
particularly the study of vigilantism. This narrative describes and analyses how the Nigerian 
government at federal and state level following a severe implementation of austerity the 
Structural Adjustment Programme (SAP) in the 1980s as recommended by the Bretton Woods 
institutions mobilised traditional rulers to organise vigilante groups at the local level. I show 
how the policy was initiated and sold at the level of government as a component of 
community policing, at the local level it was merely a continuation of plural policing with the 
blessings and support of the government. Therefore, if there is a major transformative actor in 
this process of institutionalising plural policing it is the chieftaincy institution. The traditional 
rulers therefore constitute mediating agents responsible for causing a diachronic link between 
the phenomenon of the NAPF and contemporary vigilantism.  
I have argued that the third epoch of this process is defined by Nigeria’s return to civil rule in 
1999. In this context I show how the emergence of the VGN as a present-day manifestation of 
plural policing agents, is equally directly and indirectly midwifed by the state. In the thesis, I 
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show this at the macro and micro levels. For instance, my analysis of how the Nigerian 
government’s presidential retreat on security endorsed and supported vigilante practice as a 
compliment to the NPF encouraged the VGN to further collaborate and cooperate with the 
police. Another important point I analyse in the thesis at this macro level is the official 
recognition granted to the VGN by virtue of the group’s registration with Nigeria’s Corporate 
Affairs Commission. At the micro level, I have described the cooperation and collaboration of 
the police and the VGN, this further legitimises VGN policing as part of the policing system. 
The implications of my engagement with this theme of institutionalisation, brings two points 
to the fore. First, it underlines the active involvement of the Nigerian state in the process. 
Secondly, it has provided evidence that contrast with the arguments that have advanced plural 
policing as a function of state failure or weakness. 
8.3.	Socialisation,	Violence	and	Ambivalence		
I have argued in this thesis that in historical and contemporary context violence is constitutive 
of policing practice across Nigeria. This refers to the everyday use of violence by the NAPF, 
and by the vigilante groups that succeeded the NAPF. Furthermore, violence as a tool of 
plural policing is a product of a particular form of policing socialisation. I have also argued 
that the earliest and most profound influence on policing744 has been the influence of the 
Nigerian military. This process of a military socialisation of policing has its origins in 
Nigeria’s war history745. It is very clear that from the NAPF to the VGN, the alternative 
policing structures that have engaged in policing alongside the NPF have absorbed war 
veterans and retired military men, mostly drawn from the rank and file of the Nigerian army 
in quite large numbers. Secondly, Nigeria’s several decades of military rule in the post-
colonial period has equally created a militarised police force. Consequently, the influence of 
the military on plural policing actors has also been midwifed by the socialisation that vigilante 
groups received from the police following the implementation of structural adjustment 
programme. The implication of this is the realisation that the Nigerian military, particularly 
the army has had an instrumental role in the socialisation of groups, and individuals who 
make claim to providing policing services and the maintenance of law and order. The main 
point that emerges therefore is that violent practices of policing actors are adopted and 
imbibed not just from a history of the formation and development of state security institutions, 
but also influenced by wider Nigerian political and social history. As I have previously argued 
                                                            
744 This refers to state police and vigilante alike. 
745 This refers to participation by Nigerian conscripts in the 1st and 2nd world wars, and the Nigerian civil war. 
Over the historical period, a large number of NAPF and vigilante group recruits were drawn from amongst war 
veterans. 
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there is domestication, legitimisation, and an institutionalisation of violence; there is a societal 
acceptance tacit and complacent of the use of violence as part of policing practice. My 
contribution on policing violence adds the specific context of the former Plateau Province and 
the current Plateau State to the existing literature. In all the literature, the NAPF has come in 
for very scathing criticism. As I have also shown this is not in doubt as even the former NAPF 
police officers accept some of these charges levelled against them. For example, Danladi 
Tanglar and Rufai Abubakar for instance did recount the role the NAPF played during the 
first republic. They talked about how the then ruling party in northern Nigeria, the NPC used 
the NAPF to rig elections by providing security while boxes would be stuffed, intimidate the 
opposition candidates by sometimes arresting them on fabricated and flimsy offences, and 
violently brutalise supporters of the opposition party thereby securing electoral victory for the 
ruling party.  
 
My departure from existing literature is however the argument that NAPF brutalisation and 
oppression on behalf of the NAs during the colonial period and on behalf of the NPC during 
the first republic does not tell the whole story. The story of the NAPF is equally a story of 
ambivalence. To what extent is it accurate to argue that the NAPF as an institution of colonial 
policing solely engaged in the oppression and suppression of the people? The fact that the 
evidence that suggest the contrast of this is minimal compared to the dominant narrative, is 
not a reason I would argue, to absolutely ignore it. As a rule, the exception is equally worthy 
of our inquiry. This informs my methodological decision to seek out and interview former 
NAPF officers, not the senior ranking officers, but rather the regular members of the NAPF. I 
have suggested that to understand the phenomenon of the NAPF, and plural policing in 
general we need the analytical category of ambivalence. The realisation that NAPF officers, 
also engaged in ‘proper policing’, also rendered services to their communities, engaged in 
mundane everyday practice of policing and on rare occasions did defy orders of chiefs, when 
they considered this illegal and not in their interest, provides the evidence for these 
arguments. This I argue makes ambivalence a worthy analytical category in our understanding 
of the NAPF. Furthermore, this category is still valid for present day analysis.  
 
It is important to conclusively remind ourselves that, the analysis of this thesis is not 
uninformed of the fact that in several instances, drawing from its colonial history the NPF still 
is perceived and related too by many Nigerians as an institution of the state that oppresses and 
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supresses and should be feared.746 There are cases of the police using excessive force against 
citizens, including extra-judicial killings reported in Nigerian media with such regularity.747 
As my analysis of the vigilante groups of the SAP era and the VGN has clearly demonstrated 
misconduct and unscrupulousness have continued to exist side by side with virtuous, service 
delivery oriented policing. It is a duality that is inherently constitutive of policing practice, 
and the job of the researcher as it were in this case is not to insist on drawing a conclusion that 
constrains us into taking an either or position. Ambiguity, in other words, needs to be defined 
as one of the core concepts of statehood and public authority…the state comes into being as a 
process of negotiation and differentiation.748  
 
Here I would agree with Owen, who in concluding his ethnographic study of the Nigeria 
Police Force points out what he feels is missing from analyses on Nigeria. He argues that 
alongside dysfunction, there is a second viewpoint that when we look in with more rigour and 
effort we realise, that there is:  
 …the functional state whose image fails to make it past the 
dysfunctionalist filter applied to Nigeria by those who focus 
exclusively on collapse, conflict, injustice and abjection. This 
miscarriage is not only the function of an orientalising gaze: Nigerians 
too love to lament the everyday horrors, failures and injustices 
produced by the system. But to allow ourselves to be carried away by 
that is to misunderstand the nature of what we are looking at, …when 
we reach a little way inside the state, we can find both oppression and 
working understandings, corruption and professionalism, domination 
and interpenetration, rational institutionality and copious 
informalisation, authority and negotiation. Even the opportunities for 
abusing such a system are embedded in its performance of its role; 
dysfunction and function are fully intertwined.749 
 
While policing by force has continued to be a constitutive feature of policing practice, 
particularly the practice of the VGN that I observed while conducting this study I have 
equally shown within my thesis how they have also imbibed civil practices. This has been 
informed by their quest for social legitimacy and longevity of practice. VGN members for 
instance are aware that the Nigerian state through the police still reserves the right and might 
to proscribe and dismantle vigilante practice, as was the case albeit for a brief period in some 
parts of Plateau State in the 1990s. In understanding how citizens encounter the state we also 
                                                            
746 Olonisakin, Ikpe, and Badong, The Future of Security and Justice for the Poor, 10.  
747 It should be noted of course that this is by no means strictly a Nigerian problem, as recent events in the 
United States have shown a manifestation of police brutality on citizens, with several fatal cases. 
748 Poppe, “The Power of the uniform”, 31. 
749 Owen, The Nigerian Police Force: an institutional ethnography, 357. 
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understand how the state works. In contrast to the state that produces, abjection is the state 
that actually delivers, the state that works. This is informed by the understanding of 
constituted practices of the state bureaucracy and practices of bureaucrats.750 For instance we 
may understand how the police and vigilante members (as bureaucrats) deal with the laws 
they are governed by.751 We are able to understand how officials negotiate formal rules. As a 
Divisional Police Officer in one of the local governments within my study area noted – “We 
have policing as law and policing as practice. If you want to talk about policing in the law and 
rulebooks, you go talk to my Commissioner. However if you want to talk about policing as 
practice, then I can help you.”752 In other words, state practice is not strictly, what obtains in 
the legal frameworks, it is equally the practices that individual actors engage with on a daily 
basis. Within a given social context, state-practice is conceived as a back and forth mediated 
negotiation.  
8.4.	On	Plurality	and	Policing	
 I have examined the transformation of plural policing by focusing on micro narratives. In my 
exploration of plural policing it did emerge quite early that the best place to understand the 
relations between the police and other policing actors is at the local level. My approach has 
been to understand policing practice from the lens of those who actually deliver it, in this case 
the NAPF and vigilante groups. On one hand, this means understanding the practice of the 
NAPF and vigilante groups as it relates to plural policing during British colonial rule, when 
the NAPF were active and the period from the late 1970s to the 1990s, which tracks the 
emergence and acceptance of vigilante groups as part of the policing landscape. Another 
component of this micro narrative approach is the insight gained from our understanding of 
the relationship between the NAPF/vigilante groups and the Nigerian Police Force. Relying 
on profiles generated from biographic interviews I have attempted to present a history of 
plural policing. This is in contrast to some existing literature,753 where the focus of study 
remains at the macro level. There is not one can contribute to the understanding of 
phenomenon, when the researcher does not talk to those involved. Methodological, I have 
proven yet again the viability and usefulness of oral testimony to the writing of history. To 
strictly rely on secondary material in the study of a phenomenon like policing the practice of 
which operates crucially at the local level, and further down to the individual, is to not 
                                                            
750 Bierschenk and Olivier De Sardan, States at Work…  
751 Marenin, Otwin. “Policing Nigeria: Control and Autonomy in the Exercise of Coercion.” African Studies 
Review, Vol.28, No.1, 1985: 76‐7876. 
752 Interview DPO Shendam, LGA, 10.10.2012. 
753 See for example Ahire, Imperial Policing... 
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understand the dynamics that drive policing in its plurality. My core point here is that macro 
analysis of policing while important in presenting and understanding grand trends ultimately 
provides a partial and insufficient analysis of what transpired, particularly at the local level. 
Therefore, to have a complete picture and understanding of the major processes (themes) at 
play, Institutionalisation, Plurality, Socialisation, and the changing dynamics around the 
functioning of Authority – the micro narrative is critical. This is by no means discounting 
macro dynamics, as I have shown in chapter five of the thesis, the macro level is important, 
but the picture is only complete when we extend the analysis to the micro narrative. Analysis 
that focuses on macro dynamics, I would suggest are not necessarily wrong, they are simply 
incomplete.  
 
As I noted in the methodological section on scope and periodization, across the historical 
period studied 1945-2015 three definitive epochs can be delineated: 1945-1969, 1980-1990, 
1999-2015. The first epoch captures the plural policing landscape that is constituted by the 
Nigerian police force and the NAPF. The second epoch is constituted by the NPF and 
community based vigilante groups. The third epoch as I have studied it focuses on the NPF 
and the VGN. There are comparative similarities and differences we can draw from these 
three epochs. A clear similarity is the role of traditional rulers as a constant authority is the 
process of supervision and oversight of the policing actors, off course specifically referring 
here to the NAPF, community vigilante groups, and the VGN. I have shown however, how 
the role of the traditional rulers has also changed. Traditional rulers were the fulcrum of 
native authority administration from 1945-1969, the local mobilising agents for community 
vigilante policing during the SAP era, and the responsibility of recommending and vetting 
recruits in the present-day VGN. Furthermore, traditional rulers have remained a key factor in 
the trajectory of plural policing. However, while the NAPF had a more coherent authority and 
were mainly answerable to the chiefs and emirs, the community vigilante groups and the 
VGN are answerable to multiple authorities the chief, local government officials and the local 
divisional police all make claim to being the authority that supervise VGN practice in the 
local government area. The organisation and structure has also varied across the historical 
period of study. The NAPF and the community vigilante groups were mainly community 
based. The NAPF restricted their policing work within the jurisdiction of the Native 
Authority, and the community vigilante groups were limited to their immediate community. 
The VGN in attempt to be part of the broader policing system emerged with an organogram 
that has a vertical hierarchy from the commander general, based in Kaduna down to the state 
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and local government. While the VGN may not have the same command and control in police 
practice, they do make effort to show a semblance of structure and organisation.  
8.5.	Authority,	Society	and	Policing	
When an institution authorises, sanctions or validates certain rights, 
the respect or observance of these rights by people, powerful in clout 
or numbers, simultaneously constitutes recognition of the authority of 
that particular institution.754 
It is on this basic, yet important premise that I have understood and deployed the notion of 
authority. Embedded in this conception is the communicative form of command and 
obedience, particularly within a context where having a plurality of policing actors, does 
suggest a plurality of authorities. The question was to understand how agents of plural 
policing have managed to acquire such authority, and on what basis do people accept such an 
authority. I have argued that the logic of this pluralism of authority is best captured in the 
relationship between the VGN and the police on one hand, and the VGN and their 
communities on the other. The VGN members are legitimated by practices that are in some 
cases emblematic, but also prominently explicit. The VGN therefore constitute a policing 
authority. Therefore, the discussion in the thesis on the VGN’s legitimacy does not just follow 
how they act; also important is the understanding of how they are governed. As I have noted 
previously, Vigilante oversight in the contemporary context reveals how different forms, 
multiple authorities, govern them. I have shown in the thesis how traditional rulers, local 
government officials and the police are all involved in the business of contemporary vigilante 
oversight.  
Through the lens of the VGN, I have examined how state and non-state policing actors have 
interacted, through cooperation and negotiation, I returned to my earlier arguments and show 
the contemporary manifestation should be seen as the latest stage of a process of 
institutionalising plural policing. Again, in regards to linking the forgone analysis to the micro 
level plurality, my main point is a departure from arguments where vigilante groups are 
shown to reject the politico-legal authority of the state.755 At the point of their formation and 
initial stages of evolving we may have observed a dynamic that suggest how vigilante groups 
simultaneously reinforce and weaken different dimensions of statehood. When we however 
study vigilantism over a historical period, we also realise that institutionalisation of plural 
                                                            
754 Lund, Twilight Institutions, 3. 
755 Harnischfeger, “Ethnicity, Religion and the Failure of Common Law”, 51‐78. 
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policing creates scenarios where the cooperative dynamic of the relationship between the state 
and non-state policing actors is more dominant, and less competitive.756  
We also notice how the relationship between the state and plural policing formations is 
politicised. This dynamics can be drawn from historical epochs studied but also observed in 
contemporary politics. In chapter seven, I showed how the immediate outgone government of 
Jonah Jang sought to engage the VGN in Plateau State through the lens of ‘identity politics.’ 
The administration of governor Jang did not just decline to support the VGN more damaging 
the administration actively pursued a programme of factionalising the VGN. Comparatively, 
the thesis shows how the politicisation of plural policing is not new. The role which the 
NAPF played during the first republic, specifically its functioning as a tool of the 
administration to supress opposition groups can be used here as an instructive instance.  
8.6.	On	a	Comparative	Note	
What broader implications do these arguments have for the wider concerns and 
comprehension of this thesis? I would suggest that they should be read as logical outcomes 
produced by a history of socialisation, and institutionalisation and have been midwifed by 
interaction and relationships characterised by violence, plurality and authority. The 
implications of this are first on a conceptual level. I would also suggest that they offer us 
insights into the understanding of the state and its everyday operations. They provide a new 
perspective into our understanding of vigilantism, and on a more general note plural policing 
in Nigeria. They also provide us with a platform for a comparative understanding of 
vigilantism in a local Nigerian context and as a global phenomenon. This point on 
comparison, as it relates to the specific phenomenon of vigilantism, needs further 
extrapolation. In regards to comparison within the Nigeria context, I specifically refer to how 
my study compares with the existing literature. In the literature review, preceding the 
conceptual framework I was interested in comparison in regards to questions, approach, and 
arguments of specific scholars. My point in this concluding chapter however, is the extent to 
which my study constitutes a departure from some studies on policing, vigilantism, and our 
understandings of the Nigerian state.  
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According to Bierschenk and Oliver De Sardin,757 to understand the workings of the state we 
need to study not just the apparatus of state, and the policies of the bureaucracy but also the 
practices of the bureaucrat. In this sense we see what the colonial policy was, and to be sure 
colonial policy therefore was often not what came from London; rather it was what the 
bureaucrat deemed best for his administering of the colony. This was the case with Lugard, 
Cameron, and Palmer.  
Furthermore, it was not limited to the Governor General, it also applied to the Residents in 
charge of the Provinces and the District Officers at the divisional level. This process 
continued after independence as the bureaucrats who inherited state power continued to 
impact on the processes and trajectories of local administration. This study has also added the 
interesting dynamic of bureaucratic rivalries and how this influenced the historical process. 
The colonial administration in the colony was a government made of a collection of 
individuals and groups at different levels, all with their varying interests and preferences, and 
sometimes these collided and clashed. Fred Cooper, drawing from his studies of colonial West 
Africa, asserts “…colonial elites did not always agree on which direction they should lean. 
Among colonizing elites – even if they shared a conviction of superiority – tensions often 
erupted between those who wanted to save souls or civilize natives and those who saw the 
colonized as objects to be used and discarded at will.”758 In our case I have shown how there 
were colonial officers who preferred to have the NPF in charge and having oversight 
functions to all other forms of policing, including the NAPF. In contrast, I have also discussed 
other colonial officers who preferred to leave all forms of local policing to the emirs and 
chiefs. In sum, we find colonial officers who were convinced that the only way to entrench 
indirect rule at the local level was from above, and those who preferred to use any semblance 
of local authority, allowing the chiefs to institute colonial rule and exercise power from 
below. 
Now returning to the reasons of establishing NA police, Tamuno has argued that the NA 
police were established in order to have “better police forces to assist in the maintenance of 
law and order, the preservation of public safety and the prevention, detection and punishment 
of crime.”759 In other words, the rise of crime and public disorder, characterised by waves of 
political instability, constituted the core thrust and the primary purpose for expanding policing 
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practice. Ahire in a critique of Tamuno draws our attention rather to the objectives of 
supplementing various colonial police forces and constabularies in buttressing colonial 
authority.760 Furthermore, according to Ahire, the NA police “…did not and could not 
maintain public safety, given their human and material inadequacies. Instead they performed 
duties which enabled the colonial authority to penetrate the remotest corners of the colonial 
social formation.”761 I agree with Ahire that the NA police were established primarily as a 
response to insufficient numbers of colonial police officers and the colonial state required an 
initiative to complement the existing policing structures, all in a quest to extend colonial 
authority to all nooks and crannies of the Provinces. Concerning Ahire’s critique of Tamuno’s 
explanation, I would contend that this arises because Tamuno does not critically treat what is 
actually meant by ‘maintaining law and order’ or the kinds of ‘crime’ the NA police were 
expected to ‘prevent, and detect,’ and ‘punish’. If we understand the breaking of law and 
order as subverting the smooth running of the colonial state, protesting against or refusing to 
pay tax – actions that undermined the authority of the colonial state, then Tamuno’s argument 
would be convincing. Mbaku and Kimenyi take the point further where he argued “In order to 
assign the colonial police the role of crime fighter, one would have to reclassify resistance to 
domination, subjugation, and exploitation as a crime. Only in this context can one view the 
colonial police force as a crime fighting entity.”762 This is however not problematised in 
Tamuno’s analysis. Here we are therefore left with a given reading of crime. To suggest that 
the reality, or for certain that the colonial state, its laws, and the agents of state were put in 
place for the service of the colonial peoples is to disregard what we already know.763 Again, 
in reference to Mamdani’s notion of ‘decentralised despotism’, the NA police were 
established to validate the authority of chiefs and emirs, a tool for enforcing their rule. 
Rotimi764 has elaborated on this, making the point that the NA police were established to 
among other things serve as symbols of the authority of their employers, particularly in areas 
like the Plateau Province where the NA system was a major modification of the pre-existing 
political structure. The fact is surely that the police did different things. Yes, they upheld the 
authority of chiefs, emirs, and colonial officers, even where these were unjust, but that does 
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not mean they would not investigate murder, theft, and other crimes that broke the colonial 
laws that had been put in place.  
Turning to literature on the history of policing, I start with Ahire’s argument. I contend that he 
relies too much on the policy and the structure as his basis of analysing the practice of the 
institution. While I find concurrence in his analyses of the colonial objectives of establishing 
the NA police, his dismissal of the potential and capacity of the NA police to provide policing 
services for the people because of their “human and material inadequacies” does a grave 
injustice to the careers of former NA police like Danladi Tanglar and Mallam Rufai. 
According to Ahire, “in colonial Nigeria, police recourse to legal procedures did not earn 
them the image of an impartial and professional force. In the first place, state law was foreign, 
illegitimate and antagonistic to indigenous laws and customs,”765 therefore, police work could 
not be legitimised by it. While I recognise this dynamic, and I document it in my thesis, I 
argue that seeing policing only in this logic does not account for dynamics that are more 
ambiguous. Here I am not in total agreement with Ahire. We understand the police’s core 
responsibility not only as articulated in the law but also as experienced in the practice of 
policing. I agree that colonial law as it was articulated had objectives of keeping the people in 
line; to supress all forms of civil unrest - in other words, to protect the state from the people. 
If the civil public suffers from a crisis of acceptance, it is there to be taken from but not to be 
given too. The police as an institution of this civil public are seen as an institution to avoid, 
and it does not belong to the people. The origins of its foundation and the experience of its 
practice have unquestionably led to a culture of distrust by the people. This creates 
employment and police officers without policing, coercion and force without legitimacy. 
However, policing practice was not restricted to the laws of colonial oppression and 
suppression. What is revealed with an extensive study of the micro processes of plural 
policing is practice that is characterised by several interpretations. This complication and 
ambivalence are lacking in studies of policing like Tamuno and Ahire’s. Almost straddling 
two extremes, with Tamuno all interpretations are conservatively administratively understood 
and Ahire on the other hand with a hard-hitting Marxist radical lens.766 In other words, as 
negative as the image of the police is, it is yet difficult to imagine Nigerian society without 
the police. As much as they are the harbingers of trouble and ‘palaver’, they are also 
responsible for a semblance of stability in large parts of the country.  
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It is thus misleading to disregard or dismiss the NAPF. The forgone analysis and narratives 
show that they were taken quite seriously. Tanglar and Rufai’s careers in the NAPF buttress 
my argument that the NPF men were more than security appendages of the local chiefs, 
blindly serving colonial interest. This is what is gained when such institutions are studied 
from micro perspectives. The policies and governmental directives that established this 
institution were without doubt coercive. There is no doubt that such objectives considered the 
security of the colonial state and processes to maximise the economic potential of the colony 
above all else. It is, however, inadequate and erroneous to suggest this and leave the argument 
at that, particularly with the accounts and understandings unearthed about the interface 
between macro and micro processes. Marenin767 situates police practice in Nigeria within an 
instrumentalist lens – as a tool for the protection of the state, its agents and their interest. This 
is more convincing and provides a more nuanced take in contrast to Ahire. Marenin’s main 
point is in recognising that the police as individuals and as a collective, while in the 
employment of the state and executing the directives of state agents also harbour their own 
interests and the required agency to pursue these interests. Accordingly, Marenin argues that: 
Class power and class rule may be visualized as chain of control 
linking the ruling class (and its factions) to the state, to the agency and 
to the personnel who ultimately carry out decisions. Only if state 
agency and personnel transmit ruling class preferences into policy 
without distortion that is without inserting their own interest only if 
the state and its agents are neutral is policy implemented in the 
interests of the ruling class. Policy outcomes reflect the tension 
between control (the capacity of the ruling class to shape actions to its 
desires) and autonomy (the capacity of the state and its agents to resist 
control in order to promote their own interests.)…the police are a tool 
for class rule, yet they are also actors in their own rights and 
interest.768  
Ahire seems to have examined an institution that lasted for more than four decades with a lens 
that strictly focused on macro dynamics. It is interesting to realise that he did not talk to any 
former NA police officers or individuals who lived and experienced NA policing in forming 
his opinions on the institution. His analysis therefore is deprived of the revealing empirical 
details that help to inform this study and other studies.769 Of particular note is Rotimi’s work 
on the NA and LG police in the then northern and southwestern Nigeria. Rotimi gives a 
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balanced analysis,770 as he does not just emphasise the failings of the NA police. Relying on 
personal interviews and revealing archival documents, he profiles and discusses individual 
cases from the Sokoto, Borno, and Kano NAPF in the north and the LG police of Ibadan 
Province in the southwest771 and shows how the NA police did achieve some measure of 
success in crime control. In sum, the NA police were indeed used by politicians and there 
were several cases of the NA police themselves committing crimes,772 but they rose to the 
task on occasion and did provide policing services to the people. As Marenin, again, aptly 
notes “…the police may deliver services people need in times of duress or emergency and 
provide the sense of security and predictability necessary for them to engage in routine 
behaviour. Yet the police may also be the repressive organ of state rule, the means by which 
the lives and safety of citizens are placed at the mercy of anonymous, bureaucratic, and 
personalistic discretion.”773 
The institution of NA policing went through different stages and processes, and over time the 
composition of membership changed, as did its structure, functions, and practice. The 
institution was not static, as is clear from the above profiles of NA police officers. This is not 
to claim that there was a linear progression or that the NAPF continued to improve in its 
workings and got better at it. Kemi Rotimi774 has showed in convincing detail how politicians 
in Nigeria’s First Republic used the NA police to harass and intimidate their opponents. On 
this point, he concludes that:  
 …the ruling elite used the NA police as a leverage to maintain a 
fragile political power. It was possible to enlist the support of the NA 
police because the operational control of the forces constrained their 
ability to resist misuse; also because some among the police were 
corrupt, ambitious and opportunistic. The actions of the police were 
unpopular and when the opportunity came, the people unleashed their 
wrath on them as agents of governments that they detested.775 
The former NA police accept this point argued by Rotimi. They were honest to admit that 
they were used by the politicians to harass political opponents and do the bidding of the ruling 
party. However, as I recounted in his profile, Danladi Tanglar though also talks of the 
exceptional cases where NA police rejected the orders of the chiefs. The improvements 
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experienced in the workings of the NA police in the Plateau Province in the 1950s was 
specifically connected to the enrolment of Middle school graduates as Danladi Tanglar776, Ali 
Dakshang777, and Benjamin Voncir778 emphasised. Another important development at the 
time as I have argued in chapter five was the people’s acceptance of paramouncy following 
the Macpherson initiative that recognised minority groups rather than assembling groups into 
federated NAs as was the case with previous policies.779  
I outlined how my work complements in some cases and disputes existing literature on 
vigilantism in Nigeria. My thesis is the first to study the VGN on such a scale. Some of the 
earlier studies on the Bakassi Boys, the Oodu’a People’s Congress (OPC), and the Hisbah 
(Sharia Police) had at their core, examples of vigilantism that is driven and situated within the 
social formation of identity. Another popular theme was the conception that understood 
vigilantism in the logic of contesting the authority of the state.  
Again Peter Ekeh’s formulation of ‘the two publics’ is instructive. Ekeh delineates the civic 
and the primordial publics and identified the enduring unease between loyalty to ethnic group 
and loyalty to the Nigerian state.780 The logic for the mobilisation into the VGN is beyond the 
identity logic of mobilisation we find in other forms of vigilantism in post 1999 Nigeria. 
Mobilisation in these cases is expressed through religion and ethnicity, as is the case with 
Murray Last781 and Adamu782 on the Hisba in Kano, and Fourchard783 and Akinleye784 on the 
Oodua People’s Congress (OPC) found in southwestern Nigeria. Secondly, and in line with 
one of my core arguments; the VGN which emerged from the historical process of 
institutionalisation of plural policing actually supports the state and its agencies, they are not 
resisting the state’s authority, they do not articulate their practice as a form of protest or 
resistance. Therefore, while the Bakassi Boys, the OPC and the Hisbah were emerging on to 
the scene the VGN was being registered, consequently the structures, organisation, and 
practices of vigilantism were being further transformed with the active approval and 
involvement of the state. I am in agreement with arguments that have cautioned us from 
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always concluding that the increasing prominence of non-state security actors is an automatic 
feature of state decline in power and authority.785 
 
What has emerged from my study reveals that the vigilante group I have studied (the VGN) 
does not comply with the dynamics of ethnic and religious category as the basis or the logic of 
its mobilisation. While it may be pointed out that, the formation, and its current leadership in 
most of northern Nigeria is converged around a Hausa group dynamic, its membership is 
diverse and does represent the larger heterogeneity of society. Vigilante group members 
emerge as a social grouping because of their shared experience, where we establish that 
several VGN members have a common background. There is a commonality that emerges 
because of shared attributes, these common attributes were made clear when we analysed the 
profiles of a considerable number of vigilante members as a collective. Before joining the 
VGN these are young men who fall into a category that Pratten has described as having 
experienced the “rugged life.”786 This brings in a second dimension, where we establish how 
vigilante membership is constituted by societal rejects who find redemption in being members 
of the VGN. The VGN provides an ostensible entry point to society, the recognition as 
respected and recognised members of the community. Here we refer to notions of the political 
economy of vigilantism as a form of socialisation. I presented individual cases where 
traditional local leaders also double as chairmen of local government vigilante groups. 
Vigilantism is another means of earning a livelihood, membership bestows status and respect, 
and it provides protection.  
 
What also emerges and resonates from these practices is how vigilantism functions in helping 
us understand the creation and monitoring of, for lack of a better word ‘policing’ group 
boundaries. Vigilante socialisation as I demonstrate in chapter six, speaks to the very idea of 
identity creation ‘identification’ and the more active dynamic of belonging, it creates actual 
and potential visions of an ‘us’ and ‘them’ logic. Then there is connectedness, understood as 
the relational tie that links individual vigilante members through their everyday practice. For 
the members of the VGN, they constitute a critical component of the policing system, distinct 
from general forms of community policing. These boundaries could be either socio-cultural or 
even political, ranging from the sectarian - ethnic, religious and community or moral – good 
people and bad people, criminals and non-criminals. Under underlying functions of 
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belonging, which I find, quite illuminating from my observation is the fact that despite all 
these boundaries, actual and imagined, we are still largely dealing with youth policing 
youth.787 The further question that does not necessarily fall into my consideration is to what 
extent we can draw more from studying vigilantism in regards to generational shifts and 
conflicts and the study of inequality. 
My second comparative point relates to a more general comment on vigilantism as a global 
phenomenon. This relates to what we can learn on a general comparative level. These are 
insights that have meaning across cultural, national, and historical boundaries. I have related 
my thesis to global debates on vigilantism and policing. There are two points I have engaged. 
Firstly, the arguments that suggest that contemporary cases of vigilantism in Africa are solely 
a manifestation of ‘state failure’, and the arguments where vigilante groups reject the politico-
legal authority of the state. These I argue fail to recognise the role that the state is already 
playing in sanctioning and legitimating non-state actors for the public good. Secondly, it is 
also important to consider cases of flawed comparison. Here, I refer to instances where even 
when scholars attempt to provide global comparisons (north south), the basis of such are 
flawed. An example is analyses that compare contemporary African cases with 19th and early 
20th century American vigilantism. I argue that when we attempt comparative studies, the 
temporalities of our comparative contexts are as important as the geographic spread. The 
objective overall consists of resisting the temptation to argue for an African exception, this 
means I attempts to draw comparative conclusions that situate contemporary vigilantism in 
Nigeria as a reference point for understanding emerging global dynamics.  
With every case study, our understanding is first based on a particular context. In every 
context, there are specific factors responsible for the emergence and development of vigilante 
policing. Some are historical, others more recent and contemporary. In my case, the historical 
phenomenon is the transformation of the chieftaincy institution, its emergence during colonial 
rule as the custodians of native authority rule and it is dismantling during the early decades of 
post-colonial Nigeria. All of this contributed directly to the institutionalisation of vigilantism 
and plural policing in Plateau State. Therefore, every context will have its own specific 
factors, structures and dynamics. Nevertheless, it is also important to note that the 
manifestation of vigilant policing is not restricted to Plateau State, not particular to Nigeria, 
and not essentially an African phenomenon. This is a global phenomenon that manifest in 
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varied context. Our task, challenge is to understand the varied socio-political dynamics that 
have led to the emergence of this practice in context as varied as Jos, and Kano, Nigeria; in 
Ghana and Tanzania; in the United States of America, Northern Ireland and in Russia. I would 
argue that a framework of questions as an entry point should guide such an approach. Whom 
are the vigilantes operating in the given context? What do they do? How long have they been 
doing it? What is their relationship with the state (the police)? Bierschenk and Olivier De 
Sardan capture the essence of this point; to render this clearly I quote them at length. They 
note that:  
…the investigation of African and non-African forms of state-hood 
using the same analytical concepts and the same methods enables 
interesting comparisons. Certain forms of behaviour in the context of 
the state that are less pronounced in Europe, (and North America) and 
hence barely discernible, assume such proportions in Africa that they 
could not, as it were, escape the attention of either citizens or 
researchers…Hence it is relatively easier for a researcher to access 
them in Africa. They are also present in Europe (and North America) 
of course, but much better hidden or disguised.788  
Such approach is a much-needed departure from Africanist scholarship that has seemed to be 
essentialist in its understanding of the complications and contradictions of statehood in Africa. 
In the same vein, Neubert in underlining the importance of a north-south comparative 
approach in fact nine years earlier than Bierschenk and De Sardan made the case in quite 
convincing terms. According to Neubert,  
Most studies on Africa or other countries of the South are produced 
and read against the background of the industrialized countries. The 
problem is the missing transparency of what is being compared. In 
many cases, the industrialized countries are represented by an 
idealized image of themselves. It is surprising how little many 
Africanist know about poverty, change, political structures in the 
industrialized countries and the differences among these. We rarely 
find studies that pursue the same research questions in Africa and in 
an industrialized country. This non-transparent comparison between 
African reality and idealized North will always be biased against 
Africa.789  
It can be argued that a comparative analysis of vigilante policing of context in Africa and 
Europe or America may shed light on several questions. As I have outlined in my framework 
of questions the necessary requirement to attempt such a comparison is the revealed fact that 
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the phenomenon does exist in these varying context. Therefore framing vigilante policing as a 
manifestation of failed states, or failed policing may describe a particular context, but it does 
not add to our objective to comment on the phenomenon on a global comparative context. 
8.7.	Implications	for	Security	Sector	Reform	and	Governance	(SSRG)	
Given that vigilante groups are constitutive of the policing landscape in Nigeria it is therefore 
imperative to reassess the focus of all SSRG strategies as it relates to policing and vigilante 
practice. There are two SSRG measures in regards to the police. First, a coherent SSRG 
policy that incorporates vigilante groups, and Secondly, stakeholders (the police, local 
governments, traditional rulers) as I have previously shown in chapters 6 and 7, are 
collaborating in formulating and implementing oversight processes for supervising vigilante 
group practice.  
There is a need to further shift the mind-set on how we conceptualise the security and justice 
sector, non-state security and justice actors need to be incorporated in all security sector 
reform strategies. It is important to have practical guidelines on why, when and how to engage 
with non-state security and justice actors. In order for vigilante groups to continue to function 
alongside state security institutions within a context of accountability and transparency, there 
is a place for clear-cut rules and regulations guiding their activities. A start would be to 
require all vigilante groups to register with relevant national and local authorities. The 
Vigilante Group of Nigeria (VGN) is a good example of a vigilant group with state 
authorisation operating within a legal framework. The main objective of the VGN as I 
previously stated is to support state agencies (particularly the Nigerian Police) in combating 
crime and general maintenance of law and order in society. In order to ensure that vigilante 
groups operate within legal frameworks, respect human rights values, and other obligations, it 
is necessary to establish processes of monitoring and supervision. In other words, clear 
implementation and oversight processes must accompany legal frameworks regulating 
vigilante practice. In this sense the practice of licensing regimes for vigilante groups with 
provisions to renew such licenses periodically (annually) provided they meet certain 
requirements and minimum standards, becomes an interesting option to explore. Oversight 
mechanisms can be through traditional rulers, local government, local police, local civil 
society organisations, or the state government/Province.790 It is possible to improve the 
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effectiveness and accountability of vigilante groups with oversight, supervision and close 
monitoring. These are processes that go beyond legal frameworks; oversight mechanisms 
seeks to regulate practice and make sure vigilante groups are positively contributing to 
maintaining law and order, and ensuring the security of citizens and communities. 
Instituting national, and local legal frameworks to guide and regulate the activities of 
traditional and customary leaders can have a major role in deepening accountability and 
making the activities of such institutions more transparent. The role of traditional rulers in 
local governance has been greatly curbed by the Nigerian government yet traditional rulers 
still enjoy varying levels of influence. The basis on which security law and order was defined 
and provided at the creation of the Nigerian state has changed. In recognising this 
transformative process, Olonisakin observes that we can find this change in how new and 
emerging voices have been influencing the security discourse and practice.791 The form and 
structure of such groups varies from one community to another. It could be women 
organisations, NGOs, traditional rulers, vigilante groups and community development 
associations. 
Conclusively, and returning to the Nigerian context in terms of the provision of security, and 
guaranteeing law and order, we can no longer remain strictly statist and non-statist. Plural 
policing is a phenomenon that is strikingly characterised by ambivalence. The recent active 
involvement of vigilante groups and hunter associations in the fight against insurgency in 
northeast Nigeria has created new dynamics of socialisation, institutionalisation and 
legitimation of plural policing. However, in regards to regulation, the capacity of existing 
institutional arrangements to monitor and control the plural policing landscape still raises 
many questions; this is however beyond the contours of this thesis. Equally, questions 
pertaining to legitimacy, effectiveness, equity, and human rights792 will continue to draw 
vexed discussions and research.  
 
                                                                                                                                                                                         
to  that  effect  providing  for  its  funding,  operations  and  relationship  with  the  police.  The  group  however, 
eventually got out of hand and had to be proscribed by the Nigerian government. 
 
791 Funmi Olonisakin, “Evolving Narratives of Security Governance in Africa”, in Women and Security 
Governance in Africa, Funmi Olonisakin and Awino Okech, eds., (Pambazuka Press, 2011). 
792Loader, “Plural Policing and Democratic Governance” 324. 
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